RODRIGUEZ v. FORTHRIGHT

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 7 Pltf's Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 9/6/2012. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Felix A. RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 12-4642

v.
FORTHRIGHT,

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Defendant.

THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
This matter has come before the Court upon Plaintiff Felix A. Rodriguez’s Motion to
Remand to State Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 [docket # 7]. Defendant Forthright opposes
the motion [9]. The Court has decided this motion based upon the submissions of the parties and
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated
below, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2012, Plaintiff Felix Rodriguez filed a Complaint in Middlesex County
Superior Court, alleging race & national origin discrimination and a retaliation claim, all in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 3(a). Plaintiff
alleges that after he complained of discriminatory emails and statements made by two
supervisors he subsequently was terminated from his employment. See (Compl., Notice of
Removal, Ex. A) [1]. Defendant filed a Notice of Removal in this Court on July 24, 2012, based
on federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶ 4). Plaintiff now moves to remand this
action to state court, on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter as Plaintiff
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has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
II.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case. Subject
matter jurisdiction in federal court generally falls within two broad categories of disputes: (1)
diversity cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, encompassing disputes between citizens of
different states alleging an amount-in-controversy in excess of $75,000; and (2) federal question
cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, encompassing those disputes “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Defendants have a statutory right to remove “any civil action brought in a state court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“The propriety of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in
federal court.” City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). When
confronted with a motion to remand, the removing party has the burden of establishing the
propriety of removal. See F.D.I.C. v, Wissel & Sons Constr. Co., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 119, 122
(D.N.J. 1995). Moreover, the removal statute is generally “strictly construed against removal
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d
848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992) (quotation and citation omitted).
Defendant asserts that this Court has original jurisdiction over this action because
Plaintiff’s claims of violations of Title VII indisputably arise under federal law. (Def.’s Opp’n at
3). Moreover, Defendant maintains, Plaintiff’s attempt to side-step the removal of this litigation
under the theory that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies is undermined by the fact
that he attached his EEOC right to sue letter to the Complaint. (Id. at 4–5). The Court agrees.

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Reading the Complaint as well as the EEOC’s Dismissal and Notice of Rights and
Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge, it is apparent that Plaintiff did, in fact, bring this action in accordance
with his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a law of the United States, related
to the claims investigated by the EEOC. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff did not exhaust his
administrative remedies that would be grounds for outright dismissal of this case, not remand. It
is unmistakable that federal district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Consequently, this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and the
removal of this case to federal court was proper. Therefore Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown,
IT IS on this 6th day of September, 2012,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 [docket #7]
is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiff by regular mail.

/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.

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