PENNELLO v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER that Petitioner's application, Docket Entry No. 1 , is dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner's raising his challenges in a Bivens complaint filed with the court having proper venue to entertain Petitioner's claims asserting denial of medical care; that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this action. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 12/5/2011. (mmh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSEPH PENNELLO,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 11-6964 (JAP)
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon an application by petitioner Joseph Pennello
(“Pennello” or “Petitioner”), see Docket Entry No. 1, and it appearing that:
1.
On August 4, 2011, Pennello’s criminal proceedings in this District were concluded with
this Court’s sentencing Pennello to 96 months of imprisonment. See United States v.
Pennello (“Pennello-Criminal”), Crim. Action No. 11-0285 (JAP) (DNJ), Docket Entry
No. 16. This Court’s judgment included, inter alia, the Court’s recommendation to the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) “to provide medical treatment for [Pennello’s] cancerous
condition, and drug treatment to aid in his rehabilitation.” Id. at 3.
2.
On November 30, 2011, the Clerk received an application from Pennello in the form of a
letter, dated November 28, 2011, asserting that Pennello has not received any treatment
for his cancerous conditions during his confinement at the F.D.C. Philadelphia (“FDCPhila”). Id. at Docket Entry No. 17, 1-2. The letter asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (with a visible correction, indicating that Pennello’s original choice of jurisdiction
was 28 U.S.C. § 2255), id. at 2, and requested either Pennello’s immediate release from
confinement or, in the alternative, injunctive relief in the form an order directing the BOP
to initiate treatment of Pennello’s cancerous condition. Id. at 2. Pennello’s application
arrived without any filing fee and without any application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). See Pennello-Criminal, Docket.
3.
In light of Pennello’s assertion that his application is made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
the Clerk commenced the instant habeas proceeding.
4.
To the extent that Pennello seeks release from confinement on the basis of his poor
health, Pennello’s application is mis-directed to the judicial system: if Pennello is seeking
clemency or commutation release on the grounds of his health, this Court has no power to
grant it, since such power is vested exclusively in the executive branch of government.1
2.
To the extent that Pennello considered fashioning his application as a Section 2255
motion (as the correction in Pennello’s application indicates), that motion would be
misplaced, because: (a) § 2255 envisions challenges to the sentence as imposed, see In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997); Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472,
1
Inmates in federal prisons suffering incurable deadly diseases can apply, post
sentencing, for early medical release in several ways. These include filing a motion for reduction
of sentence pursuant to: (a) the “old version” of Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) compassionate release under 18 U.S.C § 4205(g) and § 3582(c)(1), 132; and (c)
executive clemency or commutation to the President's clemency powers. Since reduction of
sentence pursuant to the “old version” of Rule 35(b) and sentence modification under Section
4205(g) can only be used by inmates whose offense was committed before November 1, 1987,
these provisions are facially inapplicable to Pennello. Section 3582(c), which applies “to the
unusual case in which the defendant’s circumstances are so changed, such as terminal illness,
that it would be inequitable to continue the confinement of the prisoner,” see S. Rep. No. 98-225,
at 121 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3304, is also inapplicable to Pennello
because his application does not indicate that his circumstances “so changed” since the time of
his original sentencing four months ago. Finally, under the executive clemency method, the
prisoner must request that the President of the United States (if the prisoner is a federal inmate)
or the governor of the prisoner’s state (if the prisoner is a state inmate) grant him a reduction or
commutation of sentence. As a federal inmate, Pennello must apply to President Obama if he
seeks clemency.
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474 (2d Cir. 1997); Wright v. United States Bd. of Parole, 557 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir.
1977); and (b) Pennello’s application makes it abundantly clear that Pennello does not
challenge his sentence as imposed. See generally Docket Entry No. 1.
3.
To the extent that Pennello wishes to challenge the alleged denial of medical care,
Pennello’s challenges cannot be raised in a Section 2241 petition. Federal law provides
two avenues of relief to prisoners: a petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights
complaint. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). “Challenges to the
validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of
habeas corpus . . . [while] requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement
[fall within the realm of] a § 1983 action.”2 Id. As § 1983 applies only to state actions, it
is not available to federal prisoners; the federal counterpart is an action under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging deprivation of a
constitutional right. See Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“A Bivens action . . . is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action against state
actors, [it] will lie where the defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights under color of
federal law.”). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained the distinction
between the availability of civil rights relief and the availability of habeas relief as
follows:
[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the “core of habeas” – the
validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence –
a challenge, however denominated and regardless of the relief sought,
must be brought by way of a habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the
2
The Supreme Court analyzed the intersection of civil rights and habeas corpus in a
series of cases beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's
favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under
§ 1983 is appropriate.
