NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE CO. v. UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT et al

Filing 12

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 6/27/2013. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS
INSURANCE CO., a/s/o CANDACE
KNIGHT,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-1124 (MLC)
O P I N I O N

Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

THE PLAINTIFF, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. (“NJM”),
brought this subrogation action against the defendants, United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and ICE employee
Steven M. Beyers.

(See dkt. entry no. 1, Compl.)

NJM’s claims

sound in state tort law, i.e., negligence, and arise from a motor
vehicle accident involving a vehicle owned by NJM’s insured and a
vehicle owned by ICE and driven by Beyers.

(See id. at ¶¶ 3, 6-7,

10.)
THE COURT originally had jurisdiction over the action because
claims were asserted against ICE, “an agency organized under the
federal branch of the United States government,” and “the property
loss occurred as a result of the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of . . . Beyers, an employee of [ICE,] while Beyers was

acting within the scope of his employment.”
U.S.C. § 2674.
dismissed.

(Id. at ¶ 2.)

See 28

However, the claims asserted against ICE have been

(See dkt. entry no. 11, 6-11-13 Order & J.; dkt. entry

no. 10, 6-11-13 Op.)

Accordingly, Beyers is the only defendant

remaining in the action, and the claims raised against him remain
viable only insofar as they have been raised against Beyers in his
individual capacity.1
THE COURT lacks jurisdiction over the claims asserted against
Beyers, which arise (1) under state law, and (2) between citizens
of the same state.

(See Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 10.)

See Lincoln Prop.

Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (requiring complete diversity
between each plaintiff and each defendant).
to dismiss those claims sua sponte.

The Court thus intends

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If

the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 462 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
is a court’s obligation to dismiss a case whenever it becomes
convinced that it has no proper jurisdiction, no matter how late
that wisdom may arrive.”); Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160,
162 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting courts’ “continuing obligation to sua
1

ICE earlier argued and NJM earlier conceded that Beyers
could not be sued as an ICE employee. (See dkt. entry no. 9-1, ICE
Br.; 6-11-13 Op. at 2 & n.1 (noting lack of opposition).) No party
-- including Beyers -- moved for reconsideration from the 6-11-13
Order and Judgment, and the time for such a motion has now passed.
See L.Civ.R. 7.1(i).
2

sponte raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction if it is in
question”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Bor. of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster,
45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Under Gibbs jurisprudence, where
the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction
is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to
decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an
affirmative justification for doing so.”)
THE COURT, for good cause appearing, will enter a separate
Order and Judgment.2

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated:

June 27, 2013

2

The remaining claims will be dismissed without prejudice to
recommence those claims in an appropriate state court within thirty
days.
3