FIELDS v. PLOUSIS et al
Filing
10
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Anne E. Thompson on 12/18/2015. (eaj)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARK FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-1139 (AET-LHG)
v.
JAMES T. PLOUSIS, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
RECEIVED
APPEARANCES:
Mark Fields, Plainti£f Pro Se
#544482/986329B
New Jersey State Prison
PO Box 861
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
DEC 2 1 2015
AT 8:30------~-M
WILLIAM T. WALSH
CLERK
THOMPSON, District Judge:
I .
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Mark Fields'
("Plaintiff"),
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Docket
Entry 1). Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at
New Jersey State Prison ("NJSP"), Trenton, New Jersey. By Order
dated November 16, 2015, this Court granted Plaintiff's
application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a).
(Docket Entry 8). At this time, the Court must review
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) (2) and 1915A to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court concludes that the complaint shall be dismissed for
seeking relief from immune defendants and for failure to state a
c 1 aim . 2 8 U . S . C . § 1915 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( ii ) - ( iii ) .
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this complaint and application for pro bone
counsel on February 20, 2014.
(Docket Entry 1). By Order dated
March 3, 2014, the Honorable Joel A. Pisano, D.N.J.,
administratively terminated the complaint for failure to comply
with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "Act"), which
establishes certain financial requirements for prisoners who are
attempting to bring a civil action in forma pauperis.
(Docket
Entry 2). The Order further instructed Plaintiff to submit a new
application to proceed in forma pauperis as the application
submitted with the complaint did not contain a certified copy of
Plaintiff's inmate trust fund account statement for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2).
(Docket Entry 2).
After more than a year elapsed with no communication from
Plaintiff, Plaintiff submitted a letter on August 28, 2015
captioned "Caution:
(Friendly Warning)" asking the Clerk of the
Court to "direct" the District Court to consolidate his civil
2
action with his pending habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, Fields v. New Jersey State Parole Board, No. 13-793 (AET).
(Docket Entry 3). This matter was reopened for judicial review
and was subsequently reassigned to this Court on September 1,
2015.
(Docket Entry 4).
By Order dated September 30, 2015, this Court
administratively terminated the complaint for failure to comply
with Judge Pisano's March 2014 Order.
(Docket Entry 5).
Plaintiff submitted a request to reopen the case, as well as an
amended application to proceed in forma pauperis, on November 6,
2015.
(Docket Entries 6 and 7). The Court granted his
application to proceed in forma pauperis on November 16, 2015.
(Docket Entry 8).
B. Factual Background
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against
Defendants James T. Plousis, Norman Robertson, John Doe, and
James MacGowan.
(Docket Entry 1 at 2). Mr. Plousis is the
Chairman of the New Jersey State Parole Board ("Parole Board"),
and the other defendants are Parole Board officers. The
following factual allegations are taken from the complaint and
are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has
made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff's allegations.
In 2006, Plaintiff was sentenced to a nine-year custodial
term, with a period of parole ineligibility expiring on January
3
9, 2011.
(Docket Entry 1
~
1). As part of his sentence,
Plaintiff would be required to complete a five-year mandatory
period of supervision upon his release.
(Docket Entry 1
~
1).
Plaintiff began this supervisory period on January 4, 2011,
however, he "refused to participate in mandatory supervision,
refused to acknowledge and refused to abide by the conditions of
supervision governing his release . . . . "
(Docket Entry 1
~
4).
Plaintiff was arrested seven months later on allegations he
violated the terms of his supervised release by using a
controlled dangerous substance, specifically heroin.
Entry 1
~
(Docket
5). After two hearings in front of a Parole Board
Hearing Officer, Carla Shabazz, Plaintiff's supervised release
was revoked on November 2, 2011. 1 (Docket Entry 1
~~
6-10). The
Parole Board assigned Plaintiff a twelve-month future
eligibility term ("FET").
(Docket Entry 1
~
10).
Defendant MacGowan conducted an initial parole
consideration hearing on June 1, 2012. As part of that hearing,
he reviewed Plaintiff's pre-parole reports and the reports and
recommendations of Officer
Shabazz~
(Docket Entry 1
~
12; Docket
Entry 1-2 at 8-10, 22.-25). He recommended Plaintiff be referred
to a Parole Board panel.
(Docket Entry 1-2 at 25). Plaintiff
1
The circumstances of this arrest and subsequent revocation of
Plaintiff's supervised release are the subject of another§ 1983
complaint, Fields v. Venable, No. 13-7134 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 22,
2013).
