HARRIS v. ARTHUR et al

Filing 9

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 6/12/2015. (eaj)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GOLDA D. HARRIS,
Civil Action No. 13-3806 (PGS)
Plaintiff,
v.

:

OPINION

VALERIE ARTHUR, et al.,
Defendants.

SHERIDAN, District Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Golda Harris (“Plaintiff’) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint on October 21, 2014 for failure to state a claim.
(ECF Nos. 6, 7.) Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8.) The Court must
now review the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to

determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint will be permitted to proceed
in part.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a prisoner currently confined at Edna Mahon Correctional Facility (“EMCF”) in
Clinton, New Jersey, brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983, against

Defendants Valerie Arthur, Administrator at EMCF; Helen Adams, Assistant Superintendent at
EMCF; Gary Lanigan, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections; “Special Administrative
Segregation

Review

Committee”;

“Parole

Board”;

“Prison

Classification

Committee”;

“Institutional Classification Committee”; D. Hunter and Tina Moreo-Corteo, Hearing Officers.

The following factual allegations are taken from the Amended Complaint and are accepted for
purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiffs
allegations.
As against Defendant Arthur, Plaintiff alleges that she was held in administrative
segregation for 68 days, during which she was not provided any handicap accommodations.
including a bathroom, cane and bedding. (Am. Compi.

¶ 5(b).)

Plaintiff also alleges that she was

denied showers and forced to stay in a “feces smeared cell” during that time.

(Id.) Plaintiff

further alleges that Defendant Arthur denied Plaintiff “ad seg” pay, while at the same time providing
payment to white “ad seg” inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Arthur refused
to respond to her grievances. (Id.)
2
With regard to Defendant Adams, Plaintiff alleges that she “approved excessive ad. seg. and
detention.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that she allowed Plaintiff to have her legal property
while in administrative segregation, but then denied Plaintiff “ILA” access. (Id.) With regard to
Defendant Lanigan, Plaintiff alleges that he ignored grievances that she filed and he failed to ensure

The Court notes that Plaintiffs 52-page Amended Complaint, and accompanying 406 pages of
exhibits, contain many facts, written in a stream-of-consciousness manner, many of which are
conclusory and seemingly unrelated to the crux of Plaintiffs claims. The Court identifies and
addresses Plaintiffs claims to the best of its ability.
2

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Arthur “denied [her] ILA.. failed to review the excess ad
seg sanctions; false imprisonment.. .theft of [Plaintiffs] judgment checks... failed to stop
wrongdoing by her staff and custody; abuse [sic] her discretion where the code or laws do not give
her discretion. ignored letter order from Hon. Douglas E. Arpert, U.S.D.J. to provide mental health
services/referrals; had knowledge of this wrongdoing and failed to act; did not adhere to
ICC/SASRC and hearing officers recommendations; retaliated against [Plaintiff] by allowing the
illegal acts to continue against [Plaintiff] causing [Plaintiff] to be victimized by custody staff who
physically assaulted [Plaintiff] and threw away [her] legal and personal property; ignored the
medical report of the prisoner therapist to provide cane for prolong standing and distance;
negligence, etc.” However, as discussed in the Court’s October 2l Opinion and Order, these bare
allegations, with no further information, are insufficient to state a claim under Iqbal.
.

. .

