R.C. et al v. GREAT MEADOWS REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION

Filing 22

LETTER OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 10/8/2013. (eaj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CLARKSON S. FISHER COURmOUSE
402 EAST STATE ST., ROOM 7000
TRENTON, NJ 08608
609·989·2009

CHAMBERS OF

MICHAEL A. SlllPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Not for Publication
LETTER OPINION
October 8, 2013

VIACM/ECF
All counsel of record
Re:

R.C. and J.C. olb/o X. C. v. Great Meadows Regional Board of Education
Civil Action No. 12-5241 (MAS) (TJB)

Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court upon the cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
the Parties. (ECF Nos. 15, 17.) Each party filed a Response. (ECF Nos. 20-21.) The Court has
carefully considered the submissions and decided the motions without oral argument pursuant to
Local Civil Rule 78.1. After careful consideration of the record, and for the reasons set forth below,
this matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings.

I.

Background
X.C. is a nine 1 year old boy with severe developmental and educational disabilities. He has

been diagnosed with global developmental delay, hypotania, hypotonic cerebral palsy and has
substantial expressive and receptive language disorders that prohibit his placement in a typical

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At the time Defendant sought to move X.C. into an in-district placement, he was seven years old.
The various certifications and briefs refer to X.C.'s age as either seven or eight, depending on the
date the respective document was drafted.

educational setting. X.C. has been classified as "Other Health Impaired" by Defendant Great
Meadows School District (the "District" or "Defendant"). He requires individual educational
instruction, occupational therapy, speech therapy and physical therapy. Prior to X.C. beginning
preschool, the District and X.C.'s parents, R.C. and J.C. ("Plaintiffs"), reached an agreement
whereby X.C. would attend school at an out-of-district private school named P.G. Chambers
("PGC") that serves children with learning disabilities similar to X.C.'s.
X.C. has attended PGC since July 2007 and both Parties agree that he has progressed well
while attending school there. In late 2010, the District began to raise the issue of creating a program
suitable for X.C. within the District. This proposed program would allegedly consist of
individualized classroom instruction by a special education teacher specifically hired to staff X. C.'s
classroom. X.C. would also allegedly receive occupational, speech and physical therapy
substantially similar to the services he receives at PGC. Although not clear from the record, and
disputed by Plaintiffs, X.C. would either be the only child in this newly developed
program/classroom or would have one other similarly situated child in his classroom. The District
contends that X.C. would have expanded exposure to typical children every day, as opposed to
PGC, where his exposure is limited to similarly disabled peers and his teachers.
Plaintiffs have objected to X.C.'s transfer from PGC into the District's newly created
program. Their objections, generally, consist of: 1) the fact that X.C. does not adapt well to
transitions that the transition plan offered by the District was either non-existent or insufficient;
2) the fact that X.C. may be alone in a classroom with an adult for a significant period of each
school day, thereby negatively affecting X.C.'s socialization skills and development; 3) concerns
related to the newly created nature of the District's proposed program and the fact that Plaintiffs
were, and continue to be, unable to observe the program to their satisfaction; and 4) an allegation
that the proposed program will not provide X.C. with a meaningful educational benefit. Defendant
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contends that the program it has proposed will meet its obligations under state and federal law and
will provide X.C. with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE").
Following Plaintiffs' objections to transitioning X. C. into the District's program in June
2011, the "stay-put" provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") took
effect and X.C. has remained at PGC throughout the administrative and judicial review of his
placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).
Administrative review of the Parties' dispute took approximately one year and on June 12,
2012, Administrative Law Judge Gail M. Cookson (the "AU") upheld Defendant's decision to
transfer X. C. in-district. 2 Upon consent of both Parties, the AU decided the dispute without a
hearing or any witness testimony. Each party submitted certifications in support of its positions
which were, obviously, not subject to cross examination or challenge as to credibility. The Parties
also submitted legal memoranda in support of their positions. Three days after submission of the
Parties' various documents, the AU rendered her decision.

II.

Analysis
A.

