HARROCKS v. SAKER SHOPRITES, INC. et al
Filing
28
OPINION. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 5/28/2013. (gxh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DOREEN HARROCKS,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5353 (MLC)
O P I N I O N
Plaintiff,
v.
SAKER SHOPRITES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
THE PLAINTIFF, Doreen Harrocks, brings the action against the
defendants, her former employer, Saker ShopRites, Inc.
(“Shoprite”), and the labor organization that represented her
interests during her term as a Shoprite employee, United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 464A (pleaded here as
“UFCW, 464A” and referenced in this Opinion as “the Union”).
dkt. entry no. 1-1, Ex. A to Notice of Removal, Compl.)
(See
It appears
that Shoprite terminated Harrocks’s employment after determining
that she brought a “small plastic bag containing a suspected
controlled dangerous substance (‘CDS’)” into the workplace.
id. at ¶¶ 9, 12.)
(See
It also appears that Harrocks, while employed by
Shoprite, was bound by the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)
between Shoprite and the Union.
(See id. at ¶ 14; see also dkt.
entry no. 23-3, Ex. A to Moroney Certification, CBA.)
HARROCKS seeks damages from Shoprite for both: (1) an alleged
breach of the CBA, pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“the Breach of Contract
Claim”); and (2) the publication of allegedly defamatory statements
(“the Defamation Claim”).
(See Compl. at ¶¶ 14-18, 22-24.)
To
support the Defamation Claim, Harrocks merely alleges that Shoprite
“published to third parties an allegation that Harrocks possessed a
CDS . . . [and] knew or should have known that the allegation had
no evidentiary support.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.)
She neither alleges
who the third parties are or might have been, nor specifies whether
the allegedly defamatory statements were made in the course of or
relation to the termination of her employment.
SHOPRITE now moves to dismiss both of the claims raised
against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
12(b)(6).
(Dkt. entry no. 23, Mot.)1
(See dkt. entry no. 24, Opp’n Br.)
Harrocks opposes the Motion.
The Court will now resolve the
Motion without oral argument, and will address each of the claims
at issue -- and the parties’ related arguments -- in turn.
See
L.Civ.R. 78.1(b).2
1
The Court earlier dismissed the Complaint insofar as it
concerned the Union. (See dkt. entry no. 27, 4-19-13 Order.)
2
The Court writes exclusively for the parties, who have
demonstrated, through their respective briefs, their familiarity
with the standard of review applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Accordingly, the Court does not recite that standard here.
2
I.
THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
SHOPRITE first argues that the Breach of Contract Claim should
be dismissed either as untimely or, alternatively, because Harrocks
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the CBA.
(See dkt. entry no. 23-1, Br. in Supp. at 5-11.)
To support its
argument, Shoprite submits the certification of Kevin Moroney,
Shoprite’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Labor
Relations.
(Dkt. entry no. 23-3, Moroney Certification.)
Moroney
claims “knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
above-captioned matter”, and raises factual allegations that go
beyond the four corners of the Complaint.
(Id. at ¶ 7-12.)
HARROCKS raises two arguments in opposition to dismissal of
the Breach of Contract Claim.
First, Harrocks argues that the
Complaint was timely filed because the applicable statute of
limitations was tolled until January 6, 2012, when she “received
the final notice granting her unemployment benefits.”
at 8.)3
(Opp’n Br.
To support this argument, Harrocks refers to peripheral
documents that were not incorporated in the Complaint.
(See id.)
Second, Harrocks argues that the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is properly attributed to the Union and, accordingly,
should not bar the Breach of Contract Claim.
3
(See id. at 9-10.)
The parties agree that the statute of limitations applying
to the Breach of Contract Claim is six months. (See Br. in Supp.
at 6; Opp’n Br. at 7.) See also Vadino v. A. Valey Eng’rs, 903
F.2d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 1990).
3
THE COURT has considered the parties’ arguments, and intends
to deny the Motion without prejudice insofar as it concerns the
Breach of Contract Claim.
The Court notes that the limitations
period for a claim under Section 301 of the LMRA accrues “when the
claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable discretion,
could have discovered the acts constituting the violation,” which
has been interpreted as the moment when the plaintiff “receives
notice that the union will proceed no further with the grievance.”
Vadino, 903 F.2d at 260 (citation omitted).
It thus appears that
issues concerning the limitations period and issues concerning a
claimant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be
intertwined, insofar as a claimant may not receive notice from her
union that it will not further proceed with a grievance.
