PIERCE v. BARTKOWSKI et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 3/20/2019. (km)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
LOUIS PIERCE,
:
:
Petitioner,
:
Civ. No. 11-5265 (FLW)
:
v.
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GREG BARTKOWSKI et al.,
:
:
Respondents.
:
_________________________________________ :
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.

Petitioner, Louis Pierce (“Pierce” or “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner incarcerated at New
Jersey State Prison, in Trenton, New Jersey. After granting in part Pierce’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus, the Court granted a motion by Respondents, Greg Bartkowski and Paula T. Dow
(collectively, “Respondents”), to stay the grant of habeas relief pending appeal. Presently before
the Court is a motion by Pierce for reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Respondents’ stay motion. (ECF No. 51.) For the following reasons, the
reconsideration motion is DENIED.
In support of their stay motion, Respondents argued that they were likely to succeed on
appeal and that they would be prejudiced by the need to undertake an expedited retrial of Pierce
which could ultimately be rendered moot by the appeal of this Court’s grant of habeas relief.
They asserted that Pierce would suffer little harm from a stay given an unlikelihood of being
released on bail and that the public interest lay in granting a stay. (See ECF Nos. 45-1 & 48.) In
opposition, Pierce disputed the significance of the burden on the State and asserted that he would

potentially be able to meet bail. Pierce argued that the public interest weighed in his favor and
that his habeas relief would not be reversed. (See ECF No. 46.)
On December 3, 2018, I issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the stay
motion. (ECF Nos. 49 & 50.) Balancing the factors for consideration identified by the Supreme
Court in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), among other cases, I found that they weighed in
favor of granting a stay. (ECF No. 49 at 4.) Particularly, I noted that Respondents had raised
non-frivolous arguments on appeal and that Respondents had “demonstrate[d] a potential for
irreparable harm if the State is compelled to pursue an expedited retrial that is ultimately
rendered moot.” (Id.) I also noted the minimum of eleven years remaining of Pierce’s original
sentence, taking account of the Supreme Court’s holding that “the State’s interest in continuing
custody and rehabilitation . . . ‘will be strongest where the remaining portion of the sentence to
be served is long, and weakest where there is little of the sentence remaining to be served.’” (Id.
(quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777 (1987)).)
Pierce now seeks reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Respondents’ stay motion. (ECF No. 51.) He argues that the grant “is based on a
misapprehension of facts and law” because “there is no actual or realistic risk that the State will
be ‘compelled to pursue an expedited retrial that is ultimately rendered moot.’” (ECF No. 51,
Mem. of Law, at 1.) Particularly, Pierce asserts that New Jersey speedy trial laws apply only to
pretrial detainees and he explains that could likely be released on bond on terms set by the state
court. He further asserts that he is not seeking an imminent trial and would be willing to
stipulate to delaying the retrial until after the Third Circuit’s ruling on his appeal. (See id. at 2–
4.)

2

Respondents oppose the motion. (ECF No. 52.) Pierce sought leave to file a letter brief
in reply, and the Court considers that brief as part of the motion papers. (ECF No. 54.)
Motions for reconsideration are permitted under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), but
reconsideration is considered an extraordinary remedy and is granted only sparingly. See Buzz
Bee Toys, Inc. v. Swimways Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 483, 515 (D.N.J. 2014); Andreyko v. Sunrise
Senior Living, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 475, 477 (D.N.J. 2014). A party seeking reconsideration
must “set[] forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge
. . . has overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Motions for reconsideration are not intended as
opportunities to reargue old matters or raise issues that could have been raised previously. See
Andreyko, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78; P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgm’t LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001). Thus, the movant has the burden of demonstrating one of three
bases for reconsideration: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability
of new evidence that was not available when the court [rendered its original decision]; or (3) the
need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood
Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
Pierce asserts that it was clear error for the Court to find “a potential for irreparable harm
if the State is compelled to pursue an expedited retrial that is ultimately rendered moot.” (ECF
No. 51, Mem. of Law.) His basis for this argument, however, largely comprises arguments and
factual assertions that were not before the Court when it rendered its initial decision. Pierce now
attempts to present new details as to why he would likely be released on bond and newly asserts
that he would stipulate to postponing a retrial until after appellate review of his habeas relief.
Pierce has not now demonstrated any error of law or fact that must be corrected to
prevent manifest injustice in the Court’s finding of “a potential for irreparable harm if the State is

3

compelled to pursue an expedited retrial that is ultimately rendered moot.” 1 See Max’s Seafood
Cafe, 176 F.3d at, 677. While Pierce speculates that perhaps recently enacted speedy trial rules
would not apply to him, he provides no precedent supporting that position, and thus fails to show
an error of law. Although he provides new information suggesting that he could be able to
obtain release on bond, this information was not before the Court when it rendered its prior
decision, and Pierce should have presented this information when the Court decided the original
stay motion. In any case, the decision granting Respondents’ stay motion was not reliant on a
certainty that Pierce must be retried before a Third Circuit decision would be forthcoming, but on
the possibility of such. Even if I were to consider Pierce’s new arguments here, they do not
eliminate such a possibility.
Accordingly, Pierce’s present motion is primarily an impermissible attempt to reargue
issues that the Court has already decided. See Andreyko, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78. He has not
shown that the Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Respondents’ stay motion was
premised on factual or legal error. Nor has he established any other basis for an award of the
“extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration. See Buzz Bee Toys, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 515.
For these reasons, Pierce’s motion for reconsideration, (ECF No. 51), is DENIED. An
appropriate Order will be entered.

DATED: March 20, 2019

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge

1

Pierce does not seem to raise any argument as to an intervening change of law or newly
discovered evidence. See Max’s Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at, 677.
4