WOOD v. HOGAN et al

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 5/6/2014. (gxh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
PHILLIP WOOD,

Civil Action No. 13-2453 (FLW)

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

ELIZABETH HOGAN, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
PHILLIP WOOD, #15067
Ann Klein Forensic Center
P.O. Box 7717
West Trenton, New Jersey 08628
Plaintiff Pro Se
WOLFSON, District Judge:
Phillip Wood, who is civilly committed to the Ann Klein Forensic Center in New Jersey,
seeks to file a Complaint without prepayment of the filing fee, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against 17 officials at Ann Klein Forensic Center. This Court will grant Wood=s application
to proceed in forma pauperis and, as required by 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B), dismiss the Complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Over 30 years ago, when he was 19 years old, Wood set fire to the family home while his
family was inside sleeping. See Wood v. Main, 789 F.Supp.2d 519 (D.N.J. 2011), certificate of
appealability denied, C.A. 11-2684 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1100 (2012);
In re Commitment of Phillip A. Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Dec. 12,

2007), certif. denied, 194 N.J. 444 (2008) (table).1 All family members escaped by jumping from
second floor windows, except his two-month old nephew, who died in the fire. In 1981, Wood
was found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGI”) of felony murder and aggravated arson in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County. He was involuntarily committed to a state
hospital as an NGI acquittee, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:8b(3), and received periodic review
hearings, in accordance with State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975).2

1

This Court takes judicial notice of prior proceedings brought by or against Wood. Courts may
take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is “capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). See also Leggett v. Bates, 533 F.App’x 57, 58 n.2 (3d Cir.
2013 ) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases.”) (citation omitted);
McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] court may take judicial
notice of a prior judicial opinion.”).
2

“When a person accused of a crime is acquitted by reason of insanity, the accused may be held in
continued confinement if the person is a danger to self or others and is in need of medical
treatment. We describe such person as being on Krol status.” In re Commitment of W.K., 159
N.J. 1, 2 (1999) (citing Krol, 68 N.J. 236). Under New Jersey law, a defendant who is committed
after an NGI finding is reviewed on a periodic basis under the same standards as those applied to
civil commitments, except that the burden for establishing the need for continued NGI
commitment is by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas the burden in a regular civil
commitment proceeding is clear and convincing evidence. See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 524 n.5;
In re Commitment of M.M., 377 N.J. Super. 71, 76-77 (App. Div. 2005). The lesser burden of
proof continues during the maximum period for which imprisonment could have been imposed as
an ordinary term of imprisonment for the charges on which the defendant has been acquitted by
reason of insanity, after giving credit for all time spent in confinement for the charges. Id.
Because the continued involuntary commitment of an NGI defendant is based upon the court’s
determination of whether the state has demonstrated that the defendant continues to be a danger to
himself or others, New Jersey law allows the person to be released prior to the maximum term if
the court finds that the NGI defendant is no longer a danger to herself or others. Id. However,
after expiration of the maximum term, the state’s burden of showing a continuing need for civil
commitment rises from the preponderance of the evidence standard under Krol and N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:4-8b(3) to the clear and convincing evidence standard set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-27.15(a). See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 524 n.5; In re Commitment of W.K., 159 N.J. 1, 4
(1999); Commitment of M.M., 377 N.J. Super. at 77 n.3.
2

By order filed March 31, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court terminated Wood’s NGI
Krol status, effective April 18, 2010, and ordered Ann Klein Forensic Center to immediately
evaluate him to determine whether or not he should be committed pursuant to the New Jersey Civil
Commitment Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.1 et seq. A hearing was conducted, and Wood was
civilly committed effective April 18, 2010, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15 (a), which
provides that “[i]f the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the patient needs continued
involuntary commitment to treatment, it shall issue an order authorizing the involuntary
commitment of the patient and the assignment or admission of the patient . . .”
Prior to the expiration of his 30-year Krol term, Wood’s Krol hearings were suspended by
court order during the time he served two separate terms of criminal incarceration. See Wood,
789 F.Supp.2d at 521-23; In re Commitment of Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *1. On May 3, 2000,
Wood was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment, based on his guilty plea to aggravated
assault on a psychiatrist, and on March 5, 2007, Wood was sentenced to a four-year term of
incarceration based on his guilty plea to third-degree assault. A state court order dated July 21,
2000, suspended Krol hearings for Wood during the time he was in the custody of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections, but provided that 90 days prior to his release date, the court would
schedule a Krol hearing.3 Id. Wood’s Krol hearings were suspended, pursuant to the July 21,
2000, order, during the time he served these terms; prior to the expiration of each term of
incarceration, the state court conducted a Krol hearing, determined that Wood posed a danger to
himself, others, and property, if released to the community, and reinstated his Krol commitment.
3

