BAADHIO v. LANIGAN

Filing 17

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 6/26/2012. (mmh)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:
RANDY BAADHIO,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., :

Civil No. 12-456 (JAP)
OPINION
:

Defendants.

:
:

APPEARANCES:
RANDY BAADHIO, Plaintiff pro se
524396
New Jersey State Prison
PO Box 861
Trenton, N.J. 08625
PISANO, District Judge
Plaintiff Randy Baadhio (“Plaintiff”) seeks to bring this
action in forma pauperis.

Based on his affidavit of indigence, the

Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the
Court to file the complaint.1
1

Plaintiff initially submitted a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §2254 and included his conditions of confinement claims.
See 117120 (JAP) Baadhio v. State of New Jersey, Docket Entry No. 1. By Order dated
January 25, 2012, this Court severed the conditions of confinement claims from
the habeas claims and opened the instant case. See 12-456 (JAP) Baadhio v.
State of New Jersey, Docket Entry No. 2. When Plaintiff filed his amended
complaint, pursuant to said order, he failed to submit a complete in forma
pauperis application and this Court denied his application and
administratively terminated the action. (Id. at Docket Entry No. 10.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a complete in forma pauperis application.
(Id., Docket Entry No. 11.) As such, this Court will re-open the case to
review the complaint.

At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, to determine whether it should
be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the
complaint should proceed in part at this time.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton,
New Jersey at the time of filing, brings this civil rights action,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Gary Lanigan,
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections; Charles
A. Warren, Administrator of New Jersey State Prison; the New Jersey
Department of Corrections; Dr. Hasson, Director of the Medical Unit
at New Jersey State Prison; University of Medicine and Dentistry of
New Jersey (“UMDNJ”); John Oszwart, a Discipline Hearing Officer;
Dr. Zimmerman, Crisis Center psychiatrist; Defendants X1, X2, X5;
Dr. Bernstein, Administrator at New Jersey State Prison’s Crisis
Center; Virginia Gee, UMDNJ social worker; Psychologist Wiegand;
current SASRC Chairman; Dr. Whasuku; Dr. Lieberman; Carol
Gallagher; Evelyn Davis, Central Reception and Assignment Facility
(“CRAF”) administrator; “Plumbing crew” at New Jersey State Prison;
and the lieutenants and sergeants of unit 2EE at New Jersey State
Prison.

The following factual allegations are taken from the

complaint and subsequent filings, and are accepted for purposes of
2

this screening only.

The Court has made no findings as to the

veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that from October 21, 2011 through November
17, 2011, upon his arrival at CRAF, he was placed in pre-hearing
detention status based on the fraudulent representations by
Defendants X1 and X2.

He states that he was denied bed linens for

four days upon his arrival, as well as heat for three days.
After a psychiatric evaluation, Plaintiff was transferred to
New Jersey State Prison on October 25, 20112 and placed in a close
custody unit, despite the fact that he had been deemed to be nonviolent and non-suicidal by Dr. Rossi.

In the close custody unit,

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied bed linens and corrective
glasses.

For over a week, he claims he was denied utensils, a

changed of clothes, recreation, pen, paper, reading material,
correspondence, soap, little or no toilet paper, and denied a
toothbrush and toothpaste for over three weeks.

He states that he

was held in a cell and forced to shower in areas with blood and
feces on the walls.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was without

running water in his cell for eleven days.
Plaintiff states that he suffered from rectal and navel
bleeding which went unaddressed for months and he was denied
medical call forms.

Plaintiff states that on several occasions,

2

The Court notes that the dates contained in the Complaint regarding
Plaintiff’s time at CRAF and New Jersey State Prison appear to be overlapping.

3

the medical professional defendants came to his cell for a medical
visit, however, they failed to open his cell door.

Instead, they

only examined him from outside the cell door, which resulted in
their failure to treat his issues.

On January 27, 2012, Defendant

Gallagher prescribed a hemorrhoid cream for Plaintiff’s issue, and
he states that the relief was immediate.
Plaintiff argues that the “open door” policy in administrative
segregation, which requires a sergeant to be present before the
doors can be opened, is problematic and that said policy resulted
in a delayed medical response for another inmate on several
occasions.
In an addendum to his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in
March 2012, the cane that he uses due to his polio, went missing
and was being held in Defendant Bernstein’s office.

Plaintiff was

forced to walk around without his cane, causing him excruciating
pain.

Further, Plaintiff states that in May 2012, the navel and

rectal infection Plaintiff previously complained about, returned.
Plaintiff requested medical attention from anyone besides Defendant
Gallagher and requested that he be seen in the clinic, not through
his cell door.

When Defendant Gallagher came to see Plaintiff on

May 9, 2012, Plaintiff refused medical attention.

Plaintiff claims

that in retaliation, his back pain medication was cancelled on May
25, 2012.

