RODRIGUEZ v. THE CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM OPINION And ORDER that the Plaintiff's motion seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint to add as Defendant the now known individual sheriffs officer, formerly plead as John Doe Defendant is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni on 5/7/2015. (kas, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

VICTOR RODRIGUEZ,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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The City of New Brunswick, et. al.,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________ :

Civil Action No. 12-4722 (FLW)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

BONGIOVANNI, Magistrate Judge

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s, Victor Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”), motion
for leave to amend his Complaint to add as a defendant the now known Sheriff’s Officer, Louis
Suarez, formerly plead as “John Doe Defendant.” Defendants, Middlesex County Sheriff’s
Department and Sheriff Mildred S. Scott, oppose Plaintiff’s motion. The Court has fully
reviewed the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, and
considers same without oral argument pursuant to L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his Complaint is DENIED.
I.

Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Victor Rodriguez, was shot and injured by law enforcement officers after he

presented a firearm during a dispute on Remson St. in New Brunswick. (See Complaint; Docket
Entry No. 1). On July 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit, listing John Doe defendants, in anticipation
of determining their identities. (Id.). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was subjected to
excessive force, in violation of his constitutional rights. (Id.).
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He further contends that the

actions of the individual defendants caused him to suffer “severe painful and permanent injuries,
severe nervous shock, mental anguish, emotional distress, great physical pain, and to undergo
emergency and medical aid treatment [which rendered him] totally and permanently disabled.”
(Id.). Plaintiff also seeks to recover from the City of New Brunswick, the New Brunswick Police
Department, Mayor John Cahill, Police Director Anthony Caputo, the County of Middlesex, the
Middlesex County Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Mildred S. Scott for “failure to properly
train and supervise the individual Defendants in the proper use of force and techniques in its
establishment of policies, procedures, practices, and customs that result in the excessive use of
force.” (Id.).
a. Plaintiff’s Argument
Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to name Sheriff Officer Louis Suarez, in place of
John Doe Defendant. (See Motion to Amend: Docket Entry No. 40). Plaintiff argues that his
proposed amendment to the Complaint is allowed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), which
takes a liberal approach to amending the pleadings. Plaintiff states: “a district court may deny a
leave to amend only where in its discretion the district court finds that the plaintiff’s delay in
seeking the amendment is undue, made in bad faith, prejudicial to the opposing party, or fails to
cure the jurisdictional defect.” Berkshire Fashions, Inc v. M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 874, 886
(3d Cir. 1992) (See Motion to Amend: Docket Entry No. 40). The Plaintiff contends equitable
considerations weigh in favor of granting his motion to amend because the proposed amendment
causes no undue delay, unfair prejudice, nor is it futile.
Plaintiff asserts there was no undue delay in seeking this leave to amend noting that when
his original Complaint was filed, Plaintiff acknowledged that he was aware of a Middlesex
County Sheriff’s Officer who was directly involved in the shooting. (See Motion to Amend:
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Docket Entry No. 40). He further attests that he was notified of the Sheriff Officer’s identity
during the discovery process of the Plaintiff’s related criminal proceeding, but at that time, the
court-ordered stay of this matter was in effect and remained as such until April 29, 2014. (Id.).
Plaintiff states nothing in the proposed Amended Complaint suggests bad faith, nor is he
advancing any new legal claims or new legal theories. Plaintiff is seeking to name as defendant
the now identified sheriff’s officer directly involved in the incident. (Id.).
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion emphasizing that Plaintiff seeks to amend the
Complaint nearly two years after becoming aware of the Sheriff Officer’s identity. (See Brief in
Opposition; Docket Entry No. 43). Defendants contend Plaintiff engaged in undue delay in
seeking this amendment. (Id.). Defendants argue Plaintiff was aware of the Sheriff Officer’s
identity 26 months prior to the filing of this motion and 14 months prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations in this matter, which ran on January 31, 2014. (Id.). Defendants note that
Plaintiff admits to having become aware of the Sheriff Officer’s identity during the discovery
process of his criminal proceeding. Defendants also note that they produced documents from the
Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office that demonstrate Sheriff’s Officer Suarez was identified
during the Grand Jury proceedings. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff’s Rule 26 disclosure identified
the Sheriff’s Officer by name, and Defendants argue that this demonstrates Plaintiff knew of the
Sheriff’s Officer’s identity since June 16, 2014, 6 months prior to the filing of this motion. (Id.)
Defendants argue that although Plaintiff’s Complaint was administratively stayed, there is no
reason why he could not have sought to leave to amend during the pendency of the stay. (Id.).

