GOODWIN v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 8

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 8/7/2012. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., :
:
Defendants.
:
:
RASHIED GOODWIN,

Civil No. 12-515 (FLW)
OPINION

APPEARANCES:
RASHIED GOODWIN, Plaintiff pro se
# 233577C/745991
Southern State Correctional Facility
4295 Route 47
Delmont, New Jersey 08314
WOLFSON, District Judge
Plaintiff, Rashied Goodwin, a state inmate presently
confined at the Southern State Correctional Facility in Delmont,
New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis.

Based

on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file
the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes

that the Complaint should be dismissed.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Rashied Goodwin, brings this civil action,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the following defendants:
the State of New Jersey; Warden C.O. O’Neil; Deputy Warden T.
Kelly; Captain J.H. Quinn; Lt. Frank Apisa and Sgt. Anthony
Davia.

(Complaint, Amended Complaint, Caption and ¶¶ 4b, 4c).

The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint,
and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.

The Court

has made no findings as to the veracity of plaintiff’s
allegations.
On December 31, 2011, an incident report was generated by
defendants, Sgt. Davia and Lt. Apisa regarding a shakedown
conducted by Davia.

At that time, the inmates on pod 2D at the

Somerset County Jail became disruptive and the security of the
pod was compromised.

After officers had reviewed video of the

incident, Plaintiff and nineteen (19) other inmates received
disciplinary charges and were placed on pre-detention hearing on
December 31, 2011.

On January 2, 2012, a first hearing was held

by Davila, one of the reporting officers.

A second hearing was

conducted on January 4, 2012, by defendant Captain Quinn and two
members of the disciplinary committee.

Plaintiff was found

guilty of three of the four disciplinary charges, and was

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sanctioned to 30 days in lock-up.

Plaintiff claims that he was

not given any appeal forms, but on January 5, 2012, he wrote to
Warden O’Neil expressing his desire to appeal the case.

(Compl.,

¶ 6).
Plaintiff alleges that O’Neil did not respond to his appeal.
However, defendant Deputy Warden Kelly did.

Kelly upheld the

disciplinary finding, stating that it was based on substantial
evidence, and denied Plaintiff’s administrative appeal.

However,

he reduced the disciplinary sanction from 30 days to 20 days in
disciplinary detention.

(Id.).

Plaintiff states that he is innocent of the charges, having
been asleep in his bunk at the time, and that camera evidence and
witnesses can confirm his innocence.

Plaintiff asserts that his

constitutional rights were violated by all of the defendants.
(Id.).

He seeks $200,000.00 in compensatory damages.

(Compl., ¶

7).
II.

STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity.

The Court is

required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

3

defendant who is immune from such relief.
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

28 U.S.C. §§

This action is subject to sua sponte

screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94

(2007)(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).

See also United
The Court must

“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Morse v. Lower

Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

The Court

need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions”
or “legal conclusions.”

Id.

A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the
former § 1915(d)).

The standard for evaluating whether a

complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.

Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”

Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.

4

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

See also Erickson, 551 U.S.

at 93-94 (In a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court
reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).
However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard
for summary dismissal of a Complaint that fails to state a claim
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

The issue before the

Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint
adequately alleged defendants’ personal involvement in
discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during
detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true,
violated his constitutional rights.

Id.

The Court examined Rule

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).1

Citing its recent opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two
working principles underlying the failure to state a claim
standard:

1

Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).
5

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
The Court further explained that
a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must
now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is
facially plausible.

This then “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in

Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
allegations of his complaint are plausible.

6

Id. at 678-79; see

also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009).
Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides
the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard”
set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 that
applied to federal complaints before Twombly.
at 210.

Fowler, 578 F.3d

The Third Circuit now requires that a district court

must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when
presented with a motion to dismiss:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50].
Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [556 U.S. at
678-79]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.

2

In Conley, as stated above, a district court was
permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of
facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion
to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the
claim’s legal elements.
7

This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this
pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of
Plaintiff, even after Iqbal.
(2007).

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to
amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or
futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir.
2000).
III.

SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).

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IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
As a general proposition, a suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in a
state treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the
state itself or by federal statute.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).

