BROWN v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 11/14/2011. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, :
:
Defendant.
:
:
KENDRA BROWN,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3123 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

THE PLAINTIFF, who is pro se, applies for in-forma-pauperis
relief under 28 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1915 (“Application”).
entry no. 1, Appl.)

(Dkt.

This Court, based upon the plaintiff’s

financial situation, will (1) grant the Application, and (2) deem
the Complaint to be filed.

The Court may now (1) review the

Complaint, and (2) dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The Court will

dismiss the Complaint, as it is frivolous and fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.
THE PLAINTIFF brings this action (“Federal Action”) pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her constitutional
rights in a dispute over a mortgage on her property (“Mortgaged
Property”).

(See dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.)

The Court is able to

discern that (1) a foreclosure action concerning the Mortgaged
Property was instituted in New Jersey Superior Court (“State

Foreclosure Action”), and (2) a judgment was entered therein.
(See id. at 1.)1
THE PLAINTIFF is attempting to avoid an order in the State
Foreclosure Action.

The proper way to do so is to seek review

through the state appellate process, and then seek certiorari
directly to the United States Supreme Court.

See D.C. Ct. of

Apps. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923).
THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE prohibits adjudication of an
action where the relief requested would require a federal court
to either determine whether a state court’s decision is wrong or
void that decision, and thus would prevent a state court from
enforcing its orders.

See McAllister v. Allegheny Cnty. Fam.

Div., 128 Fed.Appx. 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005).

This Court cannot

directly or indirectly review, negate, void, or provide relief
that would invalidate a decision in the State Foreclosure Action.
See Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 Fed.Appx. 149,
152-53 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming judgment dismissing claims
concerning state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because plaintiff sought redress from
state court judgment); Ayres-Fountain v. E. Sav. Bank, 153

1

The plaintiff also has brought an action to recover
damages for violations of her constitutional rights in a dispute
over a mortgage on a different piece of property. See Brown v.
U.S. Bank National Association, No. 11-3127 (D.N.J.).
2

Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2005) (instructing district court to
dismiss complaint concerning state foreclosure action under
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also El Ali v. Litton Loan Serv’g,
217 Fed.Appx. 115, 116 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (dismissing appeal from
order that dismissed claims concerning foreclosure action, inter
alia, as barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Shih-Ling Chen v.
Rochford, 145 Fed.Appx. 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).
THE FEDERAL ACTION also is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.2

Res judicata, or claim preclusion:

will bar a suit if (1) the judgment in the first action
is valid, final and on the merits; (2) the parties in
both actions are the same or are in privity with each
other; and (3) the claims in the second action . . .
arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the
claims in the first one.
Sibert v. Phelan, 901 F.Supp. 183, 186 (D.N.J. 1995).

Thus,

under res judicata, a judgment is given “preclusive effect” by
“foreclosing litigation of matters that should have been raised
in an earlier suit”.

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984).

As a result, a judgment

“foreclos[es] litigation of a matter that never has been
litigated, because of a determination that it should have been
advanced in an earlier suit”.

Id.

2

The Court may sua sponte address affirmative defenses
when a plaintiff proceeds under Section 1915. Ezekoye v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, 179 Fed.Appx. 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2005).
3

ALL OF THE COMPONENTS of res judicata may be satisfied here,
as (1) the state court in the State Foreclosure Action has issued
an order or a judgment, which is valid, see Flood v. Braaten, 727
F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating judgment that is final and
thus res judicata in one state’s courts will be given full faith
and credit by all other United States courts), (2) the plaintiff
is a party to the State Foreclosure Action, and the defendant in
the Federal Action is a party in the State Foreclosure Action,
and (3) the claims in the Federal Action arise from the same
transactions or occurrences as the claims that were raised, or
should have been raised, in the State Foreclosure Action.

See

Moncrief, 275 Fed.Appx. at 153-54 (affirming judgment dismissing
claims concerning state foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred
by res judicata); Ezekoye, 179 Fed.Appx. at 113 (dismissing
appeal as frivolous — in federal action concerning state
foreclosure proceeding — from order dismissing claims that were
and could have been raised against bank based on res judicata);
Ayres-Fountain, 153 Fed.Appx. at 92 (noting federal claims
concerning state foreclosure action would be barred by res
judicata); see also El Ali, 217 Fed.Appx. at 116 n.1 (dismissing
appeal; noting order dismissed claims concerning state
foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by res judicata).
THE COURT ALSO NOTES that the defendant here does not appear
to be a state actor, and thus any claims asserting constitutional

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violations are frivolous.

See Brookhart v. Rohr, 385 Fed.Appx.

67, 68 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing appeal from order that dismissed
allegations concerning constitutionally violative conduct by
private parties in state court foreclosure action because they
were not state actors); James v. Heritage Valley Fed. Credit
Union, 197 Fed.Appx. 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating defendant
credit union was not state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Awala v. Wachovia Corp., 156 Fed.Appx. 527, 528 (3d Cir.
2005) (stating bank is not state actor merely because it operates
within a regulated industry).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not cover

merely private conduct, no matter how wrongful.

St. Croix v.

Etenad, 183 Fed.Appx. 230, 231 (3d Cir. 2006).3

3

The Federal Action would also be barred if the State
Foreclosure Action is ongoing. A federal court must abstain from
exercising jurisdiction, pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine, when (1) a state court action is ongoing, (2) important
state interests are implicated, and (3) there is an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims in state court. See
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.
423, 435 (1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971);
see also Gray v. Pagano, 287 Fed.Appx. 155, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2008)
(dismissing complaint filed in connection to ongoing state
foreclosure action, inter alia, as barred by Younger abstention);
see also El Ali, 217 Fed.Appx. at 116 n.1 (dismissing appeal;
noting district court order dismissed claims concerning ongoing
state foreclosure action as barred by Younger abstention).
The Federal Action may also be barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. See Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N.
Jersey Welfare Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 1992).

5

THE COURT will dismiss the Complaint for the aforementioned
reasons.

The Court will issue an appropriate order and judgment.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

November 14, 2011

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