NEW JERSEY PRIMARY CARE ASSOCIATION, INC. v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES et al
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni on 6/28/2013. (gxh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NEW JERSEY PRIMARY CARE
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Civil Action No. 12-413 (MAS)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
et al.,
Defendants.
BONGIOVANNI, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Motion by Plaintiff New Jersey Primary Care
Association (the “NJPCA” or “Plaintiff”) for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses. [Docket Entry No.
57]. Defendant State of New Jersey Department of Human Services, et al. (“Defendants”)
oppose the Motion. [Docket Entry No. 73]. The Court has fully reviewed and considered all of
the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, and has considered
same without oral argument pursuant to L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth more fully
below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses shall be GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2012, the NJPCA filed the underlying Complaint in this action, alleging
violations of the United States Constitution and of the federal Medicaid statute under 42 U.S.C.
§1396a(bb)(5)(B). (See Compl. ¶¶62-69; Docket Entry No. 1). On April 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed
a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. [Docket Entry No. 12]. On May 7, 2012, Defendants
filed both an opposition to Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion as well as a Motion for
Summary Judgment [Docket Entry Nos. 18, 19]. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment
[Docket Entry No. 22]. The District Court heard oral argument on the preliminary injunction
motion on May 17, 2012. Additional argument on that motion as well as on the pending motion
and cross-motion for summary judgment was held on June 1, 2012. On July 5, 2012, the
District Court issued an opinion granting Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction as well
as its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket Entry Nos. 39, 40]. Defendants subsequently appealed the District Court’s
decision; that appeal is still pending before the Third Circuit [Docket Entry No. 47]. In the
interim, Plaintiff was granted leave by the District Court to bring the instant motion pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §1988 for attorney’s fees and expenses [Docket Entry No. 54].
II. ARGUMENTS
a. Plaintiff’s Argument
Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs in this matter pursuant to The Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, found at 42 U.S.C. §1988. (Plaintiff’s Brief in Support at 4;
Docket Entry No. 57-1). Plaintiff maintains that it is the prevailing party in the litigation, and
further, that the litigation acted as a catalyst for the defendant to take action. (Id.) See Waterman
v. Farmer, 84 F.Supp.2d 579 (D.N.J. March 1, 2000). Both are required to make a successful
claim under §1988. Plaintiff additionally submits that, in determining what attorney’s fees are
warranted in such a case, the Court should use the “lodestar method” which “multipl[ies] the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” (Id. at 7,
quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)).
2
The fees and costs sought by Plaintiff amount to $256,436.301 for 954 hours of work,
$243,897.59 of which is attorney’s fees and $12,538.71 of which represents expenses. (Id. at 8).
This total cost is comprised of services rendered by local counsel, Julie A. Williamson, Esq., as
well as the law firm of Feldesman Tucker Leifer Fidell (“FTLF”). Over the time period of
February 16, 2012 to October 18, 2012, Ms. Williamson billed $6,057.50 in attorney fees for
21.7 hours of work at her hourly rate of $275.002, and $469.46 in expenses for postage, filing,
FedEx charges, Turbo Legal Support Servies and Pacer Court Filing fees. (See Cert. of Julie A.
Williamson, Esq. at 5; Docket Entry No. 57-2). Therefore, the bulk of the fees sought by
Plaintiff’s counsel stems from the work performed by FTLF.
Over the time period of September 28, 2011 to July 25, 2012, FTLF billed 933.05 hours
(at various rates) and accrued $12,069.25 in expenses. (Plaintiff’s Brief in Support at 8). The
work performed by the firm of FTLF was shouldered by four individuals – two partners, an
associate and a paralegal. The partners, Kathy S. Ghiladi, Esq. and Edward T. Waters, Esq.,
both billed at a rate of $350.00/hour, while the associate, Rupinderjit Grewal, Esq., billed at
$225.00/hour, and the paralegal, Taneisha Phillips, billed at $90.00/hour.
Plaintiff argues that the “amount of time was reasonable given the complex legal and
factual issues, the need to work with multiple health centers…[the] briefing [that] occurred with
respect to both a request for preliminary injunction and to cross-motions for summary judgment,
travel for oral argument and settlement meetings, and the defense that was presented by
Defendant’s counsel.” (Id. at 8). Plaintiff argues that its attorneys exhibit an exceptionally high
1
This total does not reflect a $10,000 discount given to Plaintiff by FTLF “due to its long-standing status as a
client.” (See Plaintiff’s Brief in Support at 8.)