See, e.g., Edelman v.
The Eleventh Amendment

protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in
federal court regardless of the type of relief sought.

Pennhurst

State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Similarly, absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal court suits for money damages against state officers in
their official capacities.
169 (1985).

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity.

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

Consequently, the State of New Jersey is immune from suit in
this action, and the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice
as against the State of New Jersey accordingly.

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B.

False Disciplinary Charges
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments

provides that liberty interests of a constitutional dimension may
not be rescinded without certain procedural protections.
CONST. amend. XIV.

U.S.

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),

the Supreme Court set forth the requirements of due process in
prison disciplinary hearings.

An inmate is entitled to (1)

written notice of the charges and no less than 24 hours to
marshal the facts and prepare a defense for an appearance at the
disciplinary hearing; (2) a written statement by the fact finder
as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action; and (3) an opportunity "to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense when to do so will not be
unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals."
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71.

An inmate is also entitled to an

inmate representative in some cases, and a written decision by
the factfinder as to evidence relied upon and findings.

See Von

Kahl, 855 F. Supp. 1413, 1418 (M.D. Pa. 1994)(citing Wolff, 418
U.S. at 563-72).

However, in Wolff, the Supreme Court held that,

while prisoners retain certain basic constitutional rights,
including procedural due process protections, prison disciplinary
hearings are not part of criminal prosecution, and an inmate’s
rights at such hearings may be curtailed by the demands and
realities of the prison environment.

Id. at 556-57; Young v.

Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991).
10

Here, Plaintiff does not allege in his Complaint that he was
denied the opportunity to call and question witnesses, or present
documentary evidence.

In fact, he does not allege any procedural

due process violation with respect to his prison disciplinary
proceedings, except to say that he was found guilty despite
allegedly contradictory evidence, namely, a video tape of the
incident, which he contends proves him innocent.

Nevertheless,

on appeal to the Warden/Deputy Warden, it was determined that
substantial evidence existed to support the disciplinary finding.
Thus, it appears to this Court, from the allegations in the
Complaint, that Plaintiff actually is challenging the
disciplinary charges and findings as untrue.

To the extent that

Plaintiff is challenging the result of the disciplinary
proceedings in alleging that the disciplinary charge is false,
such claim must be dismissed.

The act of filing false

disciplinary charges does not itself violate a prisoner’s
constitutional rights.

See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949,

952-53 (2d Cir. 1986)(holding that “the mere filing of [a false]
charge itself” does not constitute a cognizable claim under §
1983 so long as the inmate “was granted a hearing, and had the
opportunity to rebut the unfounded or false charges”), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137,
1140 (7th Cir. 1984)(finding that so long as prison officials
provide a prisoner with the procedural requirements outlined in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), then the prisoner
11

has not suffered a constitutional violation).

See also Creter v.

Arvonio, No. 92-4493, 1993 WL 306425, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 5,
1993); Duncan v. Neas, No. 86-109, 1988 WL 91571, at *1 (D.N.J.
Aug. 30, 1988)(determining that “the alleged knowing falsity of
the charge [does not state] a claim of deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest ... where procedural
due process protections were provided”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding
his disciplinary proceedings and alleged false disciplinary
charges will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a
claim.
C.

Due Process Claim
Finally, it would appear from the Complaint that Plaintiff

is alleging that his disciplinary detention violates due process
because he is actually innocent of the charges.

A liberty

interest protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from
either the Clause itself, or State law.

See Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Asquith v. Dep’t of Corrs., 186 F.3d 407,
409 (3d Cir. 1999).
As to convicted and sentenced prisoners, “[a]s long as the
conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is
subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not
otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause
does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison
authorities to judicial oversight.”
12

Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S.

236, 242 (1976), quoted in Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, and Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995).

Cf. Washington v. Harper, 494

U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990)(prisoner has liberty interest under Due
Process Clause in freedom from involuntary administration of
psychotropic drugs); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1980)
(prisoner has liberty interest under Due Process Clause in
freedom from involuntary transfer to mental hospital coupled with
mandatory treatment for mental illness, a punishment carrying
“stigmatizing consequences” and “qualitatively different” from
punishment generally suffered by one convicted of a crime).
“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of
misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence
imposed by a court of law.”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (upholding

sentence of 30 days disciplinary segregation after hearing at
which prisoner was not permitted to produce witnesses).
States may confer on prisoners liberty interests that are
protected by the Due Process Clause.

