GOODWIN v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
21
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 3/25/2014. (jjc)
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
RASHIED K. GOODWIN,
:
:
Plaintiff
:
Civil Action No. 12-1040 (FLW)
:
v.
:
:
OPINION
:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
___________________________________ :
WOLFSON, United States District Judge:
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Detective Edward Conway (“Conway”),
Detective C. Lissner (“Lissner”), and Detective Sidorski (“Sidorski”) 1 (collectively,
“Defendants”) unopposed motion for summary judgment on the Amended Complaint
filed by pro se Plaintiff Rashied K. Goodwin (“Plaintiff”). In the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his civil rights, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985, as well as based upon supervisory liability, because they accused Plaintiff of
committing a crime that he did not commit, and for which Plaintiff was incorrectly
incarcerated as a result thereof.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the
Amended Complaint, arguing that: (i) Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity; (ii) Defendants are not amendable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985 because
they are not “persons” within the meaning of those statutes; (iii) Plaintiff has failed to
1
Defendants’ Answer provides that the Amended Complaint improperly identifies
this Defendant as “Syrdoski.”
1
establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution or false arrest; (iv) Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity; (v) Plaintiff’s false arrest claim is untimely; and (vi)
Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of tort claim. For the reasons that follow, the Court
denies without prejudice Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ L. Civ. Rule 56.1 statement of
undisputed material facts submitted in conjunction with Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and supported by attached materials. Plaintiff has not opposed Defendants’
facts or materials despite ample time set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s scheduling order.
Accordingly, I will deem Defendants’ facts to be admitted. See L. Civ. Rule 56.1(a)
(“any material fact not disputed shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary
judgment motion”). Nevertheless, I will view these facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. See Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir.
1986).
On September 26, 2009, Plainfield Police Department officers arrested Plaintiff
based upon information received by the Somerset County Organized Crime and Narcotics
Task Force (“Task Force”) from a confidential informant (“CI”). Def. Facts, ¶¶ 1, 4.
Plaintiff was incarcerated and detained from September 26 though October 1, 2009. Id.
at ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff’s booking sheet for this arrest lists Plaintiff’s alias as “Snipe.” Id. at ¶
1.
Notwithstanding these facts, around the same time that Plaintiff was arrested, and
while incarcerated, the Task Force was operating on information that an individual
known as “Snipe” was selling heroin in the Watchung and North Plainfield area. Id. at ¶
2
4. Based on this information, the Task Force arranged with its CI to purchase heroin
from Snipe during the week of September 27, 2009. Id. at ¶ 5. Task Force members
Lissner and Conway proceeded to Watchung at some point during this week to meet with
the CI; Lissner, acting undercover, joined the CI in meeting with Snipe. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.
When Lissner and the CI met with Snipe, Lissner exchanged phone numbers with Snipe,
and Snipe sold heroin to the CI. Id. at ¶¶ 8-10. No arrest was made at this time.
On October 5, 2009, Lissner called Snipe to arrange for a heroin purchase. Id. at
¶ 11. Although Snipe initially agreed to meet at 2:30pm that same day, Lissner was
unable to contact Snipe to confirm their meeting. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. However, on October
15, 2009, Snipe phoned Lissner to “make arrangements to meet and do business.” Id. at ¶
13. Lissner and Snipe then exchanged text messages and planned to meet on October 16,
2009, in a parking lot in Watchung, for Lissner to purchase heroin from Snipe. Id. at ¶¶
14-16. Prior to the meeting, Sidorski set up surveillance of the parking lot; Lissner
arrived to meet Snipe, who entered Lissner’s vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Snipe then handed
Lissner several bags of heroin, for which Lissner paid Snipe sixty dollars. Id. at ¶¶ 2021. No arrest was made at this time either.
As a result of these interactions with Snipe, the Task Force concluded that Snipe
resided in or around Plainfield, New Jersey, and accordingly contacted the Plainfield
Police Department for their assistance in identifying Snipe.
Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.
The
Plainfield Police Department informed the Task Force that Snipe might be an alias for
Plaintiff, and provided Conway, another member of the Task Force with a digital
photograph of Plaintiff.
Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.
After reviewing the photograph, Lissner
confirmed that Plaintiff and Snipe were the same individual. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Based on
3
this identification, Conway prepared an affidavit of probable cause on November 13,
2009, which stated, in relevant part: “On October 16, 2009, an undercover detective met
with [Plaintiff] . . . in Watchung, New Jersey . . . and purchased . . . heroin from
[Plaintiff] in exchange for a sum of U.S. Currency.” Id. at ¶ 28 (quoting Def. App’x, 32
(Affidavit in Support of Probable Cause)). Pursuant to the affidavit, an arrest warrant for
Plaintiff was issued on November 25, 2009, and on the same date Plaintiff was arrested. 2
Id. at ¶ 29. A grand jury later returned a two-count indictment against Plaintiff based on
Snipe’s sale of heroin to the Task Force on October 16, 2009. See id. at ¶ 30.