2
There is an additional one (1) hour of work billed at the paralegal rate of $90.00 per hour.
3
level of expertise in this area of litigation, and that the proposed rates for them are reasonable.
(Id. at 9). Lastly, citing to Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 92, n.5 (1989), Plaintiff submits
that this case presented “‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ circumstances warranting an enhancement by
this Court[.]” (Id.) In Blanchard, the Court outlined twelve factors to be used in determining
whether fees are reasonable and whether an enhancement is merited. Those factors include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
the time and labor required;
the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly;
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
the customary fee in the community;
whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
the amount of time involved and the results obtained;
the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
the "undesirability" of the case;
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
awards in similar cases.
Plaintiff contends that all twelve factors fall in favor of an enhancement of the lodestar in
this matter by citing to, inter alia, the time that counsel put into the case, the fact that the case
was unique, that Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience was significant, that Plaintiff’s counsel was
precluded from taking on other cases during this litigation, that Plaintiff indeed received a
discount, that Plaintiff was ultimately successful on the merits, and that very few other attorneys
would have had the expertise to take on such a case. (Id. at 9-10).
b. Defendants’ Argument
As a threshold matter, Defendants do not dispute that this matter is appropriate for the
reimbursement of attorney’s fees under §1988.
Their current appeal notwithstanding,
Defendants concede that “Plaintiff is the prevailing party and that the suit meets the catalyst
4
standard.” (Defendants’ Brief in Opposition at 8-9; Docket Entry No. 73).
Moreover,
Defendants additionally agree with Plaintiff that the lodestar method is the appropriate method of
determining the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded in a §1988 application for
same. (Id. at 8). Defendants acknowledge that reasonable fees are given in such cases, but assert
that the fees requested by Plaintiff are excessive and unreasonable. Defendants’ opposition is
threefold. Defendants object to the amount of hours expended on the case, the hourly rates
which have been applied, and the additional enhancement requested by Plaintiff’s counsel.
i. Hourly Rates
Defendants contend that the hourly rates of counsel are unreasonable, noting that Plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that same are reasonable. (Id. at 10). Defendants submit that hourly
rates are determined by establishing the “prevailing market rates in the community” and argue
that Plaintiff has submitted no evidence tending to show a customary rate and additionally, has
not “provided affidavits from other attorneys attesting to their usual and customary rates.” (Id. at
11-12). Lastly, Defendants contend that the rates awarded in similar cases in the Trenton
vicinage are significantly different than those requested by Plaintiff. (Id. at 12-13, referencing
Wong v. American Credit and Collections, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168446 (D.N.J. Nov. 28,
2012); Holzhauer v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112740 (D.N.J. Aug.
10, 2012); Cassagne v. Law Office of Weltman, Weinburg & Reis Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135207 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2011) (each finding that $325/hour was appropriate for a partner with
20+ years of experience and $200-250/hour was appropriate for an associate with 6-8 years’
experience)).
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ii. Number of Hours
The greater part of Defendants’ opposition lies with the number of hours expended by
Plaintiff’s counsel in this case. Defendants note that, although pre-litigation work was done on
the matter, the case was filed in January of 2012, “involved no discovery and…resulted in a grant
of summary judgment less than six months [later]” in July of 2012. (Id. at 5). Therefore,
Defendants submit that over 950 hours expended on this matter is excessive and unreasonable.
Defendants delineate several specific billing entries which they argue should be reduced or
excluded.
As an initial matter, Defendants remark that Plaintiff’s invoices are “block-billed,”
meaning that several tasks are billed for one block of time. (Id. at 14). Defendants’ argue
generally that Plaintiff’s hours are excessive, noting that defense counsel only spent a total of
244.1 hours on this matter. (Id. at 15). Additionally, defense counsel argues that the “division of
labor” between partners, associates and paralegals was unbalanced and that partners were doing
the work of associates, and associates the work of paralegals. (Id. at 15-16). Defense counsel
therefore suggests that all billed time be allotted 2:1:1 for associates, partners and paralegals.
(Id.)
In addition, Defendants contend that the amount spent on document preparation was
disproportionate to the work actually required. As to the Complaint, Defendants allege that 23
hours were expended on “general research in the early stages of the case” and that the actual
drafting of the pleading took a combined 74.65 hours by Ms. Ghiladi and Mr. Grewal. (Id. at 18).
Defendants note that the Complaint is 24 pages with 70 paragraphs and submits that the amount
of time spent on the document (i.e. over an hour per paragraph) is excessive, especially given
6
Plaintiff counsel’s “expertise in the area of FQHC reimbursement.” (Id.)
