MUHAMMAD v. CALABRESE et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 5/2/2013. (gxh)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DONALD ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. CALABRESE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 13-1983 (FLW)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Donald Abdullah Muhammad, Pro Se
#15921
Ann Kline Forensic Center
P.O. Box 7717
Trenton, NJ 08628
WOLFSON, District Judge
Plaintiff, Donald Abdullah Muhammad, a pre-trial detainee
confined at the Ann Kline Forensic Center in Trenton, New Jersey
seeks to bring this section 1983 action in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will
grant Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.
The Court must now review the Complaint pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief
may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint
should be dismissed.1
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts claims against various defendants, who are
all employees of the Ann Kline Forensic Center (“Ann Kline”)
where he is currently detained while he awaits trial.2
He
alleges that he was denied proper medical care in violation of
his constitutional rights.
In particular, Plaintiff states that
on October 28, 2012, he was transferred to Ann Kline for a 30-day
evaluation.
He further alleges that, while there, “he was
subject to prejudice, maltreatment and medical malpractice,
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Plaintiff recently filed a Motion for Emergency Relief (ECF
No. 6), which asserts the same claims as his Complaint. As none
of the allegations in his request for emergent relief suggest
that he is in grave danger, or facing an enhanced risk of serious
physical injury, the Court concludes that this motion does not
warrant separate analytical treatment. Moreover, the Court
concludes, infra, that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, accordingly, Plaintiff’s
emergent motion will be dismissed as moot.
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Plaintiff brings his claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities for damages, and in their official
capacities for injunctive relief.
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improper care, hate crimes, mental anguish and due process of
law.” (Compl., Stat. of Facts, ECF No. 1-1, p. 2 of 7).
In
addition, Plaintiff alleges a “failure to doctor duties [sic] and
obligations as a professional and legal responsibilities as a
doctor- which cause me to suffer from post-traumatic stress as a
result of evaluation discrimination and abuse of authority as a
professional person[].”
(Id. at p. 3 of 7).
With regard to Defendant Dr. Trivini, Plaintiff alleges that
Dr. Trivini refused to give Plaintiff medical care and pain
medication for three months, which resulted in Plaintiff
suffering severe pain in his legs and feet and prevented him from
completing his usual daily duties. (Id. at p. 4 of 7).
With
regard to Dr. Ferguson, Plaintiff alleges that the doctor denied
Plaintiff “a fair psychiatric evaluation to obtain money under
false pretense.” (Id. at p. 5 of 7).
Plaintiff further suggests that the alleged denial of
medical treatment was motivated by religious animus.
He asserts
that he has suffered “barbaric treatment,” at the hands of the
defendants, “because of [his] status as a Sunni Muslim in the
Islamic faith- Imam.”
(Id. at p. 2 of 7).
Plaintiff seeks monetary and other relief, as well as
appointment of counsel. (Compl., ¶ 7; Application for Pro Bono
Counsel, D.E. 3).
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DISCUSSION
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134, §§
801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 to 1321–77 (April 26, 1996), requires
a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required
to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding
as an indigent.
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009). Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the
proposition that “[a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the
Supreme Court held that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil
complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that
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the claim is facially plausible. This then “allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal).
While the Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint
are plausible, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. 677–679. See also Twombly, 505
U.S. at 555, & n.3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77,
84 (3d Cir. 2011); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012),
the Third Circuit has recently cautioned that Twombly and Iqbal
“do not provide a panacea for defendants . . . .”
Covington v.
Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, ––– F.3d ––––, 2013
WL 979067, *2 (3d Cir. March 14, 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679). The plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
2.
Section 1983 Actions
Through the vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff may seek
redress for violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
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rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
3.
Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Examining the merits of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Court
finds that the claims, as pled, fail to withstand sua sponte
screening.
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, as such, his denial of
medical care claims are examined under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 243–45 (1983) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
Eighth Amendment, controls the issue of whether prison officials
must provide medical care to those confined in jail awaiting
trial); Jackson v. City of Philadelphia, Case Nos. 12-2986, 123187, 2013 WL 363463, *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 31, 2013)(slip copy);
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Hubbard v. Taylor (“Hubbard I”), 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir.
2005); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, in assessing the denial of medical care to a pretrial
detainee, the inquiry is whether the denial was “imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it [was] but an incident of some
other legitimate governmental purpose.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
Here, in the body of the complaint, Plaintiff makes
allegations solely against Defendants Dr. Trivini and Director
Ferguson. Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts as to the
remaining defendants, these defendants must be dismissed from
this action without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the claims Plaintiff asserts against Dr.
Trivini and Director Ferguson are vague. As to Defendant Trivini,
Plaintiff states only that Dr. Trivini “negligently denied me
medical attention and pain relievers for three months.” (Compl.,
Statement of Facts). As to Defendant Ferguson, Plaintiff asserts
only that Director Ferguson improperly sought to “obtain money
under false pretense.” (Id. at ¶ 5). These meager, unspecific
facts do not plausibly suggest that Plaintiff suffered a
deprivation of his due process rights. Accord Aruanno v. Smith,
Civ. Action No. 09-1070 (JLL), 2011 WL 2580402, *4 (D.N.J. Jun.
27, 2011)(“Although the body of the complaint mentions [various
defendants] by name, the factual assertions against these
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defendants are too vague and conclusory to ‘nudge’ Plaintiff’s
claims of denial of medical care ‘across the line from
conceivable to plausible,’ as required to satisfy the Iqbal
standard.”)(citation omitted). Moreover, by his own admission,
Plaintiff asserts only negligence on the part of the defendants.
(Compl., Stat. of Facts, ECF No. 1-1, p. 3 of 7). Allegations of
negligence do not support a section 1983 claim. See Robinson v.
Temple Univ. Health Svcs., 2012 WL 6183603 at *2 (3d Cir. Dec.
12, 2012)(unpubl.) (Plaintiff’s “complaint alleged mere
negligence-- a state of mind insufficient to support relief
[under § 1983].”)(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Hence, even if Plaintiff’s
allegations against Dr. Trivini and Director Ferguson were
adequate under Iqbal, his claims against them would nonetheless
fail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff may reopen this case in
accordance with the attached Order upon filing of a motion to
reopen and an amended complaint, with factual allegations that
pass muster under Iqbal. Plaintiff’s Application for Pro Bono
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Counsel is dismissed as moot, as is Plaintiff’s Motion for
Emergency Relief.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
United States District Judge
Dated: May 2, 2013
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