WHEELER v. IMBODEN et al

Filing 2

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 10/15/2013. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MIKELL WHEELER,
Civil Action No. 13-2577 (MAS)
Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

DET. SCOTT IMBODEN, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
MIKELL WHEELER, Plaintiff pro se
#41257
Warren County Correctional Center
17 5 County Rd. Rt. 519S
Belvidere, New Jersey 07823

SHIPP, District Judge
Plaintiff, Mikell Wheeler, a state inmate confined at the Warren County Correctional
Center in Belvidere, New Jersey, at the time he filed this Complaint, seeks to bring this action in

forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant Plaintiff's application
to proceed informapauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l998) and order the Clerk
of the Court to file the Complaint accordingly.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim at
this time.
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Mikell Wheeler ("Plaintiff'), brings this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against Detective Scott Imboden; Detective Douglas Baylor; and Detective James
McDonald, of the Phillipsburg Police Department.

(Complaint, Caption, ,-r,-r 4b-d, 6.)

The

following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this
screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiffs allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that, on the night of February 14, 2012, Detectives Imboden and Baylor
arrested two suspects at a house where Plaintiff was staying. The detectives asked who else was
in the house and Plaintiff came out and was taken to police headquarters. Plaintiff alleges that
Det. Imboden told him three times that Plaintiff was not under arrest, but once they arrived at the
police station, Plaintiff was handcuffed to a wall in a room by himself. During the time Plaintiff
was at the station, Defendant McDonald questioned Plaintiff and "repeatedly harassed" Plaintiff
as to his name and address and "tried to get a confession out of [Plaintiff]." (!d., ,-r 6.) Plaintiff
alleges that he was held against his will and was not allowed to leave from February 14, 2012
until February 15, 2012. (!d.) For these alleged wrongs, Plaintiff seeks$ 5 million in damages.
(!d., ,-r 7.)
Plaintiff has filed several prior lawsuits before this Court regarding this same incident
that have been administratively terminated because his application for in forma pauperis ("IFP")
status was deficient. (See Wheeler v. Farrier, et a!., Civil No. 12-7845 (MAS); Wheeler v.

Baylor, et al., Civil No. 12-7860 (MAS); Wheeler v. Baylor, et al., Civil No. 13-160 (MAS).) In
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a consolidated Order signed by this Court on March 12, 2013 as to these matters, the two
complaints in Civil Nos. 12-7860 and 12-7845 were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state
a claim. (Wheeler v. Baylor, et al., Civil No. 13-160 (MAS), March 12, 2013 Order, Dkt. # 3 at
~

1.) The most recent case, Civil No. 13-160 (MAS) was administratively terminated due to a

deficient IFP application, and Plaintiff was permitted to re-open the case within 30 days if he
submitted either a complete IFP application or paid the full filing fee. (Id.,

~~

3-6.)

On April 16, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an amended Complaint in Civil No. 13-160
(MAS), (Dkt. # 4), but did not otherwise comply with the Court's March 12, 2013 Order.
Accordingly, Civil No. 13-160 (MAS) was never re-opened. Instead, on May 2, 2013, Plaintiff
filed the instant matter. The Court observes that the Complaint filed in this matter is identical in
all respects to the amended Complaint submitted by Plaintiff in Civil No. 13-160 (MAS). In the
Complaint in this matter, however, Plaintiff scribbles out the last sentence fragment in the
Statement of Claims,

~

6, that reads "when probable cause was illegally found, in the police

station handcuffed to a wall." (Wheeler v. Baylor, et al., Civil No. 13-160 (MAS), Amended
Complaint, Dkt. # 4 at~ 6.)
II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a
governmental employee or entity. Specifically, the PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte
dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a prisoner
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proceeding in forma pauperis in this matter, this action is subject to sua sponte screening for
dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and§ 1915A.
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under [the
PLRA] is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to a motion filed under Rule
12(b)(6) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Aruanno v. Green,--- F. App'x ---, 2013 WL
2350169, *2 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). According to the Supreme
Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Rather, to prevent

summary dismissal, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim
is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). Moreover, while prose pleadings are liberally construed, Higgs v. Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d
333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).