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II.

Analysis
A.

Standard of Review

According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend the pleadings is generally
granted liberally. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227
F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). Where there is an absence of the above factors: undue
delay, bad faith, prejudice or futility, a motion for leave to amend a pleading should be
granted freely. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004). The Court may,
however, deny a motion to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith . . . repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.”
(Id.)
B.

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to add as a defendant, Sheriff’s Officer Louis
Suarez. In his Original Complaint, Plaintiff listed “John Does 1-5” and alleged that “an
unidentified Officer of the Middlesex County Sheriff’s Department” was present at the scene.
Plaintiff has since determined the identity of the previously plead fictitious Defendant and now
seeks, through this motion, to supplement his Complaint to specifically plead the Sheriff’s
Officer in his individual capacity.
Defendants’ assert Plaintiff engaged in undue delay when he failed to timely file
this motion to amend his Complaint. While the federal rules of pleading are generally
receptive to amendments, when an issue of undue delay is raised, the Court must focus on
the movant’s reasons for not amending the complaint sooner. Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit has recognized that
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an amendment may become unduly delayed when the movant had prior opportunity to
amend the complaint. See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 27374 (3d Cir. 2001) (denial of motion to amend upheld where District Court cited undue
delay because the motion was filed three years after the complaint was filed and the
information on which the amendment relied was known to the plaintiffs two-and-a-half
years earlier).
Here, Defendants have shown, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff became aware
of the name of the unidentified Sheriff’s Officer well before the filing of the instant
motion for leave to amend. Defendants highlight that Plaintiff acknowledged in his brief
in support of this motion that during the discovery process of the criminal proceeding, the
identity of the Sheriff’s Officer was made known to him. (See Motion to Amend: Docket
Entry No. 40). Thus, Plaintiff was aware of the Sheriff Officer’s identity 26 months
before this motion was filed. (See Brief in Opposition: Docket Entry No. 43). While
Plaintiff stresses that his Complaint was administratively stayed on December 5, 2012,
Defendant notes that the stay came into effect one month after Plaintiff learned of the
Sheriff Officer’s identity. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Rule 26 disclosure identified the
Sheriff’s Officer by name, making it apparent that Plaintiff was aware of his involvement
since June 16, 2014. (Id.)
When the Court evaluates a motion to file for leave to amend for undue delay, the
court considers whether the movant offers “adequate justification” for the delay. Goow v.
Wittig, 558 F. App’x 257, 260 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit has denied motions for
leave to amend when there has been no reasonable explanation for the delay provided by
the moving party. See Cureton, 252 F.3d at 274 (District Court determined and Third
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Circuit upheld denial of amendment where “no reasonable explanation” was provided to
explain the delay). Here, Plaintiff provides no reasonable explanation for the delay in
filing this motion to amend. As Defendants note, Plaintiff could have sought to amend
his pleading prior to the stay being imposed or during the pendency of the stay for the
record shows at least one Defendant filed his Answer during this period. (D.E. 43). The
Court agrees.

Plaintiff, in his brief, provides no other explanation for the delay outside

the court-ordered-stay and the Court finds that reason to be insufficient.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file an Amended

Complaint to add as a defendant the now known individual sheriff’s officer, formerly
plead as “John Doe Defendant” is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
terminate Docket Entry No. 40.

Dated: May 7, 2015

s/Tonianne J. Bongiovanni
HONORABLE TONIANNE J. BONGIOVANNI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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