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, a prisoner is entitled to a
writ of habeas corpus only if he “seek[s] to invalidate the duration of [his] confinement either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a
judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the [government’s]
custody.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). In contrast, if a judgment in the
prisoner’s favor would not affect the fact or duration of the prisoner’s incarceration,
habeas relief is unavailable and a civil complaint may be appropriate. See, e.g., Ganim v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 235 Fed. App’x 882 (3rd Cir. 2007) (holding that district court
lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 to entertain prisoner’s challenge to his transfer between
federal prisons); Bronson v. Demming, 56 Fed. App’x 551, 553-54 (3rd Cir. 2002)
(habeas relief was unavailable to inmate seeking release from disciplinary segregation to
general population, and district court properly dismissed habeas petition without
prejudice to any right to assert claims in properly filed civil rights complaint).
4.
Here, Pennello asserts undue denial of medical care, seemingly raising Eighth
Amendment civil rights issues. Therefore, his claims cannot be raised in a § 2241 habeas
petition; rather, these challenges must be raised by means of a Bivens action.
5.
Unlike habeas actions, civil rights cases always require a filing fee, either as a prepayment
or a series of installment payments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The filing fee for a habeas
petition is $5.00, and inmates filing a habeas petition who are granted in forma pauperis
(IFP) status do not have to pay the filing fee. See Santana v. United States, 98 F. 3d 752
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(3d Cir. 1996) (filing fee payment requirements of PLRA do not apply to IFP habeas
corpus petitions and appeals). In contrast, the filing fee for a civil rights complaint is
$350.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Inmates filing a civil rights complaint who proceed
IFP are required to pay the entire filing fee in monthly installments, which are deducted
from the prison account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). In addition, if a prisoner has, on three
or more occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal in a federal court that
was dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from immune defendants, then the prisoner
may not bring another action IFP unless he or she is in imminent danger of serious
physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because of these differences, courts generally
do not sua sponte re-characterize a habeas pleading as a civil rights complaint. See
Toolasprashad v. Grondolsky, 570 F. Supp. 2d 610, 631, n. 29 (D.N.J. 2008). Therefore,
in the event that Pennello elects to file a Bivens action asserting undue denial of medical
care, Pennello shall accompany his civil complaint either with his duly executed IFP
application or with his prepayment of the $350 filing fee.
6.
Moreover, in the event that Pennello elects to file a Bivens action asserting undue denial
of medical care, such action shall be commenced in the proper venue. Because this case
implicates federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, proper venue is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This Subsection provides that
[a] civil action . . . may . . . be brought only in (1) a judicial district where
any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any
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defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may
otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (emphasis supplied). Here, Pennello is asserting denial of medical
care by the prison officials at the FDC in Philadelphia. See Docket Entry No. 1. That
facility is located with the venue of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania (“EDPA”). Therefore, Pennello’s Bivens challenges must be
raised in the EDPA, rather than in this District.
7.
Section 1406(a) of Title 28 provides: “The district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have been brought.” 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). Since Pennello’s application was filed in this District less than a week
ago, and this Court is not in possession of the EDPA civil complaint forms and of the
EDPA IFP application forms, and – hence – is not in the position to direct the Clerk to
serve the same for Pennello’s completion, this Court finds it proper to dismiss Pennello’s
challenges without prejudice to Pennello’s filing of a Bivens action with the EDPA,
which is the proper venue for the purposes of Pennello’s Eighth Amendment claims.
8.
In light of the Court’s decision to dismiss Pennello’s challenges without prejudice to his
filing of a Bivens action with the EDPA, this Court finds it proper to detail, for
Pennello’s guidance and reference, the relevant legal standards.
9.
It is long established that a court should “accept as true all of the [factual] allegations in
the complaint and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d
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902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit has noted that courts are not
required to credit bald assertions or legal conclusions improperly alleged in the
complaint. See Burlington Coat Fact. Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429 (3d Cir. 1997).
