7-ELEVEN, INC. v. SODHI

Filing 291

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Plaintiff's 268 Motion to Compel; denying 7-Eleven's 277 Cross-Motion for Protective Order. Ordered that by 4/1/2015, 7-Eleven shall produce the requested metadata for the documents identified in Plaintiff's moving papers. ORDERED that this Order is entered without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to request additional metadata. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 3/18/2015. (TH, ) Modified on 3/18/2015 (TH).

[C.A. 13-3500, Doc. Nos. 233, 247]
[C.A. 13-3715, Doc. Nos. 268, 277]
[C.A. 13-4578, Doc. No. 230]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
SAM YOUNES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 13-3500 (RMB/JS)
v.
7-ELEVEN, INC.,
Defendant.

7-ELEVEN,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 13-3715 (MAS/JS)
v.
KARAMJEET SODHI, et al.,
Defendants.

NEIL NAIK, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 13-4578 (RMB/JS)
v.
7-ELEVEN, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

1

This matter is before the Court on the motions to compel
production of metadata filed by the franchisee parties.1

The

Court

for

received

7-Eleven’s

opposition

and

cross-motions

protective orders against the production of metadata. The Court
held oral argument on March 6, 2015. The Younes plaintiffs seek
the production of metadata for 40 documents (including two Excel
spreadsheets, P-33b and P-37).2 The Naik and Sodhi plaintiffs
seek the production of metadata for 49 documents.3 7-Eleven seeks
to bar the production of all metadata. For the reasons to be
discussed plaintiffs’ motions are GRANTED and 7-Eleven’s crossmotions are DENIED. 7-Eleven will be directed to produce all
requested metadata.
Background
The relevant background facts will be briefly summarized.
Plaintiffs are 7-Eleven franchisees in 7-Eleven’s “Penn/Jersey
Zone.”

The

zone

encompasses

the

geographic

area

where

the

plaintiffs’ stores are located. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia,
1

The franchisees are named plaintiffs in Younes and Naik,
and the named defendants in Sodhi. Because the interests of the
franchisees are aligned, they will be collectively referred to
as “plaintiffs” or the “franchisees.”
2

The Court notes that some of the document requests are not
single documents but a range of documents. Additionally, two of
the Younes plaintiffs’ requests are duplicative: SEI11194 and
SEI16560 (P-33b).
3

Of these 49 documents the Naik and Sodhi plaintiffs
request there are two documents that also appear on the Younes
list: SEI16623 and SEI16649.
2

that they were “targeted” by 7-Eleven for franchise termination.
Plaintiffs

contend

that

7-Eleven

wanted

to

“churn”

its

franchises so it could collect windfall franchise fees from new
franchisees.

Plaintiffs

also

allege

7-Eleven

targeted

franchisees who were vocal in their criticism of 7-Eleven. In
addition, plaintiffs allege they were targeted because of their
national origin.4
The Younes plaintiffs pleaded their targeting allegations
in their complaint:
19. Plaintiffs believe and therefore aver that
Defendant has devised a plan to terminate the
Franchise Agreement with each of the Plaintiffs. The
plan is twofold: (1) to make the business conditions
so hostile that Plaintiffs will each want to
terminate the franchise agreement; and (2) to create
artificial and false evidence that Plaintiffs have
violated the Franchise Agreement as a way to
intimidate the Plaintiffs into surrendering the
franchise.
20. It is believed and therefore averred that
Defendant has used intimidation tactics or unfair
practices to terminate a number of other franchises
in the South New Jersey region.
21. At least two of these former Franchisees were
told by Defendant's agents that they were among the
first to have their Franchise Agreement terminated,
and that Defendant was going to "take back" each
store
and
terminate
each
and
every
Franchise
Agreement in South Jersey.
22. A terminated
Defendant.

