VINES v. COLUMBUS HOUSE et al

Filing 13

OPINION. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 6/12/2017. (seb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SANDRA VINES,

Civil Action No. 13-3923(FLW)

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

COLUMBUS HOUSE et al.,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter has been opened to the Court by Plaintiff’s filing of an Amended Complaint

in this action. The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application
and dismissed the original Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. (See
ECF No. 3.) The Court has screened the Amended Complaint and will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
for relief as to all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sandra Vines brings this civil rights action against Bo Robinson and Columbus House, a

halfway house which operates under the authority of the New Jersey Department of Corrections
(“NJDOC”), and employees at Columbus House, i.e., Mr. Salaga, Ms. Newborn, Mr. Maestrella,
Ms. Sheffield, Ms. McCrae, Mr. Klein, and Mr. Davis. 1 (See ECF No. 9, Am. Compl).

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Plaintiff notes that the Amended Complaint adds two new Defendants – Bo Robinson and Mr.
Davis.
1

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is divided into discrete sections that outline her allegations
against the entity and individual Defendants.
a. Bo Robinson and Columbus House
According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Bo Robinson has a contract with Columbus
House, which is the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”) halfway house where
Plaintiff resided the time of the incidents alleged in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff alleges
that Columbus House is operated on the premises of Bo Robinson. (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at
2.) Defendant Salaga is the director of Bo Robinson, and Defendant Newborn is the Director of
Columbus House. 2 Plaintiff alleges that there is a policy in place at Columbus House that
provides her with “legal access” and permits her to receive legal mail. Although the mail may be
inspected, it must be opened in her presence in her presence and staff may not read her legal
mail. She further alleges that on two occasions, she received legal mail that had already been
opened outside her presence. (Id.) She filed grievances regarding these two instances; however,
“nothing was ever done.” (Id.) She also alleges that she was unable to answer court notices and
unable to complete her change of sentence motion and file her parole appeal to the appellate
court. (Id. at 2). She further alleges that there is no law library, law books, paralegals, legal
assistants, or legal supplies available to her at Columbus House. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff filed
grievances regarding these issues to Defendant Salaga, but he allegedly failed to assist her. 3 (Id.)

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Plaintiff provides further allegations regarding the conduct of these Defendants, which is
described below.
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Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant McCrae, who works in the Classification Department at Bo
Robinson, harassed Plaintiff by telling her that McCrae “didn’t need to do anything for
[Plaintiff].” Id.
2

b. Defendant Salaga – Director of Bo Robinson
Plaintiff alleges that she complained to Defendant Salaga about “health issues, safety,
staff misconduct, opening legal mail, not giving [Plaintiff] her mail, sexual harassment, threats
by both staff and inmates, discrimination, falsification of documents, and conflict of interest.”
(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that Salaga failed to answer many of her grievances and that
there is no effective grievance policy in place at Columbus House. Plaintiff states that her “right
to an effective remedy and grievance process was violated.” (Id.)
c. Defendant Newborn – Director of Columbus House
Plaintiff alleges that she told Defendant Newborn that she was a victim of discrimination
and racist remarks, but that Newborn “down played [Plaintiff’s] complaints and ignored [her]
complaint (failing to investigate or address that allegation).” (Id. at 4.) Newborn also allegedly
“upheld the decision to delay [Plaintiff’s] transfer to a more suitable halfway house facility.”
Plaintiff further alleges that “that delay was a direct result of grievances that [Plaintiff]
submitted,” which are described above. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges she complained to Ms.
Newborn that her mail was being unreasonably held at Columbus House, sometimes for 10 days
or more. (Id.) Plaintiff also states that when she was transferred to another halfway house, her
birth certificate did not reach her by mail at the new halfway house for two months, and she lost
job opportunities due to the delay. (Id.) Although it is not clear who failed to forward Plaintiff’s
birth certificate, she appears to allege that her birth certificate was held in retaliation for her
filing of grievances. (Id.)
d. Defendant Mastrella
Plaintiff does not provide Defendant Mastrella’s job title, but she alleges that this
Defendant “falsified [Plaintiff’s] psychology reports because there were numerous illegal

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activity, safety issues, health issues, and other circumstances that threatened [Plaintiff] and
interfered with [her] treatment.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that her case manager and counselor, who
are not identified in the Complaint, became angry with her for filing numerous complaints about
the conditions at Columbus House, and that Defendant Mastrella “conspired with the counselor,
case manager, and director to deny [Plaintiff’s] transfer to a better facility.” When Plaintiff
complained about Defendant Mastrella, he allegedly further delayed her transfer and threatened
to continue to delay the transfer if she continued to complain.
e. Defendant Sheffield
Defendant Sheffield’s job title or responsibilities are not clear from the Amended
Complaint. According to the Complaint, Defendant Sheffield “violated [Plaintiff’s] right to
speak and address issues [Plaintiff] had regarding medical issues and medical and drug urine
tests and procedures.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant Sheffield allegedly “harassed” Plaintiff by
“interrupting [Plaintiff’s] legal calls and legal appointments.” Sheffield also allegedly “hit
[Plaintiff] with a door when trying to close it in [Plaintiff’s] face” when dispensing Plaintiff’s
medication. Plaintiff appears to allege that Sheffield discussed Plaintiff’s private medical
information with others and compromised Plaintiff’s safety by “breaching confidential
information to other inmates and staff involved with criminal allegations.” Sheffield also
allegedly told Plaintiff that she would be sent back to prison if she kept asking to see a doctor for
her existing and emergent medical conditions. (Id. at 4.)
f. Defendant McCrae
Defendant McCrae is identified as an employee in the Classification Department at Bo
Robinson who processes inmate requests for “legal access to the courts and legal phone calls.”
(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges the following with respect to this Defendant:

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She denied me legal access and deliberately delayed my access
when I made it clear to her about deadlines, calls, copies, law
books that I needed to adequately address my legal needs and pro
se litigation. I was unable to submit parole appeal due to inability
to research needed legal information. I was unable to proceed with
my change of custody motion and access legal transcripts that I
need in [two] separate court issues. She interfered and violated my
right to lawyer/client confidentiality when she held the phone
while I spoke with my attorney on a couple occasions and asked
questions about what I had discussed or need to discuss with my
lawyer. She denied me Notary access when I requested it for my
legal paperwork for the court. She denied me indigence when I
didn't have funds for legal copies or postage for legal mail. When I
reported all of these violations to Mr. Salaga, she harassed me by
making it difficult for me to come into the office to do my legal
work and use the phone for legal calls. She also held the disc that
had my legal pending motions on it and refused to print them out.
Then when I submitted another grievance, she came up to my unit
and told me to sign a blank grievance that would say that she have
addressed my legal access issues or she wouldn't let me do my
legal work. Then she took that form (which was only stating that I
was in the office on that one occasion), and she cut and pasted the
response to the original form that I had initially made the
complaint on. That is illegal and falsification of an administrative
and legal document. I reported that to Mr. Salaga and he didn't do
anything about it, nor did he even respond to my written grievance.
I know factually that he received it, because a staff member
personally put my grievance directly in his hand.
(Id. at 5.)
g. Defendant Klein
According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant Klein is “the director, the person in
charge of medical issues” at Columbus House.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Klein
“violated Plaintiff’s Hippa [sic] Rights”, when he allowed non-medical staff to be involved with
Plaintiff’s medical information and medication. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that her medicine was
dispensed to her in front of other inmates, and, as a result, other inmates knew the types of
medications Plaintiff was taking. (Id.) When Plaintiff complained about these practices,

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Defendant Klein allegedly threatened her by stating that she would be returned to prison if she
didn’t stop complaining and asking for medical attention. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that she has asthma, back problems, high blood pressure, and allergies to
mold, dust, spray chemicals, and smoke. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states that Columbus House
accepted her with these medical conditions and, therefore, must provide her with adequate care
for her conditions. Plaintiff alleges that although the facility is designated as non-smoking,
people in the building smoke. Plaintiff was allegedly exposed to second-hand smoke and had
asthma attacks on more than one occasion. Plaintiff alleges that she “still suffer[s] from
respiratory conditions that were worsened because of all of the illegal smoking in the facility by
smokers, both inmates and staff.” (Id. at 5.)
h. Defendant Davis
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Davis “violated [Plaintiff’s] Hippa Rights” by
dispensing her medications and discussing my medical record information in front of other nonmedical persons and other inmates on numerous occasions. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff describes Davis
as “a supervisor in charge of medication and medical requests” and states that he is responsible
for allowing non-medical staff to dispense and discuss Plaintiff’s medication, medical requests
and medical information in the presence of other inmates and other non-medical staff. (Id.) In
January 2014, Davis allegedly told another inmate that Plaintiff had a positive drug test. (Id.)
Defendant Davis also allegedly told Plaintiff that she would be returned to prison if she didn’t
stop complaining and asking for medical attention and privacy. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges
that Davis “threatened not to get [Plaintiff] medical help” on several occasions. On one
occasion, Davis was upset because Plaintiff told the previous shift supervisor that she had a
swollen eye. When Plaintiff tried to tell Davis, Davis told her to “shut the fuck up” and get out

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of the office. On another occasion, Plaintiff told him she had previously had an asthma attack,
which was noted in the log book, but Davis refused to send her to a doctor. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also includes a handwritten note alleging that Bo
Robinson “has previously been investigated for some of the allegations that [Plaintiff] made, by
the New York Times and other legal agencies.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff further alleges that “there
has been numerous instances of health hazards, drug activity, staff members prosecuted, and
[b]reaches of safety and security.” (Id.)
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.

1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those
civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts first

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separate the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as
true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable
inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618
F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Complaint must also allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings drafted by pro se parties. Tucker v.
Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699 (RBK/KMW), 2015 WL 6560645, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29,
2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Such pleadings are “held to less
strict standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. Nevertheless, pro se litigants
must still allege facts, which if taken as true, will suggest the required elements of any claim that
is asserted. Id. (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). To
do so, [a plaintiff] must plead enough facts, accepted as true, to plausibly suggest entitlement to
relief.” Gibney v. Fitzgibbon, 547 F. App'x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696
F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)). Furthermore, “[l]iberal construction does not, however, require
the Court to credit a pro se plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’ Id. (citing Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). That is, “[e]ven a pro se complaint
may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be
construed as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. (citing
Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).

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IV.