Therefore, legal conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations may not benefit
from the presumption of truthfulness. See Nice Sys., Ltd. Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d
551, 565 (D.N.J. 2001). Addressing the clarifications as to the litigant’s pleading
requirement stated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided the district
courts with guidance as to what pleadings are sufficient under Rule 8. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230-34 (3d Cir. 2008). Specifically, the Court of
Appeals observed as follows: “While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation [is] to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ . . . .” Id.
This pleading standard was further refined by the United States Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the Supreme Court clarified:
[t]he pleading standard . . . demands more than an unadorned
[“]the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me[”] accusation. [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at
555 . . . . A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Id.] at 555.
[Moreover,] the plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. [Indeed, even w]here a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [the
complaint still] “stops short of [showing] plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
Id. at 557 (brackets omitted). [A fortiori,] the tenet that a court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions [or to t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements[, i.e., by] legal conclusion[s] couched as
a factual allegation . . . . [W]e do not reject these bald allegations on the ground
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that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of [these]
allegations . . . that disentitles them to the presumption of truth. . . .
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54.
The Third Circuit observed that Iqbal hammered the “final nail-in-the-coffin” for
the “no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),3
which was applied to federal complaints before Twombly. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has instructed
district courts to conduct, with regard to Rule 8 allegations.
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. [See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949-50]. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim for relief” [in light of the definition of “plausibility”
provided in Iqbal.] In other words, a complaint must do more than allege
the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an
entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the
Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled
to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (emphasis supplied)]. This
“plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. Here, Pennello’s application named as defendant “the
United States of America,” and merely expressed Pennello’s disappointment with the fact
that he has not been receiving any medical treatment. However, such generality cannot
3
The Conley court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at
45-46. Under this “no set of facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion to
dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the claim’s legal elements.
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meet the pleading requirement, as explained in Iqbal; rather, Pennello must assert the
facts showing that his constitutional rights were violated.
10.
An inmate has a protected right to be incarcerated at a place conforming to the standards
set forth by the Eighth Amendment. The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable
prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), but neither does it permit
inhumane ones, and it is now settled that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and
the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition on “cruel
and unusual punishments, the Eighth Amendment . . . imposes duties on [prison]
officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials . . . must
take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984), see Helling, 509 U.S. at 31-32; Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 225 (1990); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Eighth
Amendment requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable
claim for a violation of his right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a
serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. Id. at 106. To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle
inquiry, the inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. “Because
society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care,
deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only
if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Here, Pennello
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asserts need for cancer treatment. This assertion suggests a serious medical need, because
it refers to a condition which, if untreated, could result in lifelong handicap or permanent
loss. See Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
347 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). “Deliberate indifference” exists
“where [a] prison official: (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended
medical treatment.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. Furthermore, deliberately delaying
necessary medical diagnosis for a long period of time in order to avoid providing care
constitutes deliberate indifference that is actionable. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d
64 (3d Cir. 1993). Deliberate indifference is also evident where officials erect arbitrary
and burdensome procedures that result in interminable delays that deny medical care to
suffering inmates. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346-47. Here, Pennello does not assert any
facts indicative of deliberate indifference: his application is silent as to any requests for
medical treatment, as it is silent as to any denials of such requests. See generally Docket
Entry No. 1. Therefore, in the event that Pennello elects to execute a Bivens complaint
for filing with the EDPA, this Court strongly urges Pennello to state, clearly and
concisely, the facts indicating that he sought medical care and had his requests denied or
unduly delayed. Pennello’s complaint should also clearly identify the defendants who
were personally involved in such denials of medical care.
11.
Finally, the Court notes that Pennello may not have exhausted his administrative remedies
with regard to his allegations. For the purposes of a Bivens action, the BOP
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Administrative Remedy Program is a three-tier process that is available to inmates
confined in institutions operated by the BOP for “review of an issue which relates to any
aspect of their confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. An inmate must initially attempt to
informally resolve the issue with institutional staff. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal
resolution fails or is waived, an inmate may submit a BP-9 Request to “the institution
staff member designated to receive such Requests (ordinarily a correctional counsel)”
within 20 days of the date on which the basis for the Request occurred, or within any
extension permitted. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. An inmate who is dissatisfied with the
Warden's response to his BP-9 Request may submit a BP-10 Appeal to the Regional
Director of the BOP within 20 days of the date the Warden signed the BP-8 response. 28
C.F.R. § 542.15(a). The inmate may appeal to the BOP’s General Counsel on a BP-11
form within 30 days of the day the Regional Director signed the BP-9 response. Id.
Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal. Id. If responses are not
received by the inmate within the time allotted for reply, “the inmate may consider the
absence of a response to be a denial at that level.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.18.
12.
This administrative exhaustion requirement applies to a wide-range of inmate complaints,
including to the challenges grounded in alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment. See
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir.
2000). While this exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional bar to litigation, it is
strictly enforced by the courts. This rigorous enforcement is mandated by a fundamental
recognition that the exhaustion requirement promotes important public policies. See, e.g.,
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Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Because of the
important policies fostered by this exhaustion requirement, it has been held that there is
no futility exception to the exhaustion requirement, and no exception for the claims
seeking solely injunctive relief. See id.; see also Canals-Santos v. Ebbert, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23091, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2010) (“contrary to [the inmate’s] assertion that
he is exempt from the exhaustion requirement because he solely seeks injunctive relief,
the Prison Litigation Reform Act . . . makes no distinction between claims for damages,
injunctive relief, or both, and therefore, the exhaustion of administrative remedies still
would be required before filing suit.”). Instead, courts have typically required
across-the-board administrative exhaustion by inmate plaintiffs who seek to pursue
claims in federal court. Moreover, courts have imposed a procedural default component,
holding that inmates must fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the inmate
grievance process before proceeding into federal court. See Spruill, 372 F.3d 218.
Applying this procedural default standard to the Section 1997e exhaustion requirement,
courts have concluded that inmates who fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison
grievance process are barred from subsequently litigating claims in federal court. See,
e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla v. Strickland, 304 Fed. App’x
22 (3d Cir. 2008); Jetter v. Beard, 183 Fed. App’x 178 (3d Cir .2006). Applying this
procedural default component, an inmate cannot excuse a failure to timely comply with
these grievance procedures by simply claiming that his efforts constituted “substantial
compliance” with the statutory exhaustion requirement. See Harris v. Armstrong, 149
Fed. App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005). Nor can an inmate avoid this exhaustion requirement
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by merely alleging that the BOP’s policies were not clearly explained to him. See Davis
v. Warman, 49 Fed. App’x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate’s confusion
regarding these grievances procedures does not, standing alone, excuse a failure to
exhaust. See Casey v. Smith, 71 Fed. App’x 916 (3d Cir. 2003). An inmate cannot cite
to alleged staff impediments to grieving a matter as grounds for excusing a failure to
exhaust, if it also appears that the prisoner did not pursue a proper grievance once those
impediments were removed. See Oliver v. Moore, 145 Fed. App’x 731 (3d Cir. 2005)
(failure to exhaust not excused if, after staff allegedly ceased efforts to impede grievance,
prisoner failed to follow through on grievance).4 Therefore, in the event Pennello did not
exhaust his administrative remedies, he should either pursue such exhaustion or be
prepared to assert the facts showing that his obligation to exhaust his Bivens challenges
administratively should be excused.
IT IS THEREFORE on this 5th day of December, 2011,
ORDERED that Petitioner’s application, Docket Entry No. 1, is dismissed without
prejudice to Petitioner’s raising his challenges in a Bivens complaint filed with the court having
proper venue to entertain Petitioner’s claims asserting denial of medical care; and it is further
4
This broad rule, however, admits of one narrow exception. If the actions of prison
officials in some fashion contributed to inmate's procedural default on a grievance, the inmate
will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan,
219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000). However, courts have recognized a clear “reluctance to invoke
equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate's] failure to exhaust as the statute requires.” Davis, 49
Fed. App’x at 368. Thus, an inmate's failure to exhaust will only be excused “under certain
limited circumstances,” and an inmate can defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by showing
“he was misled [by the prison officials as to his obligation to exhaust] or that there was some
extraordinary reason he was prevented from complying with the statutory mandate.” Harris, 149
Fed. App’x at 59; Davis, 49 Fed. App'x at 368.
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ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this action; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall close the file on this matter by making a new and
separate entry on the docket reading “CIVIL CASE TERMINATED” and serve this
Memorandum Opinion & Order upon Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested.
/s/ Joel A. Pisano
JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge
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