BRAVETTI v. LIU et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni on 12/11/2013. (jjc)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DAVID BRAVETTI, DERIVATIVELY,
ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN
ORIENTAL BIOENGINEERING, INC.

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: Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-7492-MAS-TJB
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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PLAINTIFF,
v.
TONY LIU, YANCHUN LI, BINSHENG
LI, JUN MIN, LAWRENCE WIZEL,
COSIMO PATTI, XIANMIN WANG,
BAIQUING ZHANG, EILEEN BRODY,
DEFENDANTS.
and
AMERICAN ORIENTAL
BIOENGINEERING, INC., A NEVADA
CORPORATION,
NOMINAL DEFENDANT

BONGIOVANNI, Magistrate Judge
This matter has been opened to the Court upon Motion [Docket Entry No. 12] by Plaintiff
David Bravetti, derivatively, on behalf of American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc. (“Plaintiff”)
seeking an Order (1) authorizing service on Defendants Tony Liu, Yanchun Li, Jun Min,,
Xianmin Wang and Baiqing Zhang (“Foreign Individual Defendants”) by serving American
Oriental International, Inc.’s counsel of record and (2) permitting Plaintiff to serve discovery on
American Oriental International, Inc. to obtain all addresses and all other identifying information
for Defendant Binsheng Li. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion [Docket Entry No. 14]. The
Court has fully reviewed the submissions of the parties and considers same without oral
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argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78.

For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is

GRANTED.
I.

Background and Procedural History

This is a shareholder derivative action brought by Plaintiff on behalf of nominal
Defendant American Oriental Bioengineering, Inc. (“AOB”) against some of its officers and
directors for breaches of fiduciary duties, waste of corporate assets and unjust enrichment.
Defendants are Tony Liu-AOB’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board, Yanchun
Li-AOB’s Chief Financial Officer and Director, Bingsheng Li-AOB’s Chief Accounting Officer
until November 2011 and Director until December 2011, Jun Min-AOB’s Vice President and
Director, Lawrence Wizel-AOB’s Director until May 2012 and former Chairperson of Audit
Committee Chairman, Cosimo Patti-AOB’s Director and member of the Audit Committee,
Xianmin Wang-AOB’s Director and member of the Audit Committee, Baiquing Zhang-AOB’s
Director and Eileen Brody-AOB’s Director until December 2011 and former member of the
Audit Committee. Pl.’s Compl. at 2-3. Six of the nine individual Defendants are foreign
nationals residing in the People’s Republic of China. Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 3.
A.

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plainitff argues that serving defendants who are current officers and directors of the
company through that company’s counsel comports with due process.

Brown v. China

Integrated Energy, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 560 (C.D.Cal.2012), In re GLG Life Tech Corp. Sec. Liti.,
287 F.R.D. 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Plaintiff cites cases involving China-based companies.
Plaintiff’s Br. at 6-12.
Plaintiff suggests the Hague Convention does not apply. Plaintiff’s Reply Br. at 2.
Under Volkswagenwerk Aktengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988), the Hague

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Convention does not apply when the service of process does not transmit documents abroad.
Here, Plaintiff argues that since the service of process would be on a United States law firm, the
Hague Convention does not apply. Id. at 3.
Assuming otherwise, Plaintiff submits that the legislative intent behind the Hague
Convention is to increase efficiency of notice in international cases. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff argues
that the Hague Convention should be construed broadly and that nothing in the Act prevents a
request for alternative service. Id.
Next, Plaintiff submits that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) does not have an
exhaustion requirement. Id. at 5. In other words, Hague Convention service of process does not
need to be explored first. The only condition is that the method of service must not be prohibited
by the Hague Convention.
Similarly, in MorningStar v. Dejun, 2013 WL 502474, at *1. (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013), the
Court rejected the contention that the Hague Convention provides the exclusive means for
serving defendants residing in China. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that it does not have to test the
burdens of Hague Convention service of process before the Court can exercise Rule 4(f)
discretion. Id. at 9. Service on AOB’s U.S. counsel is reasonably calculated to apprise the
Foreign Defendants of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. Id. at 11.
While AOB asserts that its lead counsel has not been in contact with two of the six
Foreign Individual Defendants, it has asserted that all of the Foreign Individual Defendants were
willing to designate an agent for service in China. Defendant’s Opp’n Br. at 8. Plaintiff suggests
this implies that all of these Defendants have been in direct or indirect contact with AOB and/or
Loeb & Loeb such that they are virtually guaranteed to receive notice of the pendency of the

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action if served by the means Plaintiff proposes. Plaintiff’s Reply Br. at 11.
B. Defendant’s Arguments
Defendants primarily argue that alternative service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(f)(3) is prohibited by the Hague Convention. Defendant’s Opp’n Br. at 2-9. When service is
made to a Hague signatory country, like China, and that country has a law requiring service of
process by transmittal of documents abroad, the use of the convention methods of service is
“mandatory.” Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988).
Next, Defendants argue that the Hague Convention is mandatory and that Plaintiff’s
proposed method of service contravenes it. Defendant’s Opp’n Br. at 5. Under Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988), where service is to be made to a
signatory country, and “the internal law of the [foreign country] defines the applicable method of
serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad,” then the use of the convention
service mechanisms is “mandatory.” While Schlunk generally held that, Defendant distinguishes
Schlunk from this case because the Defendants did not consent to the proposed method of
service, but the defendants in Schlunk consented.
Defendants also contend that Plaintiff should have exhausted the Hague Convention
method of service first. Defendant’s Opp’n Br. at 12. ABO’s counsel notes that in two of his
cases, Courts imposed a Hague Convention exhaustion requirement, i.e. that the plaintiff must
try to use a Hague method of service before the Court would allow alternative service under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). See Licker Decl. ¶7. Defendant rejects Plaintiff’s
arguments that the burdens and costs of serving foreign defendants justify an alternative service
Order.

