SLP PERFORMANCE PARTS, INC. v. SUNCOAST AUTOMOTIVE PERFORMANCE, INC.
Filing
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ORDER denying 11 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 9/20/2011. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SLP PERFORMANCE PARTS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUNCOAST AUTOMOTIVE
PERFORMANCE, INC.,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3460 (MLC)
O R D E R
DEFENDANT, Suncoast Automotive Performance, Inc.
(“Suncoast”), a Florida corporation, moving to dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
(dkt. entry no. 11, Mot. Dismiss); and Plaintiff, SLP Performance
Parts, Inc. (“SLP”), seeking, inter alia, to recover damages for
patent infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair
competition (dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.); and SLP opposing the
motion, arguing that the Court has jurisdiction over Suncoast
based upon Suncoast’s internet, sales, and marketing contacts
with New Jersey (dkt. entry no. 14, Pl. Opp.); and the Court,
under Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), deciding the motion on the
papers; and
IT APPEARING THAT SLP, in response to the motion and in the
absence of an evidentiary hearing, bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, see
Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir.
2009); and that a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing by
establishing, “with reasonable particularity, sufficient contacts
between the defendant and the forum state[,]” Mellon Bank (East)
PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992);
and that the plaintiff may meet its burden by introducing
affidavits or other competent evidence, Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at
330; and it appearing further that “in deciding a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is required to accept
the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and is to construe disputed
facts in favor of the plaintiff[,]” id. (quoting Toys “R” Us,
Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003)); and
IT APPEARING that the Court may assert personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants to the extent authorized by New
Jersey state law, Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93,
96 (3d Cir. 2004); Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d
141, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1992); and that the New Jersey long-arm
statute, New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4, provides for personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, Miller Yacht Sales, 384 F.3d
at 96; Carteret Sav. Bank, 954 F.2d at 145; and that Due Process
protections are satisfied where a nonresident defendant has
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
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fair play and substantial justice[,]” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash.,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), such that the defendant has “fair warning” that it
could be haled into court in the forum state, World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); and
IT APPEARING that personal jurisdiction, as exercised within
the limits of Due Process, may take the form of either general
jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction, Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 416 (1984); and the
Court finding here that specific jurisdiction is the more
relevant inquiry; and it further appearing that specific
jurisdiction over a defendant exists when the plaintiff’s claims
directly relate to or arise out of the defendant’s activities
with the forum, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985); and it appearing that, in such cases, the Court may
presume that a nonresident defendant had fair warning that it
could be haled into the forum state if the defendant directed its
activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); and it further appearing that the
exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate in patent
infringement actions where the nonresident defendant has sold at
least one of the allegedly infringing products within the forum
state, Osteotech, Inc. v. GenSci Regeneration Scis., Inc., 6
F.Supp.2d 349, 354 (D.N.J. 1998) (“where a defendant infringer is
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shown to have sold the allegedly infringing product in the forum
state, the forum may exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. . . .
[I]t is enough that [the nonresident defendant]
sold its product in New Jersey only once, because the product
allegedly infringes [plaintiff’s] patent, which is the subject
matter of the instant litigation.”); and
THE COURT NOTING that SLP has introduced the “Declaration of
Hank Daniecki” (Pl. Opp., Ex. G); and it appearing that Daniecki
is the founder of a vehicle repair business located and operated
at Daniecki’s home in Allentown, New Jersey (id.); and it further
appearing that Daniecki has declared under oath that Suncoast
sold and delivered an allegedly infringing product, i.e., a
Chevrolet Camaro Z Style Ram Air Hood, to him in Allentown, New
Jersey (id.);1 and the Court accordingly finding that Suncoast
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The Court recognizes that Suncoast has submitted contrary
evidence, i.e., the “Declaration of Philip Grabo.” (Dkt. no. 11,
Decl.) Suncoast attempts to argue, by reference to this
evidence, that it “has never sold any of the products accused in
Plaintiff’s Complaint of infringing on Plaintiff’s alleged
patents or trademarks in the State of New Jersey, or to any known
resident of the State of New Jersey.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) At this
juncture, however, the Court “is required to accept the
plaintiff’s allegations as true, and is to construe disputed
facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 330.
“Of course, by accepting a plaintiff’s facts as true when a
motion to dismiss is originally made, a court is not precluded
from revisiting the issue if it appears that the facts alleged to
support jurisdiction are in dispute.” Carteret Sav. Bank, 954
F.2d at 142 n.1. It follows that Suncoast may raise its
jurisdictional arguments anew at a later point in this case, or
alternatively, seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
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has “purposefully directed” its activities at residents of New
Jersey, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Osteotech, 6 F.Supp.2d at
354 (“[W]here a defendant infringer is shown to have sold the
allegedly infringing product in the forum state, the forum may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”); and the
Court therefore concluding that SLP has established sufficient
“minimum contacts” by Suncoast with New Jersey for purposes of
establishing specific jurisdiction; and
IT APPEARING that “[o]nce the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case in favor of personal jurisdiction, the defendant ‘must
present a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable[,]’”
Carteret Sav. Bank, 954 F.2d at 150; and the Court finding that
Defendant has offered no compelling reason why maintenance of
this suit in New Jersey would “offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice,” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; and
the Court accordingly intending to deny the motion; and for good
cause appearing;
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IT IS THEREFORE on this
20th
day of September, 2011
ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction (dkt. entry no. 11) is DENIED.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
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