PALADINO v. NEWSOME et al
Filing
70
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 8/29/2013. (kas, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Brian PALADINO,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 12-2021
v.
OPINION
K. NEWSOME, et al.,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter has come before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Plaintiff Brian Paladino (“Plaintiff”). (Docket Entry No. 64). Defendants Warren, Crothers,
Gerdes, Nellsen, Holder, and Lanigan 1 (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion. (Docket
Entry No. 66). The Court has decided the motion after considering the parties’ written
submissions and without oral argument, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For
the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
II.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts of this case and
recites briefly those facts relevant to the Court’s decision. On April 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed a
complaint, (Docket Entry No. 1), and then on June 28, 2012, filed an amended complaint
(collectively, “Complaint”), (Docket Entry No. 3). In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief for a
number of constitutional violations. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the Eighth
Amendment by (1) using excessive force on two occasions when several officers allegedly beat
1
As neither party has provided full names for each defendant, the Court refers to them by last name only.
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Plaintiff; (2) subjecting him to substandard conditions of confinement by limiting him to three
showers per week and depriving him of meals, recreation, contact visitation, educational
programs, hygiene supplies, cleaning supplies, and the opportunity to earn good time credits; and
(3) providing inadequate medical care, particularly by taking his prescription eyeglasses and
dentures. (Id.). He also claims that Defendants violated the First Amendment by denying him
access to religious services. (Id.). He claims they also denied him access to the courts by failing
to provide him with adequate paralegal assistance in violation of his First Amendment and Due
Process rights. (Id.). Finally, he claims that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of meals, cleaning supplies, writing supplies, and
hygiene supplies that were provided to similarly situated inmates. (Id.).
On August 13, 2012, the Court dismissed several of Plaintiff’s claims sua sponte under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. (Docket Entry Nos. 4, 5). Plaintiff was permitted to proceed
with only his claims for (1) excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) conditions
of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (3) inadequate medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (4) disparate treatment in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Docket Entry No. 4).
On January 4, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment as
to those remaining claims. (Docket Entry No. 45). Plaintiff opposed the motion on grounds that
(1) the Court’s sua sponte review of the Complaint precluded Defendants from making a motion
to dismiss; and (2) summary judgment was premature because Plaintiff had not had the
opportunity to conduct discovery. (Docket Entry No. 47). As the Court found those arguments
inadequate to address the issues raised by Defendants in their motion, the Court provided
Plaintiff with an additional opportunity to respond to Defendants’ motion. (See Docket Entry
No. 50). Specifically, the Court instructed Plaintiff to submit any evidence, including
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documents, affidavits or declarations, that address whether Plaintiff exhausted administrative
remedies prior to initiating this lawsuit. (Id.). Plaintiff submitted such materials on February 26,
2013. (Docket Entry No. 53).
On June 27, 2013, the Court issued an Opinion (“June 27 Opinion”), granting
Defendants’ motion in part and denying in part. (Docket Entry No. 57). Of relevance to the
proceedings at this stage, the Court granted summary judgment on a number of Plaintiff’s claims
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 2 (Id.). Specifically, the Court granted summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force and inadequate medical
treatment. (Id.). The Court also granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
challenge to the conditions of his confinement to the extent that claim involved allegations of
meal deprivation, visitation rights, showering, educational programs, and cleaning supplies.
(Id.). In granting summary judgment on those claims, the Court noted that Plaintiff had not
contested the completeness of the set of Inmate Remedy Systems Forms (“IRSFs”) submitted by
Defendants in support of their motion. (Id.). Using those records, the Court concluded that
Plaintiff had not submitted IRSFs for those Eighth Amendment claims and, therefore, had not
exhausted administrative remedies. (Id.).
The Court also denied summary judgment on two claims: the Eighth Amendment claim
concerning inadequate hygiene supplies and exercise and the Fourteenth Amendment claim for
denial of hygiene and writing supplies. (Id.). (Id.). Defendants had argued that although
Plaintiff submitted IRSFs to support those claims, he had not exhausted administrative remedies
because he had not appealed the prison’s responses as required. (Id.). Plaintiff presented
evidence, however, that he had not been notified of the outcome of those IRSFs and, therefore,
2
The Court also held that Defendants Warren, Nellsen, and Lanigan were not entitled to dismissal under theories of
qualified immunity or respondeat superior. (Id.).
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could not appeal. (Id.). As such, the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether Plaintiff exhausted the administrative remedies available to him and denied
summary judgment as to those claims. (Id.). Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of the
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment on certain claims. (Docket Entry No. 64).
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy” and should be “granted very sparingly.”
