ROBINSON v. DR.LEE, DENTAL SURGEON et al
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 10/9/2012. (eaj)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILFRED ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. LEE, DENTAL SURGEON,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 12-2470 (AET)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiff pro se
Wilfred Robinson
Northern State Prison
Newark, NJ 07114
THOMPSON, District Judge
Plaintiff Wilfred Robinson, a convicted and sentenced
prisoner confined at Northern State Prison in Newark, New Jersey,
seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
Based on his affidavit of indigence and the absence of three
qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the Court will
grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court
to file the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s
Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.
Plaintiff alleges that he went to the Northern State Prison
medical department for a tooth extraction by Defendant Dr. Lee.
Plaintiff alleges that the instrument broke and a dental bit went
up into his gum.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Lee was unable to
retrieve the bit and said that Plaintiff should be taken
immediately to the University Hospital for treatment.
Plaintiff
alleges that Dr. Lee then left, without ensuring that Plaintiff
would get the proper follow-up treatment.
Plaintiff was returned
to his cell where Plaintiff’s interim requests for treatment were
ignored and where the bit came out of his gums two days later
while Plaintiff was sleeping.
In addition to Dr. Lee, Plaintiff
names as Defendants University Hospital,1 the Department of
Corrections, and Northern State Prison.
Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages.
1
It appears that Plaintiff is referring to the University
of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.
2
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time,
certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions
brought with respect to prison conditions).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Court must
“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
In addition, any complaint must comply with the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement
need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim
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is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106
S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to
dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level ... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
Twombly pleading standard applies to civil rights complaints.
See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.
2008).
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized that,
when assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court
must distinguish factual contentions -- which allege behavior on
the part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one or
more elements of the claim asserted -- and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a
district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but
must permit the amendment.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
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(1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Shane
v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg
County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person2 acting
2
Neither states, nor governmental entities that are
considered arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, are
"persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70-71 and n.10 (1989); Grabow
v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39
(D.N.J. 1989) (the New Jersey Department of Corrections is not a
"person" under § 1983); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d
Cir. 1973) (New Jersey Prison Medical Department is not a
"person" under § 1983). Accordingly, all claims against the
Department of Corrections and Northern State Prison will be
dismissed with prejudice.
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under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Title 28 Sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2) require
this Court to dismiss this action if it “seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
As a general proposition, a suit by private parties seeking
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in a
state treasury is barred from federal court by the Eleventh
Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment immunity is waived by the
state itself or by federal statute.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
See, e.g., Edelman v.
The Eleventh Amendment
protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in
federal court regardless of the type of relief sought.
Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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Accordingly, to the extent not otherwise dismissible, all
claims against the New Jersey Department of Corrections will be
dismissed in accordance with the Eleventh Amendment.3
B.
The Eighth Amendment Medical-Care Claim
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the individual states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the states from inflicting “cruel and
unusual punishments” on those convicted of crimes.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-46 (1981).
Rhodes v.
This proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials
provide inmates with adequate medical care.
429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
Estelle v. Gamble,
In order to set forth a cognizable
claim for a violation of his right to adequate medical care, an
inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior
on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate
indifference to that need.
Id. at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the
inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious.
“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have
unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to
medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if
3
University Hospital, however, is not the alter ego of the
state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Fuchilla v. Layman,
109 N.J. 319 (N.J. 1988); Smith v. Hayman, 2012 WL 3024429, *1
n.4 (3d Cir. July 25, 2012); Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Oeprations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989).
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those needs are ‘serious.’”
(1992).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
Serious medical needs include those that have been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or that are so
obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for
doctor’s attention, and those conditions which, if untreated,
would result in lifelong handicap or permanent loss.
Monmouth
County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate to
show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to
his serious medical need.
“Deliberate indifference” is more than
mere malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind equivalent
to reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994).
Farmer v.
Furthermore, a prisoner’s
subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does not in
itself indicate deliberate indifference.
Andrews v. Camden
County, 95 F.Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000); Peterson v. Davis,
551 F.Supp. 137, 145 (D. Md. 1982), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1453 (4th
Cir. 1984).
Similarly, “mere disagreements over medical judgment
do not state Eighth Amendment claims.”
White v. Napoleon, 897
F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
“Where prison authorities deny reasonable requests for
medical treatment, however, and such denial exposes the inmate
‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,’
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deliberate indifference is manifest.
Similarly, where ‘knowledge
of the need for medical care [is accompanied by the] ...
intentional refusal to provide that care,’ the deliberate
indifference standard has been met.
...
Finally, deliberate
indifference is demonstrated ‘[w]hen ... prison authorities
prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for
serious medical needs or deny access to a physician capable of
evaluating the need for such treatment.”
Monmouth County Corr.
Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (citations omitted).
“Short of absolute denial, ‘if necessary medical treatment [i]s
... delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate
indifference has been made out.”
Id. (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Lee knew that the
instrument had broken off in Plaintiff’s gums, expressed the
professional opinion that Plaintiff required emergency follow-up
treatment in a hospital, but left without ensuring that Plaintiff
received appropriate follow-up treatment is sufficient to state a
claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
against Dr. Lee.
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts, however, to state
a claim against University Hospital.
It is not clear whether he
intends to base liability upon University Hospital’s status as a
contractor with the Department of Corrections or as Dr. Lee’s
employer, but § 1983 does not allow for vicarious liability.
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“A
defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement
in the alleged wrongs, liability cannot be predicated solely on
the operation of respondeat superior.
Personal involvement can
be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.”
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
Accord Robinson
v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293-96 (3d Cir. 1997);
Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Lee’s conduct resulted from
any policy or practice of University Hospital.
Accordingly, the
claim against University Hospital will be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
See Overton v. Shrager,
2011 WL 29037363, *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011).
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment medical-care claim may proceed as against Dr. Lee.
Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed as against all other
defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Anne E. Thompson
Anne E. Thompson
United States District Judge
Dated: October 9, 2012
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