franchise

4

is

a

windfall

to

The franchisee plaintiffs do not all make the same
allegations.
3

the

23. When a franchise is terminated and then sold
to a new franchisee, it is believed and therefore
averred that Defendant also presents a different
Store Franchise Agreement with terms that are more
favorable to the Defendant; Defendant gets paid for
the franchise again, and gets a new Franchise
Agreement with more favorable terms.
Compl. ¶¶ 19-23 [C.A. No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 1-3]. Sodhi alleged
in his counterclaim that he was retaliated against because of
his active involvement with the Franchise Owners Associations
(“FOA”). See Am. Counterclaim ¶¶ 12-13 [C.A. No. 13-3715, Doc.
No. 4]. The Naik plaintiffs alleged in their complaint:
44. 7-Eleven is targeting certain owners, many of whom
run successful operations, and is making serious
allegations of labor and other violations, without even
a scintilla of proof.
45. 7-Eleven routinely targets Asian/Pacific Rim/Middle
Eastern First/Generation American [sic] franchisees,
due to their perceived unfamiliarity with United States
laws.
46. By way of example only, when interrogating
Asian/Pacific Rim/Middle Eastern First/Generation [sic]
American franchisees, and making unannounced visits to
their stores, 7-Eleven representatives routinely make
derogatory
references
to
Asian/Pacific
Rim/Middle
Eastern First/Generation [sic] American franchisees.
47. 7-Eleven by way of its harassing and targeted faux
“investigations”
discriminates
against
certain
franchisees
based upon their race and national
origin in violation of
the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“LAD”).
Plaintiffs contend that 7-Eleven referred to its churning
efforts as “Project P” or “Project Philly.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-47
[C.A.

No.

13-4578,

Doc.

No.

4].

7-Eleven

denies

plaintiffs’

allegations. It argues it did not act with a nefarious purpose
4

and

it

committed

merely
by

attempted

certain

to

root

franchisees.

out

fraud

7-Eleven

and

corruption

asserts

that

the

referenced projects were “staffing initiatives” which grew from
the

anticipated

termination

of

multiple

franchise

agreements

following investigations for franchise fraud.
Despite
allegations

7-Eleven’s
are

not

vigorous

made

affidavits/certifications

of

up

out

former

denials,
of

whole

7-Eleven

plaintiffs’
cloth.

employees

The
Kurt

McCord (April 29, 2014)5, John Spavlik (September 8, 2014)6, and
Ian Shehaiber (2) (October 24, 2014, December 8, 2014)7 support
plaintiffs’

contentions.

These

witnesses

were

privy

to

7-

Eleven’s internal workings while employed at 7-Eleven. McCord
was a Corporate Investigations Supervisor for seven (7) months
in 2013. See McCord Cert. ¶ 2. He stated that 7-Eleven engaged
in a “scheme” to “churn” and “take back” franchises so they
could be resold. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 12. He alleged that 7-Eleven
disguised its churning initiative under the guise of an “Asset
Protection (Loss Prevention) Department.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. McCord
corroborated

plaintiffs’

allegation

that

“vocal” franchisees, including Sodhi. Id.

7-Eleven

targeted

¶¶ 45-47.

Spavlik

worked as a Field Consultant for 7-Eleven from 2006-2013. See

5

See C.A. No. 13-3715, Doc. No. 98-2.

6

See C.A. No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 153-1, Exhibit D.

7

See C.A. No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 163-15, Exhibit V.
5

Spavlik Aff. ¶ 2. Spavlik also stated that 7-Eleven engaged in a
practice of “targeting” franchises. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. And he stated
that he was told these efforts “originated from the upper levels
of 7-Eleven’s franchise headquarters in Dallas, Texas.” Id. ¶ 7.
Shehaiber was formerly employed by 7-Eleven as a Senior Field
Consultant/Market

Manager.

See

Shehaiber

Cert.

¶

3.

His

two

certifications are consistent with McCord and Spavlik but he
goes

into

more

detail

regarding

the

specifics

of

7-Eleven’s

conduct. For example, he alleges that in July 2012 he was placed
in charge of “Project P.”
contends

“it

became

October 30, 2014 Cert. ¶ 12.

increasingly

clear

that

Project

malicious and improper racial undertones.” Id. ¶ 17.