ANALYSIS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of

his or her constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
challenged conduct was committed by (1) a person acting under color of state law and (2) that
the conduct deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other
grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 152 (1970); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court
construes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to raise a number of claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the individual and entity defendants. More specifically, the Court construes
Plaintiff to raise the following claims for relief under § 1983: First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims related to the opening of her legal mail, denial of access to the courts, and inadequacy of
the grievance system; First Amendment retaliation claims; Eighth Amendment claims for
inadequate medical care and exposure to environmental tobacco smoke; and Fourteenth
Amendment claims for denial of medical privacy. 4 The Court next considers whether Plaintiff
has sufficiently stated any claims for relief under § 1983.

4

The Court does not construe Plaintiff to raise any state law claims for relief. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks relief under state law, she must raise those claims in an Amended Complaint.
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a. Legal Mail Claims
Plaintiff alleges that her legal mail was opened outside her presence and that she was
denied access to the court. The Third Circuit has “recognized a cause of action to address “[a]
state pattern and practice ... of opening legal mail outside the presence of the addressee inmate,”
because such a practice “interferes with protected communications, strips those protected
communications of their confidentiality, and accordingly impinges upon the inmate's right to
freedom of speech.” Diaz v. Palakovich, 448 F. App'x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v.
Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir.2006) (reaffirming the holding of Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d
1445, 1458 (3d Cir.1995)). The assertion that legal mail is intentionally opened and read,
delayed for an inordinate period of time, or stolen also states a First Amendment claim. McLeod
v. Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., No. CIV.A. 05-4710 (AET), 2006 WL 572346, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar.
8, 2006) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431-32 (7th Cir. 1996); Castillo v. Cook
County Mail Room Dep't, 990 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1993)); Thompson v. Hayman, No. 09-1833,
2011 WL 2652185, at *5 (D.N.J. July 6, 2011) (opening outside of the prisoner’s presence,
reading, delaying, or stealing a prisoner's legal mail violates a prisoner's First Amendment
rights). However, “[a] single interference with the delivery of an inmate’s personal mail, without
more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.” Fuentes v. State of New Jersey
Office of Pub. Defs., No. CIV.A. 05-3446FLW, 2006 WL 83108, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2006)
(citing Morgan v. Montayne, 516 F.2d 1367 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976)).
Here, it appears that Plaintiff attempts to state a legal mail claim against Bo Robinson
and/or Columbus House. As the Court explained in its prior screening Opinion, entities like Bo
Robinson and Columbus House cannot be found liable simply because they employ wrongdoers.
See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Natale
v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). For an entity to be
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found liable under § 1983, Plaintiff must assert in the Complaint facts showing that the entity
had a relevant policy or custom, and that this policy or custom caused a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84; accord Jiminez v. All American
Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F. 3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that a plaintiff must show a “direct
causal link between a . . . policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”) (quoting
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
Plaintiff alleges that Bo Robinson and/or Columbus House has a policy that requires legal
mail to be opened in an inmate’s presence and that Plaintiff’s mail was opened outside her
presence on two occasions. (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff, however, does not provide
any facts showing a direct causal link between the policy and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. At best, it appears that the legal mail policy was violated by one or more of the
employees of Columbus House and/or Bo Robinson, and Plaintiff seeks to hold the entities
responsible under an impermissible theory of respondeat superior. As such, her legal mail
claims under § 1983 against Bo Robinson and Columbus House are dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
To state a legal mail claim against an individual defendant, Plaintiff must allege facts
showing that the individual participated in the alleged wrongdoing amounting to a violation of
her constitutional rights. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”). Although it is not necessarily fatal to
her claim, Plaintiff has not identified the individuals who opened her legal mail or failed to stop

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their subordinates from opening her legal mail. More importantly, the Amended Complaint fails
to allege sufficient facts to show a pattern or practice of her legal mail being opened outside her
presence; rather, the Amended Complaint alleges that her legal mail was opened outside her
presence on only two occasions. (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 2.) Thus, even if Plaintiff had
identified the individuals who opened her legal mail on those two occasions, these allegations,
standing alone, fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983. As such, the Court will dismiss her
legal mail claims for failure to state a claim for relief.
b. Denial of Access to the Courts
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also attempts to state claim against entity Defendants Bo
Robinson, and Columbus House, and individual Defendant McCrae for denial of the right of
access to courts. The constitutional right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). In addition, the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the
courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their
constitutional rights. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled on other
grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). See also Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855
F.2d 1021, 1036 n. 18 (3d Cir.1988) (chronicling various constitutional sources of the right of
access to the courts).
Prisoners must be allowed “adequate, effective and meaningful” access to the courts.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977) (holding that prisons must give convicted inmates
access to law libraries or direct legal assistance). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 828, the
Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires

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prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law.” The right of access to the courts is not, however, unlimited. “The tools [that Bounds]
requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly
or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any
other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional)
consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996)
(emphasis in original).
In addition to the above limitations, “a prisoner alleging a violation of his right of access
must show that prison officials caused him past or imminent ‘actual injury’ by hindering his
efforts to pursue such a claim.” Banks v. Fraiser, No. CIV A 06-4152 FLW, 2007 WL 38909, at
*4 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2007) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)). “Where prisoners assert
that defendants’ actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must
show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’—that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’
or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as
recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe, 536 F.3d
at 205-06 (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Thus, as explained by the
Third Circuit, prisoners bringing access to the court claims “must satisfy certain pleading
requirements: The complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show
that it is “more than mere hope,” and it must describe the “lost remedy.” Id. (citing Christopher
536 U.S. at 416–17); see also Schreane v. Holt, 482 F. App'x 674, 676 (3d Cir. 2012) (A plaintiff
does not establish a constitutional violation when he establishes only that he had a “mere hope”
that he would prevail on the underlying claim.). Furthermore, conclusory allegations that an