his staff was knowledgeable. (id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he violated the current “Terhune
agreement provisions for reviewing and accessing the needs of inmates to determine placement in
c-cottage, past mental health diagnosis, medical issues and the adverse affects [sic] of harsh and
atypical hardships of prison life...” (Id.)
With regard to Defendants “Special Administrative Segregation Review Committee,”
“Parole Board,” “Prison Classification Committee” and “Institutional Classification Committee,”
Plaintiff alleges that they “did not adhere to the prisoner policy and procedures. Created illegal
prison rules to intentionally and/or negligently circumvent the code and statutes, thereby violating
[Plaintiffs] prison rights...” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that these defendants ‘created a record
of violence in [her] name to falsely imprison [her] in ad. seg. for over: 9000 days.” (Id.) Plaintiff
further alleges that this was done to retaliate against her for bringing a lawsuit against them and that
these defendants were grossly negligent. (Id.) As against Defendants D. Hunter and Tina Moreo
Cortes, Plaintiff alleges that they “gave [her] excessive sanctions; were biased against [her] by
stating in their reasons for the sanctions that the officers were credible; [and] did not have the
required substantial evidence for their finding of guilt.” (Id.)
Plaintiff is seeking the following: “(1) jury trial guaranteed by the Constitution, U.S. to have
a fair trial and relief and to remove adverse decisions by the court; (2) permanent injunction for use
of cane in cell and out of cell, except for suicide watch; (3) removal from admin. segreg.; (4) state
pay and interest from 7/2012 to present; (5) restoration of commutation time from excessive
sanctions for 2012 to 2013; (6) punitive and nominal damages, cost of suit, restitution, and
compensation for damages and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Am. Compl.

¶ 9.)

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,

§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions
in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
to prison conditions, see 42 u.s.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress

§ 191 5A(b), or brings a claim with respect

§ 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to suasponte dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to
sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and 1915A because Plaintiff is an

indigent prisoner.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcrofl v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To
survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim the complaint must allege “sufficient
,
3
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ l9l5(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir.
2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d
Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally

construed, ‘pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Ma/a v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis

added).
2.

Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 for certain violations of his

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
...

Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§

1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42,48(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
1.

Conditions of Confinement

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishment’

...

imposes on

[prison officials] a duty to provide ‘humane conditions of confinement.” Belts v. New Castle
Youth Dev., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). That is, “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526—27 (1984)). For an alleged deprivation to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation,
it must “result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 835
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.s. 337, 347 (1982)).
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege both an objective and
a subjective component. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Counterman v. Warren
CnIy. Corr. Fac., 176 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2006). The objective component requires that
the deprivation sustained by a prisoner be sufficiently serious because only “extreme deprivations”
are sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment claim. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9,
(1992). A plaintiff may satisfy the objective component of a conditions of confinement claim if
he can show that the conditions alleged, either alone or in combination, deprive him of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical
care, and personal safety.

See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347—48.

However, while the Eighth

Amendment directs that convicted prisoners not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, “the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. To the extent that
certain conditions are only “restrictive” or “harsh,” they are merely part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society. See id. at 347.
The subjective component requires that the state actor have acted with “deliberate
indifference,” a state of mind equivalent to a reckless disregard of a known risk of harm. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 835 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303. This component may be
fulfilled by demonstrating that prison officials knew of such substandard conditions and ‘acted or
failed to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to inmate health or safety.”
Ingalls v. Florio, 968 F.Supp. 193, 198 (D.N.J. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Arthur held her in administrative segregation for 68

days, during which she was not provided any handicap accommodations, including a bathroom,
cane and bedding. (Am. Compi. ¶5(b).) Plaintiff also alleges that she was denied showers and
forced to stay in a “feces smeared cell” during that time. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she filed
several grievances with Defendant Arthur alerting her to these conditions, but to nothing was done
to address the situation. Taking these allegations as true, at this screening stage, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to allow the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
4
claim to proceed as against Defendant Arthur.
2.

Disciplinary Hearings

It appears that Plaintiff is alleging a claim against Defendant Adams, ‘Special
Administrative Segregation Review Committee,” “Parole Board,” “Prison Classification
Committee,” “Institutional Classification Committee,” D. Hunter and Tina Moreo-Cortes,
challenging her various disciplinary hearings which resulted in several sanctions, including the loss
of commutation credits.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, (1994), the Supreme Court confirmed that a
prisoner’s claim for damages that calls into question the lawfulness of his conviction or confinement
is not cognizable under

§ 1983. The Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a §

1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

Id. at 487.

