S.B. et al v. TRENTON SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
Filing
39
OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 10/9/2014. (jjc)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
S.B., through his parents A.B. and :
Sh.B., A.B., individually, and Sh.B., :
Individually,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
Civil Action No. 13-0949 (FLW)(LHG)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
TRENTON BOARD OF
:
EDUCATION, NEW JERSEY
:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, :
and NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT :
OF HEALTH
:
:
Defendants. :
:
This action arises out of a three-count Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs S.B.,
through his parents A.B. and Sh.B, as well as A.B. and Sh.B individually (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), against three defendants: Trenton Board of Education (“BOE”), New Jersey
Department of Education (“DOE”) and New Jersey Department of Health (“DOH”). The
Amended Complaint alleges violations of: (Count One) Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq.; (Count Two) § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504” or the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 784; and (Count Three) the New
Jersey Special Education Statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:46-1, et seq.1 Defendants New Jersey
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This Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the federal law claims and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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Department of Education and New Jersey Department of Health (collectively, “State
Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and/or failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On August 4, 2014, Defendant Trenton Board of
Education (“BOE”), was dismissed from the case by consent and without prejudice. For the
reasons that follow, State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case are unchanged from the previous decision in this case, S.B. v.
Trenton Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 13-949, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167073 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2013).
However, since that decision, Plaintiffs have filed an Amended Complaint, which, for the
purpose of this motion, we assume to be true unless otherwise noted. S.B. is a fourteen-year-old
boy who resides with his parents in the City of Trenton, New Jersey. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7. S.B.
was diagnosed at birth with Proteus Syndrome, a congenital disorder that causes vascular
malformations, lymphedema, and hypertrophy of his trunk, hands, fingers, arms, and feet. Id. at ¶
31. He also suffers from severe asthma. Id. at ¶ 32. S.B. suffers from chronic pain from the
hemotomas caused by the vascular malformations, the drainage from the lymphedema, and the
extra weight cause by his enlarged extremities and trunk, and breathing difficulties from his
asthma. Because of these disabilities, S.B. has been receiving Supplemental Security Income
benefits and Medicaid since approximately his first birthday. Id. at ¶ 38.
S.B.’s disabilities entitled him to a variety of social and educational services under both
State and Federal law. Id. at ¶¶ 14–30. Specifically, The New Jersey Department of Health, in
conjunction with the New Jersey Department of Education, is required to provide disabled
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children, like S.B., with early intervention services (“EIS”) from birth to age three, id. at ¶ 21,
and transitional services prior to preschool and kindergarten, id. at ¶ 26. However, his parents
were never contacted or informed of these services, and S.B. received no EIS or transitional
services. Id. at ¶¶ 42–45. Instead, the first contact between Plaintiffs and any of the Defendants
occurred in July of 2004, when Sh.B., S.B.’s mother, contacted the Trenton Board of Education
to inquire about registering S.B. for kindergarten. Id. at ¶ 46.
Following that initial contact, the Complaint alleges a complete failure on the part of
BOE to provide S.B. with an education. The Court has already described these facts in detail in
the previous opinion in this case, S.B. v. Trenton Sch. Dist., No. 13-949, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
167073, *4–*11 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2013), and they need not be repeated. It is sufficient to note
that between October 2004 and March 2012, S.B. received almost no educational services,
despite numerous attempts from Plaintiffs to inquire about his educational placement with the
BOE. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 53–87. It was not until an intervention by the New Jersey Division of
Family and Youth Services in 2011 that the BOE provided S.B. with the educational services to
which he is entitled. Id. at ¶¶79–81. In March 2012, S.B. began receiving Home Instruction
(“H.I.”) services, and in December 2012, an Individual Education Program was signed,
authorizing S.B. to attend Kingsway Learning Center beginning in January 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 87, 96.
On February 15, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a seven-count Complaint against the Trenton Board
of Education, the New Jersey Department of Education, and the New Jersey Department of
Health, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq., Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §
12132, et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504” or the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 784,
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well
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as several New Jersey constitutional and statutory claims. State Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss. Following that motion, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Count One, violation of the
IDEA, Count Four, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the New Jersey state
constitution and statutory claims in Counts Five through Seven. The Court then granted State
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts Two and Three, which alleged violations of the ADA and
§ 504, respectively, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. S.B., No. 13949, at *35.