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inmate suffered prejudice will not support an access-to-courts claim. 5 Duran v. Merline, 923 F.
Supp. 2d 702, 722-23 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing Arce v. Walker, 58 F.Supp.2d 39, 44
(W.D.N.Y.1999) (internal citations omitted)). As such, an access to the Courts claim will be
subject to dismissal where “the Court [is] left to guess whether the suit had any merit.” Sanders
v. Rose, 576 F. App'x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2014).
Here, Plaintiff’s alleges that Bo Robinson and/or Columbus House has no library, law
books, paralegals, legal assistants, or legal supplies. (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 2-3.) She also
appears to allege that Defendant McCrae and other unidentified individuals interfered with her
access to the courts by denying her access to legal materials and interfering with her legal calls.
(Id. at 2, 5.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that she was unable to complete her change of sentence
motion and file her parole appeal to the Appellate Division. (Id. at 2, 5.) The Court finds these

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The actual injury requirement applies even where the prisoner can establish that the law library
or access to legal assistance is subpar. As explained by the Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey,
Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law
library or legal assistance, [and] an inmate cannot establish
relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law
library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical
sense.... [T]he inmate therefore must go one step further and
demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous]
legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he
prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical
requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal
assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had
suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before
the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library
that he was unable to file even a complaint.”
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see also Tinsley v. Del Rosso, No. CIV.A. 08-1251(RMB), 2008 WL
2236598, at *3-4 (D.N.J. May 30, 2008) (explaining same). Similarly, “there is no First
Amendment right to subsidized mail or photocopying. [Instead], the inmates must point to
evidence of actual or imminent interference with access to the courts.” Reynolds v. Wagner, 128
F.3d 166, 183 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Tinsley, 2008 WL 2236598, at *4 (explaining same).

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allegations troubling; however, to state an access to the courts claim, Plaintiff must provide facts
to suggest that her change of sentence motion and/or parole appeal had merit and that she has no
other remedy for the lost claim(s) other than her access to the courts claim. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint provides no such facts. As such, Plaintiff does not satisfy the “actual injury” pleading
requirement for an access to the courts claim. The Court will therefore dismiss her access to the
courts claims at this time.
c. Failure to have an Adequate Grievance System
Plaintiff also appears to allege that Bo Robinson and Columbus House violated her
constitutional rights by failing to have an adequate grievance system, and that individual
Defendants Salaga and Newborn violated her constitutional rights by ignoring her grievances and
complaints and/or failing to investigate her allegations. It is well-established, however, that
prisoners do not have a constitutional right to an effective grievance process. “[B]ecause a
prisoner has no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance process [citation
omitted], a prisoner cannot maintain a constitutional claim . . . based upon [the prisoner’s]
perception that [the recipient of the grievances] ignored and/or failed to properly investigate his
grievances.” Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 446 F. App'x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendants Salaga and Newborn failed to address her grievances, without more,
fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Likewise, because Plaintiff has no constitutional
right to an adequate grievance system, the failure of Bo Robinson and/or Columbus House have
an adequate grievance system is likewise not actionable under § 1983. As such, these claims are
dismissed as to all Defendants.

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d. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
The Court also construes Plaintiff to allege a number of claims for First Amendment
retaliation under § 1983 in connection with her complaints and the filing of grievances.
“Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of rights
secured by the Constitution actionable under Section 1983.” Pantusco v. Sorrell, No. CIV. 093518 DRD, 2011 WL 2148392, at *8 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (citing White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d
103, 111–12, (3d Cir. 1990)). As such, “[g]overnment actions, which standing alone do not
violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part
by a desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.” Id. (citing Mitchell v.
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted).
To state a § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation, plaintiff must show: “(1) [s]he
engaged in protected speech, (2) the defendant took adverse action sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and (3) the adverse action was
prompted by plaintiff’s protected speech.” Wilson v. Zielke, No. 09–2607, 2010 WL 2144292,
*1 (3d Cir. May 28, 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.2003)). With
respect to the first element, a prisoner’s submission of grievances is constitutionally protected
conduct. See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530. 6 The “adverse action” requirement is satisfied by
showing adverse action “sufficient ‘to deter a person of ordinary firmness’ from exercising his
First Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Suppon v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Finally, a prisoner must show that the constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or
motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him.” Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333–34 (quoting

6

Similarly, the filing of a lawsuit is protected activity under the First Amendment right of
prisoners to petition the court. Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir.1997); Milhouse v.
Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373–74 (3d Cir. 1981).
16