Additionally,
Defendants estimate from Plaintiff’s invoices that the 40-page preliminary injunction motion
involved 257.65 hours of time (of which 232.4 were billed to the client), amounting to
$57,612.50 in fees. (Id. at 21). Lastly, Defendants characterize the time spent on both Plaintiff’s
cross-motion for summary judgment and their reply as unnecessary; noting that a 34-page brief
took 132.4 hours and a 15-page reply took 34.5 hours. (Id. at 23).
Defendants further contend that several time entries were excessive and inappropriate
with regard to travel and time for the preliminary injunction hearing, as well as administrative
tasks and other costs. With respect to the hearing, Defendants maintain that several attorneys
did not need to travel from Washington D.C. when local counsel was available. (Id. at 24-25).
Moreover, Defendants estimate that Plaintiff’s counsel spent 21 hours preparing for a hearing
which took 1.5 hours. (Id.) Generally, Defendants argue that Ms. Ghiladi and Mr. Waters, both
partners, each billed separately for tasks performed together. (See generally Defendants’ Brief in
Opposition at 27-29).
Defendants also argue that certain time entries are irrelevant, have
inappropriate descriptions, or are “administrative tasks not normally billed to clients” such as
scheduling, reviewing the docket and printing and distributing documents filed with the court.
(Id. at 30-32).
iii. Costs
Defendants acknowledge that “costs are generally recoverable as long as they are
necessary and reasonable in order for the attorney to be able to render legal services” but contend
that Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden in that respect. (Id. at 32). Defendants submit that
7
costs associated with transcript fees, meals, PACER fees, FedEx charges, Turbo Legal Support
Services, and West group online research costs should be excluded. (Id. at 33-34).
iv. Enhancement
Finally, while Defendants recognize that an enhancement of fees may be appropriate in
“exceptional circumstances,” Defendants maintain that this case does not exhibit any rare or
exceptional circumstances and therefore, such an enhancement is not merited.
c.
Plaintiff’s Reply
Plaintiff responds by stating that it provided adequate support to show that the hourly
rates requested are reasonable. Plaintiff argues that it extends the same rates to all members of
the “National Association of Community Health Centers (“NACHC”), of which the NJPCA is a
member” and that it “charged higher rates for other clients that are not NACHC members[.]”
(Plaintiff’s Brief in Reply, at 1-2; Docket Entry No. 77). Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the
cases cited by Defendants are inapposite to show that the rates requested are unreasonable.
Plaintiff notes that those cases involved claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) and that “the law firm involved was under some scrutiny[.]” (Id. at 2). Additionally,
Plaintiff argues that, in this case, the rates surrounding the community of Washington, D.C.
should be invoked, as their firm is located there and the NJPCA has been a long-standing client.
(Id. at 4). Plaintiff points to the Laffey Matrix, a tool used to assess legal fees in the
Washington-Baltimore area, in support of this argument. (Id.)
Plaintiff also rebuts Defendants’ argument that its hours are unreasonable. Plaintiff argues
that “[e]ven though…counsel possessed the particular expertise litigating claims involving Title
42 U.S.C. §1396a(bb)…there is nothing ‘cookie cutter’ about such litigation as each State has it
8
own particular payment methodology, Medicaid State Plan, State law and regulations and each
State raises its own defenses in response to such litigation.” (Id.) Plaintiff further argues that the
number of hours spent by defense counsel on this matter is “utterly irrelevant[.]” (Id. at 5).
As to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s counsel exhibited an “inappropriate task
balance[,]” Plaintiff argues that “FTLF is a small law firm with a boutique health law practice”
and that only nine attorneys “regularly work on litigation matters.” (Id.) Plaintiff also refutes
Defendants’ specific objections to several counsel being present and argues that there is some
generally accepted duplicity in having both local and pro hac counsel present. (Id. at 6).
Lastly, with respect to costs claimed for legal research software, Plaintiff notes that
“FTLF’s engagement agreement with the NJPCA does refer to computerized legal research.”
(Id.)
