BAADHIO v. LANIGAN
Filing
101
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 10/29/2014. (mmh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CLOSED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RANDY BAAHDIO,
Civil Action No. 12-456 (JAP)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
GARY LANIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Randy Baahdio
PO Box 3411
Princeton, NJ 08043
Plaintiff Pro Se
Joseph M. Micheletti
Office of the NJ Attorney General
Division of Law
PO Box 112
Trenton, NJ 08625-0112
Attorney for Defendant Bernstein
Gregory J. Giordano
Lenox, Socey, Wilgus, Formidoni,
Brown, Giordano & Casey, LLC
3131 Princeton Pike
Building 1B
Trenton, NJ 08648
Attorney for Defendants Wiegand, Zimmelman, Leiberman,
Ahsan, Gogarty, Gallagher, Nwachukwu, and UMDNJ
PISANO, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Bernstein (ECF No. 89) and Defendants Wiegand, Zimmelman, Leiberman, Ahsan,
2
Gogarty, Gallagher, Nwachukwu, and UMDNJ (ECF No. 92). The Court decides these matters
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the motions for summary judgment and dismiss the
complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 67) to claim constitutional violations
stemming from conditions of confinement. Defendant Bernstein filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 89) in which Defendant asserts, among other arguments, that Plaintiff did
not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the claims upon which he now seeks
relief in this matter.
Defendants Wiegand, Zimmelman, Leiberman, Ahsan, Gogarty,
Gallagher, Nwachukwu, and UMDNJ then filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
92) asserting various arguments and joining in Defendant Bernstein’s argument regarding failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff never filed administrative appeals with regard to
the claims he presents here. (See ECF No. 89-2.) The Court will decide the matter on the issue
of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies regarding his claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court shall grant summary judgment, as to any claim or defense, “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate
where the Court is satisfied that “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
3
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact
might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. “By its very terms, this standard provides that the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1), (4); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party
seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (citation omitted)); see also
Singletary v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although the initial
burden is on the summary judgment movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, ‘the burden on the moving party may be discharged by “showing” - that is, pointing out to
the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case’
when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof.” (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325)).
4
Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by
affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324. “[T]he non-moving party, to prevail, must ‘make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 F.App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986) (citations omitted). Instead, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by
[its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324; see also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (“The object of [the
Rule] is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint ... with conclusory allegations of
an affidavit.”); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (“To raise a genuine issue of
material fact, ... the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by
the movant,” but must “exceed[] the ‘ mere scintilla’ threshold and ... offer[] a genuine issue of
material fact.”).
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s
evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino
v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In
5
making this determination, however, the court may consider materials in the record other than
those cited by the parties. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
In support of the Motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, Defendants have submitted information related to the administrative complaints filed
by Plaintiff. (See ECF 89-2.) While Plaintiff filed a number of inmate remedy forms
concerning various issues, Plaintiff failed to file an Administrative Appeal with respect to any of
the requests. Id. These facts are not in dispute.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to any prisoner’s
filing of a civil rights action regarding prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). Specifically,
Section 1997e(a) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
Exhaustion is a precondition for bringing suit and, as such, it is a “‘threshold issue that courts
must address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right
time.’” Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013) (alternation in original)
(citations omitted).
“[T]he ... exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation omitted). See
also Nyhuis v. Ngo, 204 F.3d 65, 68-69 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the § 1997e(a) exhaustion
6
requirement applies equally to claims brought by federal and state prisoners). In addition, a
prisoner must exhaust all available administrative remedies even where the relief sought, such as
monetary damages, cannot be granted through the administrative process, as long as the
grievance tribunal has authority to take some responsive action. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2001).
The applicable procedural rules for properly exhausting administrative remedies “are
defined not by [§ 1997e(a)], but by the prison grievance process itself. Compliance with prison
grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by [§ 1997e(a)] to ‘properly exhaust.’”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004)
(same). The burden of proving non-exhaustion lies with the defendants asserting the defense.
Jones, 549 U.S. at 212, 216-17.
Section 1997e(a) “demands that a prisoner exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing suit.” Strickengloss v. State Correction Institution at Mercer, 531 F.App’x 193, 194 (3d
Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 204). See also Thrower v. U.S.,
528 F.App’x 108 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of Bivens claim for failure to exhaust, even
though prisoner exhausted his remedies after filing suit) (citing Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d
201, 209 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases)); Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F.App’x 991,
993 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting “unanimous circuit court consensus” that a prisoner cannot fulfill the
exhaustion requirement after filing the complaint). Accordingly, if Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing this action, he cannot cure that defect during the pendency
of this suit.
7
The New Jersey Department of Corrections has established a comprehensive Inmate
Remedy System, through which “inmates may formally communicate with correctional facility
staff to request information from, and present issues, concerns, complaints or problems to the
correctional facility staff.” See N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.1 through 4.9. The Inmate Remedy System
Form is available from inmate housing units, the Social Services Department, and the law
library. N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.4(f). An aggrieved inmate must submit the Inmate Remedy System
Form to the designated institutional coordinator, who refers it to the appropriate official for
response. N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.8. The Inmate Remedy System Form must be complete and legible
and must include “a clear and concise statement summarizing the request.” N.J.A.C. 10A:14.4(e). Generally, the response to a routine request is to be provided to the inmate within 30
days. N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.4(i), 10A:1-4.5(e). Where further deliberation is necessary, the initial
response to the inmate shall include statements that indicate that further deliberation is necessary,
the nature of the deliberation required, and the timeframe within which the final response shall
be provided to the inmate. N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.4(i). An inmate may appeal the initial response to
the institution Administrator within 10 calendar days from the issuance of the initial decision,
and the Administrator is to respond within 10 business days. N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.4(i), 10A:1-4.6.
The response from the Administrator completes the administrative remedy procedure. N.J.A.C.
10A:1-4.6(d). The New Jersey regulations specifically provide that “[t]he comprehensive
Inmate Remedy System to include a ‘Routine Inmate Request’ and/or ‘Interview Request,’ and
an ‘Administrative Appeal’ must be utilized and fully exhausted prior to an inmate filing any
legal action regarding information requests, issues, concerns, complaints, or problems.”
N.J.A.C. 10A:1-4.4(d).
8
Here, the undisputed evidence reflects that Plaintiff initiated administrative remedies, but
failed to exhaust them by administrative appeal. Even if the initial response to Plaintiff was not
a satisfactory resolution of Plaintiff’s request, he was required to appeal the decision in order to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Cf. Ramos v. Hayman, Civil No. 11-0259, 2011 WL
3236395 (D.N.J. July 27, 2011) (holding that New Jersey state prisoner who failed to appeal or
respond to initial response asking him to contact an investigator had failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies).
Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
that were available to him, as he is required to do by § 1997e(a) before bringing suit. The
Motion for summary judgment will be granted and all of Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Bernstein (ECF No. 89) and Defendants Wiegand, Zimmelman, Leiberman, Ahsan, Gogarty,
Gallagher, Nwachukwu, and UMDNJ (ECF No. 92) are granted.
accompanies this Opinion.
/s/ Joel A. Pisano
JOEL A. PISANO, U.S.D.J.
DATED: October 29, 2014
An appropriate Order
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?