GOODWIN v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 7

OPINION. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 8/13/2012. (TH, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., :
:
Defendants.
:
:
RASHIED GOODWIN,

Civil No. 12-1040 (FLW)
OPINION

APPEARANCES:
RASHIED GOODWIN, Plaintiff pro se
# 233577C/745991
Southern State Correctional Facility
4295 Route 47
Delmont, New Jersey 08314
WOLFSON, District Judge
Plaintiff, Rashied Goodwin, a state inmate presently
confined at the Southern State Correctional Facility in Delmont,
New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis.

Based

on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file
the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes

that the Complaint should be proceed in part.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Rashied Goodwin, brings this civil action,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the following defendants:
the State of New Jersey; the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office;
Detective Edward Conway; Detective C. Lissner; and Detective
Syrdoski.

(Complaint, Amended Complaint, Caption and ¶¶ 4b, 4c).

The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint,
and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.

The Court

has made no findings as to the veracity of plaintiff’s
allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and
imprisoned on fabricated allegations by Detectives Conway and
Lissner of the Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office.

In

particular, Plaintiff alleges that Conway reported that Plaintiff
had sold him a quantity of “CDS” on September 27, 2009 and
another day in October 2009.

Detective Syrdoski generated a

police report that allegedly confirmed these false allegations.
(Compl., ¶¶ 4d, 6).
Plaintiff’s attorney confirmed that Plaintiff had been in
police custody on the dates in question and prepared a Notice of
Alibi to dismiss the criminal charges.

On July 2, 2010, the

Honorable Paul Armstrong, J.S.C., dismissed the case and

2

Plaintiff was released from custody after having been detained
pretrial for six months.

(Compl., ¶¶ 5, 6).

$150,000.00 in compensatory damages.

Plaintiff seeks

(Compl. and Amended Compl.,

¶ 7).
II.

STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity.

The Court is

required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

28 U.S.C. §§

This action is subject to sua sponte

screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94

(2007)(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).

See also United
The Court must

“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

3

Morse v. Lower

Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

The Court

need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions”
or “legal conclusions.”

Id.

A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the
former § 1915(d)).

The standard for evaluating whether a

complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.

Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”

Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

See also Erickson, 551 U.S.

at 93-94 (In a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court
reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).
However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard
for summary dismissal of a Complaint that fails to state a claim
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

The issue before the

Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint
adequately alleged defendants’ personal involvement in
discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during
detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true,
violated his constitutional rights.

4

Id.

The Court examined Rule

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).1

Citing its recent opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two
working principles underlying the failure to state a claim
standard:
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
The Court further explained that
a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

1

Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).
5

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must
now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is
facially plausible.

This then “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in

Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
allegations of his complaint are plausible.

Id. at 678-79; see

also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009).
Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides
the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard”
set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 that
applied to federal complaints before Twombly.
at 210.

Fowler, 578 F.3d

The Third Circuit now requires that a district court

2

In Conley, as stated above, a district court was
permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of
facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion
to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the
claim’s legal elements.
6

must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when
presented with a motion to dismiss:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50].
Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [556 U.S. at
678-79]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.
This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this
pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of
Plaintiff, even after Iqbal.
(2007).

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89

Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to
amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or
futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir.
2000).
III.

SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

7

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
As a general proposition, a suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in a
state treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the
state itself or by federal statute.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
8

See, e.g., Edelman v.
The Eleventh Amendment

protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in
federal court regardless of the type of relief sought.

Pennhurst

State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Similarly, absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal court suits for money damages against state officers in
their official capacities.
169 (1985).

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity.

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

Consequently, the State of New Jersey is immune from suit in
this action, and the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice
as against the State of New Jersey accordingly.
B.

Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff alleges that the Somerset County Prosecutor’s

Office brought false charges against him in violation of his
constitutional rights.

A prosecutor is absolutely immune from

suit for all actions and decisions undertaken in furtherance of
his prosecutorial duties.
(1976).

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410

The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is absolutely

immune from damages under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” such
as “initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State’s
case,” id. at 430–31, including use of misleading or false
testimony and suppression of evidence favorable to the defense by
a police fingerprint expert and investigating officer.

Since

Imbler, the Supreme Court has held that “absolute immunity
9

applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial
proceeding, or appears in court to present evidence in support of
a search warrant application[,but] absolute immunity does not
apply when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal
investigation, when the prosecutor makes statements to the press,
or when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness in support of
a warrant application.”

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335,

343 (2009)(citations omitted).
Thus, because a prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages
under § 1983 for presenting or withholding evidence in the
furtherance of judicial proceedings, Plaintiff’s damage claim
against the Somerset County Prosecutor for pursuing false charges
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.3
C.

