HARRIS v. BENNETT et al

Filing 13

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 6/10/2015. (eaj)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GOLDA D. HARRIS.
Civil Action No. 13-6674 (PGS)
Plaintiff.
v.

:

OPINION

ERIC BENNETT, et al.,
Defendants.

SHERIDAN, District Judge:
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Golda Harris (“Plaintiff’) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint on October 21, 2014 for failure to state a claim.
(ECF Nos. 7, 8.) Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10.) The Court must
now review the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to

determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice in its entirety.
1. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983, against Defendants

Eric Bennett, Plaintiffs former landlord; the Plainfield Housing Authority; the New Jersey
Department of Corrections

—

l)ivision of Operations; Valerie Arthur; Cathy Morgan; and William

Hauck. The following factual allegations are taken from the Amended Complaint and are accepted
for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiffs

2
1
allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bennett, her prior landlord, violated the “HAP contract”
between Plaintift Plainfield Housing Authority and himself, by taking various actions while she
was living in his apartment building. (Am. Compl.

¶ 5(a).) Plaintiff alleges that this is a violation

of federal regulations and the Federal housing and Urban Development Act of 1937.
Plaintiff specifically states that she is not raising a

(Id.)

§ 1983 claim against Defendant Bennett or the

Plainfield Housing Authority. (id.)
Against New Jersey Department of Corrections, Plaintiff alleges that this defendant “failed
to higher [sicj qualified staft and train and supervise its staff and prison officials in the rules and/or
regulations to prevent violations listed in the complaint.” (Id. at ¶5(b).) Plaintiff also identifies
2
many occasions where Defendants Valerie Arthur, Cathy Morgan and William Hauck denied him
copies, legal documents and access to the prison’s paralegals.

(Id.)

Plaintiff is seeking an

injunction to return her cane; removal from administrative segregation; an injunction to provide her
with paralegal assistance three times per week; back pay for her time spent in administrative
segregation; an injunction requiring Plainfield Housing Authority to pay provider bills; and

The Court notes that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and accompanying 210 pages of exhibits,
contain many facts, written in a stream-of-consciousness manner, many of which are conclusory
and seemingly unrelated to the crux of Plaintiffs claims. The Court identifies and addresses
Plaintiff’s claims to the best of its ability. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs conditions-ofconfinement and denial of medical care allegations are essentially a re-statement of the claims
already alleged in Civil Action No. 13-3806 and 14-3869, respectively, and therefore will not be
discussed in this case.
2

The New Jersey Department of Corrections is not a “person” under § 1983. See Ewing v.
C’umberlandCnty., No. 09—5432, 2015 WL 1384374, at *25 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2015); Brown v, New
Jersey Dep’! of Corr., No. 12—5069, 2014 WL 4978579, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2014); Grubow v. S.
Stale Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538—39 (D.N.J. 1989) (state department of corrections and
state prison facilities are not “persons” under § 1983). Therefore, the Department of Corrections
will be dismissed from this action with prejudice.

3
monetary damages. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,

§

801-8 10, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions
in which a prisoner is proceeding informa pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C.

§

§

§

1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress

1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect

I 997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief This action is subject to
sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and

§

1915A because Plaintiff

is proceeding as an indigent and is a prisoner.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcrofl v. Iqbal. ‘a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a forrnulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Be//Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To
survive sna sponte screening for failure to state a claim the complaint must allege “sufficient
,
3
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UFMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

‘The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1 91 5(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
§
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir.
2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d
Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

4
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally

construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.. 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
2.

Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of his

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress
Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
1. Joinder
This Amended Complaint contains unrelated allegations against disparate defendants that
are not properly joined in a single complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20. A

district court may raise the issue of improper joinder sua 5ponte. See (‘hen v. Shun Qiao Zhang,
Civil No. 10—6255, 2011 WL 612727. at *2 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 10, 2011) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.21;

5
Schulman v. IP. Morgan mv. Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d 799. 804 (3d Cir. 1994); Braverman v. Kaskey,
P.C. v. Toidze, Civil No. 09—3470, 2010 WL 4452390, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 4,2010)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) states that ‘{a] party asserting a claim

...

may join, as

independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” In a multidefendant case like this one, however, the propriety of joinder is most directly controlled by the
Rule 20 limits on joinder of defendants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) states:
Persons

...

may be joined in one action as defendants if:

