RAMNAUTH v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 4

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 3/1/2013. (eaj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
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:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, :
et. al.,
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Respondents.
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:
LALL B. RAMNAUTH,

Civil Action No. 12-2499 (PGS)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
LALL B. RAMNAUTH, Petitioner Pro Se
# J-2011-03202
354 Doremus Avenue
Newark, New Jersey 07105
SHERIDAN, District Judge
This matter is before the Court by application of petitioner
Lall B. Ramnauth for a writ of error coram nobis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a).

For reasons discussed below, the petition will

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Lall B. Ramnauth, filed a petition for a writ of
error coram nobis on or about April 24, 2012.1

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According to the

Pursuant to the “prison mailbox rule,” a habeas petition
is deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivers it to prison
officials for mailing, not on the date the petition is ultimately
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allegations and attachments to his petition, Petitioner was
convicted in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County,
on or about August 7, 2003, on charges of aggravated assault and
unlawful possession of a weapon.

He was sentenced to seven years

in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier.
Exhibits A, B).

(Petition, pg. 4 and

Petitioner complains that he was ineffectively

represented by counsel because counsel never advised Petitioner
about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction,
namely, that Petitioner would be subject to deportation.

(Pet.,

pg. 4).
Petitioner filed a state court petition for post-conviction
relief (“PCR”), which was eventually denied.

The Supreme Court

of New Jersey denied certification on Petitioner’s appeal from
denial of his state PCR petition.

(Pet., pg. 5, Ex. J).

filed with the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71
(1988); see also Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir.
1988) (applying prison mailbox rule set forth in Houston, which
dealt with filing of an appeal, to a pro se prisoner’s filing of
a habeas petition). Although the Court is unable to determine
the exact date that Petitioner handed his petition to prison
officials for mailing, Petitioner signed a certification of his
petition on April 24, 2012. See Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d
159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1988) (using date prisoner signed petition
as date he handed it to prison officials for purposes of
calculating timeliness of habeas petition). Accordingly, this
Court finds April 24, 2012 was the date this petition was filed
for purposes of calculating the timeliness of the petition, and
not the date the petition was received by the Clerk of the Court
on April 27, 2012.
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On December 22, 2010, removal proceedings were commenced
against Petitioner based on his arson conviction.

A removal

order was issued on November 1, 2011, but Petitioner appealed.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s
appeal on March 2, 2012.

After the removal order was first

issued, and after his state PCR proceedings completed, Petitioner
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in this District Court, Ramnauth v. State of New
Jersey, Civil No. 12-599 (PGS).

Petitioner continues to appeal

his removal order and the matter currently is pending in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

(Pet., pg.

4 and Exs. E, F, G, H and I).
At the time that Petitioner filed this petition, he is in
custody pursuant to the removal order.

It is plain that

Petitioner is no longer confined pursuant to the state court
judgment of conviction that he now challenges, as admitted by
Petitioner, he was released from state custody on July 11, 2008
and he completed his 3 years of parole immediately thereafter.
(Pet., pg. 5).
II.

STANDARDS FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

As Petitioner is seeking relief from a state court
conviction, this application is best construed as a habeas
petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

United States Code

Title 28, Section 2243 provides in relevant part as follows:
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A court, justice or judge entertaining an application
for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ
or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause
why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from
the application that the applicant or person detained is
not entitled thereto.
Petitioner brings his habeas petition as a pro se litigant.
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A

pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be
construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance.

See Royce

v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney
General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 912 (1970).

Nevertheless, a federal district court can

dismiss a habeas petition if it appears from the face of the
application that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

See

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996); Siers v. Ryan, 773
F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989).
III.

“IN CUSTODY” JURISDICTION

Because Petitioner is challenging a state court conviction,
his action for habeas relief is properly considered under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 2254 provides:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,
or a district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground
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that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(emphasis added).

While the “in custody”

requirement is liberally construed for purposes of habeas corpus,
a petitioner must be in custody under the conviction he is
attacking when the petition is filed, in order for this Court to
have jurisdiction.

See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-92

(1989).
No court has held that a habeas petitioner is in custody
when a sentence imposed for a particular conviction had fully
expired at the time the petition was filed.

Indeed, the Supreme

Court held that its decision in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968) “strongly implies the contrary.”

Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491.

In Carafas, the Supreme Court noted that the unconditional
release of petitioner raised a ‘substantial issue’ as to whether
the statutory ‘in custody’ requirement was satisfied.
490 U.S. at 491 (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. at 238).

Maleng,

The Court

ultimately found the in custody requirement was satisfied in
Carafas, not because of the collateral consequences of a
conviction, but due to the fact that petitioner had been in
physical custody pursuant to the challenged conviction at the
time the petition was filed.
Carafas, 391 U.S. at 238).

Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (citing
Thus, the clear implication of the

Supreme Court’s holding is “that once the sentence imposed for a

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conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of
that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an
individual ‘in custody’ for purposes of a habeas attack upon
it.”2

Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492.
Here, it is evident that the state court conviction and

sentence now challenged by Petitioner had fully expired before he
filed for federal habeas relief.

He was sentenced to a seven-

year prison term, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier, on
October 10, 2003.

Petitioner admits that was released from state

custody on July 11, 2008 and completed his term of parole three
years later.
April 2012.

He did not file this application for relief until
Moreover, it is evident from the allegations in

Petitioner’s action that Petitioner is an immigration detainee
who is now confined pursuant to a removal order.
Petitioner did not file this habeas petition until April 24,
2012, long after he was released from state custody.

Thus,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2254 and his
petition is subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Federal habeas relief in this regard also is not available
because it is a prohibited successive habeas petition.
Petitioner refers to his federal habeas petition he filed on or

2

Collateral consequences of a conviction include such
things as the deprivation of the right to vote, to hold public
office, to serve on a jury, or to engage in certain businesses.
See St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
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about January 25, 2012, Ramnauth v. State of New Jersey, 12-599
(PGS).

On September 27, 2012, that habeas petition was dismissed

by this Court for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2), without prejudice to petitioner bringing an
application before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit for leave to file a second or successive § 2554
habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).

See

Ramnauth v. State of New Jersey, 12-599 (PGS), Docket entry nos.
2 and 3.
It would appear that Petitioner is well aware that relief
under § 2254 is not available under the facts of this case.
Accordingly, he brings this action as a writ of error coram
nobis.

A writ of error coram nobis has traditionally been used

to attack convictions with continuing consequences when the
petitioner is no longer “in custody” for purposes of habeas
review.

United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir.

2000).

However, the writ of error coram nobis is available in

federal court only for those who were convicted in federal court.
28 U.S.C. 1651(a); Neyor v. I.N.S., 155 F. Supp.2d 127, 136
(D.N.J. 2001).

Consequently, the Court cannot construe this

habeas petition as a writ of error coram nobis.

Instead,

Petitioner’s only course for relief from the collateral
consequences of his expired state conviction is to bring a common

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law writ of error coram nobis in the state court where he was
convicted.
IV.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or
judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be
taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

“A petitioner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims
or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Cockrell, 1537 U.S. 322 (2003).

Miller-El v.

“When the district court denies

a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue
when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000).

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Here, jurists of reason would not find the Court’s
procedural disposition of this case debatable.

Accordingly, no

certificate of appealability will issue.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the petition will be dismissed for
failure to satisfy the “in custody” requirement under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a), and because there is no jurisdiction under a writ of
error coram nobis.

No certificate of appealability will issue.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/Peter G. Sheridan
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
DATED: March 1, 2013

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