BRADFORD v. BOLLES et al
Filing
69
MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 12/5/2014. (eaj)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DREW BRADFORD,
Civ. No. 13-1910
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
JOE BOLLES, et al.,
Defendants.
THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
Presently before the Court are multiple motions filed by Plaintiff Drew Bradford and by
Summit Defendants.1 On October 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to File Out of Time, a
Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s August 4, 2014 Opinion and Order,2 and a Motion to
Amend Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No. 52). Subsequently on October 24, 2014, Summit
Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a Motion for Summary Judgment
on Count I of their Counterclaim. (Doc. No. 54). On December 1, 2014, this Court held a show
cause hearing to address the apparent abandonment of Plaintiff’s lawyer. This lawyer failed to
appear, and Mr. Bradford represented to the court that he would be proceeding pro se. On that
same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions against Summit Defendants and their counsel.
(Doc. No. 66). After reviewing the parties’ written submissions and considering the parties’
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These Defendants include: the City of Summit, the Summit Police Department, Captain Steve
Zagorski, Andrew Bartolotti, and W. Paul Kelly.
2
This Opinion and Order granted the Judiciary Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 49,
50). The Judiciary Defendants include: Joe Bolles, Mary Braunschweiger, Eugene Farkas, the
Honorable Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., Meryl Nadler, Patrice Rindok, the Trial Court
Administration, and the Administrative Office of the Courts.
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December 1, 2014 oral arguments, all of Plaintiff’s Motions will be denied, Summit Defendants’
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be granted and their Motion for Summary Judgment
will be dismissed as moot.
I.
Plaintiff’s Motions
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) requires any Motions for Reconsideration to be filed within 14
days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion. Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration was filed on October 20, 2014, more than two months after the Court’s August
4, 2014 Order was entered. Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiff’s recent abandonment by his
lawyer, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and finds no grounds for
reconsideration. In order to succeed on a motion for reconsideration, the moving party must
demonstrate (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new, previously
unavailable evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest
injustice. See North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” and thus granted “very sparingly.” Ivan v.
Middlesex Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d. 546, 551 (D.N.J. May 6, 2009). After reviewing Plaintiff’s
briefs in support of his Motion (Doc. No. 52, 53, 60, 62, 67), Plaintiff has demonstrated no facts,
no change in controlling law, and no clear error of law or manifest injustice that warrants
reconsideration. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to File Out of Time will be dismissed as moot,
and his Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint seeks to add a new Judiciary Defendant,
Elizabeth Lipari. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), leave to amend the complaint is freely granted
unless there is undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962). Here, Plaintiff’s amendment would be futile. The Court’s August 4, 2014
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Opinion granted Judiciary Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the basis of these Defendants’
immunities, among other reasons. (Doc. No. 49 at 6). As a fellow staff member of Somerset
County court, Ms. Lipari enjoys the same immunities as her co-workers, the Judiciary
Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to his Complaint is futile, and his
Motion to Amend the Complaint will be denied.
Finally, Plaintiff brings a Motion for Sanctions against Summit Defendants, their counsel,
and counsel’s firm. (Doc. No. 66). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 allows the court in its discretion to impose
appropriate sanctions against attorneys and parties who have signed and filed pleadings, motions,
or other papers that after reasonable inquiry are not grounded in fact or warranted by law. Such
sanctions should be imposed only in the “exceptional circumstance” and should be guided by
equitable considerations. Doering v. Union Cnty Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191,
194–95 (3d Cir. 1988). After reviewing Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 66) and in light of the
dispositive ruling in favor of Summit Defendants (see below), the Court does not find any
grounds for sanctions here. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions will be denied.
II.
Summit Defendants’ Motions
In assessing a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) the
Court must accept as true all of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and determine whether the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251,
253 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims against the Summit Defendants are time-barred
or otherwise precluded as they stem from events that occurred between 2005 and 2006. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying
personal injury claim in the state in which the claim arises. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634
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(3d Cir. 2009). In New Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years
from the date of accrual. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, and failure to
investigate an arrest accrued in 2005 or 2006 and are thus time barred since Plaintiff did not file
his Complaint until March 27, 2013. In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Summit
and the Summit Defendants are covered by a contractual release signed by Plaintiff and arise out
of the same set of facts that were the subject of Plaintiff’s Superior Court claim in the Bradford
v. Gleason case. Thus, these claims are also precluded by the terms of the Release and by New
Jersey’s Entire Controversy Doctrine, N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim based on the false testimony of one of the
Summit Defendants, there is no such cause of action. Therefore, Summit Defendants’ Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted, and judgment will be entered in favor of Summit
Defendants.
During the hearing on December 1, 2014, Summit Defendants stated that they would
withdraw their Counterclaims and instead seek reasonable attorneys’ fees from Plaintiff for
defending the lawsuit. Therefore Summit Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count
I of their Counterclaim will be dismissed as moot, and the Court will direct Summit Defendants
to timely file their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, including an affidavit of services.
/s/ Anne E. Thompson
ANNE E. THOMPSON, U.S.D.J.
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