RAMNAUTH v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 9/27/2012. (eaj)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LALL RAMNAUTH,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.
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Civil No. 12-599 (PGS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
LALL RAMNAUTH, Petitioner pro se
J-2011-03202
Essex County Correctional Facility
354 Doremus Avenue
Newark, New Jersey 07105
SHERIDAN, District Judge
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Lall
Ramnauth (“Petitioner” or “Ramnauth”) for habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his New Jersey state court
conviction.1
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss this petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because it is a second or successive habeas petition.
See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b).
1
Petitioner submitted an application to proceed in forma
pauperis, and it appears that he qualifies for indigent status.
I.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is challenging a New Jersey state court
conviction that was entered in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 02-10-01261-I.
Petitioner does not provide the date of his judgment of
conviction, but does state that he was sentenced to an aggregate
prison term of seven years subject to an 85% parole disqualifier.
(Petition at ¶¶ 1, 2 and 3).
Petitioner states that he appealed
his conviction before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, which was denied, and that his petition for
certification before the Supreme Court of New Jersey also was
denied.
However, he fails to provide the dates of these
decisions or any information as to the grounds raised on appeal.
(Pet., ¶ 9).
Petitioner also acknowledges that he sought habeas review of
his conviction in an earlier action in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, which was denied, but he
could not remember any specifics regarding his earlier habeas
action.
(Petition at ¶ 11a).
He next states that he filed a
state post-conviction relief petition, which was denied.
Petitioner appealed the decision denying his state PCR petition,
and his appeal was denied.
He again provides no dates regarding
his state collateral review proceedings, nor does he indicate the
grounds he raised on state PCR review.
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(Pet., ¶¶ 11b and 11c).
The § 2254 habeas petition suggests that Ramnauth’s state PCR
petition was filed after his first § 2254 habeas petition.
This Court takes judicial notice of Ramnauth’s earlier
§ 2254 habeas action, Ramnauth v. State of New Jersey, Civil No.
05-5504 (WJM).
That action was initially filed on or about
November 21, 2005 and was denied for lack of substantive merit by
Opinion and Order entered on December 27, 2006.
See Ramnauth v.
State of New Jersey, Civil No. 05-5504 (WJM)(Docket entry nos. 8
and 9).
In the District Court’s December 27, 2006 Opinion, the
following procedural history was recited as follows:
Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a jury verdict in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex
County, of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:121b(1), and third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful
purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d. On the aggravated assault
conviction, Petitioner was sentenced to prison for a term of
seven years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier
pursuant to the No Early Release Act (“NERA”), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2d, and to a concurrent term of four years on the
weapon conviction.
On March, 2005, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, affirmed the conviction. On May 25, 2005, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification.
(Ramnauth v. State of New Jersey, Civil No. 05-5504 (WJM),
December 27, 2006 Opinion at pg. 3, Docket entry no. 8).
Ramnauth raised the following claims for relief in his first
habeas action: (1) the introduction of hearsay testimony at trial
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
against him; (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
weapon conviction and the State failed to prove every element of
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the weapon offense; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in withholding
exculpatory evidence from the grand jury and for use of
inflammatory language during summation at trial; (4) denial of a
fair trial due to faulty jury instruction regarding the lesser
included offenses and a faulty jury verdict form; and (5)
sentencing violations.
(Ramnauth v. State of New Jersey, Civil
No. 05-5504 (WJM), December 27, 2006 Opinion at pp. 6-29, Docket
entry no. 8).
All of these claims were reviewed and denied for
lack of substantive merit.
(Id.).
It would appear that sometime after Petitioner’s first
§ 2254 petition was denied, Ramnauth filed a timely state PCR
petition.
In his state PCR petition, Ramnauth raised the
following claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (A)
counsel operated under an impermissible conflict of interest
because he represented, in previous matters, members of the
victim’s immediate family; (B) counsel failed to investigate and
impeach the State’s proofs and investigate and obtain exculpatory
witnesses and evidence on Ramnauth’s behalf for trial; (C)
counsel failed to sufficiently meet and discuss the case with
Ramnauth, and interfered with Petitioner’s right to testify at
trial by erroneously advising Petitioner not to testify due to
prior criminal history even after this history was revealed to
the jury during trial; and (D) counsel failed to assess and
advise Petitioner about immigration consequences.
4
See State v.
Ramnauth, 2010 WL 2990757, *1, 2 (N.J. Super. A.D. July 26,
2010).
The state PCR court denied Ramnauth’s petition and he
appealed to the Appellate Division.
In an unpublished per curiam
opinion, filed on July 26, 2010, the Appellate Division found
Petitioner’s claims to be without merit and affirmed the trial
court’s decision denying the state PCR petition.
Id.
Ramnauth attaches a copy of the Order of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey denying his petition for certification on appeal
from denial of his state PCR petition, dated February 3, 2011.
Thereafter, Ramnauth filed this second action on or about
January 25, 2012, challenging the very same conviction.
He
raises grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
conflict of interest in representation, and refers to these
claims as having been exhausted in his state PCR petition.
(Petition at ¶ 12).
As stated above, Ramnauth admits that he
filed an earlier habeas action in the United States District
Court.
Petitioner, however, does not state whether he first
sought permission from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit to file a second or successive habeas petition,
which he otherwise would be required to do under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(A).
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II.
A.
ANALYSIS
Sua Sponte Dismissal
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading
requirements.”
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
A
petition must “specify all the grounds for relief” and set forth
“facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified.”
See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2004), applicable to
§ 2241 petitions through Habeas Rule 1(b).