4
alleges Defendant MacGowan "admitted confidential material that
Plaintiff has to admit to the direct testimony of the ·Parole
Officer testimony based upon the Hearing 9/30/2011; and admit to
having a drug problem .
before Parole Authorities eligible
Pla~ntiff
asserts
Defendant MacGowan relied on inaccurate information,
(Docket
for release [sic]." (Docket Entry 1 ! 12).
Entry 1 ! 14), and that he was partially responsible for the
delay in Plaintiff's hearing,
(Docket Entry 1 ! 15).
According to the complaint, Defendants Robertson and Doe
denied Plaintiff parole and established an eighteenth-month FET
on July 5, 2012, based on Defendant MacGowan's inaccurate
information and the Hearing Officer's reports, none of which
supported the revocation of his supervised release.
(Docket
Entry 1 !! 17, 19; Docket Entry 1-2 at 26-27). Plaintiff alleges
Defendants Robertson and Doe did not conduct a timely hearing
before his eligibility date of August 2, 2012.
(Docket Entry 1 !
12). He further alleges Defendant Robertson erred by not
recusing himself from the review of Plaintiff's case as he had
personal knowledge of the underlying facts and was biased
against Plaintiff,
(Docket Entry 1 !
16), and that these
defendants were likely responsible for the delay in his hearing.
(Docket Entry 1 ! 15) .
Plaintiff appealed these decisions, and on February 27,
2013, Defendant Plousis issued the final agency decision
5
affirming the denial of parole.
(Docket Entry 1 !
20; Docket
Entry 1-2 at 28-30). Plaintiff asserts this decision was
motivated by the desire to cover-up the violations by the other
defendants.
(Docket Entry 1 ! 20). He further alleges Defendant
Plousis increased the FET to twenty months from eighteen months.
(Docket Entry 1 ! 20; Docket Entry 1-2 at 30). He states that he
was entitled to a hearing in February 2014, but it never
occurred.
(Docket Entry 1 ! 20).
Plaintiff alleges the Defendants' actions denied him of his
rights under the First, Eighth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
(Docket Entry 1 at 34). He asks for relief in the
form of an order declaring the Defendants' actions to be
unconstitutional.
(Docket Entry 1 at 35). He also requests
$5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive
damages for the violation of his constitutional rights, and
damages for mental and emotional suffering.
(Docket Entry 1 at
35-36) .
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
§§ 801-810,
104~134,
110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B), seeks redress against a governmental
6
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.
§
1997e.
The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e) (2) (b) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
proceeding in forma pauperis and is seeking redress from a
governmental entity or employee.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
(2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.'"
55 6 U.S. 662, 67 8 ( 200 9)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim, 2 the complaint must
2
"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) ." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x
7
allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fai.r Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim."
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) .
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who,
under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230,
232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Ci.r. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
8
§
1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Paro1e Officer Immunity
The Third Circuit has ruled that "probation and parole
officers are entitled to absolute immunity when they are engaged
in adjudicatory duties," such as serving as a hearing examiner
or making a decision to revoke or deny parole. Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1989). Parole officers
may only assert qualified immunity for actions taken in their
executive and administrative capacities. Id. at 776.
Here, Plaintiff argues he was denied a timely hearing for
release on parole by Defendants MacGowan, Doe, and Robertson,
that Defendant MacGowan's referral to a Board Panel was
improper, and that Doe's and Robertson's denial of parole and
establishment of an
eighteen-mont~
9
FET was not supported by the
evidence. He alleges Defendant Plousis improperly denied his
appeal and extended his FET.
Defendants Doe and Robertson are entitled to absolute
immunity for their decision to deny Plaintiff release on parole
as this is an adjudicatory act and not an executive,
administrative, or investigative function.
Ibid.; Keller v. Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 240 F. App'x 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding parole officer entitled to absolute immunity for taking
part in deciding whether inmate should be granted parole).
Likewise, Defendant Plousis acted in his adjudicatory capacity
when he denied Plaintiff's appeal of the Board's decision. He is
entitled to absolute immunity for this act. Establishing a FET
is analogous to sentencing and is thus more of a "judicial" act
than an administrative or executive act. Defendant Plousis is
also entitled to absolute immunity for this act.