III. ANALYSIS
a. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
Title 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) provides that the Court, in Its discretion, may award reasonable
attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing party. A plaintiff is “prevailing” and thereby
entitled to a fee award if he or she has succeeded on “any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433, 103 S.ct. 1966, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“To be eligible to make a prevailing-party claim under §1988, the plaintiff must, at a
minimum…be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship
between itself and the defendant.” Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223 (3d
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
9
In the present matter, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was ultimately successful on
the merits, as the District Court entered summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. 3 Therefore,
Plaintiff is permitted to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under §1988. However, as noted
above, the parties’ dispute lies in the reasonableness of the fees requested by Plaintiff. The
Court shall therefore turn to the calculation of fees based on the lodestar fee methodology.
b. Calculation of Lodestar Fee
The first step in calculating reasonable attorney’s fees under §1988 requires the Court to
determine the lodestar fee, defined as the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The party seeking attorney’s fees has the
burden of producing sufficient evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market rate for the
character and complexity of the legal services rendered. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896,
n.11 (1984). The burden of establishing the lodestar rests on the fee applicant, who must
provide appropriate documentation of the hours spent and the market rate. If the documentation
is inadequate, a court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The
opposing party must make specific objections to the requested fee. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892
F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). “Once the adverse party raises objections to the fee request, the
district court has a great deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in light of those objections.”
Id. However, the district court cannot decrease a fee award based on factors not raised at all by
the opposing party. Id.
3
As noted above, however, this determination is currently before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
10
i. Reasonable Rate
In order to determine a reasonable hourly rate, the Court must assess the “skill and
experience of the prevailing attorneys and compare their rates to the rates in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blakey,
2 F.Supp.2d 598, 602 (D.N.J. April 9, 1998) (citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 337
(1995)). “Under normal circumstances, a prevailing party's attorneys should be compensated
based on market rates in the vicinage of the litigation. However, if a prevailing party can show
that it required the particular expertise of counsel from another vicinage, or that local counsel
were unwilling to take on the litigation, then it would be entitled to compensation based on
prevailing rates in the community in which its attorneys practice.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v.
Honeywell Int’l Inc., 426 F. 3d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 2005). In the instant matter, the hourly rates
sought by Plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the rates suggested by Defense counsel are as follows:
ATTORNEY
TITLE
RATE
SUGGESTED RATE
Julie A. Williamson
Local Counsel
$275
No objection
Kathy Ghiladi
Partner
$350
$325
Edward Waters
Partner
$350
$325
Rupinderjit Grewal
Associate
$225
$150
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden to show a reasonable
customary hourly rate.
While Ms. Ghiladi and Ms. Williamson have submitted affidavits
attesting to the reasonableness of their proposed hourly rates, indeed, no other affidavit,
declaration or certification was provided by any other attorney tending to show a customary rate.
See Blum, 465 U.S. at 896, n.11 (“the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory
evidence - in addition to the attorney's own affidavits - that the requested rates are in line with
11
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience, and reputation.”) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
argument that their rates were reasonable because they are comparable to rates that FTLF charges
to other entities in the NACHC and indeed are lower than rates FTLF has charged to
non-NACHC members to be irrelevant. The inquiry is not whether the rates charged were
reasonable to a particular client of the firm, but whether the firm charges rates similar to those
charged by other firms and other attorneys in the community for the relevant area of litigation.
Plaintiff’s argument merely demonstrates a customary rate for FTLF, not a customary rate for the
legal community in the relevant area.
Therefore, as counsel has not included any affidavits or any other outside evidence
corroborating its own affidavit, the Court cannot find that counsel has made a prima facie
showing of reasonableness. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the rates
for Washington, D.C. should be applied in this matter. Although it appears that a long-standing
relationship exists between FTLF and NJPCA, such a business relationship is not enough to
show that outside counsel was required and that local counsel had been sought to no avail.
Furthermore, Plaintiff first argued that Washington, D.C. rates should be applied in its reply brief
filed in support of the pending motion. The Court finds that said argument should have been
raised in Plaintiff’s initial moving brief.
Lastly, the Third Circuit has expressly cautioned
against relying on the Laffey Matrix, the tool cited by Plaintiff to support its requested hourly
rates. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d at 710, n.14.
When the prevailing party fails to make a prima facie showing that the hourly rates
requested are reasonable, the Court must exercise its discretion in setting a reasonable hourly
12
rate. Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir.
1996), quoting Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 77 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 1995) (unpublished). The Court’s
discretion in this regard is broad. (Id.) While the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sustain
its burden, the Court shall nonetheless award the rates as requested by counsel. The Court, in
exercising Its discretion, notes that It is familiar with the rates of counsel in New Jersey and in
the Trenton vicinage and finds that the rates requested are not unreasonable. See Evans v. Port
Auth. of NY & NJ, 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that in determining the
reasonableness of a fee request, “the court will inevitably engage in a fair amount of ‘judgment
calling’ based upon its experience with the case and the general experience as to how much a
case requires”) (citation omitted). In so finding, the Court notes that Defendants suggest a
decrease in the partner hourly rate of only $25 per hour. The Court finds this this difference is
hardly monumental and indeed, does little to suggest that $350 an hour is unreasonable.