Plaintiff alleges that he is in extreme pain.

On June 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring Defendants to see
4

Plaintiff in the clinic for his navel and rectal infections and to
re-instate his pain medication.

Plaintiff also requests a TRO

preventing the Department of Corrections from transferring him to
another prison.
II.

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§

801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a
district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a
governmental employee or entity.

The Court is required to identify

cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an
indigent and is a prisoner.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
5

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”

FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2).

Citing

its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
for the proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent a summary
dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege “sufficient factual
matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.

This then

“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
at 1948).

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint
are plausible.

See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50.

See also Twombly,

505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d
77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).

“A complaint must do more than allege the

plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such
an entitlement with its facts.”

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing

Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir.
2008))
2.

Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
6

for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color
of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994);
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
1. Conditions of Confinement
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
punishment’ ... imposes on [prison officials] a duty to provide
‘humane conditions of confinement.’”

Betts v. New Castle Youth

Dev., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010)(quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).

That is, “prison officials must ensure

that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates.’”

Id. (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526–27).

An

alleged deprivation, to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

7

violation, must result in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities. Id. at 835.
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must
allege both an objective and a subjective component.

Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Counterman v. Warren Cnty. Corr.
Fac., 176 Fed.Appx. 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2006).

The objective

component mandates that only those deprivations denying the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to
form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).

Helling v.

This component requires that the

deprivation sustained by a prisoner be sufficiently serious, for
only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to make out an Eighth
Amendment claim.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

The

subjective component requires that the state actor have acted with
“deliberate indifference,” a state of mind equivalent to a reckless
disregard of a known risk of harm.
(1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835
A plaintiff may satisfy the

objective component of a conditions-of-confinement claim by showing
that the conditions alleged, either alone or in combination,
deprive him of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,
such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,
and personal safety.
(1981).

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48

However, while the Eighth Amendment directs that convicted

prisoners not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, “the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”
8

Rhodes, 452

U.S. at 349.

To the extent that certain conditions are only

“restrictive” or “harsh,” they are merely part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.
347.

Id. at

An inmate may fulfill the subjective element of such a claim

by demonstrating that prison officials knew of such substandard
conditions and “acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of harm to inmate health or safety.”

Ingalls

v. Florio, 968 F.Supp. 193, 198 (D.N.J. 1997).
The Court finds that the allegations as set forth by Plaintiff
regarding his conditions while at CRAF do not rise to the level of
a serious constitutional deprivation.

Plaintiff has alleged no

facts to show that he has been deprived of basic hygiene and
shelter needs for an extended period of time.

Indeed, his

allegations involve only loss of bed linens and heat for a very
short period of time.

Therefore, this claim will be dismissed

against all defendants for failure to state a claim.3

3

With regard

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim against
Defendants X1 and X2 for filing false reports about him, which resulted in his
placement in pre-hearing detention when he arrived at CRAF, that claim is also
dismissed. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952–53 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that “the mere filing of [a false] charge itself” does not constitute
a cognizable claim under § 1983 so long as the inmate “was granted a hearing,
and had the opportunity to rebut the unfounded or false charges”); Hanrahan v.
Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that so long as prison
officials provide a prisoner with the procedural requirements outlined in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), then the prisoner has not
suffered a constitutional violation). See also Creter v. Arvonio, No.
92–4493, 1993 WL 306425, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 1993); Duncan v. Neas, No.
86–109, 1988 WL 91571, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 1988) (determining that “the
alleged knowing falsity of the charge [does not state] a claim of deprivation
of a constitutionally protected liberty interest ... where procedural due
process protections were provided”). To the extent Plaintiff is attempting
to allege a due process violation, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts
under Iqbal to allow said claim to proceed. As such, it will be dismissed
without prejudice.

9

to his conditions of confinement claims while at New Jersey State
Prison, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
to allow that claim to proceed at this time.
2. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied and delayed access to
medical care for his navel and rectal bleeding.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the individual states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the states from inflicting “cruel and unusual
punishments” on those convicted of crimes.
344–46.

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at

This proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate
medical care.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).

In

order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right
to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious
medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that
constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. Id. at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the inmate
must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious.

“Because

society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access
to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to
an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

Serious medical needs

include those that have been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment or that are so obvious that a lay person would recognize
10

the necessity for doctor’s attention, and those conditions which,
if untreated, would result in lifelong handicap or permanent loss.
Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347
(3d Cir. 1987).

For purposes of this Opinion, the Court will

assume that Plaintiff’s navel and rectal bleeding and back pain
constitute serious medical conditions.
The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate to
show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to
his serious medical need.

“Deliberate indifference” is more than

mere malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind equivalent to
reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.
837–38.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at

Furthermore, a prisoner’s subjective dissatisfaction with

his medical care does not in itself indicate deliberate
indifference.

Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F.Supp.2d 217, 228

(D.N.J. 2000); Peterson v. Davis, 551 F.Supp. 137, 145 (D.Md.
1982), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1984).

Similarly, “mere

disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment
claims.”

White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).

“Courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or
adequacy of a particular course of treatment ... [which] remains a
question of sound professional judgment. Implicit in this deference
to prison medical authorities is the assumption that such informed
judgment has, in fact, been made.”

Inmates of Allegheny County

Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).

Even if a doctor’s judgment
11

concerning the proper course of a prisoner’s treatment ultimately
is shown to be mistaken, at most what would be proved is medical
malpractice and not an Eighth Amendment violation.

Estelle, 429

U.S. at 105–06; White, 897 F.2d at 110.
“Where prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical
treatment, however, and such denial exposes the inmate ‘to undue
suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,’ deliberate
indifference is manifest.

Similarly, where ‘knowledge of the need

for medical care [is accompanied by the] ... intentional refusal to
provide that care,’ the deliberate indifference standard has been
met.... Finally, deliberate indifference is demonstrated [w]hen ...
prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended
treatment for serious medical needs or deny access to a physician
capable of evaluating the need for such treatment.”
F.2d at 346 (citations omitted).

Lanzaro, 834

“Short of absolute denial, if

necessary medical treatment [i]s ... delayed for non-medical
reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out.”
(citations omitted).

Id.

“Deliberate indifference is also evident

where prison officials erect arbitrary and burdensome procedures
that ‘result[ ] in interminable delays and outright denials of
medical care to suffering inmates.’”

Id. at 347 (citation

omitted).
At this juncture, based on his statements regarding his
medical issues and the delays and denials of treatment, Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to allow his Eighth Amendment medical
12

claim to proceed against the medical professional defendants.
3. “Open Door” Policy
Plaintiff’s complaint contains a paragraph concerning the
policy of requiring a sergeant to be present before a door can be
opened in administrative segregation.

However, he does not allege

any facts as to how, if at all, this policy has affected him.
Rather, he only states facts related to another inmate by the name
of Kato.

To the extent Plaintiff’s challenges could be construed

as claims asserted on behalf of inmate Kato, Plaintiff lacks
standing to raise these challenges and it will be dismissed with
prejudice.

See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990)

(explaining that to stand in for another as plaintiff, the
purported plaintiff must among other things provide an adequate
explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other
disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own
behalf to prosecute the action).

Likewise, to the extent that

Plaintiff alleges that his rights have been somehow violated by
this policy, it is not clear what constitutional claims he is
attempting to raise.

As such, this claim will be dismissed without

prejudice.
4. Department of Corrections
Plaintiff’s allegations against the Department of Corrections
fail to state a cognizable claim.

A suit by private parties

seeking to impose liability which must be paid from public funds in
a State treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh
13

Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the
State itself or by federal statute.

See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v.
Sdiamon–Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).

Thus, the

Eleventh Amendment protects States and their agencies and
departments from suit in federal court regardless of the type of
relief sought.

See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
Similarly, absent consent by a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal court suits for money damages against State officers in
their official capacities.
169 (1985).

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity.

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

Correspondingly, neither States, nor governmental entities that are
considered arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes are
persons within the meaning of § 1983.

See Will v. Michigan Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70–71 and n. 10 (1989); Grabow v.
Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J.
1989) (the New Jersey Department of Corrections is not a person
under § 1983).

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of

Corrections will be dismissed with prejudice.4

4

Similarly, it appears that the State of New Jersey was inadvertently
included as a defendant on the docket as a result of Plaintiff’s naming of the
State of New Jersey as a respondent in his habeas action. As such, the Clerk
of the Court is advised to remove the State of New Jersey as a defendant in
this action.

14

5. Defendants Warren, Lanigan, and “D.O.C. Division of
Operations Director”
Further, it appears that Plaintiff is asserting a claim of
liability against Commissioner Lanigan, Administrator Warren and
the “Director of D.O.C. Division of Operations” on the sole basis
that they are supervisors, in some capacity, of the New Jersey
State Prison, where the events alleged took place.

The complaint

fails to allege any facts in support of a claim based on supervisor
liability.

Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed without

prejudice as against Defendants Lanigan, Warren, and the “Director
of D.O.C. Division of Operations” pursuant to Iqbal.
As a general rule, government officials may not be held liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
theory of respondeat superior.

See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948;

Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a municipal “person”
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515–16
(1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the
misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or
negligences, or omissions of duty, of subagents or servants or
other persons properly employed by or under him, in discharge of
his official duties”).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that

“[b]ecause vicarious or supervisor liability is inapplicable to

15

Bivens5 and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
S.Ct. at 1948.

Iqbal, 129

Thus, each government official is liable only for

his or her own conduct.

