DAVIS v. DEFALCO

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 1/26/2015. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LESLIE A. DAVIS,
Civil Action No. 14-1105 (MAS) (DEA)

Plaintiff,

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL DEFALCO,
Defendant.

SHIPP, District .Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Leslie A. Davis's ("Davis") motion for
default judgment against Defendant Michael DeFalco ("DeFalco"). 1 Davis requests judgment
against Defalco for presumed damages in the amount of $500 plus taxed costs and an injunction
permanently enjoining Defalco from publishing defamatory material.
I.

Background

Davis asserts that DeFalco published per se slanderous and libelous statements and
remarks about her on various websites. (Compl.

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1, ECF No. 1.) Davis works as a controller

for Jonsilver Auto Sales, LLC d/b/a Paramus Nissan ("Paramus Nissan"). (Id.

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2.) DeFalco

worked as a sales representative at Paramus Nissan from May 20, 2013, until he was let go on
December 3, 2013. (Id.

CJ[

3.) Davis alleges that, after his termination, DeFalco posted false,

disgusting, and defamatory statements on Facebook attacking her personal and professional
reputation. (Id.
1

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9.) Davis also claims these statements constitute tortious interference with her

Davis specifies Rule 55(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis for her
motion. The Court construes Davis's motion as one made pursuant to Rule 55(b) generally and
decides the motion pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2).

prospective economic advantage. (Id.

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20.) DeFalco has not answered or otherwise appeared in

this matter. Davis now moves for default judgment against DeFalco. Davis requests a default
judgment in her favor for $500 plus taxed costs and an injunction permanently enjoining
DeFalco from publishing defamatory material.
II.

Discussion

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the entry of default judgment
against a party that has not appeared or defended claims asserted against it. A court may "enter a
default judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive
pleading."

Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing

Anchorage Assoc. v. V.l. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990)). "[T]he entry
of a default judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the district court," Hritz v. Woma

Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted), but "default judgments
are generally disfavored in our circuit." Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir.
2008).
Prior to granting judgment or providing relief of any kind, the Court must first determine
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. "[l]t is indeed axiomatic that, prior to
entering default judgment, the Court must ensure that it has proper jurisdiction over the
action .... " Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat'l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596
F. Supp. 2d 842, 849 (D.N.J. 2008). Davis brought suit in federal court claiming diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of
citizenship between plaintiff and defendant and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.

Id. Because Davis is a citizen of New York and DeFalco is a citizen of New Jersey, the Court
finds complete diversity of citizenship between Davis and DeFalco. However, as Davis's motion

limits damages to $500 plus taxed costs, the Court must analyze whether or not Davis satisfies
the requisite amount in controversy.
Generally, damages alleged in a complaint over $75,000 satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the
jurisdictional amount. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) (citing St. Paul

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)).

Accordingly, the party

asserting jurisdiction carries the burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper throughout the
litigation. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
Davis concedes, in her motion, that only presumed damages in the amount of $500 are
available based on the claims presented, and Plaintiff does not request compensatory damages in
her complaint.

(Pl.'s Br. 4, ECF No. 7-3; Compl. fl 18, 22.) Claims based on presumed

damages are limited to a nominal amount. Nu Wave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., Inc., 432
N.J. Super. 539, 558 (2013).

Davis's complaint also seeks punitive damages in excess of

$75,000. (Compl. fl 18, 22.) A claim for punitive damages is not included when calculating the
amount in controversy if punitive damages are not available as a matter of law.

Gray v.

Occidental Life Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 935, 936 (3d Cir. 1968). The availability of punitive damages
is a matter of state law, "which a federal court must resolve by reference to the law as set forth
by the state's legislature." Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

Under New Jersey law, "punitive

damages may be awarded only if compensatory damages have been awarded ...." N.J.S.A.
2A:15-5.13. Davis admits "[c]ompensatory damages are not available to the [P]laintiff since she
has not produced any evidence of monetary or other losses t[o] her reputation." (Pl.'s Br. 4.)
Likewise, Davis concedes punitive damages are not available.

(Id.)

Therefore, Davis's

admission satisfies the Court that, to a legal certainty, the requisite amount in controversy is not
recoverable, 2 and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
The Court concludes Davis's claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount required by
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Accordingly, without considering the motion for default judgment, the
Court must dismiss Davis's complaint for want of jurisdiction.

III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Davis's complaint against DeFalco for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court denies as moot Davis's motion for default
judgment.

·1.--#

Dated: January-±~ 2015

2

MICHAEL A. SHI~ I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In diversity suits seeking injunctive relief, courts determine the amount in controversy by the

value of the rights which the plaintiff seeks to protect. Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. Tarbuck,
62 F.3d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the value of Davis's right to enjoin DeFlaco from
publishing defamatory material is speculative, and such speculation is insufficient to establish
the amount in controversy requirement. Leonard Parness Trucking Corp. v. Omnipoint
Commc'n, Inc., No. 13-4148, 2013 WL 6002900, at *6 (D.N.J. 2013); see also Columbia Gas
Trans. Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d at 543.