Likewise, the Court finds that $225 per hour for an associate is reasonable. See Cassagne, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135207 at *15-17 (finding that an hourly rate of $200 for an associate was
reasonable); Levy v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124226, *25
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2011) (finding that an hourly rate of $200-$210 for an associate was reasonable).
ii. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
The Supreme Court has held that counsel is expected to exercise “billing judgment” and
that district courts “should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not
‘reasonably expended’” including “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” work.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff’s submitted
billing indicates that all counsel combined expended 954 hours on this case. As outlined above,
13
Defendants have argued that these hours be reduced for several reasons. Defendants’ revised
calculations and reasoning can be summarized in the following chart:
BILLING ENTRY
LENGTH
BILLED AMOUNT4
Complaint
24 pages
23 research hours
74.65 drafting hours
SUGGESTED
AMOUNT
8 research hours
12 drafting hours
Motion for Preliminary
Injunction
40 pages
257.65 hours
60 hours
Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment
34 pages
132.4 hours
35 hours
Reply to Summary
Judgment
15 pages
34.5 hours
15 hours
Preliminary Injunction
Hearing
1.5 hours5
21 preparation hours
13 preparation hours
Travel Expenses
N/A
$12,948.57 in time
billed and travel costs
all travel time should be
excluded or ½ rate should
be billed for one attorney
only
Response to 2 page letter
2 pages
6.75 hours
3 hours
Various two-partner entries
N/A
10.2 hours on same task
Exclude 10.2 hours
Intra-office Conferences
N/A
48.45 hours
15 hours
4/10/2012 entry to review
and revise motions
N/A
2 hours
Exclude 2 hours
5/9/2012 entry to draft and
revise PI reply
N/A
12.25 hours
Exclude 12.25 hours
4
The Court notes that these approximations are taken from Defendants’ Brief. As noted, an exact hour amount
cannot be determined as to each task because of the “block-billing” nature of the entries.
5
The Court notes that the minute entry records the total time at 1 hour. (See Docket Entry No. 31.)
14
BILLING ENTRY
LENGTH
BILLED AMOUNT4
All “change in scope”
entries
N/A
13.5 hours
SUGGESTED
AMOUNT
Exclude 13.5 hours
Administrative Tasks
N/A
1.5 hours
Exclude 1.5 hours
The Court shall address Defendants’ objections in turn.
1. Time Spent on Documents
Overall, the Court finds the amount of time that counsel spent drafting and reviewing its
pleadings, as well as moving and reply papers to be excessive. As noted, the Complaint consists
of 70 paragraphs outlining the history of FQHC payment provisions, the purpose of the Medicare
managed care program and the goal of the Balanced Budget Act. In short, the Complaint was
predominantly a recitation of the history of statues and implementation analysis; only pages
22-24 of the Complaint provide specific causes of action. As such, having expended 23 hours
on research, and lifting excerpts from the legislative history and statutes, the Complaint should
have practically written itself and therefore the Court finds that 74 additional hours of drafting is
excessive and a reduction is warranted. The Complaint did not contain any complicated fact
pattern or complicated claims. Therefore, the Court shall allow the research hours to remain but
shall reduce the drafting hours by half to 37.33 hours. See Port Drivers Fed’n 18, Inc. v. All
Saints, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93700 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2011) (finding 60 hours for a 13-page
Complaint with 59 paragraphs to be “utterly ridiculous” and reducing to 10 hours).
Likewise, the time spent on the motion for preliminary injunction is extremely
disproportionate to the length and substance of the brief accompanying it. Again, the Court
finds that counsel’s proficiency in this area of the law works against them with respect to this
15
request. Counsel states that “there are few attorneys in this country who are well-versed in the
highly specialized areas of matters affecting recipients of federal funds, the Medicaid program,
community health centers and their role in the Section 330 Public Health Service grant program.”
(See Cert. of Kathy S. Ghiladi at ¶6; Docket Entry No. 57-3). Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel serves
as general counsel to the NACHC and has had a long-standing relationship with the NJPCA. (Id.)