The IDEA Generally

The IDEA entitles a disabled child to a FAPE, which "consists of educational instruction
specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as
are necessary to permit the child to 'benefit' from the instruction." S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist.
of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d

751, 756 (3d Cir. 1995)). School districts are required to review a child's Individualized Education
Program ("IEP") "at least annually to determine whether the child is reaching the stated goals. In
addition, the IEP team is to revise the IEP to address lack of progress, necessary changes arising

2

Various attempts at settlement and mediation occurred prior to the AU's determination.
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from reevaluation of the child, and parental input, among other things." !d. at 265 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(l)(A)(4)).

The IDEA contains a main-streaming component, also known as the least-restrictive
environment ("LRE") requirement, which evinces Congress' intent that disabled children receive
education in a setting alongside their typical peers to the maximum extent possible. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5)(A). The Third Circuit has defined the "least restrictive environment [as the setting]

that, to the greatest extent possible, satisfactorily educates disabled children together with children
who are not disabled, in the same school the disabled child would attend if the child were not
disabled." Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 535 (3d Cir. 1995). The preference for
mainstreaming, however, is secondary to the IDEA's goal that children receive a "meaningful
educational benefit." S.H., 336 F.3d at 272. Importantly, a "School District cannot bootstrap the
meaningful educational benefit with the LRE requirement [because the] IDEA requires that disabled
students be educated in the least restrictive appropriate educational environment." !d. Stated
differently, "[i]f the educational environment is not appropriate, then there is no need to consider
whether it is the least restrictive." !d.
Whether a proposed placement will provide a meaningful educational benefit is "an
individual determination personal" to the child at issue. !d. at 271. Critical to X.C.'s case, once a
district has determined that an out-of-district placement is appropriate, any ensuing decision to
bring the child back into the district (or to transfer the child to any other destination) must not be
"detrimental" to the child and is necessarily informed by the child's current placement. !d. at 272
("In other words, if a change in [a child's] placement will be detrimental, this is a factor in

determining whether the new placement will achieve a meaningful educational benefit."). This

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implicitly requires the AU, or the district court, to consider the adequacy and qualities of the
proposed placement against the qualities and attributes of the current placement. !d. 3

B.

Standard of Review

Review of an AU's decision in the IDEA context takes place under a modified de novo
standard. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this standard, "a
district court gives 'due weight' and deference to the findings in the administrative proceedings."
P.P. ex rei. Michael P. v. W Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
citations omitted.) Factual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima
facie correct and a "federal district court ... [is] required to defer to the AU's factual findings
unless it can point to contrary nontestimonial extrinsic evidence on the record." S.H., 336 F.3d at
270. "The 'due weight' obligation prevents district courts from imposing their own view of
preferable educational methods on the states." D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993)). If "an AU has heard
live testimony and determined that one witness is more credible than another witness, [that]
determination is due special weight." D.S., 602 F.3d at 564 (citing Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of
Educ. v. P.S. ex rei. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Court exercises plenary review
over the AU's legal conclusions. P.N. v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235 (D.N.J. 2003).

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Defendant argues, correctly, that an IEP is typically only examined to determine whether it
provides a "basic floor of opportunity" and that it need not provide "the optimal level of services"
that a parent may want for their child. (Def.'s Br. 15, ECF No. 17-1) (citing Holmes v. Millcreek
Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also S.H., 336 F.3d at 271. However, the
Third Circuit's binding precedent in S.H. unambiguously applies in situations such as the one
currently before the Court. As such, the AU was required to consider the educational benefit
gained at PGC to the prospective benefits of the in-district placement. If change from one
environment to the other would be detrimental, that is a factor which mitigates against a finding
that the in-district placement would provide a FAPE.
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C.