P

He
had

Shehaiber

also contends 7-Eleven’s take-back efforts targeted franchisees
with the greatest influence in the franchise community. Id. ¶ 20.
In addition, he alleges that 7-Eleven has “every reason to hide
the existence of [Project P] as it was racially motivated in
targeting

both

Indian

franchisees,

and

franchisees

that

were

opinionated, successful and involved in franchise associations.”
December 8, 2014 Cert. ¶ 26. 7-Eleven gives these witnesses
little

credence.

It

affidavits/certifications
executed

by

biased

contends

are

former

not

credible

employees

deposed.

6

who

that
because
have

not

their
they

were

yet

been

During the course of the case plaintiffs learned about a
significant 7-Eleven effort addressing the actual or possible
take back of 7-Eleven franchises, including those of plaintiffs
Younes, Atalla and Sodhi. 7-Eleven referred to this effort in
various ways including “Operation Philadelphia,” “Operation P,”
“Project Philly,” “Philly Project,” “Project P,” “Operation Take
Back,”

“Philadelphia

Project”

and

“Penn/Jersey

Project.”

The

parties vigorously dispute the purpose of 7-Eleven’s efforts. 7Eleven contends the referenced project was a legitimate effort
to staff the stores it took back following findings of noncurable fraudulent conduct by franchisees. Plaintiffs contend
the

project

was

exactly

what

is

set

forth

in

the

affidavits/certifications of McCord, Spavlik and Shehaiber. No
matter what the real purpose of the project was, it is clear
that it involved a significant undertaking involving high level
7-Eleven personnel as well as in-house and outside counsel.
To

put

it

mildly

plaintiffs

have

had

a

difficult

time

obtaining 7-Eleven’s documents regarding Project P. Plaintiffs
initially believed Project P was internally referred to by 7Eleven

as

“Operation

Philadelphia”.

After

first

denying

that

Operation Philadelphia existed, 7-Eleven has slowly come around
and

has

produced

some

documents

related

to

Project

P.

Nevertheless, 7-Eleven has produced documents in dribs and drabs
and

even

after

months

of

discovery
7

and

numerous

court

conferences addressing discovery disputes, 7-Eleven acknowledges
that not all relevant, requested and non-privileged Project P
documents

have

been

produced.8

Moreover,

some

of

the

key

documents produced thus far are not dated and do not list the
author or recipients. For example, plaintiffs request metadata
for Deposition Exhibit P21. This document is a diagram created
by 7-Eleven with the name of a Sodhi plaintiff. The document
does

not

identify

the

date

the

document

was

created,

who

authored it, and to whom it was distributed. Plaintiffs’ efforts
to “get to the bottom” of the document at 7-Eleven’s depositions
have been unsuccessful. The Court’s efforts to get 7-Eleven to
explain the document at oral argument were also unsuccessful.
Exhibit 21 is not an aberration. Other key 7-Eleven documents
have been produced without important identifying information.9
Exhibit P26 is a good example of an important document whose
preparation

and

distribution

is

mysterious.

This

PowerPoint

presentation is titled “Project P Core Team Kickoff 3/20/2012.”
Similar to P21, plaintiffs’ efforts to “get to the bottom” of
this document have been unsuccessful. Further, several key 7Eleven

witnesses

deposed

to

date

have

8

either

denied

the

Remarkably, 7-Eleven acknowledged at the March 13, 2014
oral argument on another discovery motion that its response to
the Court’s October 16, 2014 Order was not complete. The Order
required 7-Eleven to produce certain Project P documents by
October 28, 2014. See C.A. No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 132 ¶ 4.
9

See P19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 33b, 38.
8

existence of Project P or claimed not to have relevant knowledge
regarding the project. See Younes Br. at 3-5. In addition, 7Eleven’s

deposition

testimony

to

date

has

been

largely

unsuccessful in clarifying who authored or prepared many of the
referenced
from,

key

when

documents,

the

where

documents

the

were

listed

created,

information

and

why

came

different

versions of certain documents were produced.
The Younes plaintiffs have identified 38 documents and two
Excel spreadsheets for which they want metadata. See Younes Br.
at

7.