Defendants MacGowan, Doe, and Robertson appear to have
acted in their administrative functions when they scheduled
Plaintiff's hearing and referred the case to the Board Panel,
however:. See Williams v. Consovoy, 333 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 n.2
(D.N.J. 2004), aff'd, 453 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2006). They are not
entitled to absolute immunity for those actions, but they may
raise qualified immunity as a defense. Wilson,
878 F.2d at 776.
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Doe and Robertson for
denying Plaintiff parole artd his claims against Defendant
10
Plousis are dismissed with prejudice. His claims against
Defendants MacGowan, Doe, and Robertson relating to the
scheduling of Plaintiff's hearing and referring the case to the
Panel are dismissed without prejudice as they are presently
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
B. Heck . v ~ HUD!Phrey
Plaintiff's complaint may not proceed at this time as it is
barred by Heck and its progeny. In Heck, the Supreme Court held
that before a § 1983 plaintiff may "recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid," he must first "prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus[.]" Id. at 486-87; see also Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty.,
804 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2015)
("'[A] prior criminal case must
have been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of
the accused in order to satisfy the favorable termination
element.'" (alteration in original)
(quoting Kassler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009))).
The Third Circuit extended Heck to suits alleging unlawful
revocation of parole because "success on the § 1983 claim would
11
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the Parole Board's
decision." Williams v. Consovoy,
453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.
2006) . Plaintiff alleges violations of the First, Eighth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
(Docket Entry 1 at 34);
however, all of Plaintiff's arguments are essentially challenges
to the propriety of the Defendants' decisions to deny him
release on parole and the procedures by which they arrived at
their decisions. Although he asserts he is not seeking release
from custody, he does ask the Court to issue a declaratory order
stating that his continued custody is unconstitutional.
Entry 1
~
(Docket
20). Judgment in favor of Plaintiff under any theory
would therefore necessarily imply the invalidity of the Board's
decisions. Plaintiff's challenges to the Parole Board's denial
of parole and the procedures it used to arrive at its
determination are therefore barred unless and until its decision
is rendered invalid. See Butler v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
613 F. App'x 119, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2015)
(challenge to timeliness
of hearing Heck-barred if Plaintiff asserts subsequent custody
imposed by Board must be invalid) .
Plaintiff has not submitted any facts suggesting that the
Board's decisions have been overturned; indeed the record
indicates the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
dismissed his appeal.
(Docket Entry 1-2 at 33). This indicates
12
that his "convictions" have not been invalidated, therefore Heck
and Williams apply.
As Plaintiff's
§
1983 matter cannot proceed at this time,
the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff shall not be given leave to amend his complaint at
this time as Plaintiff is also presently pursuing habeas relief
from the Parole Board's decision in this Court. Fields v. Warden
N.J. State Prison, No. 15-8471 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 7, 2015);
Fields v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. 13-7693 (D.N.J. filed Dec.
19, 2013) . 3 In the event the Court grants the requested habeas
relief, Plaintiff will have two years from that date to file a
new § 1983 complaint. 4 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90
(1994).
("[A]
§
1983 cause of action for damages attributable to
an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not
ac~rue
until
the conviction or sentence has been invalidated."); Vickers v.
Childs, 530 F. App'x 104, 105 (3d Cir. 2013)
("If a plaintiff
seeks damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or
sentence, a
§
1983 cause of action does not accrue until the
conviction or sentence has been invalidated or terminated
favorably, whether by direct appeal or some other means.").
By Order dated December 7, 2015, this Court severed Plaintiff's
habeas petition into two proceedings. Fields, No. 13-7693
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2015) (order).
4 Plaintiff may not raise claims in his new complaint that this
Court has dismissed with prejudice.
3
13
C. Motion to Conso1idate
Plaintiff asks this Court to consolidate this civil matter
with his pending habeas petitions, Fields v. Warden N.J. State
Prison, No. 15-8471 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 7, 2015), and Fields v.
N.J. State Parole Ed., No. 13-7693 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 19, 2013).
(Docket Entry 3). As this complaint is being dismissed, and
Plaintiff cannot pursue § 1983 relief unless and until his
habeas petition has been granted or the Parole Board's decision
has been invalid by some other means, the Court finds that it is
not in the interests of justice to consolidate the cases.
Petitioner's motion to consolidate is denied.
D.
Motion~for
tbe Appointment of Counse1
Plaintiff has also asked this Court to appoint him pro bona
counsel.
(Docket Entry 1-4) . As the complaint is being
dismissed, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's claims against
Defendants Doe and Robertson for denying Plaintiff parole are
dismissed with prejudice. His claims against Defendant Plousis
are dismissed with prejudice in their entirety. His claims
against Defendants MacGowan, Doe, and Robertson relating to the
scheduling of Plaintiff's hearing and referring the case to the
Panel are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted at this time, 28 U.S.C. §
14
1915(e) (2) (B) (ii). Plaintiff's motion to consolidate and for the
appointment of counsel are denied. An appropriate order follows.
ANNE E. T
U.S. District Judge
Date
15
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