A court presented with a petition for writ of habeas corpus
“shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the
respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted,
unless it appears from the application that the applicant or
person detained is not entitled there.”
28 U.S.C. § 2243.
Thus,
“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas
petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.”
McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; see also United States v. Thomas, 221
F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000); Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025.
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than
more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be
construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance.
See Royce
v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney
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General, 878 F.2d 714, 721–22 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 912 (1970).
Nevertheless, a federal district court can
dismiss a habeas corpus petition if it appears from the face of
the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
See
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996); Siers v. Ryan, 773
F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989).
See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2254, 2255.
B.
Petitioner’s Claims for Habeas Relief
This habeas action admittedly is not Ramnauth’s first § 2254
habeas petition.
Federal law imposes strict limitations on a
United States District Court’s consideration of “second or
successive” habeas petitions.2
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(3).
In
this case, Ramnauth raises grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel that were not raised in his first § 2254 habeas petition.
2
The term “second or successive” is not defined in the
statute, but it is well settled that the phrase does not simply
“refe[r] to all § 2254 applications filed second or successively
in time.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 944 (2007). The
term has been the subject of substantial recent discussion in
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551
U.S. 930 (2007)(creating an exception for a second application
raising a claim that would have been unripe had the petitioner
presented it in his first application); Stewart v.
Martinez–Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)(treating a second
application as part of a first application where it was premised
on a newly ripened claim that had been dismissed from the first
application as premature); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)
(declining to apply the bar of § 2244(b) to a second application
where the first application was dismissed for lack of
exhaustion).
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), a claim presented in a second or
successive § 2254 petition that was not presented in an earlier §
2254 petition must be dismissed unless:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
(B)(I) the factual predicate for the claim could not have
been discovered previously through the exercise of
diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)(A), (B).
Thus, any claim that has not already been adjudicated must
be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive
rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high
probability of actual innocence.
§ 2244(b)(2).
Moreover, under
§ 2244(b)(3), before the district court may accept a successive
petition for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it
presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet
§ 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions.
See
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529–530 (2005).
If a second or successive petition is filed in the district
court without such an order from the appropriate court of
appeals, in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, the district court may dismiss for want of
jurisdiction or “shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
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transfer such action ... to any other such court in which the
action ... could have been brought at the time it was filed.”
28
U.S.C. § 1631. See also Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139
(3d Cir. 2002) (“When a second or successive habeas petition is
erroneously filed in a district court without the permission of a
court of appeals, the district court’s only option is to dismiss
the petition or transfer it to the court of appeals pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1631.”).
This Court finds that this Petition is a “second or
successive” petition over which it lacks jurisdiction, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).3
This Court further finds that it is
not in the interests of justice to transfer this action to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1631, for determination as to whether the second or successive
petition satisfies the requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2),
because at the time he filed this second habeas action, it
appears that Petitioner was not “in custody” pursuant to the
state court judgment being challenged.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Section 2254(a) provides:
3
Because this Petition is “second or successive” there is
no need to give the notice otherwise required by Mason v. Meyers,
208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000). Indeed, this Court notes that the
District Court advised Ramnauth of his rights under Mason by
Order issued to Petitioner on January 3, 2006 in his first
federal habeas action. (Ramnauth v. State of New Jersey, Civil
No. 05-5504 (WJM), Docket entry no. 2). Consequently, Petitioner
was no notice of the requirement to marshal all of his claims in
one, all-inclusive habeas petition.
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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(emphasis added).
While the “in custody”
requirement is liberally construed for purposes of habeas corpus,
a petitioner must be in custody under the conviction he is
attacking when the petition is filed, in order for this Court to
have jurisdiction.
See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-92
(1989).
No court has held that a habeas petitioner is in custody
when a sentence imposed for a particular conviction had fully
expired at the time the petition was filed.
Indeed, the Supreme
Court held that its decision in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968) “strongly implies the contrary.”
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491.
In Carafas, the Supreme Court noted that the unconditional
release of petitioner raised a ‘substantial issue’ as to whether
the statutory ‘in custody’ requirement was satisfied.
490 U.S. at 491 (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. at 238).
Maleng,
The Court
ultimately found the “in custody” requirement was satisfied in
Carafas, not because of the collateral consequences of a
conviction, but due to the fact that petitioner had been in
physical custody pursuant to the challenged conviction at the
time the petition was filed.
Carafas, 391 U.S. at 238).
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (citing
Thus, the clear implication of the
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Supreme Court’s holding is “that once the sentence imposed for a
conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of
that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an
individual ‘in custody’ for purposes of a habeas attack upon
it.”4
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492.
Here, it is evident that the state court conviction
challenged by Ramnauth had fully expired before he filed this
second § 2254 habeas petition.
He was sentenced to a seven-year
prison term, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier, on October
10, 2003.
Consequently, his full seven-year prison term would
have been satisfied on or about October 10, 2010.
Ramnauth did
not file habeas petition until January 25, 2012, almost fifteen
months later.
Furthermore, it was filed while Petitioner was in
custody pursuant to final order of removal issued by an
Immigration Judge.
Thus, it would appear that Ramnauth also may
not be entitled to relief under § 2254 because he was not “in
custody” pursuant to the state court judgment of conviction being
challenged in his habeas petition.
Accordingly, the Petition
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
4
Collateral consequences of a conviction include such
things as the deprivation of the right to vote, to hold public
office, to serve on a jury, or to engage in certain businesses.
See St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2), without prejudice to petitioner bringing an
application before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit for leave to file a second or successive § 2554
habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).
Further,
Petitioner’s application for appointment of counsel (Docket entry
no. 1-2) is denied as moot.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Peter G. Sheridan
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated: September 27, 2012
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