The Court rejected the contention that

supervisor liability can be imposed where the official had only
“knowledge” or “acquiesced” in their subordinates conduct.

See

id., 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Here, there are no allegations of any wrongful conduct with
respect to Defendants Lanigan, Warren, and the “Director of D.O.C.
Division of Operations”, other than in their capacities as
supervisors.

Accordingly, any § 1983 claims must be dismissed

without prejudice as against these defendants.
6.

Motion to Produce Documents and to Film Evidence

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff requests several documents
from Defendants.

He also filed a separate request to “film

evidence” at the prison.

(Docket Entry No. 13.)

However,

discovery has not yet even begun and as such, these requests will
be denied as premature.
7. Motion for TRO
On June 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for a TRO and
Order to Show Cause requesting that the prison medical staff be

5

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).

16

required to treat his recently-returned navel and rectal infections
and to stop prison officials from transferring him to another
prison.

(Docket Entry No. 15.)

This Court denied said request

because at that time, the case was closed.

(Docket Entry No. 16.)

To the extent Plaintiff wishes to renew his application, now that
the case is re-opened pursuant to this opinion and order, the Court
finds that said request would be denied.
Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should
be granted only in limited circumstances.”

Novartis Consumer

Health v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d
578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted).

To

secure the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction or TRO,
plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable harm; (3) granting
the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the
defendants; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public
interest.”

Maldonado v. Houston, 157 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir.

1998)(as to a preliminary injunction); see also Ballas v. Tedesco,
41 F.Supp.2d 531, 537 (D.N.J. 1999) (as to temporary restraining
order).

A plaintiff must establish that all four factors favor

preliminary relief.

Opticians Ass’n of America v. Independent

Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990).
In this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he will
likely succeed on the merits.

By his own admission in his

application, since filing his medical request form on May 12, 2012,
17

prison medical personnel have come to his cell to address his
issues.

However, Plaintiff refused to be seen by those

individuals.

Further, Plaintiff states that in response to the

medical personnel’s decision to discontinue his back pain
medication, he has decided to voluntarily cease all medications.
Since Plaintiff has refused to allow the medical personnel to
address his issues, even though they came to his cell pursuant to
his request, he has not shown that he will likely be successful in
showing deliberate indifference on the part of these defendants.
As such, his request for a TRO will be denied without prejudice at
this time.
With regard to his request to restrain Defendants from
transferring him, Plaintiff’s request will also be denied because
he is unable to show likelihood of success on the merits.

An

inmate does not possess a liberty interest arising from the Due
Process Clause in assignment to a particular custody level,
security classification, or place of confinement.

See Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–22 (2005) (finding that the Constitution
does not give rise to liberty interest in avoiding transfers to
more adverse conditions of confinement); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25 (1976).
The custody placement or classification of state prisoners is among
the “wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have
been the business of prison administrators rather than of the
federal courts.”

Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
18

Governments, however,

may confer on inmates liberty interests that are protected by the
Due Process Clause.

“But these interests will be generally limited

to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence
in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the
Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”
(1995).

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

Thus, a convicted inmate such as Plaintiff has no liberty

interest arising under the Due Process Clause itself in remaining
in a prison facility of his choosing.

See Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 466–67 & n. 4 (1983); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150
(3d Cir. 2002).
8.

Physical Evidence

Since the filing of his complaint, Plaintiff has sent several
boxes to this Court containing what Plaintiff describes as
evidence, including, among other things, samples of rust, a used
bed sheet, soap and toothbrush.

Plaintiff is advised that it is

unnecessary for him to submit any physical evidence to the Court at
this time and he should refrain from doing so unless he expressly
seeks and receives permission from the Court.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement claim regarding his time at CRAF are dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim regarding
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his time at New Jersey State Prison and his medical claims may
proceed.

Plaintiff’s claims regarding the “open door” policy as it

relates to inmate Kato are dismissed with prejudice.

His claims

regarding the “open door” policy as it relates to Plaintiff are
dismissed without prejudice.
dismissed with prejudice.

The Department of Corrections is

Defendants Lanigan, Warren, and

“Director of D.O.C. Division of Operations” are dismissed without
prejudice.

Plaintiff’s discovery requests are denied without

prejudice as premature.

Plaintiff’s request for a TRO is denied

without prejudice.
Plaintiff may move to file an amended complaint to correct the
deficiencies, and to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate the
plausibility of the dismissed claims, as outlined in Iqbal, and in
accordance with this Opinion.
adhere to the court rules.6

Plaintiff’s motion to amend must

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 26, 2012
/s/ JOEL A. PISANO
JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge

6

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the
original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and “cannot be
utilized to cure defects in the amended [complaint], unless the relevant
portion is specifically incorporated in the new [complaint].” 6 Wright, Miller
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in
the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations
to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer
course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.

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