For

these

documents

plaintiffs

want

“the

date

of

origination, author, custodian, date of each modification and
author of each modification, and to the extent available, any
data

which

established

electronically
argue

they

regarding

distributed.”

need
who

to

the

knew

whom
Id.

requested
what

and

the

at

8.

document
The

metadata
when

Younes

because

makes

had

the

been

plaintiffs

“information

document

trail

particularly critical in discovery.” Id.
The Naik and Sodhi plaintiffs make similar arguments.

They

seek metadata for an additional 49 documents, two of which are
duplicative

of

the

Younes

requests.

See

Cert.

of

Gerald

A.

Marks, Esq. ¶ 4. The Naik and Sodhi plaintiffs request the same
information from the metadata. Id. ¶ 5. Like the Younes parties
these

plaintiffs

claim

they

have

been

unable

to

obtain

key

information regarding the documents from 7-Eleven’s witnesses.
9

Discussion
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E) addresses the production of
electronically stored information (“ESI”). A party requesting
ESI

may

specify

the

form

of

production,

which

can

include

metadata, and the responding party can produce the ESI in the
form specified or object.10 Peterson v. Matlock, C.A. No. 11-2594
(FLW/DEA), 2014 WL 5475236, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2014) (citing
Romero

v.

2010)).

Allstate

Some

Ins.

courts

Co.,

hold

271
that

F.R.D.
a

96,

107

party

must

(E.D.

Pa.

show

a

“particularized need” for metadata. Wyeth v. Impax Laboratories,
Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006); U.S. ex rel. Carter v.
Bridgeport Educ., Inc.,
*19

(S.D.

requesting

Cal.
party

Feb.
to

20,
show

F. Supp. 3d
2015)
a

, 2015 WL 818032, at

(“[C]ourts

have

‘particularized

required

need’

for

the
the

metadata, not simply a generalized view as to its importance.”).
To the extent it is necessary, plaintiffs have shown a
particularized need for the requested metadata. Plaintiffs have

10

Metadata, commonly defined as “data about data”, is
“information describing the history, tracking, or management of
an electronic document.” Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co.,
230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005). It includes “all of the
contextual, processing, and use information needed to identify
and certify the scope, authenticity, and integrity of active or
archival electronic information or records.” Id. (citation
omitted); United States v. Haymond, 672 F.3d 948, 952 n.10 (10th
Cir. 2012) (“Metadata, which is commonly described as ‘data
about data,’ is defined as [s]econdary data that organize,
manage, and facilitate the use and understanding of primary
data.”) (alteration in original).
10

demonstrated that many of the paper documents produced to date
are missing source, date, and other key background information.
This missing information is plainly relevant and discoverable.
Further, the requested metadata is relevant to authenticating 7Eleven’s documents, especially since the authors or creators of
some important documents are unknown. It is not insignificant
that plaintiffs only identified a relatively small number of
documents for which they request metadata rather than asking for
metadata for all documents.
Having

established

that

plaintiffs

need

the

requested

metadata, the question becomes whether it should be produced.
Generally, the burden “rests with the party objecting to the
production

of

metadata

or

ESI

to

show

undue

hardship

or

expense.” Peterson, 2014 WL 5475236, at *1 (citing Susquehanna
Commercial Fin., Inc. v. Vascular Res., Inc., 2010 WL 4973317,
at * 13 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2010)); see also Camesi v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., C.A. No. 09–85, 2010 WL 2104639, at *7
(W.D. Pa. May 24, 2010) (“a clear showing of undue hardship
and/or

expense

may

excuse

Defendants'

production

in

native

format”). As explained in detail infra, 7-Eleven has failed to
show it will suffer undue hardship or expense if it is compelled
to produce the requested metadata. Thus, plaintiffs’ motions to
compel metadata will be granted and 7-Eleven’s cross-motions for

11

protective

orders

to

bar

the

discovery

of

metadata

will

be

denied.
7-Eleven
plaintiffs’

makes

motions

several
and

in

arguments

support

of

in

its

opposition

cross-motions.