False Arrest and Imprisonment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and

imprisoned based on lies by Detective Conway and Detective

3

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages from
supervisory prosecutors for failing to adequately supervise, the
claim fails. “Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior [and] a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1948. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that a supervisory defendant can be liable for
“knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ [misconduct.]”
Id. Moreover, in Van de Kamp, the Supreme Court held that a
supervisory prosecutor is absolutely immune for failing to
adequately train and supervise district attorneys on the duty not
to withhold impeachment evidence and failing to create any system
for accessing information pertaining to the benefits provided to
jailhouse informants. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344–45.
10

Lissner.

This Court construes these allegations as a claim of

false arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment actionable under § 1983.

See Walmsley v. Philadelphia,

872 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1989)(citing cases); see also Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994)(§ 1983 claim for false arrest
may be based upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures).
To state a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) there was an arrest; and (2) the
arrest was made without probable cause.

Dowling v. City of

Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).

Moreover “where

the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee
has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a
detention pursuant to that arrest.” Groman v. Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995); Palma v. Atlantic County, 53 F. Supp.2d
743, 755 (D.N.J. 1999)(citing Groman).

“[P]robable cause to

arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been
or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”

Adams v.

Officer Eric Selhorst, 2011 WL 5068087, at * 2 (3d Cir. October
26, 2011)(citing Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483
(3d Cir. 1995)).
A claim of false arrest (and the accompanying claim for
false imprisonment) accrues immediately upon the arrest at issue,
11

and the period of limitations begins to run as soon as the false
imprisonment ends, i.e., when the arrestee becomes held pursuant
to legal process.4

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).

See

also Singleton v. DA Philadelphia, 411 Fed. Appx. 470, 472 (3d
Cir. 2011)(ruling that accrual of a claim for false arrest
occurred on the date that the plaintiff “was arrested and charges
were filed against him”); Alexander v. Fletcher, 367 Fed. Appx.
289, 290–91 (3d Cir. 2010)(affirming the district court’s
conclusion that a § 1983 false arrest claim began to accrue on
the date of arrest); Montgomery v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126
(3d Cir. 1998)(a claim for false arrest, “covers [ ] only [ ] the
time of detention until the issuance of process or arraignment,
and not more,” citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484
(1994)).

“Thereafter, unlawful detention forms part of the

damages for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious
prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence
of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.”
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389-90 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court considered and rejected the argument that
a Heck-like deferred-accrual rule must delay the accrual of false
arrest claims.
This would end the matter, were it not for the [prisoner’s]
contention that Heck v. Humphrey ... compels the conclusion
4

Hence, the injury of false arrest/false imprisonment can
be based solely on the events/restraint that takes place from the
moment of arrest and until the moment of arrestee being held
pursuant to legal process, e.g., arraignment.
12

that his [false arrest] suit could not accrue until the
State dropped its charges against him. [T]he Heck rule for
deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists
“a conviction or sentence that has not been ...
invalidated,” that is to say, an “outstanding criminal
judgment.” It delays what would otherwise be the accrual
date of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant
conviction which success in that tort action would
impugn.... What [prisoner] seeks, in other words, is the
adoption of a principle that goes well beyond Heck; that an
action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction
cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set
aside. The impracticality of such a rule should be obvious.
In an action for false arrest it would require the plaintiff
(and if he brings suit promptly, the court) to speculate
about whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it will
result in conviction, and whether the pending civil action
will impugn that verdict, ...-all this at a time when it can
hardly be known what evidence the prosecution has in its
possession. And what if the plaintiff (or the court)
guesses wrong, and the anticipated future conviction never
occurs, because of acquittal or dismissal? Does that event
(instead of the Heck-required setting aside of the extant
conviction) trigger accrual of the cause of action? Or what
if prosecution never occurs-what will the trigger be then?
We are not disposed to embrace this bizarre extension of
Heck. If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he
has been convicted (or files any other claim related to
rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated
criminal trial), it is within the power of the district
court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil
action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a
criminal case is ended.... If the plaintiff is ultimately
convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that
conviction, Heck will require dismissal [without prejudice
to filing an action for wrongful conviction if that
conviction is eventually overturned]; otherwise, the civil
action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit ....
There is, however, one complication that we must address
here. It arises from the fact that § 1983 actions ...
sometimes accrue before the setting aside of-indeed, even
before the existence of-the related criminal conviction.
That of course is the case here, and it raises the question
whether, assuming that the Heck bar takes effect when the
later conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations on
the once valid cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck
bar subsists.... We have generally referred to state law
for tolling rules .... [We are not] inclined to adopt a
federal tolling rule to this effect.
13

Id. at 391-94 (citations omitted).
Elaborating on the gist of Wallace, the Court of Appeals
observed,
In Wallace, the Court refused to extend Heck [-based
deferred accrual] to a § 1983 claim for false arrest in
which there was no outstanding conviction at the time of the
accrual.... See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. The Court ...
clarified that the Heck [prematurity] bar is applicable only
when, at the time the § 1983 suit would normally accrue,
there is an existing criminal conviction.
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2010).
Therefore, in this case, Heck’s deferred accrual rule does
not apply, and Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment false
arrest/imprisonment claim accrued, at the latest, when he
appeared before a Magistrate Judge and was bound over for trial
or arraigned on charges.