If it would, the

Plaintiff also alleges a claim against Defendant Arthur for failing to respond to her grievances.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 4.2.) It is well established that “[p]risoners are not constitutionally entitled to a
grievance procedure and the state creation of such a procedure does not create any federal
constitutionairights.” Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D.Pa. 1997). Moreover, a failure
to respond to an inmate’s grievances “does not violate his rights to due process and is not
actionable.” Stringer v. Bureau ofPrisons, 145 F. App’x 751, 753 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Antonelli
v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 ((7th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff “can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence
has already been invalidated.” Id.

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997), the Supreme

Court addressed the related issue of “whether a claim for damages and declaratory relief brought
by a state prisoner challenging the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-time
credits is cognizable under § 1983.” The Court held that in cases where “the nature of the challenge
to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment,” such claim
is not cognizable under
cognizable under

§ 1983. Id. The Court held that the inmate’s claim in Balisok was not

§ 1983 because the serious procedural defects of which he complained “would, if

established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits.” Id. at
646.
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are difficult to decipher. To the best the Court can determine,
it appears that disciplinary charges were brought against her at different times.

Defendants

“conspired” to “create a record of violence in [her] name to falsely imprison [her] in ad. seg.” and
failed to follow policy and procedures. Similar to the prisoner in Balisok, if the allegations Plaintiff
makes here are found to be true, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of the loss of commutation
credits which was imposed as a sanction. Therefore, any claims Plaintiff makes challenging her
disciplinary hearings are dismissed without prejudice.
3.

Access to the Courts

The right of access to the courts derives from the First Amendment’s right to petition and
3
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The right of access to the courts

The right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition. McDonald
v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985); Bill Johnson’c Rests. v. 1’/LRB,
461 U.S. 731, 741, 103 S.Ct. 2161,76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983). Also, “[t]he constitutional guarantee of
due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts
in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional

requires that “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access be provided to inmates wishing to
challenge their criminal charge, conviction, or conditions of confinement. Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.s. 817, 822 (1977). Officials must “give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present

claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the Courts.” Id. at 825.
Bounds held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id.
at 828. But the right of access to the courts is not unlimited. “The tools [that Bounds] requires to
be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally,
and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction
and incarceration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
Moreover, a prisoner alleging a violation of the right of access must show that officials
caused previous or imminent “actual injury” by hindering efforts to pursue such a claim or defense.
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-51, 354-55; Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997).
“He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy
some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities,
he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring
before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable to file
even a complaint.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.

rights.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974),
overruled on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104
L.Ed.2d 459 (1989).

a.

Defendant Adams

Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Adams “allowed [Plaintiff to have] her legal property
on detention, but then denied ILA access.” (Am. Compl.

¶

5.) Plaintiff does not provide any

further information. It is unclear whether she had law library access, but did not have paralegal
assistance. Nor is it clear what claims Plaintiff was attempting to perfect when she was denied
paralegal assistance. Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege any “actual injury” that she sustained as a
result of Defendant Adams’ denial of inmate paralegal assistance while she was “on detention.”
See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-51, 354-55. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
b.

Unnamed Defendants

Plaintiff also asserts a violation of her First Amendment rights when, on February 5, 2013,
she was denied writing supplies, phone calls to “the social worker,” legal telephone calls and legal
supplies and forms.

(Am. Compl.

¶

5.18.)

Specifically, she alleges that she was denied the

minimum ten hours per week in the law library. (Id.) She states that this directly affected another
one of her cases before this Court, Civil Action No. 11-1321, which had been dismissed for failure
to comply with discovery requests. (Id.)
Plaintiff does not provide enough information under Iqbal to allow this claim to proceed.
She does not identify who denied her writing supplies, phone calls to “the social worker.” legal
telephone calls and legal supplies and forms. Nor does she identify how the denial of phone calls
to her social worker and other unidentified “legal calls” had an effect on her ability to litigate the
other matter pending before this Court. Moreover, it appears from the allegations in the Amended
Complaint that Plaintiff was only denied her writing supplies, phone calls to “the social worker.”
legal telephone calls and legal supplies and forms for one day, February 5.