On February 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a three-count Amended Complaint against BOE,
DOE, and DOH, alleging that all three Defendants violated provisions of Title II of the
ADA(Count One); § 504 (Count Two); and N.J.S.A. 18A:46-1 et seq. (Count Three).
Underlying all three claims against State Defendants, are Plaintiffs’ allegations that DOH and
DOE failed to identify S.B. as a child with a disability, Am. Compl. at ¶ 104, that they failed to
provide plaintiffs with EIS, id. at ¶¶ 104–108, 120-122, and that DOE failed to monitor the DOH
and the BOE, resulting in Plaintiffs failing to receive the services to which they were entitled as a
result of S.B.’s disabilities, id. at ¶¶ 111, 125.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the instant matter, State Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), based on the statute of limitations. When a Rule 12
motion “is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first,
because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other defenses
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and objections become moot.” In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 837 F. Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
A defendant may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). There is no presumption of truthfulness that attaches to the allegations
of the complaint when determining a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Mortensen v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Once a
12(b)(1) challenge is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d
Cir. 2006). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is treated as either a “facial or factual challenge to
the court's subject matter jurisdiction.” Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,
176 (3d Cir. 2000). Under a facial attack, the movant challenges the legal sufficiency of the
claim, and the court considers only “the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced
therein and attached thereto in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. Under a factual
attack, however, “the challenge is to the actual alleged jurisdictional facts.” Liafom, LLC. v. Big
Fresh Pictures, Civ. No. 10-0606, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95251, 2011 WL 3841323 (D.N.J.
Aug. 24, 2011). In the instant matter, State Defendants do not challenge the alleged jurisdictional
facts. Rather, State Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and because State Defendants invoke
the Eleventh Amendment, see Def. Br., 11, challenging the legal sufficiency of the claim. Thus,
State Defendants have launched a facial attack, and the Court must examine the allegations of the
complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
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Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a claim for failing to state a basis upon which
relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “courts are required to accept all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). However,
the factual allegations set forth in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Although a statute of limitations question is an affirmative defense which is normally
raised under Rule 8(c), the statute of limitations may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “where
the complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative
defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran &
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Administrative Exhaustion
State Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ADA and § 504
claims because Plaintiffs’ did not exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA—which
State Defendants claim is required here, despite the fact that Plaintiffs bring only non-IDEA
claims. Def Brief at 12. Under the IDEA, the right to a “free and appropriate public education” is
safeguarded by elaborate procedural mechanisms, including the right to a due process hearing
before an administrative official. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775,
778 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)). Parties who are “aggrieved
by the findings and decision” of a due process hearing may bring a civil action in court, and the
court grants such relief as may be appropriate.” Id. “[I]tis clear from the language of the Act that
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Congress intended plaintiffs to complete the administrative process before resorting to federal
court.” Id. Exhaustion is required before the statute grants subject matter jurisdiction to the
district court. Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, ___, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13641 at *12–*13 (3d Cir. 2014)
Administrative exhaustion under the IDEA is required even in non-IDEA claims, “where
the plaintiff seeks relief that can be obtained under the IDEA.” Id. Section 1415(l) expressly
provides a rule of construction, which states that:
[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 1210112213], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791794f], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such
laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the
[IDEA administrative process] shall be exhausted to the same extent
as would be required had the action been brought under this
subchapter
[Id. at *13–*14 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).]
“This provision bars plaintiffs from circumventing [the] IDEA's exhaustion requirement by
taking claims that could have been brought under IDEA and repackaging them as claims under
some other statute—e.g., section 1983, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the ADA.” Id. at
*14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to determine whether exhaustion is
required, the “inquiry is whether the claim could have been remedied by the IDEA's
administrative process.” Id. at *15. That is, claims asserted under § 504 or the ADA will require
exhaustion, “if they seek relief that is available under the IDEA.” Id.
In Batchelor, the plaintiffs alleged that the school district retaliated against a student and
his mother when they advocated for the student’s right to a free and appropriate public education
(“FAPE”). Id. at *18. The plaintiffs asserted three claims: retaliation and failure to provide a
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FAPE under the IDEA; retaliation in violation of §504; and retaliation in violation of the ADA.