to
It

argues: (1) the parties agreed at the outset of the case that
documents need only be produced in PDF format without metadata;
(2) 7-Eleven does not possess much of the requested metadata;
(3)

the

minimally

metadata

that

meaningful

and

is

available

potentially

is

“extremely

misleading”;

and

limited,
(4)

it

would be “unreasonably burdensome to require 7-Eleven to reproduce [its] … documents with metadata.” Def.’s Br. at 1 [Doc.
No. 246]. 7-Eleven supports its opposition with the Declaration
of its Director of Information Technology Michael Larson, [C.A.
No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 246-1]. Larson alleges:
6. 7-Eleven does not track, and, therefore, cannot
produce: the date of each modification of the listed
documents; the author of each modification of the
listed documents; or data establishing to whom the
documents
in
question
have
been
electronically
distributed.
7. The only metadata that 7-Eleven does maintain is
the metadata embedded in the document itself and
preserved
by
the
native
application.
Of
the
information sought by the Requesting Parties, the
only available metadata is as follows:
a.

The author of the document (however, in many
cases, the author will be listed as "7-Eleven,
Inc.," to whom the Microsoft license was issued);

b.

The date the document was created; and

12

c. The date on which the document was last modified
and the author of the last modification.
No information is captured about whether the document
was forwarded or distributed electronically.
. . .
12. To the extent any meaningful metadata actually
existed, 7-Eleven would have to expend substantial
additional resources to search for, harvest it, and
produce it. Because 7-Eleven operated under an
agreement with opposing counsel that no metadata
would need to be produced, 7-Eleven harvested and
produced documents with no regard for collecting or
maintaining the original metadata.
. . .
16. In sum, the efforts necessary to harvest and
produce any available metadata would be timeconsuming and costly, and would yield minimal
information that is likely to be inaccurate and not
meaningful to the parties that [sic] requested it.
Larson Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7, 12, 16.
None of 7-Eleven’s arguments are persuasive. It is true
that

the

However,

parties
good

originally

cause

exists

Susquehanna

Commercial

(regardless

of

manner

of

the

agreed

Fin.,

fact

production,

to

to

modify

request

the

agreement.

2010

the

parties

had

agreed

existed

for

modifying

cause

WL

metadata.

Inc.,

that

good

not

4973317,

See

at

*14

on

the
that

agreement and compelling the production of metadata where “a
number of questions . . . have arisen regarding both the scope
of

production

prior

efforts

and,
to

potentially,

locate

and

the

identify

adequacy

of

responsive

Plaintiff's
documents”);

Romaro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 105-106 (E.D. Pa
13

2010) (requiring defendant to produce documents in native format
with

associated

parties

agreed

metadata
to

only

even

though

produce

early

TIFF

in

images).

the
Had

case

the

plaintiffs

known at the outset of the case the difficulties they would face
in

obtaining

documents,

it

relevant
is

information

unlikely

they

regarding

would

have

7-Eleven’s

agreed

to

forego

requesting metadata. The changed circumstances plaintiffs face
justify

modifying

their

earlier

agreement

not

to

request

metadata.
Thus far plaintiffs have undertaken substantial efforts to
obtain

key

information

about

some

of

7-Eleven’s

documents

without success. This includes basic information such as who
prepared

a

document

distributed.
this

basic

and

when

and

to

whom

the

document

was

There is no justifiable reason to deny plaintiffs
discovery

that

may

exist

in

7-Eleven’s

metadata,

especially when 7-Eleven has not offered to voluntarily provide
the requested information. 7-Eleven’s suggestion that plaintiffs
should question its witnesses at their depositions about the
requested information is unnecessary and impractical. Plaintiffs
should not have to use their limited deposition time to question
witnesses about basic issues such as when scores of documents
were prepared, who prepared them, who received them, etc. The
requested

metadata

is

unquestionably

14

relevant

to

important

issues in the case. It cannot be gainsaid that plaintiff is
entitled to this information.
7-Eleven’s

argument

requested

metadata

important

can

be

and

that
that

summarily

it

does

what

it

not

have

some

does

have

is

addressed.

7-Eleven

of

the

minimally

only

has

to

produce what is available. The Court does not expect 7-Eleven to
produce

metadata

that

does

not

exist.