Several months later, during pretrial practice, Plaintiff’s public defender wrote a
letter to the prosecutor in charge of Plaintiff’s case, alerting the prosecutor that Plaintiff
had an alibi for the first alleged sale between Snipe and the CI during the week of
September 27, 2009, and requesting further discovery in that regard, including the exact
date of that sale. Id. at ¶ 31; Def. App’x, 68. The prosecutor rejected defense counsel’s
request for discovery related to the sale to the CI, explaining that Plaintiff had been
indicted for a sale of heroin to the Task Force on October 16, 2009, and, for that reason, it
was the prosecutor’s position that Plaintiff was not entitled to know the exact date of the
other sale to the CI.3 Def. Facts, ¶ 32. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defense counsel
filed a Notice of Alibi on behalf of Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 34.
In subsequent correspondence, the prosecutor acknowledged that Plaintiff had
been incarcerated from September 26 to October 1, 2009, but reasoned that because the
week of September 27 extended through October 3, Plaintiff’s alibi did not preclude him
2
Probable cause was also found to support the criminal complaint issued against
Plaintiff. See Def. Facts, ¶ 29 (citing Def. App’x, 80).
3
The prosecutor also rejected defense counsel’s discovery request in order to
protect the identity and safety of the CI. Def. Facts, ¶ 32.
4
from possibly meeting with the CI to sell heroin after Plaintiff had been released from his
incarceration. See id. at ¶ 34. Defense counsel responded by asserting that, based on the
prosecutor’s concession that Plaintiff had been incarcerated for most of the week of
September 27, the alleged sale between Snipe and the CI necessarily must have occurred
on October 3, 2009, and accordingly requested discovery of police records indicating the
same. See id. at ¶ 35. The prosecutor again rejected defense counsel’s request, relying
solely on the fact that “the investigator who conducted the sale is confident that it took
place during the time when [Plaintiff] was not in custody,” and reiterating that, in the
interest of confidentiality, the prosecutor was unwilling to release information that could
reveal the identity of the CI. See id. at ¶ 36.
Ultimately, in light of the foregoing, and following a motion by the prosecutor,
the state court judge entered an order dismissing the indictment against Plaintiff on July
2, 2010. On February 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed his first Complaint, and on March 13,
2012, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint asserting claims for deprivation of his
constitutional rights against several state defendants; pursuant to its initial screening
obligations under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against the State of New Jersey and the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office. See Dkt.
No. 8. Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d
102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir.
5
1996). The burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls
on the moving party. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir.
1999). Once the moving party has satisfied this initial burden, the opposing party must
identify “specific facts which demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue for trial.”
Orson, 79 F.3d at 1366.
Not every issue of fact will be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment; issues of fact are genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). Further, the nonmoving party cannot rest upon mere allegations; he
must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). In conducting a review of the facts, the non-moving party is
entitled to all reasonable inferences and the record is construed in the light most favorable
to that party. See Pollock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d at 864. Accordingly, it
is not the Court’s role to make findings of fact, but to analyze the facts presented and
determine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See
Brooks, 204 F.3d at 105 n.5 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249); Big Apple BMW v. BMW
of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
Lastly, where, as here, the motion is unopposed, summary judgment may only be
granted if record evidence supports the moving party’s affirmative claim(s). Anchorage
Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Where the moving
party has the burden of proof on the relevant issues, this means that the district court must
6
determine that the facts specified in or in connection with the motion entitle the moving
party to judgment as a matter of law.”).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts violations of his civil rights, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, against Defendants based on their misidentification of Plaintiff
related to certain heroin sales. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants incorrectly
concluded that Plaintiff was the individual involved in two heroin sales orchestrated by
the Task Force in 2009, and that based on their misidentification, Plaintiff was wrongly
incarcerated for six months until the state court judge ordered that Plaintiff’s indictment
be dismissed. The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants as claims for
false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution. In that connection, I note
that Plaintiff does not specify in the Amended Complaint whether his claims are asserted
against the Defendants in their official or individual capacities. Because I must construe
a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, I analyze Plaintiffs’ claims as if they are brought
against Defendants individually and in their official capacity as Police Detectives.