While counsel’s skill and experience in this area is commendable, it does little to justify the
amount of hours expended by counsel on this type of motion, which is routinely filed in cases
such as this. Additionally, the Court notes that the first 17 pages of the brief consist of text
mirroring that of the Complaint. (See Docket Entry No. 12-3). Therefore, the Court shall reduce
the amount of hours spent on this motion by half to 128.83 hours. See Port Drivers Fed’n 18,
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93700 at *19 (finding over 200 hours for a 26-page motion for
preliminary injunction “unwarranted” and reducing to 50 hours).
Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment purports to have taken over 130 hours to
complete. Again, the Court finds this amount to be excessive in light of counsel’s skill in this
area of the law. Moreover, much of the information included in the brief is duplicative of
information found in the Complaint and Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
Therefore, as above, the Court shall halve the amount of time spent on the cross-motion for
summary judgment to 66.2 hours.
Last for the Court’s consideration is the time expended on Plaintiff’s reply memorandum,
as well as the 2-page response letter drafted by counsel. The Court finds that these time entries
are not excessive. Therefore, the Court shall not reduce the number of hours expended on either
the brief or the response letter.
16
In sum, the amount of hours spent drafting papers and briefs shall be reduced as follows:
Attorney
Billing Entry
Complaint
PI Motion
SJ Motion
Kathy S. Ghiladi
hrs req hrs allow
29.90
14.95
58.90
29.45
42.00
21.00
Rupinderjit S. Grewal Julie A. Williamson
Laura Hoffman
hrs req
hrs allow hrs req hrs allow hrs req hrs allow
44.75
22.38
----156.00
78.00
1.5
0.75
16.5
8.25
90.40
45.2
-----
2. Time Spent Preparing for Hearings and on Travel
“Under normal circumstances, a party that hires counsel from outside the forum of the
litigation may not be compensated for travel time, travel costs, or the costs of local counsel.”
Interfaith Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d at 710. “[I]n order to determine the rate at which attorneys may
be compensated for their travel time, a court must look to the practice in the local community.”
(Id. at 711) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the Court looks at the
prevailing rates at which travel time is compensated in the forum state, which in this matter is
New Jersey. Case law from the District of New Jersey establishes that the prevailing rate for
travel time in New Jersey is fifty percent of the attorney’s reasonable market rate. See Port
Drivers Fed’n 18, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93700 at *31; Glass v. Snellbaker, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73012 at *20 (D.N.J. Sep 23, 2008); Erhart, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57709, *23;
Posa v. City of East Orange, No. Civ. 03-233 (FSH), 2005 WL 2205786, *5-6 (D.N.J. Sep 08,
2005).
As to Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction hearing, the Court finds that 21 hours of
preparation is not unreasonable. Even though the hearing lasted little over an hour, the Court
finds that this is but one factor to be considered. The Court notes that hearings of this nature can
last several hours. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel was instructed to return on another date and
17
resume the hearing. (See Docket Entry No. 36). Moreover, the Court appreciates that counsel
cannot always anticipate the Court’s concerns and, as such, needs to be thoroughly prepared and
well versed on all relevant issues of fact and law. Therefore, the Court shall not reduce these
hours, especially in light of the fact that the amount of time spent on the motion itself has already
been reduced as described above.
In regard to the travel time and costs billed for outside counsel to attend the hearing, the
Court finds that, other than the fact that the NJPCA is a long-standing client of FTLF, no other
evidence has been shown or asserted that local counsel was unwilling to take on the case. The
NJPCA voluntarily chose FTLF to represent it and thus, is not entitled to recoup attorney’s fees
associated with travel time. Therefore, adopting Defendants’ estimate of travel time6, which
Plaintiff has not expressed any objection to, Ms. Ghiladi’s hours are reduced by 21 and Mr.
Grewal’s hours are reduced by 14.
3. Time Spent by Partners and Intra-Office Conferences
Defendants argue that it is unnecessary and duplicative for two partners to bill for time
spent working on the case together. “Clearly the court must exclude ‘duplicative billing for tasks
which could not reasonably have required the identical expenditure of time by two partners’.”
Jefferson v. City of Camden, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46654 at *30 (June 30, 2006), citing Evans
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001).
The Court finds that several tasks were performed together by both Mr. Waters and Ms.
Ghiladi. It appearing that Ms. Ghiladi was lead counsel in this case, the Court shall exclude
6
Defendants estimate that the trip from Washington, D.C. to Trenton, N.J. takes 3.5 hours each way. Therefore,
given that a total of 5 trips were made by both counsel, this results in total travel billings of 35 hours. (See Docket
Entry No. 73 at 26.)