The state court order issued prior to Wood’s release from his first term of criminal incarceration,
which order was dated October 18, 2002, established a maximum limit of Krol supervision of 30
years, remanded Wood to Ancora Psychiatric Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, vacated the
suspension of Krol hearings, and established a Krol hearing for December 6, 2002. See Wood,
789 F.Supp.2d at 521-23; In re Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *1.
3

Wood appealed the orders suspending and reinstating his Krol hearings to the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, arguing that the suspension and reinstatement of his
hearings violated due process. See In re Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *1. On December 12,
2007, the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Id. The Appellate Division
noted that, although state law required “periodic reviews of the [NGI] commitment no later than
(1) three months from the date of the first hearing, and (2) nine months from the date of the first
hearing, and (3) 12 months from the date of the first hearing, and (4) at least annually thereafter, if
the patient is not sooner discharged,” id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(f)(2)), the Law Division’s orders
had properly relaxed this rule. Id. at *3. “If Wood had been afforded a Krol hearing while
imprisoned, he would not have been released, even if it were determined he was no longer a danger
to self or others.” Id. The Appellate Division found that, because there was no purpose to be
accomplished by a Krol review while Wood was incarcerated, a relaxation of R. 4:74-7 was
appropriate, did not violate Wood’s constitutional rights, and was in accordance with his consent.
Id. The Appellate Division also rejected Wood’s argument that his transfer to prison for service
of the new criminal sentence necessitated termination of his Krol status because he was no longer
mentally ill. Id. On March 12, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied Wood’s petition for
certification. See In re Wood, 194 N.J. 444 (2008) (table).
Wood has filed 31 actions in this Court, including habeas corpus petitions and civil rights
complaints. Of particular interest, on September 5, 2008, while he was serving his second term of
incarceration, Wood filed his first § 2254 petition challenging the orders suspending and
reinstating his Krol hearings. See Wood v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 08-4515 (JBS) opinion (D.N.J.
Feb. 20, 2009). On February 20, 2009, this first petition was dismissed for lack of subject matter

4

jurisdiction because, at the time he filed it, Wood was incarcerated at the New Jersey State Prison
serving the four-year sentence imposed on March 5, 2007, and he was not “in custody” on the
orders challenged in the petition. On April 1, 2010 (17 days before Wood’s NGI commitment
expired), Wood filed a second § 2254 petition challenging the orders suspending and reinstating
his Krol hearings on due process grounds. See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d 519. On June 6, 2011, this
second § 2254 petition was dismissed as moot and, alternatively, on the merits. The court found
that the due process claims raised in the petition became moot when New Jersey terminated
Wood’s NGI Krol status on April 18, 2010, and then civilly committed him under the clear and
convincing evidence standard applicable to civil committments under N.J. STAT. ANN.
30:4-27.15(a) because there was no injury-in-fact attributable to Wood’s previous commitment on
NGI Krol status under the preponderance of the evidence standard that could be remedied by a
favorable decision on his habeas petition.4 Alternatively, the court found that Wood was not
entitled to habeas relief on the merits of his due process claims because the adjudication of these
claims by the Appellate Division was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 532.

4

The court reasoned:
[O]n a practical level, Petitioner was recently civilly committed under the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard . . . . Thus, even if the Court found that New
Jersey erroneously employed the preponderance of the evidence standard to
commit him at the expiration of his penal sentence, there is no relief to be had by
Petitioner. A favorable ruling by the Court would result in an order directing
respondents to release Petitioner unless they commit him under the clear and
convincing evidence standard. And that is exactly what happened when
Petitioner’s Krol status expired on April 18, 2010 – Petitioner has already been
committed under the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in accordance with
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15(a).

Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 526.
5

In the Complaint presently before this Court, Wood raises three due process claims. In
Count One, he claims that he was wrongfully committed in violation of due process after the
expiration of his prison terms by the July 21, 2000, and October 18, 2002, orders of the Law
Division. (Complaint, Count One, ECF No. 1 at 20.) Wood asserts that, “although he remains
confined under civil commitment as the result of the invalid Krol orders of July 21, 2000, and
October 18, 2002, that are constitutionally defective, he has no remedy available because the
federal court has also determined that the court lacks jurisdiction because he is no longer under
Krol status as well.” (ECF No. 1 at 16.) In Count Two, Wood claims that “defendants . . . denied
plaintiff the ability to access adequate treatment programs or any form of treatment, and
deliberately and willfully den[ied] him adequate treatment which resulted in a form of punishment
rather than adequate treatment . . . in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (ECF No. 1 at 21.) In Count Three, Wood claims that defendants violated his
liberty interest, created by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)(2) and (d)(3), to the “‘least restrictive
setting’ by not providing plaintiff with any treatment programs; or providing a way so that plaintiff
could have access to adequate assigned treatment programs, and by having him isolated, secluded,
and confined at AKFC.” (ECF No. 1 at 21.) For violation of his constitutional rights, Wood
seeks declaratory relief, an injunction enjoining “defendants from violating plaintiff’s due process
rights,” and compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF No. 1 at 23.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to
1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