Nonetheless, courts must be cognizant that the Iqbal standard "is not akin to a

probability requirement." Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d
114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides in

relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
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deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F .3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). See also

Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff appears to assert a claim of false arrest and imprisonment stemming from his
February 14, 2012 detention by the Defendant police detectives. "To state a claim for false arrest
under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: ( 1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that
the arrest was made without probable cause." 1 James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680
(3d Cir. 2012); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994); Ferry v. Barry, Civil
No. 12-009, 2012 WL 4339454, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2012). Probable cause is an "absolute
1

A claim for false imprisonment arises where a person is arrested without probable cause and
subsequently detained pursuant to that unlawful arrest. Adams v. Selhorst, 449 F. App'x 198,
201 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)).
See also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (to state a claim for false imprisonment,
plaintiff must show that (1) he was detained; and (2) the detention was unlawful); O'Connor v.
City of Philadelphia, 233 F. App'x 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2007); and see Wildoner v. Borough of
Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 389 (2000) (recognizing the existence of probable cause as a complete
defense to false imprisonment).
Notably, the period of false arrest and imprisonment is very short: a claim under § 1983
for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest, refers only to the period of
incarceration lasting from the moment of arrest until the first legal action, e.g., an arraignment.
See Groman, 47 F.3d at 636. Indeed, the Supreme Court explained that, "[f]alse arrest and false
imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter," Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, and the
damages recoverable under such claims are limited to those ensuing from the period of detention
until the first legal action. See Connelly v. Wren, Civil No. 12-2123 (NLH), 2013 WL 74233, *4
(D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2013).
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defense to ... false arrest, false imprisonment and § 1983 claims."

Wildoner v. Borough of

Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 744 A.2d 1146 (2000). "Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts

and the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the
person to be arrested." Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Revell v. Port Authority of New York,
New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128, 137 n. 16 (3d Cir. 2010); Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d

480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). The arresting officer must only reasonably believe at the time of the
arrest that an offense is being committed, a significantly lower burden than proving guilt at trial.
Wright v. City of Phi/a., 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff has described the facts of his detention and arrest by Defendants. The
Defendants allegedly took Plaintiff into custody for questioning because Plaintiff was staying
that night at a residence where Defendants had arrived to arrest two other individuals.
Overnight, after questioning Plaintiff, Defendants arrested him. Plaintiff simply alleges that no
probable cause existed for his arrest.

In an earlier, identical pleading, Plaintiff alleged that

probable cause was fabricated. In this case, Plaintiff has not described the information known to
the police after they eventually arrested him upon questioning, nor has he described the charges
for which he was arrested. Instead, he has asserted only the fact of his detention and arrest,
which he characterizes as lacking in probable cause. The fact of arrest, alone, is not sufficient to
raise Plaintiff's right to relief above a "speculative level." See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Cf
Bradley v. Jersey City Police Dept., Civil No. 12-5236 (SRC), 2013 WL 4606710, *4 (D.N.J.

Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissing a claim for false arrest that provided no details concerning the
circumstances of arrest); Mines v. Whalen, Civil Action No. 10-2850, 2011 WL 5452535, *5-*6
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(D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (same). At the very least, in the facts as alleged here by Plaintiff, there
appears to be sufficient basis for Plaintiffs initial detention for questioning by police as Plaintiff
was staying with two other individuals who were arrested by police on the night of February 14,
2012. Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
of false arrest and imprisonment at this time. 2
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, in its
entirety, against all named Defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and
1915A(b)(l), for failure to state a claim at this time. An appropriate order follows.

United States District Judge
Dated:

to/J)//3

2

This dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended Complaint to cure the
deficiencies of his pleading as discussed above. Plaintiff should note that when an amended
complaint is filed, it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended
complaint specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing
Associates, LLC v. Huntington National Bank, No. 12-2430, 2013 WL 1338986, *5 (3d Cir.
April 4, 2013)(collecting cases). See also 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of
the allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations to be
adopted must be clear and explicit. /d. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. /d.
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