Mount Health Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287\ (1977)). In this regard, the mere fact
that an adverse action occurs after a grievance is filed is relevant, but not dispositive, for the
purpose of establishing a causal link between the two events. See Lape v. Pennsylvania, 157
Fed. App'x. 491, 498 (3d Cir. 2005). To establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff
usually must prove either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to
establish a causal link. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir.
2007) (citing Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503–04 (3d Cir.1997); Woodson
v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920–21 (3d Cir.1997)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Newborn upheld the decision to delay her transfer
to another facility, allegedly in retaliation for her filing of various grievances, and that Defendant
Mastrella conspired to deny her transfer, allegedly in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing of
grievances against her counselor and case manager. (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 4.) The Court
assumes without deciding that a lengthy delay in transfer (or denial altogether) to a better facility
could under some circumstances constitute an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising her constitutional rights. Here, however, Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint makes clear that she was eventually transferred to another facility, and does not
provide any facts about the length of the delay. As such, the Court cannot determine whether the
alleged delay in transfer would prevent a person of ordinary firmness from pursuing her
constitutional rights. See Brandt v. Feibusch, No. CIV.A. 10-4223 FLW, 2012 WL 1937563, at
*13 (D.N.J. May 29, 2012) (finding in context of civil commitment that an approximately six
weeks delay did not constitute adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness
from exercising his rights). Furthermore, aside from bare allegations, Plaintiff’s Amended

17

Complaint fails to provide facts that would connect any alleged delay in her transfer or denial of
transfer to her filing of grievances. Although it appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff’s
transfer was delayed and/or denied after she filed various grievances, “the mere temporal
association between his litigation and the alleged delay in his transfer is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the litigation was a motivating factor in the Defendants’ actions or to raise his
claims above a mere ‘speculative’ level.” Brandt, 2012 WL 1937563, at *13 (citing Gans v.
Rozum, No. 06–62J, 2007 WL 257127, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug.31, 2007) (mere temporal
connection between filing of civil rights complaint and exercise restriction is “too thin a reed” on
which to hang a retaliation claim), aff'd, 267 F. App’x. 178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 844
(2008)). As such, the Court will dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claims premised on her
delayed transfer.
Plaintiff also alleges that the two-month delay in forwarding Plaintiff’s birth certificate to
her new halfway house was an act of retaliation by unidentified individuals who were displeased
by Plaintiff’s filing of various grievances (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 4.); Plaintiff, however, has
not provided sufficient facts to connect the delay in forwarding her birth certificate to her filing
of any grievances or identified the person or persons who were allegedly responsible for delaying
her birth certificate. The Court will also dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claim based on
the two-month delay in the forwarding of her birth certificate.
Plaintiff also alleges a claim for First Amendment retaliation against Defendant McCrae
for alleged interference with her “legal access” and legal phone calls. 7 (Id. at 5.) According to
the Amended Complaint, Defendant McCrae denied and delayed Plaintiff’s “legal access,”

7

Plaintiff does not explain the term “legal access” and it is not clear what type of legal access
was denied by Defendant McCrae.
18

denied her requests for notary and copying services and postage, and interfered with Plaintiff’s
legal calls. Plaintiff alleges that after she reported this misconduct to Defendant Salaga, McCrae,
“harassed her by making it difficult for [Plaintiff] to . . . do her legal work and use the phone for
legal calls” and “held the disc that had [Plaintiff’s pending motions on it and refused to print
them out.” 8 (Id. at 5.) Thus, Plaintiff alleges that McCrae engaged in the same type of
misconduct prior to and after Plaintiff’s filing of grievances, i.e., interfering with her legal access
and legal phone calls. As such, it is not clear how, if at all, McCrae’s misconduct was motivated
by Plaintiff’s filing of grievances. Although Plaintiff alleges facts to show that McCrae was
upset by Plaintiff’s filing of grievances against her, she does not provide sufficient facts to
suggest that Plaintiff’s filing of grievances “was a substantial or motivating factor in the
decision” to interfere with Plaintiff’s legal work and legal calls. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333–34
(internal quotation and citation omitted). To the extent Plaintiff alleges that McCrae’s refusal to
turn over her disc or print out her legal papers constitutes an “adverse action,” the Court finds
that this one incident, without more, would be insufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness
from exercising her First Amendment rights.
The remaining First Amendment retaliation claims appear to be premised on Defendants’
threats to take adverse action against her. After allegedly delaying her transfer, Defendant
Mastrella allegedly threatened to continue to delay the transfer if she continued to file
grievances. (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 4.) Defendants Davis, Klein, and Sheffield also
allegedly told Plaintiff that she would be returned to prison if she didn’t stop complaining about

8

Earlier in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that unidentified individuals denied
her legal calls and failed to inform her of legal calls in retaliation for her various grievances. (Id.
at 1.)
19

her medical treatment and violations of her privacy. (Id. at 5-6.) Finally, Defendant Davis
allegedly threatened to deny Plaintiff medical assistance “on a couple of occasions”. (Id. at 6.)
The Third Circuit has held in unpublished decisions that “threats alone do not constitute
retaliation[.]” 9 See Burgos v. Canino, 358 F. App'x 302, 306 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Maclean v.
Secor, 876 F. Supp. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (collecting cases)); see also Fischl v. Armitage,
128 F.3d 50, 55 (2nd Cir.1997) (“Mere allegations of verbal abuse, threats, or defamations by a
correctional officer to a prisoner are not cognizable in a Section 1983 action.”). Similarly, a
number of district courts in the Third Circuit have held that threats alone do not amount to a
constitutional violation. Compare Prisoners' Legal Ass’n v. Roberson, 822 F. Supp. 185, 189