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that: (i)
Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (ii) Defendants are not
“persons” within the meaning of §§ 1983 and 1985; (iii) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
fails to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution of false arrest; (v) Plaintiff’s
claims are untimely; (vi) Plaintiff failed to timely file a notice of tort claim; and (vii)
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.4
4
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed
because Defendants are not “persons” under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act
(“NJCRA”). Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Complaint or Amended Complaint does Plaintiff
7
As an initial matter, the Court must address whether sovereign immunity bars
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal court suits
for money damages against state officers in their official capacities. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Here, Defendants argue, without any factual basis,
that they are immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants do not provide any
facts or argument that they are state officers, or otherwise an arm of the state.5 Simply
because Defendants may have been acting under color of state law does not necessarily
entitle them to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181
F.3d 339, 350-51 (3d Cir. 1999).
As Defendants have the burden of proving that
sovereign immunity applies, Christy v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d
Cir. 1995), which burden they have not met, I cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s claims are
not barred under the Eleventh Amendment.6
With respect to the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, the Court
notes that, in dismissing certain of Plaintiff’s claims sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), no ruling was made regarding whether Plaintiff had timely filed his
Complaint because neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint provided the dates
of Plaintiff’s arrest, incarceration, or arraignment.
Nevertheless, I noted that New
identify the NJCRA as a basis for his claims, and thus the Court need not address this
argument.
5
At most, Defendants refer to themselves in their brief accompanying their motion
for summary judgment as “State Defendants” without any further explanation, and rely
on case law suggesting that county prosecutors are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. These conclusory and irrelevant arguments concerning whether Defendants’
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity—in their apparent capacity of local police
officers—is insufficient for Defendants to meet their burden of establishing that
sovereign immunity applies.
6
For this reason, I do not reach Defendants’ argument that, as “state officials,” they
are not “persons” under §§ 1983 and 1985.
8
Jersey’s two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2, applies
to civil rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985, Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police
Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989), and thus, Plaintiff’s claims could potentially be
time barred.
A claim of false arrest, and the accompanying claim for false imprisonment,
begins to accrue immediately upon the arrest at issue. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
389-90 & n.3 (2007); Singleton v. DA Philadelphia, 411 F. App’x 470, 472 (3d Cir.
2011) (ruling that accrual of a claim for false arrest occurred on the date that the plaintiff
“was arrested and charges were filed against him”); Alexander v. Fletcher, 367 F. App’x
289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that a § 1983 false
arrest claim began to accrue on the date of arrest). Significantly, however, although the
claim accrues upon arrest, the statute of limitations does not begin to run at the same
time. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he running of the statute of limitations on
false [arrest and] imprisonment is subject to a distinctive rule . . . [.] Limitations begin to
run against an action for false imprisonment when the alleged false imprisonment ends.”
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). In that
connection, “a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such
[legal] process—when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on
charges. . . .” Id. at 389-90 (citations omitted). Put differently, the statute of limitations
for a false arrest/imprisonment claim begins to run “when the individual is released, or
becomes held pursuant to legal process,” i.e., is arraigned. Alexander v. Fletcher, 367 F.
App’x at 290 n.2 (citing Wallace, supra; emphasis added). As with other civil rights
claims, under New Jersey law, the statute of limitations for a false arrest/imprisonment
9
claims is two years. Fleming v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 255 N.J. Super. 108, 154-55
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992). 7 Thus, for the purposes of Plaintiff’s false arrest and
imprisonment claims against Defendants, I must determine when Plaintiff was released
from the arrest effected by Defendants, or first held pursuant to legal process, i.e.,
arraigned or bound by a magistrate, following his arrest by Defendants.
In connection with their motion for summary judgment, Defendants have
submitted records showing that Plaintiff was arrested on November 9, 2009 for the
alleged October 16, 2009 sale of heroin to the Task Force. Beyond that, Defendants have
not submitted any document showing the date that Plaintiff was arraigned on the charges
in the indictment, or showing when Plaintiff was released from Defendants’ custody.
Indeed, Defendants have not even shown the date that Plaintiff was indicted on the drug
charges for which he was incarcerated. Although Defendants did supply a copy of the
indictment, there is no readily apparent date.8 Because I must draw inferences in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, I cannot conclude that Plaintiff was indicted, let alone
arraigned, on or before February 22, 2010—two years prior to the date Plaintiff filed his
original Complaint. Cf. Alexander v. Fletcher, 367 F. App’x at 290 n.2 (taking judicial
notice of criminal record indicating date of arraignment for purposes of calculating
statute of limitations period). The absence of any fact in the record currently before me
7
Notably, Plaintiff’s imprisonment does not toll the running of the statute of
limitations. See Alexander, 367 F. App’x at 290-91 & n.2; see also Hughes v. Smith, 264
F. Supp. 767, 769 (D.N.J. 1967), aff’d, 389 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1968). Thus, the July 2,
2010 date when Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed does not start the running of his
statute of limitations in this case. Rather, as noted above, the pertinent date is when
Plaintiff was released from Defendants’ custody, arraigned, or otherwise became held
pursuant to “legal process.”