As

for

the

alleged

“minimal importance” of the requested metadata, the Court will
let plaintiffs evaluate the importance of their discovery, not
7-Eleven.
7-Eleven’s

burdensome

argument

is

not

convincing.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the requested information is
probative. On the other hand 7-Eleven has not convinced the
Court that it would be unduly burdensome or expensive to produce
the requested metadata. See Romano, 271 F.R.D. at 107 (“Multiple
courts have found that, in light of the emerging recognition of
the benefits of producing metadata, the burden falls on the
party objecting to the production to show undue hardship and
expense.”).

7-Eleven

does

not

substantiate

the

unreasonable

burden it will allegedly endure. For example, 7-Eleven argues
that “the efforts necessary to harvest and produce any available
metadata would be time-consuming and costly, and would yield
minimal information that is likely to be inaccurate and not
meaningful to the parties that requested it.” Larson Decl. ¶ 16.
15

These conclusory allegations do not satisfy 7-Eleven’s burden of
proof. Larson merely talks in general terms and does not aver
specific details about the alleged burden to 7-Eleven beyond the
cost per hour to hire a consultant. 7-Eleven will undoubtedly
incur some time and cost to retrieve the requested metadata.11
However, the cost is unlikely to be material in comparison to
the stakes in the case and the transaction costs the parties are
already
metadata

incurring.
for

all

Further,
of

plaintiffs

7-Eleven’s

are

documents.

not

requesting

Plaintiffs

only

request metadata for a finite number of documents. The Court
does not expect the cost to retrieve the requested metadata to
be extensive or costly.12

11

In the Larson Declaration 7-Eleven suggests that in order
to produce metadata it will have to locate original files and
“manually analyze them” to determine if the metadata is
accurate. Larson Decl. ¶ 13. 7-Eleven states that it will
subsequently have to “harvest the documents anew, in a forensic
manner.” Id. ¶ 14. This is not a high price to pay to get
answers to key mysteries in the case. Further, all of the
plaintiffs seek the same metadata: the date of origination,
author, custodian, date of each modification and author of each
modification, and to the extent available, any data which
establishes to whom the document had been electronically
distributed. See Younes Br. at 8; See Cert. of Gerald A. Marks,
Esq. ¶ 5. 7-Eleven shall produce metadata responsive to this
Order to the extent it exists.
12

The Court denies 7-Eleven’s request that plaintiffs share
the cost of producing its metadata. There is no good cause to
detract from the ordinary practice that parties bear their own
costs of responding to discovery. See Major Tours, Inc. v.
Colorel, C.A. No. 05-3091 (JBS/JS), 2009 WL 3446761, at *5
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009), aff'd, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2010)
("cost shifting should only be considered when electronic
16

Conclusion
In summary, plaintiffs’ motions to compel metadata will be
granted and 7-Eleven’s cross-motions to bar the production of
metadata will be denied.
ORDER
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 18th day of March, 2015, that
plaintiffs’ motions [C.A. No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 233; C.A. No.
13-1715, Doc. No. 268; C.A. No. 13-4578, Doc. No. 230] to compel
metadata are GRANTED, and 7-Eleven’s cross-motions to bar the
production of metadata [C.A. No. 13-3500, Doc. No. 247; C.A. No.
13-3715, Doc. No. 277] are DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that by April 1, 2015, 7-Eleven shall produce the
requested metadata for the documents identified in plaintiffs’
moving papers. The documents identified by the Younes plaintiffs
are P-33b and P37 and the documents contained in the chart cited
in footnote four on pages 7-8 of their brief [C.A. No. 13-3500,
Doc. No. 233-1]. The documents identified by the Naik and Sodhi
plaintiffs are listed in paragraph four of the Certification of
Gerald A. Marks, Esquire [C.A. No. 13-3715, Doc. No. 268-1; C.A.
No.

13-4578,

Doc.

No.

230-1].

The

metadata

required

to

be

produced is “the date of origination, author, custodian, date of
each modification and author of each modification, and to the
discovery imposes an undue burden or expense on the responding
party.”) (citation omitted).
17

extent

available,

any

data

which

established

to

whom

the

document had been electronically distributed”; and it is further
ORDERED that this Order is entered without prejudice to
plaintiffs’ right to request additional metadata.

s/Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge

18