ALLEN v. BAYLOR et al

Filing 5

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 4/15/2014. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOHN ALLEN,

Civil Action No. 13-4386 (FLW)

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

LEONA BAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
JOHN ALLEN #455146B
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Plaintiff Pro Se
WOLFSON, District Judge:
John Allen, who is confined at New Jersey State Prison in New Jersey, seeks to file a
Complaint asserting Equal Protection claims against several government officials and entities
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.1
For the reasons expressed in this Opinion, and as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b), this Court will dismiss the Complaint.

1

On July 30, 2013, this Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis because he did not include the prison account statement required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2). On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff submitted the account statement to the Clerk.

I. BACKGROUND
Allen brings this Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to Equal Protection of the laws against Leona Baylor, Municipal Clerk for the
City of Trenton; Tony Mack, then Mayor of Trenton; the City of Trenton; the Clerk of the Mercer
County Board of Chosen Freeholders; the Mercer County Board of Chosen Freeholders; Anthony
P. Carabelli, Chairman of the Mercer County Board of Chosen Freeholders; and John Doe, Clerk
of the Mercer County Board of Chosen Freeholders. He asserts the following facts, which this
Court is required to regard as true for the purposes of this review. Allen alleges that on November
18, 1989, William Rogers and Francis Bodnar were killed in Trenton. He maintains that the City
of Trenton thereafter offered a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the
person responsible for the deaths of Rogers and Bodnar. Plaintiff asserts that LC Peques, a paid
informant for the Trenton Police Department “accepted the terms of the reward, by illegally
recording the conversations of Plaintiff, then turning over (2) loaded .357 Handguns, and later
g[i]ving a formal statement dated December 20, 1989.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4.) Allen
alleges that, after his homicide conviction in 1991, the City of Trenton and the Mercer County
Board of Chosen Freeholders authorized the expenditure of funds to reward Peques.
Allen further alleges that in 2011, he submitted requests to the Clerk of the City of Trenton
and to Mercer County Counsel, pursuant to New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, New Jersey’s
Open Public Meetings Act, and New Jersey common law, for the reward offer in the 1989 Bodnar
and Rodgers homicide cases, the recommendations made by public officials regarding the reward,
and reward disbursements made by Trenton and/or the Mercer County Board of Chosen
Freeholders. He asserts that his requests were denied in 2011, and on September 14, 2011, he
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filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Mercer County, against the City Clerk, the
Mercer County Board of Chosen Freeholders, and Mercer County Counsel, claiming violation of
the Open Public Records Act and New Jersey common law. He alleges that on January 27, 2012,
the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court denied relief without a hearing, he appealed to
the Appellate Division; on May 6, 2013, Allen received an order from the Appellate Division that
dismissed his appeal for failure to correct deficiencies in his appellate submissions; on June 27,
2013, the Appellate Division denied his motion to vacate the dismissal of the appeal; and on July
10, 2013, Allen filed a notice of petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court.2
Allen contends that Defendants violated his rights under the “class of one” theory of the
Equal Protection Clause by denying him access to the reward offer and expenditure, contrary to the
New Jersey Open Public Records Act, Open Public Meetings Act, and New Jersey common law
“because of plaintiff’s prisoner status.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 10.) For violation of his
Equal Protection rights, Allen seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to
1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or a prisoner seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The PLRA directs
district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

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Allen has attached to the Complaint numerous documents regarding his requests and the state
court proceeding.
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relief. Id. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under these statutes because
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is a prisoner, and he seeks redress from a governmental
entity and governmental employees.
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim3,
the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc.,
708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Federal Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan,

111 U.S. 379, 383 (1884). “[T]hey have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the
Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)).
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School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a
cause of action for violation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law. 4 To
recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to
be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation
was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liberally construing

Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court reads the Complaint as attempting to state a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 against the named Defendants.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
1. To prevail on an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff “must present evidence that s/he has been
treated differently from persons who are similarly situated.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d
315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)). An
Equal Protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained if the plaintiff “claims that she has
been irrationally singled out as a so-called ‘class of one.’” Enqquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553
U.S. 591, 601 (2008). In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), a property owner
brought a § 1983 complaint claiming that the Village of Willowbrook’s requirement of a 33-foot

4

The statute provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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easement to connect her property to the municipal water supply violated Equal Protection because
the village had required only a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the
water supply. Olech’s complaint claimed that the 33-foot easement demand was irrational and
arbitrary, that the village ultimately connected her property after receiving an adequate 15-foot
easement, and that the 33-foot easement was motivated by ill will resulting from a previous
unrelated successful lawsuit against the village by the Olechs. The District Court dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim, the Seventh Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the Equal Protection Clause gave rise to a cause of action on behalf
of a “class of one” where plaintiff did not allege membership in a class. The Supreme Court held
that Olech’s complaint stated a valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause because prior case
law “recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. at 564.
In this case, Allen claims that Defendants deprived him of Equal Protection “under ‘class
of one’ theory, when [D]efendant[s] deprived plaintiff of access to the reward offer made by the
City of Trenton, in the homicide cases of Francis Bodnar & William Rodgers pursuant to N.J.S.
2A:153-4, violating the New Jersey Open Public Records Act . . . , Open Public Meetings Act . . .,
and New Jersey’s Common law right to public records, because of plaintiff’s prisoner status.”
(Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 10.) Although courts must liberally construe complaints brought by
pro se plaintiffs, this Court finds that Allen’s Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 for
violation of the equal protection clause. “A ‘class of one’ Equal Protection claim requires a
plaintiff to show that he ‘was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated . . . and
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that there was no rational basis for such treatment.” Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F.App’x 554, 563
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Allen’s Equal Protection claim fails because he does not allege unequal treatment, i.e., that he was
intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners. Nor does he assert facts
showing that there was no rational basis for the denial of his request for records. See Carson, 488
F. App’x at 563; Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 337-38. This Court will dismiss the Complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B.

Amendment
A District Court generally grants leave to correct the deficiencies in a complaint by

amendment. See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). However, in this case, the Court will not grant
Allen leave to amend the Complaint because amendment would be futile. Nothing in the
Complaint and attachments suggests that Defendants treated his request for information differently
from a request made by any other prisoner seeking similar information or that there was no rational
basis for denying Allen’s request. In fact, the attachments to the Complaint indicate that there
was a rational basis for denying the request, i.e., Defendants denied Plaintiff’s request in
accordance with the statutory exemption in the Open Public Records Act for “criminal
investigatory records,” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A:1.1, and the public policy of the Act to “safeguard
from public access a citizen’s personal information with which it has been entrusted when
disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 47:1A-1. (ECF No. 1 at 18-19, 29.) Moreover, in light of the fact that the New Jersey
courts denied Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking to compel Defendants to disclose the same information he
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seeks in the instant case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may prohibit this Court’s granting Plaintiff
the relief he seeks in this action, i.e., ordering Defendants to disclose this same information to
Plaintiff.5
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, this Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.

DATED:

April 15, 2014

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a district court from exercising jurisdiction over “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
There are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: “(1) the
federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complain[s] of injuries caused by [the]
state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4)
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” B.S. v.
Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 260 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Great Western Mining & Mineral
Company v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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