Discussion

The AU's decision relied upon thirteen undisputed facts. One of those factual findings
included the determination that the District's proposed "classroom for multiply disabled students
would allow the students to remain in their home community without transportation outside the
district with the opportunity to interact with typical peers in a less restrictive environment." (AU
Decision 4, Ex. 26 to Barger Cert., ECF No. 14-3.) The AU's "legal analysis and conclusions"
heavily stressed the "strong statutory preference for educating children in the 'least restrictive
environment"' but also noted that the District could not "'bootstrap the meaningful educational
benefit with the least restrictive environment requirement"' and that consideration of the services
X.C. received at PGC was a factor that must be considered as part of a determination whether
Defendant's IEP would offer X.C. a FAPE. (/d. at 7.)
In S.H., the Third Circuit upheld the determination of an AU who found that the defendant
school district's plans to return a hearing impaired child to an in-district public school with
additional mainstreaming possibilities did not offer a meaningful educational benefit. S.H., 336 F.3d
at 272-74. First, the court concluded that the mainstreaming possibilities were de minimis. !d. at
272. Second, the court noted that the AU had conducted a detailed factual comparison of the
child's current school and proposed placement and noted that "significant differences" existed in
their respective educational programs such that the proposed in-district school would be
"detrimental" to the child. !d. at 273. Those differences were the key factors in the Court concluding
that the proposed placement would not provide a FAPE. As such, it affirmed the decision of the
AU.
Here, the Court is presented with a case similar to S.H. but different in one crucial aspect:
the decision of the AU in S.H. was based upon the factual universe developed at an evidentiary

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hearing. No such hearing occurred here. 4 Rather, the AU's decision seemingly indicates that she
wholesale adopted the District's contention that it would offer a "mirror-image" of the program
offered at PGC. (Compare AU Decision at 8 with Muller Cert. 5 <J[ 9, Rymon Cert.
Cert. 16, Peck Cert.

<J[

<J[

18, Simone

18.) The Court is aware that it must give the factual conclusions of the AU

due weight. That deference, however, is overcome when the Court can point to non-testimonial
evidence in the record that contradicts the AU's findings. Although clear evidence to overturn the
AU does not exist in the record, there is strong evidence in the record contradicting the AU's
conclusion that the in-district placement would be a mirror-image of PGC's program. Importantly,
the AU did not explain a basis for discarding the opinions of X.C.' s teachers and therapists at PGC.
Those opinions included statements that X.C. "would evidence regressive behaviors if he were
removed from" PGC and that the staff at PGC all agreed that "X.C. should remain at" PGC.
(Fernando Cert. 6 <J[<J[ 22-23~ David Cert.

<J[<J[

14-15~ Jacobs Cert. <J[<J[ 12-13; Haggerty Cert. <J[<J[ 19-20~

Hearne Cert. <J[<J[ 17-18.)
Additionally, and contrary to the holding in S.H., the AU's decision did not reflect a
sufficient factual analysis of the impact of the fact that X.C. may be alone in a classroom for a
significant period of time each day and whether that would detrimentally affect his ability to receive
a meaningful education, especially compared to the more active classroom environment at PGC.
The AU's statement that such a small class size may be a factor that attracts parents to places such

4

The Court is aware that the Parties, both here and before the AU, agreed that no hearing was
necessary and that the Parties would rely upon their respective certifications. That does not alter the
Court's conclusion that the factual record here requires further development and that the AU is
required to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the conflicting evidence.
5

The certifications listed in this citation are all contained in Exhibit 35 to the Barger Certification,
ECF No. 14-4.
6

The certifications listed in this citation are contained in Exhibits 29-33 to the Barger Certification,
ECF No. 14-4.
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as Great Meadows does not meet the detailed factual analysis called for in S.H. The AU's decision
is also missing any analysis of whether the mainstreaming opportunities in-district would be
meaningful, or as was the case in S.H., de minimis.
The Court is careful to note that it is not substituting its reading of the record for that of the
AU. The Court cannot conclude, however, that the AU's decision was based upon a sufficient
factual analysis of X.C.'s proposed placement and that the in-district environment would provide
X. C. with a meaningful education in light of his progress at PGC. As such, this matter is remanded
for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing. See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 526 (remand for
further administrative proceedings appropriate); L.M. ex rei. H.M. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
256 F. Supp. 2d 290, 305 (D.N.J. 2003) (same). The AU shall take special care to factor in
consideration of the possibility that X.C.'s placement in-district, as compared to PGC, will
detrimentally affect his ability to receive a free appropriate public education.

III.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, and other good cause shown, this matter is REMANDED for

further administrative proceedings. An appropriate order will be entered.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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