STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION OF N.J., INC. v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM and ORDER that Plaintiff's application to temporarily, preliminary, and permanently enjoin and otherwise restrain Defendant from investigating or disciplining Trooper Christopher Burgos is DENIED; that Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees and costs of suit is DENIED; that the Clerk of the Court designate the action as CLOSED. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 12/11/2013. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL
ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY, INC.,,

Civil Action No.: 13-cv-1065 (PGS)

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.

SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on an Amended Complaint and application [ECF No. 9] by
Plaintiff, State Troopers Fraternal Association of New Jersey, Inc. ("Plaintiff' or "STFA"), whereby
Plaintiff seeks to permanently enjoin Defendants, State of New Jersey and Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes 1
("Defendants"), from investigating or disciplining STFA President Trooper Christopher Burgos
(Trooper Burgos”) who was acting in furtherance of his union responsibilities, for violating the Rules
and Regulations of the Division of State Police (“Division”). By way of amended complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants’ investigation of Trooper Burgos interferes with or chills his first amendment
rights because it “relates solely to activity which occurred while [Trooper Burgos] was acting as STFA
President.” Pl.’s Compl at ¶ 19 [ECF No. 1]. More specifically, Defendants’ investigation into union
matters restricts the right of union members to freely associate under the First Amendment. Defendants
oppose Plaintiffs application, arguing primarily that Trooper Burgos's conduct, namely the disclosure
of confidential documents, is not protected conduct under the First Amendment. The Court, having

1 In his official capacity as Superintendent of the State of New Jersey, Division of State Police, only, having the statutory
authority to investigate and discipline members of the Division. N.J.S.A. 53:1-1 et seq.

considered the parties' submissions, and having heard oral argument on February 22, 2013 and October
21, 2013, hereby denies Plaintiff’s application for a permanent injunction barring the investigation or
discipline of Trooper Burgos.
Trooper Burgos has been a member of the New Jersey State Police since June 19, 1986, and has
also served as the elected President of the STFA. STFA is the union that represents the interests of the
New Jersey State Troopers below the rank of Sergeant (Id at 17, 5 through 28, 19). As President of the
STFA, Trooper Burgos is responsible for representing the union during contract and labor negotiations
(Burgos T. 28, 14-17) and supporting union members facing discipline by the Division's Office of
Professional Standards (“Division”) (Burgos T. 32, 1 through T. 33, 25). Notably, on disciplinary
matters, Trooper Burgos acts as a liaison between the Division and union members (and their counsel)
(Burgos T. 32); but he is not a party to their disciplinary proceedings in a personal or official capacity.
The instant action arises as a result of Trooper Burgos’ unauthorized release of a confidential
Division document which he received while acting as STFA president. The document was a
"Supervisory Review Sheet" drafted by the Division and contained the preliminary results of an internal
investigation by the Division into the conduct of Trooper Keith Juckett and Sergeant Richard Wambold
“Confidential Document.”
On or about August 16, 2012, Burgos obtained the Confidential Document when Katherine
Hartman, Esq. (“Hartman”) forwarded it to Burgos (T. 22, 6-18; T. 51, 5-15). Since, Hartman
represented other troopers in other matters before the Division, she realized that she received the
Confidential Document in error, and she emailed it to Trooper Burgos, in his capacity as STFA
President. (Burgos T. 26, 18 through T. 27, 20).
In the ordinary course of business at the Division, documents like the Confidential Document are
not routinely disclosed until the final disposition of an individual case. Only the final conclusion of an
internal investigation is disclosed. Pl.’s Br. in Opp. at 11. Nevertheless, having received the Confidential

Document from Hartman, Trooper Burgos forwarded copies of it to Vincent Nuzzi, Esq., counsel for
Trooper Keith Juckett (Burgos T. 49, 7-19) and Charles Sciarra, Esq., counsel for Sergeant Richard
Wambold. (Burgos T. 51, 19-24)
When the Division realized that the Confidential Document had been released without
authorization, it launched an internal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the disclosure. On
December 4, 2012, the Division’s investigation focused on Trooper Burgos because he was the
individual who disclosed the Confidential Document to the lawyers without authorization. (Burgos T.,
22 through T. 6, 16). On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff commenced the instant action to enjoin Defendants
from compelling an interview of Trooper Burgos as part of the Division’s internal investigation.
On February 22, 2013, at the injunction hearing, the Court denied an injunction but instructed the
parties that if the interview of Trooper Burgos gave rise to any disputes about First Amendment
concerns, then plaintiff may object and bring the questions here for review. On February 26, 2013, the
Division interviewed Trooper Burgos, and no such disputes arose at that time.
On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 9] seeking, this time, to
permanently enjoin Defendants’ from further investigation and/or subsequent discipline of Trooper
Burgos, on First Amendment grounds. Plaintiff argued that any adverse action taken by the Division
against Trooper Burgos would restrict the constitutional right of union members to freedom of
association. Defendants opposed that application 2, arguing “that Plaintiff has not made the necessary
showing to obtain the extraordinary relief of a permanent injunction” (Pl.’s Br. in Opp. at 8-21).
II.
Injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited
circumstances." Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co.,
2 The Court notes that from April 26, 2013 to September 19, 2013, this case was subjected to substantial delays resulting
from the Court’s accommodation of numerous requests by counsel on both sides for adjournments.( ECF Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18,
23.