6

defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is subject to
sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because this Court is granting
Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis.
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim5,
the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc.,
708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Federal Jurisdiction
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a cause of action for violation of

constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law.6 To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)).
5

6

The statute provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
7

must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to
identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated and to [then] determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719
F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court construes the
Complaint as raising procedural and substantive due process claims with regard to Wood’s civil
commitment proceedings and his treatment during his commitment.
The Due Process Clause provides that a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. 14. “[T]he Due Process Clause contains
a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful governmental actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
“[I]n a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the
governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 532 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). Conduct
which shocks the conscience “encompasses only the most egregious conduct,” Newman v. Beard, 617
F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2020), which must be “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest . . .” Lewis at 849. The Third Circuit has held that “the appropriate test for
assessing liability in the context of involuntary commitment decisions is the ‘shocks the conscience’
standard announced in County of Sacramento[.]” Obado v. UMDNJ, Behavioral Health Center, 524
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8

F.App’x 812, 815 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., 371 F.3d 165 (3d Cir.
2004)).
In addition, “when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and
general well-being.”
199-200 (1989).

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189,

In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), an involuntarily committed

developmentally disabled person brought an action, not challenging his commitment, but arguing that
the conditions of his confinement infringed his constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety,
freedom of movement, and training.

The Supreme Court held that involuntary commitment

proceedings do not extinguish a person’s constitutionally protected liberty interest in safe conditions,
freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint, and minimally adequate “training as an appropriate
professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free
from bodily restraints.” Id. at 324; see also Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Romeo
requires that restraints be imposed only to the extent required by the judgment of professionals in
charge of the involuntarily committed, and that the involuntarily committed receive minimally
adequate training.”)

The Youngberg Court emphasized that, “[b]ecause the facts in cases of

confinement of mentally [ill] patients vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and
circumstances of the case before a court.” Id. at 319 n.25. The Court observed that, because these
liberty interests are not absolute, “[t]he question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has been
infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate
due process.” Id. at 320. In determining whether these liberty interests have been violated, a court
must balance the liberty of the individual and the legitimate interests of the State. Id. at 321. The
Court held that “the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment

9

was in fact exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally
acceptable choices should have been made.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this professional judgment standard, a decision,
if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when
the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (footnotes omitted).7
Liberty interests may also arise under state law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466
(1983). New Jersey law provides that “[e]very individual who is mentally ill shall be entitled to
fundamental civil rights and to medical care and other professional services in accordance with
accepted standards[.]” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1; see Scott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 638 (3d Cir.
1982); Brandt v. Acuff, Civ. No. 11-3557 (FLW), 2012 WL 665625 *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2012). New
Jersey law further provides that “[e]ach patient receiving treatment” has the right “[t]o the least
restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment.”

N.J. STAT. ANN. §

30:4-24.2(e)(2); see Brandt at *7.
In addition to a substantive component, the Due Process Clause also has a procedural
component. “To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to
him did not provide due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.
2006); see also Santos v. Secretary of D.H.S., 532 F.App’x 29, 33 (3d Cir. 2013). Due process

7

The Youngberg Court defined a professional as “a person competent, whether by education, training
or experience, to make the particular decision at issue,” and reasoned that “[l]ong-term treatment
decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate
training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of the [mentally ill].”
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
10