Id. at *8. As in this case, the plaintiffs argued that they need not have exhausted their
administrative remedies for their § 504 and ADA claims. Examining the plain language of the
statute, which “affords parents of a disabled child the opportunity to present a complaint ‘with
respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,’” id. at *18 (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)), the Third Circuit noted that “there is a logical path to be drawn from
the Appellants' claims of retaliation to the District's failure to provide, and Ms. Batchelor's effort
to obtain for, Ryan ‘a free appropriate public education.’” Id. at *21. The Circuit therefore held
that the plaintiff’s “retaliation claims asserted under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
ADA ‘relate unmistakably’ to the provision of a FAPE to Ryan, and are thus subject to the
IDEA's exhaustion requirement.” Id. at *19.
In this case, as in Batchelor, Plaintiffs’ claims “relate unmistakably” to the provision of a
FAPE to S.B., and are subject to IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Plaintiffs’ claims explicitly
arise out of alleged violations of the IDEA requirements, including failure to locate and evaluate
S.B., and the failure to provide EIS. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 15, 42–43. Under the plain language
of the IDEA statute, therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims relate to the IDEA, and Plaintiffs are required to
exhaust their administrative remedies. See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at ___, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
*18–19.
Plaintiffs assert, however, that exhaustion is not required. Plaintiffs claim that exhaustion
would be futile because the Defendants have agreed to provide S.B. with “all necessary related
services” going forward. Pl. Brief at 22. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, the only possible remedy is
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monetary damages, which is not available under the IDEA. Pl. Brief at 26. Therefore, according
to Plaintiffs, their claims do not require administrative exhaustion. Id.
Plaintiffs are correct that administrative exhaustion is not required where “exhaustion
would be futile or inadequate,” “where the issue presented is purely a legal question,” or “where
the administrative agency cannot grant relief.” Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Plaintiffs are also correct that compensatory and punitive damages
are not available under the IDEA. Batchelor, 759 F.3d at ___, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *24.
However, “the District Court is not constrained in the relief it is authorized to grant by the
remedies sought in the [Plaintiff’s] Complaint. On the contrary, the nature of Appellants' claims
and the governing law determine the relief, regardless of Appellants' demands.” Id. at *25 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)).
Thus, in Batchelor, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ claims that exhaustion was not
required because plaintiffs sought monetary damages. Noting that “‘the theory behind the
grievance may activate the IDEA’s process, even if the plaintiff wants a form of relief that the
IDEA does not supply,’” the panel held that “parents ‘cannot ignore remedies available under the
IDEA and insist on those of their own devising; under the IDEA, educational professionals are
supposed to have at least the first crack at formulating a plan to overcome the consequences of
educational shortfalls.’” Id. at *26 (quoting Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98
F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996)). The panel also found that “even though a monetary award is not
available to Appellants during the IDEA administrative process as compensatory and punitive
damages, such an award may nevertheless be granted as reimbursement for certain expenses
incurred.” Id. at *28. Thus, where “both the genesis and the manifestations of the problems are
educational,” the appropriate route is through the IDEA, which “offers comprehensive
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educational solutions . . . to directly address educational harms,” including compensatory
education, “and, in addition, provides reimbursement for certain financial losses that occur as a
result of the educational harms.” Id. at *30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Like the Third Circuit, both the Second and the Seventh Circuits have found
administrative exhaustion necessary in cases where plaintiffs sued for damages under the ADA
and § 504, but did not bring IDEA claims. Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992; Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288
F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002). The Second Circuit reasoned that exhaustion was necessary, even
though no claims were brought under the IDEA, because “the IDEA is intended to remedy
precisely the sort of claim made by [the plaintiff]: that a school district failed to provide her with
appropriate educational services.” Polera, 288 F.3d at 488. “The fact that [the plaintiff] seeks
damages, in addition to relief that is available under the IDEA, does not enable her to sidestep
the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA.” Id. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that “the
[IDEA] statute speaks of available relief, and what relief is ‘available’ does not necessarily
depend on what the aggrieved party wants.” Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 991.
Although Plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages, “both the genesis and the
manifestations of the problems are educational.” See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at ___, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at *30. S.B. received almost no educational services for many years. Am. Compl. at ¶ 80.