Defendant’s Opp’n Br. at 11.

Under the Hague Convention Advisory Committee

Comments, “if service is not accomplished within six months, the Hague Convention authorizes

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use of alternative means.” Defendant believes this comment suggests the Hague Convention
methods of service need to be explored first.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s proposed method of service does not comport
with Due Process requirements for notice with respect to two defendants.

Id. at 12-13.

Defendant argues that two defendants have had no contact with ABO’s lead counsel. Defendant
believes it is questionable whether ABO’s counsel had any contact with any of the other four
foreign defendants. Id. at 13.
II.

Analysis

The United States District Court for the Central District of California has already decided
this issue in a parallel securities class action suit involving the same defendants. This Court
agrees with the California Court’s analysis. See McGee v. American Oriental Bioengineering,
Inc., No. CV 12-5476 FMO (SHx), attached as exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s brief. Thus, the Court
holds that Plaintiff may serve Defendants through Loeb & Loeb, LLP for three reasons. First,
the Hague Convention is not mandatory. Second, the particularities and necessities of this case
make it appropriate to permit alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3). Third, the proposed method
of service comports with due process.
Courts may direct service when “the particularities and necessities of a given case require
alternative service of process.” See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 at
1016 (9th Cir. 2002). Court-ordered service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) is
equal to other forms of service. Id.

Courts can grant Rule 4(f)(3) requests even where a

plaintiff does not show that the other means are unduly burdensome or impossible. Yet, it is
helpful to plaintiff’s case to show some measure of difficulty in effecting service by usual means.
Vanleeuwen v. Keyuan Petrochemicals, Inc., 2012 WL 5992134 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citations

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omitted). Alternative service must be (1) directed by the court; and (2) not prohibited by
international agreement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(f)(3).
The Court finds that alternative service of process is not prohibited by the Hague
Convention. The Hague Convention sets out the means for service of process for foreign
defendants in international civil suits. However, it “shall not apply where the address of the
person to be served is not known.” Hague Convention, Art. 1. While the defendants offered to
provide an address of a designated agent of process, See Defendant’s Opposition at 8, this is not
an “address of the person to be served.” Defendant submitted a declaration from Chinese
Attorney Huan Wang, who attests that “[u]nder Peoples Republic of China law, the designation
of an agent is equivalent to a residential address.” See Wang Decl. at ¶2. Yet, Wang cites no law
backing his belief that “the same is true for purposes of the Hague Convention.” Id. at 3. In the
absence of legal basis to support this claim, the Court finds that the Hague Convention does not
apply because the address of the persons to be served is unknown.
Likewise, the Hague Convention does not apply because Plaintiff’s proposed method of
service does not require the transmittal of documents abroad. Under Khachatryan v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 578 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2008), the Hague Convention
did not apply where Khachatryan served Toyota Japan under California law in a manner which
did not require the transmittal of documents abroad. Here, the proposed method to serve Loeb &
Loeb in the United States does not require the transmittal of documents abroad. Thus, the Hague
convention does not apply.
To comport with Due Process requirements, the method of service must be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &

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Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). A plaintiff may properly serve a foreign defendant by
effecting service on the domestic counsel or registered agent for a company in which the
defendant is an officer or director. Vanleeuwen, 2012 WL 5992134, at *3 (citations omitted),
See Brown v. China Integrated Energy, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 560, 566 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (Even if the
individual defendants are not actively involved in directing the litigations, their close connection
to China Integrated makes it all but certain that when Gao, Li, and Guo are served through the
company’s counsel or its agent, they will receive notice of the suit.”) (citations omitted) See
Rose v. Deer Consumer Products, Inc., 2011 WL 6951969, at *2 (C.D. Cal 2011) (permitting
service on the company’s registered agent where each individual defendant was a current or
former officer or director of the company, the company was actively participating in the action,
and the company’s counsel had communications with the individual defendants).
The Court finds that by serving Loeb and Loeb, the U.S. Counsel of Record, Plaintiff
comports with due process requirements because the method is reasonably calculated to apprise
defendants of the lawsuit.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff may effect service on Tony Liu, Yanchun Li, Jun Min, Xianmin Wang and Baiquing
Zhang by serving AOB’s counsel, Loeb & Loeb, LLP.
2. With respect to Defendant Binsheng Li, who is no longer employed by AOB and has had no
contact with AOB’s counsel, Plaintiff may serve AOB with discovery requests to obtain all
addresses and all other identifying information for Binsheng Li. AOB shall respond to the
discovery requests within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date of service of the requests.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Docket Entry No. 12.

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Dated this 11th Day of December, 2013

s/ Tonianne J. Bongiovanni
TONIANNE J. BONGIOVANNI
United States Magistrate Judge

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