THE COURT has reviewed the CBA, which outlines the grievance
procedures at issue.4
The Court’s review demonstrates that both of
Shoprite’s arguments fail at this stage of the proceedings.
When
the CBA is read in the light most favorable to Harrocks, it appears
that the Union may have been responsible for furthering the
grievance process.
(See CBA at Article 9, ¶ B (“If the Union and
4
The Court has considered the CBA without converting the
Motion to a motion for summary judgment, as the CBA was both
integral to and explicitly relied on in the Complaint. (See Compl.
at ¶¶ 14-16.) See Enigwe v. U.S. Airways/U.S. Airways Express, 438
Fed.Appx. 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2011).
4
[Shoprite] cannot agree as to the justification of the discipline
and/or discharge, the dispute shall be submitted to
arbitration.”).)
Accordingly, the court is unable to determine at
this stage of the proceedings: (1) when or whether Harrocks
received notice that the Union would not further proceed with the
grievance procedures outlined in the CBA; (2) whether the Union or
Harrocks ultimately bore responsibility for furthering the
grievance proceedings; and (3) when the limitations period relating
to the Breach of Contract Claim began to accrue.
F.2d at 260.
See Vadino, 903
Following discovery, Shoprite may raise these issues
anew in a timely and properly filed motion for summary judgment.5
5
Both Shoprite and Harrocks, as noted above, relied on
evidence beyond the Complaint and CBA when supporting or opposing
the Motion. The Court has not considered that evidence. See
Snyder v. Baxter Healthcare, 393 Fed.Appx. 905, 907 n.4 (3d Cir.
2010) (“Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), affidavits or other peripheral
documents are generally not permissible for a district court’s
consideration because a motion to dismiss attacks claims contained
by the four corners of the complaint.”). The Court would, however,
consider such evidence upon a later motion for summary judgment.
Before such a motion is filed, the parties should determine whether
Harrocks was in any sense misled by the Union. They should also
determine whether Harrocks met her “duty to exercise due diligence”
by familiarizing herself “with the collective bargaining agreement,
and . . . making . . . such inquiries as would be reasonably
calculated to acquire the pertinent information concerning” the
Union’s alleged failure to proceed with grievance procedures. See
Carrington v. RCA Global Commc’ns, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 632, 638-39
(D.N.J. 1991) (dismissing claim asserted under Section 301 of the
LMRA where the plaintiff suggested neither that reasonable
inquiries were made nor that the union misled him).
5
II.
THE DEFAMATION CLAIM
SHOPRITE argues that the Defamation Claim should be dismissed
because it is preempted by the LMRA.
(See Br. in Supp. at 11-15.)
To support this argument, Shoprite argues that the statements at
issue arose in the context of and are thus inextricably intertwined
with a grievance procedure contemplated by the CBA.
(See id.)
Shoprite also argues that the Defamation Claim should be dismissed
because Shoprite was privileged to make such statements during a
grievance proceeding contemplated by the CBA. (See id. at 15-16.)
THE ALLEGATIONS appearing in the Complaint, viewed in the
light most favorable to Harrocks, do not support dismissal of the
Defamation Claim.
The Complaint does demonstrate that such
statements were made during grievance proceedings, and the Court,
when resolving the Motion, cannot accept Shoprite’s contrary
assertions.6
The Court may only decide the Motion based on the
facts alleged in the Complaint.
See Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008); Juice Entm’t, LLC v.
6
The Court notes that the allegations supporting the
Defamation Claim are meager, at best. Harrocks alleges that
Shoprite “published to third parties an allegation that Harrocks
possessed a CDS,” but she fails to allege, inter alia: (1) which
Shoprite employees made the statements at issue; and (2) whether
such publication arose from or otherwise related to the grievance
procedures contemplated by the CBA. Harrocks also fails to allege
when the statements were made or who the statements were made to.
This information would prove relevant
6
Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., No. 11-7318, 2012 WL 2576284, at *2
(D.N.J. July 3, 2002).
The Court thus intends to deny the Motion
without prejudice, insofar as it concerns the Defamation Claim.7
III. CONCLUSION
THE COURT, for the reasons stated above, will deny the Motion
without prejudice.
The Court will issue a separate Order.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
.
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date:
May 28, 2013
7
Shoprite may, of course, renew this argument on a later
motion for summary judgment.
7
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