18
several of Mr. Waters’ entries which It deems were unnecessarily duplicative. The entries which
have been excluded are summarized in the following chart:
DATE
PARTNER
DESCRIPTION
9/28/2011
ETW
Review correspondence with State; listen to
conference call with State regarding
wraparound; confer with K. Davis;
participate in Board Meeting
4.00
$1,400
10/4/2011
ETW
Litigation preparation; e-mails to staff
0.25
$87.50
10/5/2011
ETW
Review files; conference with KSG and RG
regarding preparation of court
1.25
$437.50
10/17/2011
ETW
Conference call with Ms. Davis; KSG;
review letter from State; confer with KSG
regarding same
1.00
$350.00
10/18/2011
ETW
Confer with K. Davis regarding latest letter
from State; edit response to same
2.50
$875.00
10/26/2011
ETW
Confer with local counsel regarding facts;
background
0.50
$175.00
11/9/2011
ETW
Confer with KSG regarding status
0.25
$87.50
11/28/2011
ETW
Begin review of complaint
0.50
$175.00
11/29/2011
ETW
Review draft Complaint
1.00
$350.00
11/30/2011
ETW
Confer with Kathy Grant Davis; confer
with RG and KSG regarding status
0.75
$262.50
12/8/2011
ETW
Review documents from Health Centers;
conference call with Ms. Davis
0.75
$262.50
12/9/2011
ETW
Review documents; e-mails regarding same
0.75
$262.50
12/12/2011
ETW
Confer with KSG regarding litigation
issues; background; facts
0.25
$87.50
19
HOURS AMOUNT
DATE
PARTNER
DESCRIPTION
12/13/2011
ETW
Confer with KSG; RG regarding strategy
for lawsuit; review documents; facts; confer
with Ms. Davis regarding above
3.50
$1,225.00
12/15/2011
ETW
Review letter from State; e-mails from
health centers; draft e-mails for K. Davis
2.00
$700.00
12/19/2011
ETW
Confer with KSG; RG; and Gil Bernhard
all regarding factual development
2.00
$700.00
12/20/2011
ETW
Confer with Ms. Davis; KSG regarding
meeting with State; status
0.75
$262.50
12/21/2011
ETW
Draft talking points; confer with Kathy
Grant Davis regarding meeting with State
1.00
$350.00
12/22/2011
ETW
Confer with Ms. Grant Davis regarding
meeting with State; confer with KSG
regarding same; review notes
1.50
$525.00
12/23/2011
ETW
Strategy meeting with KSG and RG
regarding lawsuit
2.50
$875.00
12/28/2011
ETW
Review due process cases; confer with R.
Grewal regarding same
1.00
$350.00
1/9/2012
ETW
Begin review of complaint
0.75
$262.50
1/10/2012
ETW
Review complaint; edit same
1.50
$525.00
1/23/2012
ETW
Confer with R. Grewal regarding complaint
0.25
$87.50
1/24/2012
ETW
Review/respond to e-mails; confer with R.
Grewal regarding status; next steps
0.25
$87.50
1/26/2012
ETW
Review/respond to e-mails regarding site
visit (Rudine Smith); confer with R. Grewal
regarding same
0.75
$262.50
2/8/2012
ETW
Update from KSG
0.35
$122.50
20
HOURS AMOUNT
DATE
PARTNER
DESCRIPTION
HOURS AMOUNT
4/5/2012
ETW
E-mails regarding status
0.15
$52.50
4/13/2012
TOTAL
ETW
Confer with KSG/RG regarding status
0.25
32.25
$87.50
$11,287.50
Defendants also maintain that the time allocated to intra-office correspondence and
conferences should be lessened. The Court finds the amount of intra-office time is acceptable
and shall not adjust the lodestar.
4. Remaining Objections
As to Defendants’ remaining objections, Plaintiffs have only disputed one in its reply
brief. This is the April 10, 2012 entry to revise motions, which Defendants claimed applied to
the preliminary injunction motion. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, has clarified that this entry
pertained to pending pro hac vice motions before the Court. Therefore, the Court shall not
exclude this entry.
Nevertheless, with respect to the other objections (i.e. the 5/9/2012 entry, the “change in
scope” entries, and the administrative tasks), the Court finds that Defendants have made a prima
facie challenge to these entries, and Plaintiff has made no attempt to respond to or explain same.