See L. CIV. R. 7.1(I) cmt.6(d) (internal quotations omitted); Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., 545 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2008) (“The standard for reconsideration is
high and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.”). A proper motion for reconsideration
“must rely on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence not previously available; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law
or prevent manifest injustice.” North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Motions for reconsideration “are not an opportunity to argue what could have been, but
was not, argued in the original set of moving and responsive papers,” nor are such motions “an
opportunity for the parties to avail themselves of additional briefing.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n Act, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2001). In other words, such
motions “should not provide the parties an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.” Tischio v.
Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J. June 29, 1998).
IV.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment on
certain Eighth Amendment claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Docket Entry
No. 64). Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied for failure to comply
with Local Civil Rule 7.2, which requires a party to file moving papers and a brief in separate
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documents. (Docket Entry No. 66 at 3). While Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff has
failed to submit a brief in a separate document, it is “always within the discretion of a court . . .
to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it
when in a given case the ends of justice require it.” Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv.,
397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970) (internal quotations omitted). “Enforcement of local district court
rules therefore must be tempered with due consideration of the circumstances of the dispute.”
Hitachi Capital Am. Corp. v. Nussbaum Sales Corp., No. 09-731, 2010 WL 1379804, at *3
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010) (citing Cohen v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 782 F.2d 923, 924 (11th Cir.
1986)). The Third Circuit has clarified that a “district court can depart from the strictures of its
own local procedural rules where (1) it has a sound rationale for doing so, and (2) so doing does
not unfairly prejudice a party who has relied on the local rule to his detriment.” U.S. v. Eleven
Vehicles, Their Equip. & Accessories, 200 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000). In accordance with
these principles, the Court will exercise its discretion to relax the procedural rules and consider
Plaintiff’s motion despite its procedural deficiency. In determining that such leniency is
necessary, the Court notes that Plaintiff has complained that the prison refuses to provide him
with adequate legal supplies, including paper. (Docket Entry No. 64 at ¶ 4). As filing separate
papers may, therefore, be difficult for Plaintiff and there is no suggestion that Defendants have
relied on this Local Civil Rule to their detriment, the Court will now consider Plaintiff’s motion.
Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds it necessary to grant
reconsideration on one issue. In the June 27 Opinion, the Court granted summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim regarding a 2010 incident in which
Newsome, Perkins, Antionello, Crothers, and Gerdes allegedly threw Plaintiff to the floor and
beat him. (Docket Entry No. 57 at 10-11). Plaintiff points out, however, that Defendants
submitted a set of IRSFs in support of their motion that spans only May 2011 through June 28,
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2012. (Docket Entry No. 64 at ¶ 2; see also Docket Entry No. 45, Attach. 2 at ¶ 11). The Court
agrees, therefore, that Defendants did not show that Plaintiff failed to submit an IRSF concerning
that incident as he could have submitted an IRSF prior to May 2011. As Defendants bear the
burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff exhausted
administrative remedies, the Court will, therefore, vacate its June 27 Opinion to the extent it
granted summary judgment as to that excessive force claim.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s other arguments in favor of reconsideration,
however. Plaintiff argues primarily that he did in fact exhaust all administrative remedies
available to him. (Docket Entry No. 64 at ¶ 1). Absent some evidence or argument to support
this, however, the Court is unchanged. Plaintiff contends that he provided such evidence in the
form of “certified copies of administrative appeals, and other documentation showing how the
IRSF system forms are manipulated . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 4). The Court, having re-examined these
submissions, however, finds nothing to alter its conclusion that Plaintiff failed to submit IRSFs
for certain claims. 3
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants “have hindered [him] through affirmative
misconduct, improper handling of IRSF forms, not sending out [his] legal mail, not permitting
any legal phone calls, not sending out personal mail to family, not permitting phone calls to
family, refusing to provide needed legal stationary suplies (sic) . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 3). He also
contends that “numerous” IRSFs and administrative appeals have “gone missing” since August
2010. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7). Importantly, however, Plaintiff does not contend that he submitted IRSFs
for any of the claims previously dismissed by the Court for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that a genuine issue of material existed as to
3
Plaintiff’s submissions focus on the content of the prison’s responses to his IRSFs, complaining that they were
inadequate or “offensive.” (See Docket Entry No. 53, Attachs. 6, 7). His submissions do not demonstrate that
Plaintiff submitted any IRSFs for his claims that have not been received by the Court.
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whether he exhausted administrative remedies and the Court determines that reconsideration is
not necessary to correct clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is granted in part and
denied in part. An appropriate order will follow.
/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
Date:
August 29, 2013
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