requires periodic reviews of a person’s continuing need for institutionalization. See O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975) (“Nor is it enough that Donaldson’s original confinement was
founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary
confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer
existed.”); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[D]ue process required periodic reviews of
her continuing need for institutionalization. Periodic reviews are required because if the basis for a
commitment ceases to exist, continued confinement violates the substantive liberty interest in freedom
from unnecessary restraint.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, New Jersey law requires an order
authorizing involuntary commitment to provide for review hearings at least once every 12 months; at
each hearing, the state has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person, on the
date of the hearing, is mentally ill, that mental illness causes the patient to be dangerous to self or
dangerous to others or property, 8 that the patient is unwilling to be admitted to a facility for voluntary
care or accept appropriate treatment voluntarily, and that the patient needs inpatient care because other
less restrictive alternative services are not appropriate or available to meet the patient’s mental health
care needs. See In re Commitment of J.R., 390 N.J. Super. 523, 531 (App. Div. 2007); In re
Commitment of J.S., 2006 WL 2237677 *3 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. Aug. 7, 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-27.2(h), (i), (m), (r); N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(f)(1), (f)(2)(iv). Moreover, a commitment review
hearing may include the question of the adequacy of treatment, provided notice is given. See In re
Commitment of K.D., 357 N.J. Super. 94, 98-99 (App. Div. 2003); Matter of D.J.M., 158 N.J. Super.
497 (App. Div. 1978).

8

“‘Dangerous to others or property’ means that by reason of mental illness there is a substantial
likelihood that the person will inflict serious bodily harm upon another person or cause serious
property damage within the reasonably foreseeable future. This determination shall take into
account a person’s history, recent behavior and any recent act or threat.” N.J. STAT. ANN. §
30:4-27.2(i).
11

(1) Count One – Commitment Without Procedural Due Process
As explained above, in Count One, Wood claims that the state court orders suspending and
reinstating his Krol commitment upon the expiration of his criminal terms of incarceration violated due
process.

Wood does not articulate what procedures he believes due process required prior to

re-committing him. It is undisputed that he received Krol hearings before each term of incarceration
expired, and that the Appellate Division upheld the reinstatement of Wood’s Krol hearings and
rejected his due process challenge to his commitment upon the expiration of his terms of
imprisonment. It is also undisputed that the court found in Wood v. Main that Wood was not entitled
to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the Appellate Division adjudicated his due process claims on
the merits and that adjudication was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence
under § 2254(d)(1). See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 527. Finally, there is no dispute that the Third
Circuit denied Wood’s request for a certificate of appealability challenging the court’s dismissal of his
§ 2254 petition.
The doctrine of claim preclusion “bars ‘repetitious suits involving the same cause of action’
once ‘a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits.’” United States v.
Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S.Ct. 1723, 1730 (2011) (quoting Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 597 (1948)); accord Duhaney v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). Claim
preclusion is properly applied where there has been: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit
involving; (2) the same parties or their privies; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of
action.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
In this case, the “same cause of action” and “final judgment on the merits” components are
satisfied, as Wood unsuccessfully raised his current procedural due process claims in his previous §
2254 action, which the court dismissed on the merits and for which the Third Circuit denied a

12

certificate of appealability. The “same parties or their privies” element is also satisfied here. Wood
brought his § 2254 action against John Main, the Chief Executive Officer at Ann Klein Forensic
Center, and in the § 1983 action presently before this Court, Wood names John Main, as well as 16
other officials at Ann Klein Forensic Center, including psychiatrists, program coordinators,
psychologists, social workers, and nurses. This Court finds that, although not every defendant named
in the present action was also named in Wood’s habeas case, the defendants’ alignment of interests
satisfies the privity requirement and precludes Wood’s current procedural due process claim
challenging the procedures used to re-commit him after his criminal sentences expired. This Court
will, accordingly, dismiss this claim with prejudice under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Alternatively, even if this Court were to find that Wood’s due process rights were violated by
use of the preponderance of the evidence standard to commit him at the expiration of his incarceration,
rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard, the most that this Court could order as relief
would be a new civil commitment hearing utilizing the clear and convincing evidence standard. See
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (holding that plaintiff’s claims challenging the procedures
used to deny parole eligibility and suitability were cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because success
in such an action “means at most a new parole hearing” at which Ohio parole authorities use the proper
procedures and may, in their discretion, decline to shorten plaintiff’s prison term); Aruanno v.
Hayman, 384 F.App’x 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that Aruanno’s challenge to the procedures used
to civilly commit him was cognizable under § 1983 because “success on his due process claims would
entitle Aruanno only to a new civil commitment hearing.”).

Because Wood received a civil

commitment hearing, which utilized the clear and convincing evidence standard, in 2010 when his
30-year Krol status expired, there is no relief this Court could provide under § 1983 for his allegedly
wrongful commitment.