As such, Plaintiff has not sustained its burden to show the reasonableness of the fees requested
and those remaining entries shall be excluded.
iii. Costs
In response to costs, Plaintiff merely asserts that “FTLF’s engagement agreement with the
NJPCA does refer to computerized legal research.” (Plaintiff’s Brief in Reply, at 6). While this
evidence is minimal, the Court shall permit these costs to remain. However, Plaintiff says
21
nothing else to explain or rebut Defendants’ disputes regarding the other costs. Therefore, all
costs associated with travel, transcript fees, meals, PACER fees, and FedEx charges are hereby
excluded. A chart detailing those excluded costs follows:
DATE
ATTORNEY
DESCRIPTION
10/3/2011
FTLF
Capital Reporting Company – Copy of Transcript re:
Medicaid Conference Call
AMOUNT
$417.80
5/16/2012
FTLF
Khatereh S. Ghiladi – Travel Expenses re: Trip to
Trenton, NJ (Train for KSG and RG ($600.00), Hotel
($196.22), Parking ($35.00), Food (14.75))
$845.97
5/17/2012
FTLF
Rupi Grewal – Travel Expenses re: Trip to Trenton,
NJ (Hotel ($186.58), Cab Fare ($27.50))
$214.08
5/22/2012
FTLF
Parking at Union Station for RSG
$7.00
5/22/2012
FTLF
Khatereh S. Ghiladi – Travel Expenses re: trip to
Trenton, NJ (Train Fee ($20.00), Food ($6.83), Taxis
($30.00))
$56.83
5/22/2012
FTLF
FROSCH Travel, Inc. – Amtrak Service to/from
Trenton, NJ for KSG
$209.00
5/23/2012
FTLF
JoAnne Caruso – Transcript of Court Proceedings on
May 17, 2012
$261.60
5/31/2012
FTLF
Khatereh S. Ghiladi – Travel Expenses re: Trip to
Trenton (Hotel ($183.97), Food ($3.84), Train Fee
($34.00), Taxi ($20.00))
$241.81
5/31/2012
FTLF
FROSCH Travel, Inc. – Amtrak Service to/from
Trenton, NJ for KSG
$237.00
5/31/2012
FTLF
Rupinderjit Grewal – Travel Expenses re: Trip to
Trenton, NJ (Hotel ($183.45), Add’l Train Fare
$235.88
22
DATE
ATTORNEY
5/31/2012
FTLF
5/31/2012
FTLF
6/30/2012
FTLF
N/A
DESCRIPTION
($30.00), Cabs ($22.43))
AMOUNT
FROSCH Travel, Inc. – Additional Charge re: Ticket
change for Amtrak Service to/from Trenton, NJ for
KSG
FROSCH Travel, Inc. – Amtrak Service to/from
Trenton, NJ for RG
$164.00
Pacer Service Center – Online Research re: Court
Electronic Records (4/1/12 – 6/30/12)
$137.70
Williamson
Federal Express
$158.56
N/A
Williamson
Pacer Court Filing System
$27.80
N/A
TOTAL
Williamson
Turbo Legal Support Service
$237.00
$239.87
$3,691.90
Therefore, with total costs originally at $12,538.71 and having been reduced by $3,691.90, total
allowed costs shall be $8,846.81.
iv. Fee Enhancement
Lastly, the Court finds that, in light of the several reductions and exclusions enumerated
above, Plaintiff’s counsel is not entitled to an enhancement of fees.
c. Final Lodestar Fee
In sum, the Court having determined the appropriate hourly rate and the appropriate
number of hours to be billed, the lodestar shall be as follows:
LEGAL
PROFESSIONAL
Kathy S. Ghiladi
HOURS
REQUESTED
388.20
HOURS
FINAL
EXCLUDED
HOURS
106.90
281.30
23
HOURLY
RATE
$350.00
TOTAL
$98,455.00
LEGAL
PROFESSIONAL
Edward T. Waters
HOURS
REQUESTED
38.00
HOURS
FINAL
EXCLUDED
HOURS
32.25
5.75
HOURLY
RATE
$350.00
TOTAL
$2,012.50
Rupinderjit S. Grewal
428.50
165.83
262.67
$225.00
$59,100.75
Laura Hoffman
16.50
8.25
8.25
$175.00
$1,443.75
Julie A. Williamson
21.70
0.75
20.95
$275.00
$5,761.25
Taneisha Phillips
TOTAL
1.00
0.50
0.50
$90.00
$45.00
$166,818.25
When added to the costs identified above, the final sum to be awarded in attorney’s fees
and expenses is $175,665.06.
III.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART. An appropriate
Order follows.
Dated: June 28, 2013
s/Tonianne J. Bongiovanni
HONORABLE TONIANNE J. BONGIOVANNI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
24
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