Finally, though

Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered “actual injury” due to the denial of these items, the Court

notes that in Civil Action No. 11-1321, the Court of Appeals recently remanded the case to this
Court pursuant to a request and concession by the defendants. See Harris v. Lanigan, Civil Action
No. 11-1321, ECFNo. 64.)
Based on the foregoing, the claim for denial of access to the courts against unnamed
Defendants is dismissed without prejudice.
4.

Denial of “Ad-Seg” Pay

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Arthur discriminated against her by “paying other white ad.
seg. inmates and denying [Plaintiff] ad. seg. payment on handicap idle status, and refused to provide
[Plaintiff] with the statutory authority which eliminated ad. seg. pay; had no authority to stop [her]
idle status pay.” (Am. Compl.

¶ 4.2.)

This claim must be dismissed pursuant to Iqbal for failure to provide sufficient factual
matter. Based on the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, the Court cannot discern
the meaning of’ad seg. payment on handicap idle status.” Moreover, it is unclear why Plaintiff is
alleging that she would be entitled to payment for being held in administrative segregation. This
claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
5.

Commissioner Lanigan

a. Supervisory Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Commissioner Lanigan knows of the acts and violations against
Plaintiff and failed to take action.
Courts do not recognize

§

1983 liability on a theory of respondeat superior; instead, a

plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant, through defendant’s own actions, violated the
Constitution. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948; see also Jordan v. Cicchi, 428 F. App’x 195, 198—99
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). The Third

Circuit has identified two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates: (1) “liability may attach if they, with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which
directly caused [the] constitutional harm”; or (2) “a supervisor may be personally liable under

§

1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as
the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional
conduct.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). “Failure to” claims-failure to train, failure to discipline or failure to
supervise-are generally considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability. Id. at 316-17.
To hold an official liable on a claim for failure to supervise based on a policy or practice, a
plaintiff “must identify a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ, and
then prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury created an
unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the policy
created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the constitutional
injury was caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or procedure.” Barkes, 766
F.3d at 317; Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).
Here, Plaintiff only generally alleges that Commissioner Lanigan failed to ensure his staff
was knowledgeable and trained.
procedures.

She provides no facts with regard to specific policies and

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff intended to raise a claim against Commissioner

Lanigan for failure to supervise, that claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
b. Non-Supervisory Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Lanigan violated the current “Terhune agreement
provisions for reviewing and accessing the needs of inmates to determine placement in c-cottage,

past mental health diagnosis, medical issues and the adverse affects [sic] of harsh and atypical
hardships of prison life...” (Am. Compl.

¶ 4.3.)

This claim must be dismissed pursuant to Iqbal for failure to provide sufficient factual
matter. Based on the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, the Court cannot identify
the meaning of the “Terhune Agreement” or what requirements it allegedly imposes on Defendant
Lanigan. This claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claim against Defendant
Arthur will be permitted to proceed. All other claims will be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

6
and 1915A(b)(l). If Plaintiff wishes to address the deficiencies identified herein, she must file a
motion to amend the complaint which complies with all relevant rules. An appropriate order
follows.
Dated:

Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J.

6

The Court notes that Plaintiff also appears to raise a claim for a “conspiracy to cover-up medical
evidence.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.1.) Though Plaintiff provides a substantial amount of information,
she fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for conspiracy. In order to sufficiently allege a
claim of a civil rights conspiracy, the complaint must specifically set forth: (I) the conduct that
violated the plaintiffs rights; (2) the time and the place of the conduct; and (3) the identity of the
officials responsible for the conduct. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 431 n. 8 (3d Cir.
1990) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir.1988)). Furthermore, the
allegations of conspiracy must be grounded firmly in facts; they cannot be conclusory nor can they
hinge on bare suspicions and foundationless speculation. See Youngv. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405
n. 16 (3d Cir. 1991) (aflirming dismissal of conspiracy claims based upon mere suspicion and
speculation). Here, Plaintiff does not state any facts which would indicate a conspiracy among the
Defendants. Rather, it appears to all be independent conduct by various officials. (Am. Compi.
¶ 5.1.) As such, any intended conspiracy claim will be also dismissed without prejudice.