“But these interests will

be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give
rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force,
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (finding that disciplinary segregation
conditions that effectively mirrored those of administrative
segregation and protective custody were not “atypical and
13

significant hardships” in which a state conceivably might create
liberty interest); see Asquith, 186 F.3d at 411–12 (return to
prison from halfway house did not impose “atypical and
significant hardship” on prisoner and, thus, did not deprive him
of protected liberty interest).
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997), held that a
15–month confinement in administrative custody did not impose
“atypical and significant hardship,” even in the face of a state
regulation requiring release to the general population after 20
days in the absence of a misconduct charge.

Id. at 709.

But the

Griffin court noted that if an inmate is committed to undesirable
conditions for an atypical period of time in violation of state
law, then that is a factor to be considered in determining
whether the prisoner has been subjected to “atypical and
significant hardship” triggering due process protection.

Id. at

708.
Here, Plaintiff’s 20-day confinement in disciplinary
detention in this case did not expose him to “atypical and
significant hardship.”

Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state

a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process.
To the extent that Plaintiff is not a convicted prisoner,
but a pretrial detainee, this Court likewise finds no cognizable
due process violation.

Pretrial detainees cannot be subjected to

14

harsh conditions or treatments for retributive purposes.3

In

Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court found “that [pretrial]
detainees, not yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be
punished” and as such, “any restrictions on liberty that were
reasonably related to government objectives [must] not [be]
tantamount to punishment.”

441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).

The Third

Circuit further elucidated the Bell standard and warned that
punitive measures taken against pretrial detainees are violative
of the Due Process Clause:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for
the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident
of some other legitimate governmental purpose....[I]f a
restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a
legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental
action is punishment that may not constitutionally be
inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3d Cir.2008).
However, the Supreme Court held that “not every disability
imposed during a pretrial detention amounts to “punishment” in
the constitutional sense.”

Id.

“If a particular condition or

restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a

3

The liberty interests of pretrial detainees differ from
the liberty interests of inmates that have been sentenced.
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341-2 (3d Cir. 2000). While a
sentenced prisoner has a liberty interest only in remaining free
from “restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, the liberty interests of
pretrial detainees are subjected to a higher standard of
protection. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
15

legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to punishment.”

Id. 441 U.S. at 539.

For instance, the Court further explained that the
government has legitimate interests that stem from its need to
maintain security and order at a detention facility.

“Restraints

that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and
are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had
he been released while awaiting trial.”

Id. 441 U.S. at 540.

Retribution and deterrence, however, are not legitimate
nonpunitive governmental objectives.

Id. 441 U.S. at 539 n. 20.

Nor are grossly exaggerated responses to genuine security
considerations.

Id. at 539 n. 20, 561–62.

See also Hubbard, 399

F.3d at 157–60, 164–67; Fuentes v, Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341–42
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 821 (2000).
The Court exhorted, however, that
In determining whether restrictions or conditions are
reasonably related to the Government’s interest in
maintaining security and order and operating the institution
in a manageable fashion, courts must heed our warning
that”[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of corrections
officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in
the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated
their response to these considerations, courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n. 23 (citations omitted).

16

In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that he was singled
out for punishment.

Indeed, on the face of his Complaint, he

alleges that he was one of 19 other inmates receiving
disciplinary charges.

Moreover, his 20-day disciplinary sanction

was not excessive, harsh or a grossly exaggerated response to a
serious security incident.

Plaintiff does not allege any other

conditions of his detention that would suggest it was harsh,
atypical or exaggerated under the circumstances.

Thus, the

totality of circumstances in this case do not show a serious
deprivation or an arbitrary, purposeless, excessive restriction
to suggest that Plaintiff’s 20-day disciplinary detention was an
unconstitutional punishment.
Therefore, this Court finds no due process violation and
Plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed with prejudice accordingly,
for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint will
be dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and

1915A(b)(1) and (2).

An

appropriate order follows.

s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
Dated: August 7, 2012
17