SLAUGHTER v. SANTIAGO et al
Filing
57
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 11/30/2015. (kas, )
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHARLES S. SLAUGHTER,
Civil Action No. 13-2383 (MAS)
Petitioner,
v.
OPINION
R E C E I V
Ef;·D
ANGEL SANTIAGO, et al.,
NOV 3 0 2015
Respondents.
AT 8:30
WILLIAM T. WALSH
CLERK
SHIPP, District Judge:
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Petitioner Charles S. Slaughter ("Petitioner"), confined at the Adult Diagnostic and -Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey, filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"), challenging a sentence imposed by the State of New
Jersey for aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. Presently before the
Court is Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b), (ECF No. 52) ("Motion"), challenging the Court's March 31, 2015 Order denying the
Petition, (ECF No. 43). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the Motion. 1
After he appealed the Court's denial of the Petition, see infra, Petitioner filed a motion to
retain the entire record for use in the appeal. (ECF No. 46.) However, certification of the record
was automatically completed by the Clerk of the Court when Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. .. _
(See ECF No. 44.) As such, that motion is dismissed as moot. Furthermore, as the Court is denying
the Motion, Petitioner's (1) motion to appoint pro bono counsel, (ECF No. 48), (2) motion to
temporarily stay all proceedings, (ECF No. 53), and (3) motion to reinstate all proceedings, (ECF
No. 56), are also dismissed as moot.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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On January 22, 2004, a jury in the New Jersey Superior Court convicted Petitioner ofone--·~·~·~ 7 :·::··:··
count of first degree aggravated sexual assault, two counts of second degree attempted aggravated
sexual assault, and one count of third degree endangering the welfare of a child, after he was found
to have molested and sexually assaulted his own daughter when she was between the ages of five ·
and seven. (Op. 2, Mar. 31, 2015, ECF No. 42.) Petitioner was initially sentenced to an aggregate
term of 22 years imprisonment with an 85 percent period of parole ineligibility. (ECF No. 29-31 .
at 2.) Petitioner appealed the conviction and sentence, and the Appellate Division affirmed the
conviction~ but remanded for resentencing.
(Id)
On December 1, 2006, Petitioner was
resentenced and, thereafter, he filed a petition for certification. (Id.) On January 31, 2007, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey denied the petition for certification. (Id.)
On March 20, 2007, Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). (Id) Several years
later,·onMarch 16, 2010, the Law Division denied Petitioner's PCR application. (Id) Petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal from that decision on October 21, 2010, and the denial of PCR was
affirmed on June 14, 2012. (Id) Petitioner's petition for certification from that ruling was denied
on October 25, 2012. (Id.) After exhausting his state court remedies, Petitioner filed the Petition
with this Court on April 8, 2013.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) The Court ordered an answer froin
Respondents, which was then filed on July 29, 2014. (Resp., ECF No. 29.) After reviewing the
records of the case and the parties' submissions, the Court denied the Petition on substantive
growids. (See Op., Mar. 31, 2015.) Subsequently, Petitioner appealed the Court's judgment to the
Third Circuit. (Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 44.) While his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed · ·
the instant Motion. Petitioner's appeal is still currently pending.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Ordinarily; the Court is barred from considering motions that address the merits of the case·,·~t~~th:+·~:,,,, . ·
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once the case has been appealed. Kull v. Kutztown Univ. of Pa., 543 F. App'x 244, 247 (3d
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2013); Thomas v. Northeastern Univ., 470 F. App'x 70, 71 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Griggs v. }'!:.:
Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d
.
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Cir. 1985)). However, the Court can consider and deny a Rule 60(b) motion even while a·case·hr:;~1'.iXl!hl;<:i:'
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on appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.l(a)(2) ("If a timely motion is made for relief that the cowt
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Robinson, 313 F.3d at 140. Therefore, the Court must decide whether to deny the Motion for·a•if:;\f.:liq;:i_:::_::.
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lack of jurisdiction, or to transfer the case to the Third Circuit. The Court finds that denying the
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Motion is more appropriate than transfer, as transfer would be futile. See United States v. Doe,
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No. 13-4274, 2015 WL 5131208, at *13 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2015) (precedential) (holdingthataRuie:·~ini;;:;:::'.-:::·. ·
60 motion disguised as a second or successive habeas petition is not entitled to relief).
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·· '· Section 2244(b) requires the court of appeals to dismiss a second or successive habeas ??;!~·:,:
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petition unless Petitioner shows that the new claims, among other things, rely on "a new rule ·of
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con8titutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that wa8 .:'.:foi:;iJ:;'. :'. :.
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previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). "As a result of[§ 2244(b)], it is essential ..:(H/:J::~'. '. ,.
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that habeas petitioners include in their first petition all potential claims for which they might desife
fo seek review and relief." Mason v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis ill
origi~al). ·In that regard, the Court explicitly notified Petition~r of these consequences In ii Mason.
order issued on July 5, 2013. (See Order, July 15, 2013, ECF No. 4.) Pittman, being "a sttt~
appellate decision, could not hav~ contained a new rule of constitutional law made retroact1~e by
the United States Supreme Court. Even if Pittman was a Supreme Court case that announced a
new retroactive rule of constitutional law, there can be no argument that it was
"pre~io~~ly
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unavailable"-Pittman was decided ori May 13, 2011, and the Petition was dated April
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Petitioner was required to bring any claims based on Pittman in his original Petition, ot at the very
.}eastin-response to the Court's Mason order, and Petitioner did neither. As such, if the
transfer this Motion, which is, in effect, a second or successive petition, to the Third
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Third Circuit is likely to dismiss it under § 2244(b)(2). See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,
petition·that was not presented in a prior application must be dismissed unless the
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a new tu.le of constitutional law, previously unavailable, that has been made retroactive).
the Court will not transfer the Motion to the Third Circuit.
III.
CONCLUSION
'For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is DENIED.
s/ Michael A. Shipp
Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J.
Dated: November 30, 2015
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