9

The Third Circuit has also held in unpublished opinions that Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on retaliation claims premised on threats alone. See Wilson v. Zielke, 382 F.
App'x 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing threat to put a plaintiff in jail and holding that a
defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim
premised on threats alone, as “neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has
defined with specificity the contours of when a threat constitutes an adverse action in the
official-detainee setting”). The Court assumes without deciding that Defendants, who appear to
be employees of a private prison contractor, would not be entitled to seek qualified immunity
under Supreme Court precedent. In Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), the Supreme
Court denied qualified immunity to prison guards who were privately employed, despite their
quintessentially public function. Subsequently, in Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012), the
Supreme Court considered whether a private attorney temporarily retained by a municipal
government as an investigator could claim qualified immunity in an action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Finding no distinction in the common law “between public servants and private
individuals engaged in public service,” the Court held that the investigator could assert “qualified
immunity” in the lawsuit. Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 398. The Filarsky Court, however, reaffirmed
the holding of Richardson in rejecting immunity for the private prison employees, emphasizing
that the incentives of the private market suffice to protect employees when “a private firm,
systematically organized to assume a major lengthy administrative task ... for profit and
potentially in competition with other firms,” assumes responsibility for managing an institution.
Id. at 393 (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413); see also McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th
Cir. 2012) (holding that, even after Filarsky, private psychiatrist providing services to inmates as
employee of Community Behavioral Health, a private entity, was not entitled to a qualified
immunity defense); Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2013)(declining to decide
issue but noting that Richardson is still good law); Hasher v. Hayman, No. 08-4105 (CCC), 2013
WL 1288205, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2013) (finding that Defendants, who were employed by
private prison medical services contractor, failed to establish entitlement to qualified immunity).
20

(D.N.J. 1993) (“[V]erbal harassment does not give rise to a constitutional violation enforceable
under § 1983.”); McKnight v. Bucks County Dep't of Corrs., 2008 WL 4771845, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (“Plaintiff may obtain relief under § 1983 if the verbal threats are accompanied by a
reinforcing act.”); Gay v. City of Philadelphia, 2005 WL 1844407, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(allegation that defendant threatened plaintiff, without any accompanying allegation that
defendant carried through on threat, was not adverse action) with Douglas v. Marino, 684 F.
Supp. 395, 398 (D.N.J. 1988) (stating claim where prison employee threatened inmate with
knife).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mastrella, Sheffield, Klein, and Davis
“threatened” Plaintiff in response to her complaints about the conditions at Columbus House.
Plaintiff’s allegations are extremely general and provide no context from which the Court could
determine whether any of the threats at issue would deter a reasonable person from exercising
her constitutional rights. For instance, Plaintiff does not provide facts about when and where the
threats occurred, their frequency, or whether the threats were actually carried out and/or
accompanied by any reinforcing act. With respect to Defendants Sheffield, Klein, and Davis, it
also appears that the threats were made in response to Plaintiff’s verbal complaints and not in
response to her filing of protected grievances. Because threats alone are generally insufficient to
constitute “adverse action” and Plaintiff has not provided facts to suggest that the threats were
sufficient to deter a reasonable person from exercising her constitutional rights, the Court will
dismiss the remaining First Amendment retaliation claims.
e. Eighth Amendment Claims for Inadequate Medical Care and Exposure to
Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Plaintiff also appears to allege that Defendants Klein and Davis denied her adequate
medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. “In order to establish an Eighth

21

Amendment violation with respect to conditions of confinement, a prisoner must show that he
has been deprived of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ such as food, clothing,
shelter, sanitation, medical care, or personal safety.” Panton v. Nash, 317 F. App'x 257, 258 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 834 (1994)).
The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
mandates that prison officials not act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs by denying or delaying medical care. Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 446 F. App'x 400,
403 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). In order to sustain a
constitutional claim, a prisoner must make: 1) an “objective” showing that the prisoner’s medical
needs were sufficiently serious; and 2) a “subjective” showing that the prison official acted with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d
Cir. 2002)). “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (citing Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d
Cir. 2009)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges generally that Columbus House accepted her with certain medical
conditions and implies that Defendants Klein, who is in charge of “medical issues”, and
Defendant Davis, who assisted Klein, failed to provide her with adequate medical care. (ECF
No. 9, Am. Compl. at 5-6.) Plaintiff allegedly suffers from asthma, back problems, high blood
pressure, and various allergies to mold, dust, spray chemicals, and smoke. Even assuming that
some or all of Plaintiff’s conditions are sufficiently serious, she has not provided facts showing
that Defendants Davis and Klein were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. To
make such a showing, Plaintiff would need to provide facts suggesting that one or both of these

22

Defendants recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm by denying or delaying her
medical care.
Plaintiff’s more specific allegations with respect to Defendant Davis likewise fail to state
a claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that when
she attempted to tell Defendant Davis that she had a swollen eye, he cursed at her and told her to
get out of his office. (Id. at 6.) On another occasion, she reported to Davis that she had
previously had an asthma attack, which had been noted in a log book, but he refused to have her
seen by a doctor. (Id.) Although some of Defendant Davis’ conduct appears unprofessional, it
does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, i.e., a reckless disregard of a serious risk of
harm to Plaintiff. Even assuming that Davis denied Plaintiff treatment for her swollen eye,
Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to suggest that her swollen eye was a serious medical
condition for which she needed immediate treatment or that Davis disregarded a substantial risk
of serious harm to Plaintiff when he told her to leave his office despite her swollen eye. Plaintiff
also alleges that Defendant Davis refused to send her to a doctor after she reported to him that
she had previously had an asthma attack. Although asthma can be a serious medical condition,
and an asthma attack can be a medical emergency while it is ongoing, Plaintiff does not allege
sufficient facts suggesting that Davis recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
Plaintiff by deciding not to send her to a doctor after she reported a prior asthma attack. For the
reasons explained above, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts showing that Defendants Klein
and/or Davis were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical condition(s), and the Court will
dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims for inadequate medical care against these Defendants.
Plaintiff also appears to raise a § 1983 claim against Defendant Klein related to her
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”) at Columbus House. Plaintiff alleges that