As of March 2012, his academic skills were at pre-kindergarten levels or below. Id. at ¶ 87. He
suffered from cognitive impairment as a result of a lack of educational experiences. Id. at ¶ 94.
The IDEA, therefore, is the most appropriate avenue for relief, as it provides comprehensive
educational solutions, such as compensatory education. See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at ___, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *30. Although Plaintiffs seek relief not available under the IDEA, because
their complaints stem from that statute, exhaustion is still required. To the extent that Plaintiffs’
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claims under the ADA and § 504, Counts One and Two of the Amended Complaint, are not
barred by the statute of limitations, they are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
B. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed without prejudice on subject matter jurisdiction grounds,
and therefore all other issues are moot. See In re Corestates, 837 F. Supp. at 105. However,
Plaintiffs may choose to renew their claims following the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
For the benefit of the parties, therefore, the Court will briefly address the question of whether
any of Plaintiffs’ federal claims are barred by a statute of limitations.
Section 504 and the ADA do not have their own statutes of limitations. In the Third
Circuit, though, “the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations applies to claims made for education
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,” P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 737
(3d Cir. 2009). “The IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do similar statutory work,” and
the Third Circuit thus found that “applying the state statute of limitations could frustrate federal
policy” in the area of education for children with disabilities. Id. at 736. Like in P.P., where “[a]ll
of the plaintiffs’ § 504 claims [were] premised on their IDEA claims,” id., Plaintiffs’ claims
under § 504 and the ADA are entirely premised on S.B.’s entitlement to services under the
IDEA, Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 13–30. Accordingly, like in P.P., the IDEA provides the closest
analogy for both the § 504 and the ADA claims, and supports the same federal policies. See P.P.,
585 F.3d at 735. The IDEA’s two year statute of limitations therefore applies to Plaintiffs’
claims.
Recognizing that IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations applies, Plaintiffs argue that their
claims are subject to the continuing violation doctrine and are therefore not barred. Pl. Brief at
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32. However, the IDEA statute of limitations is not subject to equitable tolling principles,
including the continuing violation doctrine. D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 248 (3d
Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs also assert that their claims are timely under IDEA’s statutory exception,
which provides that the statute of limitations does not apply if the parent did not request a
hearing due to “the local educational agency’s withholding of information from the parent that
was required under this part to be provided to the parent.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(ii).
However, “local educational agency” is defined in the IDEA as, generally, “a public board of
education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative
control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary schools or
secondary schools . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(a). In contrast, a “State educational agency” is
defined as “the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the
State supervision of public elementary schools and secondary schools.” Id. at § 1491(32).
Plaintiffs have not explained how State Defendants are local educational agencies instead of state
educational agencies, although only local agencies are covered under the exception to the statute
of limitations. Indeed, in the Amended Complaint, only the BOE is described as a “Local
Educational Agency”; DOE is described as a “State Educational Agency,” and DOH is not
described as an educational agency at all. Am. Compl.¶¶ 8, 10–11. It is therefore unlikely that
this statutory exception to the IDEA statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ claims against
State Defendants.
Although the Court does not decide the motion on these grounds, it is likely that
Plaintiffs’ claims against State Defendants for alleged events occurring prior to February 2011
are barred under the IDEA two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ allegations, however,
include a claim that DOE failed to adequately oversee the BOE between 2005 and 2013, Am.
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Comp. at ¶ 100. To the extent that such an allegation is sufficient to bring a cause of action
against DOE, Plaintiffs’ claim would survive the statute of limitations, though the claim would
be limited to those violations which occurred within two years of the date the original Complaint
was filed.
C. State Law Claims
State Defendants also assert that Count Three of the Amended Complaint, which asserts
violations of the New Jersey Special Education Statute, should be dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, and that Plaintiffs cannot recover monetary damages for violations of New
Jersey laws on education. The Court need not decide these issues. Both of Plaintiffs’ claims
under federal law are dismissed because of Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative
remedies. The Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state
law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2014)
(upholding District Court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
where all federal claims were dismissed).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted, and all
counts against State Defendants are dismissed, without prejudice.
Dated: October 9, 2014
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J.
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