RATLIFF v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 5/7/2012. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
: Civil Action No. 11-4423 (JAP)
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
O P I N I O N
v.
:
:
MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS :
OFFICE, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
______________________________:
TYSON RATLIFF,

APPEARANCES:
Tyson Ratliff, Pro Se
#644194/ SBI #752110B
Northern State Prison
P.O. Box 2300
Newark, NJ 07114
PISANO, District Judge
Plaintiff Tyson Ratliff, a prisoner at the Northern State
Prison, Newark, New Jersey, has submitted a pro se complaint
alleging violations of his civil rights.

Plaintiff has not paid

the filing fee, and seeks permission to proceed in forma
pauperis.

Based on Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigence, this

Court will grant his request.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b).

For the following reasons, the complaint will be

dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff states that on October 4, 2008, he was arrested
and falsely imprisoned on allegations that he possessed a weapon.
He was incarcerated for sixteen months.

In November 2008,

defendants attempted to force Plaintiff to take a guilty plea,
and on March 6, 2010, a trial by jury was held.

Although

Plaintiff asserts he was maliciously prosecuted, he does not
state that he has had a favorable termination.

He alleges that

defendants were not properly trained, and that he was falsely
imprisoned for false charges of possession of a weapon.
Plaintiff seeks to sue the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s
Office, the New Brunswick Police Department, and various lawyers
and others involved in his prosecution.

He seeks monetary

relief.
DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard
1.

Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134, §§
801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 to 1321–77 (April 26, 1996), requires
a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity.

The Court is required

to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

This action is subject to sua sponte

screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent and is a
prisoner.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009).

The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the proposition that “[a] pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held
that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is

facially plausible.

This then “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

(3d Cir. 2009)(citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948).
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint
are plausible.

See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50.

See also

Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc.,
643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).

“A complaint must do more than

allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”

A complaint has to
Fowler, 578 F.3d at

211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35
(3d Cir. 2008)).
2.

Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting

under color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir.
1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
B.

Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff asserts that he was maliciously prosecuted and

falsely imprisoned on weapons charges.
To prove malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his
favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding
without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the
plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote
omitted); see also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); Baker
v. Wittevrongel, 363 Fed. App'x 146 (3d Cir. 2010); Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2009).

Moreover, to

state a claim under § 1983 against an individual, a “plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1948.
In this case, Plaintiff has not pled a case for malicious
prosecution.
in his favor.

He has not shown that the criminal proceeding ended
As such, his claim must be dismissed under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Further, the Court notes that the prosecutors and attorneys
involved in Plaintiff’s criminal case are not subject to suit
under § 1983.

See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325

(1981) (holding that public defenders do not act under color of
state law); Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1972)
(privately-retained counsel does not act under color of state law
when representing client); Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228 (3d
Cir. 1972) (court-appointed pool attorney does not act under
color of state law); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976) (state prosecutors are immune from damages for actions
taken in their official prosecutorial capacities).
Moreover, any attempts to challenge the fact or duration of
Plaintiff’s confinement must be raised in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

Plaintiff cannot challenge his state court criminal conviction in
this § 1983 action.

Nor can he seek monetary relief for an

unconstitutional conviction or sentence until that conviction or
sentence has been invalidated.
477, 489-90 (1994).

See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

Here, Plaintiff has not pled that he had any

convictions or sentences overturned.

Thus, his claims are not

ripe for consideration of monetary damages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint will be dismissed.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

/s/ Joel A. Pisano
JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge
Dated:

May 7, 2012