PROFESSIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY, IAFF LOCAL 4610, PFANJ, AFL-CIO v. MONMOUTH OCEAN HOSPITAL SERVICES CORPORATION (MONOC)

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM ORDER that PEMSA's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 12/31/2014. (mmh)

RECEIVED
!DEC 3 1 20~4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AT 8:30
M
WILLIAM T WALSH CLERK

PROFESSIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY,
IAFF LOCAL 4610, PFANJ, AFL-CIO,
Civil Action No. 13-2135 (MAS) (DEA)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM ORDER

v.
MONMOUTH OCEAN HOSPITAL SERVICES
CORPORATION (MONOC),
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge
Plaintiff Professional Emergency Medical Services Association ofNew Jersey, IAFF Local
4610, PFANJ, AFL-CIO ("PEMSA'?) moves for reconsideration of this Court's April 28, 2014
Memorandum Order. (Pl.'s Mot., ECF No. 32.) Defendant Monmouth Ocean Hospital Services
Corporation ("MONOC") filed opposition (Def. 's Opp'n, ECF No. 34.) The Court has carefully
considered the parties' submissions and decided the matter without oral argument pursuant to
Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, PEMSA's
motion is denied.
Local Civil Rule 7.1 (i) "permits a party to seek reconsideration by the Court of matters
'which [it] believes the Court has overlooked' when it ruled on a motion."' NL Indus., Inc. v.

Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting local rule). "The
standard of review involved in a motion for [reconsideration] is quite high, and therefore relief
under this rule is granted very sparingly." United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J.

1994) (citing Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986)). The moving party must
show "that dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were overlooked by the court
in reaching its prior decision." United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345
(D.N.J. 1999).
PEMSA contends that this Court's April 28, 2014 Memorandum Order (ECF No. 31)
overlooked the "futility exception" to the general exhaustion requirement articulated in Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). PEMSA misreads the Court's decision. In fact,

the Court considered the futility exception but determined that it did not apply because the
employee in question had not "at least attempt[ed] to use the grievance procedure set forth in a
collective bargaining agreement before [he sought] redress in the courts." (Mem. Order 2.)
Contrary to PEMSA's assertion, this conclusion is in accord with Cole v. Pathmark, 672
F. Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1987). There, the court observed that "[e]ven where it is argued that pursuit
of contractual grievance procedures would be futile, the Supreme Court has made clear that
plaintiff must still attempt to satisfy this requirement, which can be done by making a showing that
the employee made repeated complaints to the company and union officials." Jd at 805 (emphasis
added). In this case, the Amended Complaint simply did not allege an attempt to exhaust the
administrative remedies set forth in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly,

IT IS on this 31st day of December, 2014, hereby ORDERED that PEMSA's motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.

s/ Michael A. Shipp
· MICHAELA. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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