8
If anything, the indictment appears to have been issued in 2010, as it contains a
docketing number beginning in “10.”
10
showing when Plaintiff was arraigned or released from Defendants’ custody makes it
inappropriate
to
conclude
that
Plaintiff
failed
to
timely
bring
his
false
arrest/imprisonment claims against Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on that basis is denied.9
Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie claim
for false arrest/imprisonment, and, in any event, Defendants are protected under the
doctrine of qualified immunity. A claim for false arrest/imprisonment requires that (1)
there was an arrest; and (2) the arrest was made without probable cause. Dowling v. City
of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).10 The crux of Defendants’ arguments
is that the record clearly shows that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff,
including the affidavit of probable cause supporting arrest, the criminal complaint
indicating that probable cause had been shown, and the grand jury indictment. Relying
on this evidence, Defendants contend that summary judgment is proper because no
reasonable jury could find that probable cause was lacking for Plaintiff’s arrest, and that,
9
Defendants also move for summary judgment on “Plaintiff’s failure to show that a
notice of a claim was timely filed” pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act
(“NJTCA”). As an initial matter, I note that Defendants are not arguing that Plaintiff in
fact has not filed a notice of tort claim, only that it is not in the record. I am not
convinced by Defendants’ position that their summary judgment motion should be
granted due to Plaintiff’s failure to indicate whether a notice of tort claim had been filed.
More importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that claims for violations of
civil rights brought under § 1983 do not require compliance with the NJTCA. Fuchilla v.
Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 537 A.2d 652 (1988); see also Harris v. Latamore, Civ No. 075299(JLL), 2008 WL 2937185, at *2 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008) (“[T]his Court finds that
New Jersey has long recognized that § 1983 actions cannot be barred by the Tort Claims
Act notice provision . . . .” (citing Fuchilla, supra)). Defendants do not address why
Plaintiff should be required to file a notice of tort claim related to this § 1983 action; thus,
I find this aspect of Defendants’ motion to be meritless.
10
Similarly, a claim of malicious prosecution also requires, inter alia, a showing of
the absence of probable cause to prosecute. See Merkle v. Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d
782, 791-95 (3d Cir. 2000).
11
because the existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim,
Herman v. City of Millville, 66 F. App’x 363, 365 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2003), Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants are meritless.
Defendants’ argument is misplaced. The issue of probable cause is normally a
question for the jury. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1997),
abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007). Although
Defendants argue that the evidence submitted objectively shows that there was probable
cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, these documents only show that there was a warrant,
complaint, and indictment. Defendants have not submitted anything showing why it was
reasonable for them to believe that Plaintiff and Snipe were the same individual—for
example, Defendants have not submitted the photograph of Plaintiff that the Plainfield
Police Department supplied to the task force that Lissner relied on to identify Plaintiff as
“Snipe,” or any evidence supporting the Plainfield Police Department’s conclusion that
Plaintiff and Snipe were the same individual. United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197,
1206 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1018 (1985) (noting that probable cause is
based on “whether the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were
sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense [had been] committed.”). Here,
Defendants simply have not shown that there is insufficient evidence for a jury to make a
finding that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff; thus it would be
inappropriate for the Court to make a ruling on the issue of probable cause. Deary v.
Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 1984). Indeed, the question
of whether Defendants had a reasonable basis to arrest Plaintiff is the central disputed
12
fact in this matter, precluding an entry of summary judgment at this juncture.11 See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In light of the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment without prejudice. Defendants may re-file their motion should they obtain
additional evidence to support their arguments regarding the timeliness or merits of
Plaintiff’s claims. Furthermore, given Plaintiff’s failure to oppose Defendants’ motion,
and Plaintiff’s apparent changes of address since the filing of his Amended Complaint, as
noted on the docket, the Court directs Plaintiff to inform the Court within 20 days of this
Opinion and accompanying Order whether Plaintiff in fact wishes to continue pursuing
his claims against Defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint is denied without prejudice. Furthermore,
Plaintiff is directed to inform the Court within 20 days whether Plaintiff is continuing to
pursue his claims in the Amended Complaint against Defendants.
Dated: March 25, 2014
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J.
11
The same reasoning applies to Defendants’ qualified immunity defense—the
material dispute over probable cause is sufficient at this juncture to preclude the Court
from ruling on whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as it is unlikely
that it would be objectively reasonable for Defendants to arrest Plaintiff if they lacked
probable cause. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987).
13
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