See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–392.

See

also Singleton, 411 Fed. Appx. at 472 (false arrest claim accrued
on the date plaintiff was arrested and charges were filed);
Alexander, 367 Fed. Appx. at 290–91.

Plaintiff’s imprisonment

does not toll the running of the statute of limitations.

See

Hughes v. Smith, 264 F. Supp. 767, 769 (D.N.J. 1967), aff’d, 389
F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1968).

Thus, the July 2, 2010 date when

Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed does not start the running of
his statute of limitations in this case.
The Complaint does not provide the date of Plaintiff’s
arrest or when he was arraigned on charges.

However, it is

presumed to have occurred before July 2, 2010, but after October
2009.

Consequently, there appears to be an issue as to the
14

timeliness of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, and such claim may
be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.5
Nevertheless, as the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, the pertinent accrual dates are not known at this
juncture, and Plaintiff has otherwise pled facts of a false
arrest claim that may be sufficient to avoid summary dismissal at
this preliminary screening stage, this Court will allow this
claim to proceed at this time.
D.

Malicious Prosecution Claim
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert an

unconstitutional malicious prosecution claim, this claim will
also be dismissed with respect to the Somerset County Prosecutor.
As stated above, a prosecutor is absolutely immune for actions
performed in the role of advocate.

See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.

However, Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution against
the detectives is not subject to absolute immunity.

A claim of

malicious prosecution against an officer for a particular crime
under § 1983 “alleges the abuse of the judicial process by
government agents.”

Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217,

225 (3d Cir. 1998).

“To prove malicious prosecution under § 1983

when the claim is under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)

5

New Jersey’s two-year limitations period on personal
injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2, applies to civil rights claims
under § 1983. Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t, 892
F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989).
15

the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant
initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the
defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing
the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as
a consequence of a legal proceeding.”

Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d

75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007)(footnote omitted); see also Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that detective/officers in the
prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal proceeding against
Plaintiff, knowing that the charges against him were false.
Plaintiff further alleges that he was incarcerated for six months
pending trial before the charges were dismissed.

Finally, the

allegations of the Complaint show that the prosecution terminated
in his favor, namely, that the Judge dismissed the charges
against Plaintiff when an alibi defense was confirmed by police
records showing that Plaintiff was in custody on the dates of the
charged offenses.

Under these circumstances, as alleged, if

true, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against the
nonimmune detective defendants will be allowed to proceed at this
time.
E.

Appointment of Counsel
On or about March 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application

for appointment of counsel in this matter.

(Docket entry no. 4).

Indigent persons raising civil rights claims have no absolute
16

constitutional right to counsel.
454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997).

Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d

In determining whether to appoint

counsel, a court should consider several factors:
As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff’s claim must
have some merit in fact and law. ... If the district
court determines that the plaintiff’s claim has some
merit, then the district court should consider the
following factors:
(1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her
own case;
(2) the complexity of the legal issues;
(3) the degree to which factual investigation will
be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue
such investigation;
(4) the amount a case is likely to turn on
credibility determinations;
(5) whether the case will require the testimony of
expert witnesses;
(6) whether the plaintiff can attain and afford
counsel on his own behalf.
[Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56, 157 n.5 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1196 (1994).] This list
of factors is not exhaustive, but instead should serve
as a guide post for the district courts.
Correspondingly, courts should exercise care in
appointing counsel because volunteer lawyer time is a
precious commodity and should not be wasted on
frivolous cases. Id. at 157.
Parham, 126 F.3d at 457-58.
Applying these factors to this case, the Court is not
inclined to allow appointment of counsel at this time.
Plaintiff’s claims in his Complaint do not involve complex issues
of law or fact, and it is unlikely that there will be a need for
extensive investigation and discovery for plaintiff to prepare
and present his case for trial.

Plaintiff also appears to be
17

articulate and demonstrates an understanding of the legal issues
and ability to prepare documents and present his case coherently.
Finally, expert testimony is not essential to plaintiff’s ability
to present his case, and it is not apparent at this time that the
case will necessarily rest on credibility determinations that
would necessitate appointment of counsel.

Thus, the only factor

weighing in favor of appointment of counsel is plaintiff’s
indigency.

Given the balance of factors against appointment of

counsel at this time, the Court will deny plaintiff’s application
for appointment of counsel without prejudice to him renewing such
application at a later time if the circumstance in this case so
warrant.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint will
be dismissed with prejudice, in its entirety, as to defendants,
the State of New Jersey and the Somerset County Prosecutor’s
Office, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),(iii) and
1915A(b)(1) and(2).

The Complaint will be allowed to proceed as

to the remaining defendants, Detective Edward Conway, Detective
C. Lissner, and Detective Syrdoski, at this time.

Finally,

Plaintiff’s application for appointment of counsel will be denied
without prejudice.

An appropriate order follows.

s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
Dated: 8/13/2012
18