(A) Any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or occurrences; and
(B) Any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

See also McDaniel v. Lanigan, Civil No. 12—3834, 2012 WL 5880371,

at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (claims by prisoners are not exempt from Rules 18 and 20) (citing

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)). Rule 20’s requirements are to he liberally
construed in the interest of convenience and judicial economy. See Pa/at/mo v. Newsoine, Civil
No. 12—2021,2012 WL 3315571, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2012) (citing Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252,
1253 (11th Cir. 2002)). But this application, however liberal, “is not a license to join unrelated
claims and defendants in one lawsuit.” Id. (citing Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App’x 436 (3d
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); George, 507 F.3d 605; Cough/in v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348(9th Cir. 1997)).
“Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a
single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out
of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all.” 7
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure

§

1655 (3d ed.). Then, and only then,

6
“Rule 18 may be invoked independently to permit plaintiff to join as many other claims as plaintiff
has against the multiple defendants or any combination of them, even though the additional claims
do not involve common questions of law or fact and arise from unrelated transactions.” Id.

In

case of misjoinder, “a court may not simply dismiss a suit altogether. Instead, the court has two
remedial options: (I) misjoined parties may be dropped ‘on such terms as are just’; or (2) any claims
against misjoined parties ‘may be severed and proceeded with separately.” DirecTV Inc. v. Leto,
467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 21).
Here, Plaintiff clearly states two completely separate and distinct claims against two sets of
separate and distinct sets of defendants: (1) claims against Eric Bennett and the Plainfield Housing
Authority regarding Plaintiffs previous apartment; and (2) claims against the Department of
4
Corrections defendants regarding Plaintiffs right to access the courts. It is clear that there is no

right to relief asserted against these two sets of defendants arising out of the same transaction or
occurrences and no question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in this action. As
a result, the Court will sever the two sets of claims. Because this case has been identified as one
pursuant to

§ 1983, the Court will consider Plaintiffs access to the courts claim in this action. The

Court will instruct the Clerk to open a new civil action where Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint alleging only the claims against Defendants Bennett and the Plainfield Housing

Plaintiff also generally alludes to Defendants failing to respond to grievances. However, it is
well established that “[p]risoners are not constitutionally entitled to a grievance procedure and the
state creation of such a procedure does not create any federal constitutional rights.” Wilson v.
Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D.Pa. 1997). Moreover, a failure to respond to an inmate’s
grievances “does not violate his rights to due process and is not actionable.” Stringer v. Bureau of
Prisons, 145 F. App’x 751, 753 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430
((7th Cir. 1996)).

7
Authority.

2.

Access to the Courts
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee inmates a right of access to the courts.

See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries
or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346 (quoting Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (internal quotations omitted)). This right however, is not
unlimited. “The tools [Bounds] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their
confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and
perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.
Additionally, an inmate must show that the lack of meaningful access to the courts caused
him past or imminent “actual injury”. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350—52; Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d
175, 177—78 (3d Cir. 1997). To do this, he must identify an “arguable,” “nonfrivolous” underlying
cause of action, either anticipated or lost, and show that the prison’s deficient program frustrated
his efforts to litigate that action. Lewis, at 35 1—53; Christopher v. flarbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415
(2002). To satisfy the “actual injury” requirement,
[An inmate] might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared
was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement
which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance
facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably
actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was
so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable to
file even a complaint.

8
Lewis, 518 U.s. at 351.

On February 21, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied pens, paper and envelopes”
which led to her inability to file a reply brief and then a dismissal of state court case no. UNN-L
3960-10. (Am. Compl.

¶

5.12.) However, Plaintiff does not provide any information as to the

nature of that case and it is unclear whether she was attempting to attack her sentence or challenging
a condition of her confinement, which are the only types of cases for which Bounds requires access
to the courts. Moreover, the Court notes that according to the exhibits filed with the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff filed a grievance on February 21, 2013, indicating that she did in fact have a
writing implement and paper. (Am. Compl. 23, ECF No. 10-1.) Plaintiff’s claim for this incident
is dismissed without prejudice.
On February 25, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied “large envelopes” to mail out
reply briefs in Civil Action No. 11-1321 (PGS) and state court case no. UNN-L-3960-10, resulting
in both actions being dismissed. (Am. Compl.

¶ 5.12.) However, it is unclear how the denial of

“large envelopes” would have affected Plaintiff’s ability to access the courts.