23

Columbus House is designated as a smoke-free facility, but that staff and inmates there smoked
“all the time.” (ECF No. 9, Am. Compl. at 5-6.) While at Columbus House, Plaintiff allegedly
had an asthma attack on more than one occasion due to the illegal smoking and allegedly still
suffers respiratory complications from the exposure to second-hand smoke. “There are two
varieties of ETS claims – present injury claims and future injury claims – and they are measured
by different standards.” Brown v. DiGuglielmo, 418 F. App'x 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 273 (3d Cir. 2003) (Ambro, J., dissenting in part)). The Court
considers whether Plaintiff states a claim under § 1983 as to either type of ETS claim.
Here, with respect to her present injury claim, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient
allegations suggesting that Defendant Klein or any other prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to her serious medical needs, i.e., the alleged exacerbation of her asthma from tobacco
smoke. See Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 273 (A present injury claim is a standard condition-ofconfinement claim governed by the principles the Supreme Court established in Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), requiring a prisoner
to “allege a sufficiently serious medical need (the objective component) and deliberate
indifference by prison officials in response (the subjective component).”). For instance, Plaintiff
does not allege that she complained to Defendant Klein or any other prison official that she had
an ETS-related illness amounting to a sufficiently serious medical need or that she specifically
sought medical treatment on account of excessive ETS exposure and was denied treatment; as
such, she fails to establish deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Klein or other prison

24

officials as to any such medical need. 10 See Brown, 418 F. App'x at 103–04 (citing Atkinson,
316 F.3d at 266).
“Liability for a future injury case based on exposure to ETS requires proof of: (1)
exposure to unreasonably high levels of ETS contrary to contemporary standards of decency; and
(2) deliberate indifference by the authorities to the exposure to ETS.” Brown, 418 F. App'x at
104 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). Even assuming without deciding that
Plaintiff has provided sufficient facts to suggest that she was exposed to “unreasonably high
levels of ETS contrary to contemporary standards of decency”, she fails to provide facts
suggesting that Defendant Klein was deliberately indifferent to the exposure, i.e., that he was on
notice of the problem and failed to address it. As such, her future injury ETS claim against
Defendant Klein is likewise dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.
f. Fourteenth Amendment Claims related to Medical Privacy
Finally, the Court also construes Plaintiff to allege that Defendants Klein and Davis
violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in her medical information. 11 An individual
has a constitutional right to privacy which protects “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). The Third Circuit held that the
10

Because respondeat superior liability is unavailable under § 1983, Defendant Klein may not
be held liable for the misconduct of other staff members at Columbus House/Bo Robinson.
11

Plaintiff often describes this alleged misconduct as violations of her “hippa” [sic] privacy
rights, apparently referring to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”). Although the Court construes Plaintiff to raise claims arising solely under § 1983
and does not construe Plaintiff to allege a federal cause of action under HIPPA, it notes for
Plaintiff’s benefit that “[t]here is no federal private right of action under HIPPA.” Baum v.
Keystone Mercy Health Plan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 718, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Dodd v. Jones,
623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078,
1082 (9th Cir. 2007); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006); Compliance and
Enforcement, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,600, 82,601 (Dec. 28, 2000) (“Under HIPAA, individuals do not
have a right to court action.”). As such, to the extent she had raised a claim under HIPPA, it
would subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
25

prisoners have a constitutional right to privacy in medical information, but that the right is
“subject to substantial restrictions and limitations in order for correctional officials to achieve
legitimate correctional goals and maintain institutional security.” 12 Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309,
317, 323 (3d Cir. 2001). The court explained that a prisoner’s right to medical privacy is not as
extensive as the right of a free citizen: “We do not suggest that Doe has a right to conceal [his]
diagnosed medical condition from everyone in the corrections system. Doe’s constitutional right
is subject to substantial restrictions and limitations in order for correctional officials to achieve
legitimate correctional goals and maintain institutional security.” Doe, 257 F.3d at 317; see also
Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App'x 186, 188 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that “[d]isclosure of
[Plaintiff’s] medical records . . . to the grievance officer responsible for responding to
[Plaintiff’s] claim was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of adjudicating
the grievance and assessing the severity of [Plaintiff’s] alleged injury); Stephens v. Chairman of
Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 173 F. App'x 963, 965 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that district
court had failed to address Doe in dismissing claim regarding review of Plaintiff’s medical