13

(2) Counts Two and Three - Inadequate Treatment
In Counts Two and Three, Wood raises substantive due process claims, namely, that
defendants failed to provide adequate mental health treatment in the least restrictive setting.
Specifically, in Count Two, Wood claims that “defendants . . . denied plaintiff the ability to access

adequate treatment programs or any form of treatment, and deliberately and willfully den[ied] him
adequate treatment which resulted in a form of punishment rather than adequate treatment . . . in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 21. To support Count
Two, Wood alleges:
Since plaintiff has been confined at AKFC he has consistently argued with the
treatment team that he does not need treatment and if he does he is not receiving
any. However, all of the above defendants because of his complaints and
grievances treat him with contempt . . . . Rather than treating plaintiff for any
condition that they claim plaintiff needs to be confined at AKFC for, they
arbitrarily keep him confined as a prison[er] without offering any adequate
treatment to help plaintiff be discharged.
*
*
*
Plaintiff did not have any adequate contact with the psychiatrist or treatment team.
Plaintiff would see the treatment team once a month, for the monthly review of his
progress; however, there was no actual treatment to review or assess because
plaintiff did not have any adequate treatment programs in order for the treatment
team to monitor or review his prognosis because he was not receiving any.
(Complaint, ECF 1 at 17-19) (paragraph numbers omitted).
In Count Three, Wood claims that defendants violated his liberty interest, created by N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)(2) and (d)(3), to the “‘least restrictive setting’ by not providing plaintiff
with any treatment programs; or providing a way so that plaintiff could have access to adequate
assigned treatment programs, and by having him isolated, secluded, and confined at AKFC.”
(Complaint, Count Three, ECF No. 1 at 21.)

As factual support, Wood asserts that defendants

“have violated plaintiff’s right to the ‘least restrictive setting’ by implementing, promulgating,
creating, or possess[ing] responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that prohibited
14

plaintiff from having access to adequate treatment programs in contravention of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 21-22. He also alleges that his placement on an
unspecified date on “seclusion status . . . without the doctors or treatment team assessing the need
for seclusion within one hour” violated his due process rights. Id. at 22.
The problem with Counts Two and Three in the Complaint is that Wood does not assert
facts connecting any Defendant to the alleged denial of adequate treatment in the least restrictive
setting. Assuming that Wood has a constitutionally protected right to some minimum level of mental
health treatment, this Court finds that the Complaint, as written, does not adequately provide any facts
showing that any Defendant was personally involved in violating his due process rights. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution”); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888) ("A public
officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances,
or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly
employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties"); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in
the alleged wrongs”). Indeed, Wood sues 17 persons who are employed at Ann Klein Forensic
Center. Those Defendants include chief executive officer John Main; assistant chief executive
officer Glen Figuerson; chief psychiatrist Elizabeth Hogan; psychiatrists Darius Chacinski,
Douglas Smith, Robert Roth; psychologist Riccardo Grippaldi; program coordinators Jenna
Caccese, Edward McGowan, and Reed Glady; social workers Patricia Fleming, Maria Deduro,
Nydia Santos, Patricia Foundos, and Gwendolyn Johnson; and nurses Justyna Obersmidt and
Karen Ramczak. However, aside from identifying these Defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations do not
15

set forth any facts showing how each Defendant was personally involved in violating his rights.
Without those connections, Plaintiff’s allegations cannot meet the Rule 8 pleading requirements,
and therefore, counts two and three fail to state a claim against any named defendant.
B.

Amendment
A District Court generally grants leave to correct the deficiencies in a complaint by

amendment. See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). This Court observes that Wood has written over
20 letters during the pendency of this proceeding; these letters show that he is articulate and intelligent.
In light of his letters and Wood’s numerous prior proceedings, there is no basis for this Court to find
that Wood is incapable of setting forth factual allegations showing the way in which each named
Defendant violated his constitutional rights. Thus, the Court will grant Wood 45 days to file an
amended complaint which corrects the pleading deficiencies in the Complaint by asserting allegations
showing that each named defendant was personally involved in violating his right to minimally
adequate treatment under the professional judgment standard.9 Bear in mind, if Plaintiff elects to file
an amended complaint, he is free to attach reports or transcripts to support his claims that the named
defendants are failing to exercise professional judgment or refusing to provide needed treatment,
contrary to the professional judgment standard.
9

Although Wood has been confined in mental hospitals for almost 30 years, this Court notes that “the
mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has
imposed punishment.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). The Hendricks Court rejected the notion that confinement for a
potentially indefinite duration evidenced a state’s punitive intent. “Far from any punitive objective,
the confinement’s duration is instead linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold
the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.” Hendricks at
363. Moreover, the Supreme Court “ha[s] never held that the Constitution prevents a State from
civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to
others . . . . [I]t would be of little value to require treatment as a precondition for civil confinement of
the dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment existed. To conclude otherwise would obligate
a State to release certain confined individuals who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply
because they could not be successfully treated for their afflictions.” Id. at 366.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, this Court grants the application to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismisses the Complaint.

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.
DATED:

May 6, 2014

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