Presumably,

Plaintiff could have submitted her reply briefs in a regular size envelope or otherwise contacted the
court with a letter in a regular size envelope to seek an extension of time to file her briefs. Further,
as stated above, Plaintiff does not provide any information as to the nature of state court case no.
UNN-L-3960-10 and it is unclear whether she was attempting to attack her sentence or challenging
a condition of her confinement. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim based on
this incident is dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 21, 2013, she was denied paralegal assistance by C. Morgan.
(Am. Compl.

¶ 5.15.) Based on the grievances provided in her exhibits, it appears that Plaintiff

9
was seeking paralegal assistance related to a state court case she filed against the Plainfield Housing
Authority and Bank of America. (Am. Comp)., Ex. F.) However, neither of those parties would
be defendants in a case where Plaintiff is challenging her criminal conviction or conditions of
confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Therefore, this claim is dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that C. Morgan denied “internet research for legal reference material not in
the prison library” on June 28, 2013. (Am. Compi.

¶ 5.15.)

However, Plaintiff does not provide

any information as to the nature of the case for which she sought internet access and it is unclear
whether she was attempting to attack her sentence or challenging a condition of her confinement.
Moreover, she does not allege any “actual injury” which occurred as a result of her denial of internet
access. Plaintiffs claim for this incident is dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 26, 2013, she was denied copy services by C. Morgan. (Am.
Compi. 5.16.) However, she does not state with any specificity exactly which cases were affected
and whether those cases are attacking her sentence or challenging a condition of her confinement.
Finally, she fails to allege any “actual injury.” Plaintiffs access to the courts claim based on this
incident is dismissed without prejudice.
On August 15, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied a request for her account
statement, which resulted in “delay” and “dismissals of the circuit and appellate court appeals.”
(Am. Compi.

¶ 5.16.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in state case number A-1704-13, her case

was delayed due to Defendants’ refusal to provide an account statement. (Am. Compl.

¶ 5.18.)

She also alleges that Civil Action No. 13-3879 (CCC) was delayed due to an insufficient account
statement. However, she fails to allege any “actual injury” since it appears that the cases which
were ‘dismissed” were ultimately reinstated, or were only delayed, not dismissed. See Harris v.
Bennett. Civil Action No. 13-3879 (CCC). Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim based on this

10
incident is dismissed without prejudice.
On August21. 2013, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied access to paralegals while she was
on detention status. (Am. Compl.

ij

5.17.) Again, Plaintiff does not state with any specificity

exactly which cases were affected and whether those cases are attacking her sentence or challenging
a condition of her confinement. Further, she also fails to allege any “actual injury.” Plaintiff’s
access to the courts claim based on this incident is dismissed without prejudice.
On February 11, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied copies service for a brief which
she filed with the Third Circuit, so she was unable to serve opposing counsel. (Am. Compi.

¶

5.19.) Plaintiff filed her only copy with the Third Circuit. Flere, Plaintiff has failed to allege any

“actual injury.” The Court of Appeals received the brief and Plaintiff does not allege that the
appeal was dismissed for failure to provide service on defendants. This claim will be dismissed
without prejudice.
On February 11, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that she was only receiving one visit per week for
law library services. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.20.) However, she again does not state with any specificity
exactly which cases were affected and whether those cases are attacking her sentence or challenging
a condition of her confinement. Further, she also fails to allege any “actual injury.” Plaintifis
access to the courts claim based on this incident is dismissed without prejudice.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will sever the two sets of claims contained in the
Amended Complaint into two separate actions.
pursuant to

Because this case has been identified as one

§ 1983, the Court considers Plaintiffs access to the courts claim in this action. The

Court will instruct the Clerk to open a new civil action where Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint alleging only the claims against Defendants Bennett and the Plainfield Flousing

11
Authority.
With regard to the access to the courts claims, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed in
its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §sS
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and t9l5A(b)(l). However, because it is conceivable that Plaintiff may be able
to supplement her pleading with facts sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted herein, the Court
5
will grant Plaintiff leave to move to re-open this case and to file a second amended complaint.
The Court notes that Plaintiff should address çpy her access to the courts claims in any second
amended complaint filed in this action. An appropriate order follows.
Dated:

Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer
performs any function in the case and ‘cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended
[complaintj, unless the relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new [complaintj.’ 6
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted).
An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but the
identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid
confusion, the safer course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.