12

To determine whether a prison policy or regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests,” a court must consider the factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987). They are: (1) whether there is a “‘valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it,’ and this connection
must not be ‘so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational;’” (2) “whether inmates
retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right;” (3) “the costs that
accommodating the right would impose on other inmates, guards, and prison resources
generally;” and (4) “whether there are alternatives to the regulation that ‘fully accommodate the
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.’” DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47,
51 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999)). The court in
Delie did not address whether there were legitimate penological interests present in that case
because there was an undeveloped record on that issue and the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. See Jefferson v. Husain, No. CV 14-2485, 2016 WL 1255731, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (explaining that the Delie does not provide insight as to what would qualify
as a legitimate penological interest).
26

records by doctor during disciplinary hearing, but affirming dismissal after finding that Plaintiff
had put his medical condition at issue in challenging the disciplinary charge).
Courts construing prisoner’s medical privacy claims have framed the right narrowly and
have applied it to situations involving “unusual medical condition[s], which, if disclosed
unnecessarily, would likely expose the inmate to ridicule, discrimination, or even potential
violence and harm, particularly when word of the condition is likely to spread through “humor or
gossip[ .]” Smith v. Hayman, No. CIV.A. 09-2602 PGS, 2012 WL 1079634, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar.
30, 2012) (citing Powell v. Shriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (tying the availability of a §
1983 claim for invasion of medical privacy to conditions such as HIV and Gender Identity
Disorder), aff'd, 489 F. App'x 544 (3d Cir. 2012)). In Delie, for example, an HIV-positive
inmate claimed that his constitutional right to medical privacy was violated by the following
procedures: prison nurses announced his medications loud enough that other prisoners could hear
and infer his condition; prison staff informed escorting officers of his medical condition; and
during physician visits, the clinic room door was kept open, allowing officers, inmates, and
guards to see and hear Doe and the treating physician. 257 F.3d at 311-12. More recently, in
Smith v. Hayman, 489 F. App'x 544 (3d Cir. 2012), a prisoner asserted a claim for deprivation of
his constitutional right to medical privacy related to his attempt to be diagnosed and treated for
Gender Identity Disorder. The plaintiff claimed his right to privacy was violated because the
prison psychiatrist and social worker held confidential counseling sessions within view and
potential earshot of other inmates. 13 Id. at 548.

13

In Delie, which was decided in 2001, the Third Circuit held that the defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s medical privacy claim because “the contours of defendants'
legal obligations under the Constitution were not sufficiently clear in 1995 that a reasonable
prison official would understand that the non-consensual disclosure of a prisoner's HIV status
violates the Constitution.” 257 F.3d at 322. More than ten years later in Smith, 489 F. App'x at
27

Here, Plaintiff’s medical conditions include asthma, back problems, high blood pressure,
and allergies to mold, dust, spray chemicals, and smoke, and she does not identify which of these
conditions or medications, if any, were improperly disclosed by Klein and Davis. (See ECF No.
9. Am. Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendants Klein and Davis permitted
nonmedical staff to dispense Plaintiff’s medications in front of other inmates and gave
nonmedical staff access to Plaintiff’s medical information on Plaintiff’s medical request forms.
(Id. at 5-6.) As a result of this practice, other inmates knew what types of medications Plaintiff
was taking. (Id.) Defendant Davis allegedly discussed Plaintiff’s medical information with her
in the presence of inmates and nonmedical staff and dispensed Plaintiff’s medication in a
counselor’s office in the presence of nonmedical staff and inmates. (Id. at 6.) Defendant Davis
also allegedly told another inmate that Plaintiff had failed a drug test. (Id.)
Assuming that Defendant Davis disclosed that Plaintiff failed a single drug test and that
Defendants Davis and Klein disclosed that Plaintiff has certain medical conditions by talking
about her conditions openly and dispensing medication in front of non-medical staff and inmates,

549, the Third Circuit found that it “was aware of no case law...that would suggest that the
conduct of the defendants, in light of their attempts to avoid disclosure, violated a clearly
established constitutional right, and [Delie] did not establish any such rule with obvious clarity.”
Thus, as noted by another district court in this Circuit, “[s]ubsequent cases have done little to fill
in the gaps left by Delie and define the parameters of a prisoner’s right to privacy in his medical
information.” Jefferson v. Husain, No. CV 14-2485, 2016 WL 1255731, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 2016) (denying qualified immunity where it was unclear whether doctor was entitled to
qualified immunity as a private actor acting under color of state law)(citing Smith 489 F. App'x
at 549); see also Illes v. Kcomt, Civil No. 1:12-CV-0395, 2014 WL 297352, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa.
Jan, 27, 2014)(granting qualified immunity where Plaintiff alleged that counseling sessions were
conducted at Plaintiff's cell door, rather than in a private room, and finding that the parameters of
the right had not been so clearly established that the defendant would have known that his
actions constituted a constitutional violation). As noted in footnote nine, the Court does not
address qualified immunity because it assumes without deciding that Defendants would not be
entitled to the defense under Richardson because they are employees of a private prison
contractor.
28

these allegations, standing alone, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Even if the
Court were to read the Amended Complaint to allege that Defendants Davis and Klein disclosed
that Plaintiff had asthma, back problems, high blood pressure, and/or allergies, these conditions
are commonplace and do not constitute “unusual medical condition[s], which, if disclosed
unnecessarily, would likely expose the inmate to ridicule, discrimination, or even potential
violence.” Smith, 2012 WL 1079634, at *18. Although the allegations in the Amended
Complaint suggest that Defendants Davis and Klein may have acted unprofessionally, their
conduct does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983. As such,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims premised on the violation of medical privacy.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the Amended Complaint is dismissed it its entirety

pursuant to the Court’s screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An appropriate
Order follows.

/s/
Freda L. Wolfson
Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J.

Date: June 12, 2017

29