290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002)(quotation and citation omitted). To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff
must demonstrate to the court that such extraordinary relief is warranted. “In ruling on a motion for a
preliminary injunction, the court must consider: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the
merits at final hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the conduct
complained of; (3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary
injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.” AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421,
1427 (3d Cir. N.J. 1994); see also Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, 176 F.3d. 151, 153 (3d Cir.
1999)(quoting Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d. 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1998)). When seeking a permanent
injunction, a plaintiff must show actual success on the merits. Premier Sys. Consultants, Ltd. v. Mahin,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19294, at 3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 14, 1999)(citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390, 392, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 1832, 68 L. Ed. 2d 175, 178 (1981)). A plaintiff’s failure to establish any
element in its favor renders an injunction “inappropriate”. Nutrasweet Co., 176 F.3d. at 153.
Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction does not meet several of the factors. At the
outset, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate actual success on the merits of its First Amendment claim of
“expressive association”. Pl.’s Brief at 13 [ECF. No. 12]. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s
argument that any investigation into the STFA President would be fatal to the Union. see Pl.’s Complaint
at ¶ 27 (where it alleges “A union cannot function if its leaders are not free to communicate with their
members about problems and complaints.”). Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence sufficient to
support its assertion that any inquiry—even if limited in scope to the actions of a single individual in a
single instance—would have a chilling effect on the freedom of association of the members of STFA’s
members of STFA. See Pl’s Brief at 12 (“There is obviously a chilling effect on the President … There is
also a chilling effect on the members right to Associate with the STFA which has been dragged into an

investigation.”). The Division’s review of this one minor incident involving several individuals does not
undermine the function of the union.
Plaintiff has also failed to prove that the STFA would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive
relief. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to establish “any injury other than that which is incidental to" the
pending state proceedings. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164, 63 S. Ct. 877, 87 L. Ed. 1324
(1943). If Plaintiff’s petition is denied by this Court, Plaintiff is not without a remedy, it has the option
to seek constitutional relief in the state administrative proceeding, 3 or any appeal therefrom. N.J. Ct. R.
2:2-3(a)(2). Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendants are targeting or harassing Trooper
Burgos because of his union involvement. The interview of Burgos was an ordinary procedure in
Division operations.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any “adverse action” against Trooper Burgos
would harm the public interest. To the contrary, “The State of New Jersey has a significant interest in
maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of its police force.” Terry v. Town of Morristown,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51837 (D.N.J. July 17, 2007)(internal quotation and citation omitted); see also
State Troopers Non-Commissioned Officers Ass’n v. New Jersey, 643 F. Supp. 2d 615, 638 (D.N.J.
2009). The discipline of state troopers "involves the most profound and fundamental exercise of
managerial prerogative and policy," implicating "not only the proper conduct of those engaged in the
most significant aspects of law enforcement, involving the public safety and the apprehension of
dangerous criminals, but also the overall effectiveness, performance standards, and morale of the State
Police." New Jersey v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 134 N.J. 393, 634 A.2d 478, 491 (N.J.

3 The Division regularly transmits disciplinary matters to the Office of Administrative Law (the “OAL”) for a plenary review
of any disciplinary charges by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Constitutional claims may be raised before an ALJ, who
is "clothed with ample authority to rule upon such questions in their initial decisions, to the extent the issues arise legitimately
in the context of the contested case hearing and are necessary for a complete disposition of any genuine issue in the contested
case." Jones v. Dep't of Cmty. Affs., 395 N.J. Super. 632, 930 A.2d 477, 480 (N.J. App. Div. 2007). The ALJ’s
recommendation is reviewed by the Superintendent of the Division, who renders the final decision regarding the disciplinary
charges. Thereafter, plaintiffs have a right to appeal.

1993)(holding that the discipline of state police was not subject to negotiation or collective bargaining
agreement). The public depends on the order of its law enforcement bodies, which itself depends on the
enforcement of the Rules and Regulations established by the Division. It is in pursuance of that end that
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Division require every member to submit to questioning
by the Division when necessary. see Declaration of Erin M. Greene, Esq. (“Greene Decl.”), Ex. A at 20
[ECF No. 29-1].
In deciding this matter, the Court is mindful that the most culpable person may be the officer who
mistakenly emailed the Confidential Document to Katherine Hartman, Esq.; but there are no facts that
show that the State Police are targeting Burgos because of his role as President of the Union, as opposed
to the others individuals involved.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court upon Amended Complaint and application [ECF No.
9] by Plaintiff State Troopers Fraternal Association of New Jersey, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “STFA”), seeking
to permanently enjoin Defendants, State of New Jersey and Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes (collectively
“Defendants”), from investigating and/or disciplining STFA President, Trooper Christopher Burgos
(“Trooper Burgos”), for violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the State of New Jersey,
Division of State Police (“Division”); and the Court, having considered the parties submissions; and
having heard oral argument on February 22, 2013 and October 21, 2013, and for the reasons stated
above;
It is on this 11th day of December, 2013;
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to temporarily, preliminary, and permanently enjoin and
otherwise restrain Defendant from investigating or disciplining Trooper Christopher Burgos is
DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs of suit is DENIED; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court designate the action as CLOSED.

s/Peter G. Sheridan
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.
December 11, 2013