GOLDEN-KOETHER et al v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 11/29/2011. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARY ALICE GOLDEN-KOETHER,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
:
:
:
: CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3586 (MLC)
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
:
:
:
:
:
:
COOPER, District Judge
Plaintiffs, Mary Alice Golden-Koether and Caitlin C. Koether
(“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action in New
Jersey state court against defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(“Chase”), alleging “fraud” on the basis that Chase had not
provided “a copy of the original ‘Wire Transfer Receipts’”
requested by Golden-Koether with respect to withdrawals of
approximately $452,000 between September 2006 and October 2006,
from a bank account of which she contends she was a 50% owner.
(Dkt. entry no. 1, Rmv. Not., Ex. 1, Compl. at 1-2.)
Chase
removed the action on the basis that federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.
(Rmv. Not. at 2.)
Chase contends that although Plaintiffs’ claim
does not cite to a federal statute, it arises under the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.
(Id.)
Chase now moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).
no. 13, Mot. Dismiss.)
(Dkt. entry
Chase contends the Complaint must be
dismissed because it is barred by the EFTA’s statute of
limitations.
(Dkt. entry no. 14, Def. Br. at 2.)
Plaintiffs
have responded to this argument in their opposition papers.
(Dkt. entry no. 16, Pl. Opp’n at 9.)
The Court decides the
motion on the submissions of the parties, without oral argument,
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1(b).
For the reasons stated
herein, the motion will be granted.
I.
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
In addressing a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine, whether under any reasonable reading of
the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
At this stage, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’
A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
2
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007)).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged--but it has not ‘show[n]’--that the
‘pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950
(quoting Rule 8(a)(2)).
The Court, in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, may consider the complaint,
exhibits attached thereto, matters of public record, and
undisputedly authentic documents if the plaintiff’s claims are
based upon those documents.
See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
II.
Electronic Fund Transfer Act
The EFTA was enacted “to provide a basic framework
establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of
participants in electronic fund and remittance transfer systems,”
particularly with regard to individual consumer rights.
U.S.C. § 1693(b).
15
It provides a private cause of action for a
consumer to seek damages for financial institutions’ unauthorized
electronic transfer of funds from the consumer’s account.
See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693a, 1693m; Raine v. Reed, 14 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir.
1994).1
1
The New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code expressly states that it
does not apply to claims governed by the EFTA, insofar as the
EFTA is the exclusive remedy for consumers seeking documentation
3
“The EFTA governs wire transfers to and from bank accounts
‘established primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes.’”
Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 257 F.Supp.2d 632, 638 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2)).
The Court finds
that the EFTA applies to Plaintiffs’ claim that Chase failed to
provide supporting documentation regarding what the Complaint
appears to suggest may have been unauthorized wire transfers from
a consumer account jointly owned by Golden-Koether and her exhusband.
III. EFTA Statute of Limitations
The EFTA requires that when a consumer believes an
unauthorized electronic fund transfer or other error has
occurred, the consumer must provide, within sixty days of
receiving documentation such as an account statement, oral or
written notice to a financial institution setting forth the
identifying account information and the basis for the consumer’s
belief that the account contains an error.
15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a).
The financial institution is obliged to investigate and respond
to such notice within ten business days.
Id.
Any action brought
under the EFTA must be brought “within one year from the date of
the occurrence of the violation.”
15 U.S.C. § 1693m(g).
“In
light of the ten-day statutory period within which a financial
pertaining to fund transfers, disputing the validity of a
transfer, and asserting claims against financial institutions.
N.J.S.A. §§ 12A:4A-104, 12A:4A-108.
4
institution must provide a written response,” the statute of
limitations begins to run ten days after the consumer provides
the oral or written notice of the alleged error to the financial
institution.
Berenson v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., LLC, 403 F.Supp.2d
133, 145 (D. Mass. 2005).
The wire transfer transactions at issue occurred in
September and October 2006.
(Compl. at 2.)
The Complaint
alleges that on some unspecified date, Golden-Koether had a
telephone conversation with an Executive Assistant at Chase, “was
told that the bank statement” for the period in question “was a
true statement,” but Chase failed to “give [her] further
information on [her] account for the past 3½ years.”
(emphasis added).)
(Id. at 4
It is thus evident from the face of the
Complaint that any claim arising under the EFTA is barred by the
one year statute of limitations.
Even presuming that Plaintiffs
satisfied the prerequisite of providing notice within sixty days
of receiving the bank statement showing the September and October
2006 account withdrawals, three and a half years passed between
Golden-Koether’s providing notice to Chase and the filing of the
Complaint on December 6, 2010.
15 U.S.C. § 1693m(g); see Houck
v. Local Fed. Sav. & Loan, Inc., No. 93-6046, 1993 WL 191818, at
*3 (10th Cir. June 1, 1993 (Table Decision at 996 F.2d 311));
Springer v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 09-628, 2010 WL 427417, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2010).
5
IV.
Common Law Fraud
The Complaint also must be dismissed insofar as it purports
to assert a claim for common law fraud.
(See Pl. Opp’n at 8
(“Actually, what I am suing for is fraud on Chase Bank. . . .
[for] not giving me documents of a joint account of mine.”).)2
To state a claim for fraud, Plaintiffs must allege “(1) a
material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact;
(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an
intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable
reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.”
Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997).
Plaintiffs have not alleged that they relied upon the bank
statement showing withdrawal of funds by wire transfer for the
September to October 2006 period.
Rather, the Complaint alleges
that Golden-Koether notified Chase that she wished to receive
further documentation regarding these withdrawals, and has been
damaged as a result of retaining attorneys to obtain such
documents since Chase responded to her notification in a way that
was unsatisfactory to her.
(Pl. Opp’n at 7 (“I have spent all
money on attorneys attempting to gain the wire transfer
2
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review proceedings that
occurred in state court, referred to in the Plaintiffs’
opposition papers. (Pl. Opp’n at 5, 8.) See, e.g., Dunleavy v.
Gannon, No. 11-361, 2011 WL 5321004, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Nov. 1,
2011) (observing that the “District Court lacks the entitlement
of appellate jurisdiction required to review a state court
judgment” and discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
6
documents. . . .” and referring to the “account withdrawal
summary . . . I had received originally in October of 2006”).)
As Chase points out, the Complaint cannot be read as suggesting
that Plaintiffs relied on the account statement, because GoldenKoether alleges that she has been trying to obtain the “wire
transfer receipts” for years.
at 3; Compl. at 4.)
(Dkt. entry no. 17, Def. Reply Br.
See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567
F.Supp.2d 719, 727-28 (D.N.J. 2008) (dismissing fraud claim for
failure to plead reasonable reliance where plaintiff indicated
that it thought the representation in question was false from the
time it was communicated).
Because no reasonable reliance has
been alleged, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for common law
fraud.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed supra, the Court will grant the
motion to dismiss.
The Court will issue an appropriate Order and
Judgment.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:
November 29, 2011
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?