STEWARD v. A.A. BAILS BONDSMAN AGENCY
Filing
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OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 9/25/2014. (kas, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HENRY L. STEWARD,
Civil Action No. 14-1214 (MAS)
Plaintiffs,
v.
OPINION
A.A. BAILS BONDSMAN AGENCY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
HENRY L. STEWARD, Plaintiffpro se
# 512292
Mercer County Correction Center
P.O. Box 8068
Trenton, New Jersey 08650
SHIPP, District Judge
Plaintiff, Henry L. Steward, a state inmate confined at the Mercer County Correction
Center in Trenton, New Jersey, at the time he filed this Complaint, seeks to bring this action in
forma pauperis. This action was administratively terminated by Order entered on March 5,
2014, because Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") was deficient. (ECF
No.2.) Plaintiffthereafter submitted an IFP application on March 19, 2014, asking that his case
be re-opened. (ECF No. 3.) By Order entered on May 30, 2014, this case was re-opened for
review ofPlaintiffs IFP application and for screening of the Complaint. (ECF No.4.) Based on
Plaintiffs affidavit of indigence and prison account statement, the Court will grant Plaintiffs
IFP application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint accordingly.
Further, having screened the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief, the Court concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. As discussed below, the sole named Defendant is not a state actor, and
the allegations of the Complaint do not support any claim that Defendant was acting under color
of state law, or otherwise in concert with State officials, such that Defendant's actions could be
deemed attributable to State action, a necessary element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Henry L. Steward ("Plaintiff'), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against Defendant A.A. Bails Bondsman Agency, alleging that Defendant has refused to release
Plaintiff on bail in breach of contract. (ECF No. 1,
Complaint,~~
1a, 4b.) The complaint alleges
that A.A. Bails Bondsman Agency, a private bail bond agency, provided Plaintiff with a bail
bond after Plaintiffs arrest and original charge on June 12, 2011. In August 2011, Plaintiff was
incarcerated for ten months in federal custody for violation of probation, but Plaintiff and his
wife continued to make payments to the bail bond agency. When Plaintiff was released from
federal custody, he was transferred to state custody due to a warrant for missing a court date.
Plaintiff was released on July 1, 2012. Plaintiff claims that after his release, he obtained a job
and made every payment on his bail bond. However, in March 2013, Plaintiff and his wife
initiated divorce proceedings, and in June 2013, Plaintiff was arrested because Plaintiffs wife
reported the family car stolen. The charges were dismissed but Plaintiff was transferred to
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Mercer County Correction Center because Plaintiff had failed to appear for a July 22, 2013 court
date. Those charges were later dismissed on September 6, 2013. (!d., ,-r 6.)
Plaintiff complains that the Judge reinstated his bail, but Defendant A.A. Bails Bondsman
Agency declined to provide a bail bond because Plaintiff had missed too many payments. (!d.)
Plaintiff seeks to be released on bail so that he can attend marriage counseling. He claims that
Defendant A.A. Bails Bondsman Agency's refusal to issue a bond for his release is hindering
that process and is causing his wrongful confinement and mental anguish. (!d., ,-r 7.)
II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a
governmental employee or entity. Specifically, the PLRA directs the district court to screen the
complaint for cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and§ 1915A.
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal of a complaint that fails
to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the proposition that "[a] pleading that offers 'labels
and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,"'
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to
prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege "sufficient factual matter" to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
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2009)(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). See also Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)
("The touchstone of the pleading standard is plausibility .... "[A]llegations that are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth; ... [a court should] "look for well-pled
factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then 'determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.'") (citations omitted). In short, "[a] complaint must do more than allege
the plaintiffs entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts."
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). Thus, while pro se pleadings are
liberally construed, Higgs v. Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 20011), "prose litigants still
must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, courts must be cognizant
that the Iqbal standard "is not akin to a probability requirement." Covington v. International
Association of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679).
III. DISCUSSION
To recover against a defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant acted under "color of state law" to deprive him of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws. 1 See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011); Groman v.
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Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
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Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). "The color of state law element is a
threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law." Id. at
63 8 (citation omitted). The color of state law element in a section 1983 action requires that "the
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of [the plaintiffs rights] be fairly attributable to the
State." Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). For the conduct to be "fairly
attributable" to the State: (1) the deprivation must be caused by (a) the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State, or (b) by a rule of conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom
the State is responsible; and (2) the defendant must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor, either because the person (a) is a state official, (b) acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or (c) performed conduct otherwise chargeable to the State.
See id. at 936-39.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated several instances where a private party's
actions may be fairly attributed to state action, explaining that such attribution accrues if: (1) a
private defendant's wrongful activity results from the State's coercive power; (2) the State
provides significant encouragement to a private defendant's wrongful activity; (3) a private
defendant engages in a wrongful conduct while acting jointly with the State or its agents; (4) a
nominally private defendant is effectively controlled by the State during the defendant's
wrongful activity; (5) a private defendant has been delegated a public function by the State and
used that delegation to engage in the wrongful activity; or (6) the government manages or
controls a private defendant in connection with the defendant's wrongful activity.
See
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass 'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001).
Generally, courts have held that bail bondsmen are not state actors, noting that the acts of
receiving bail money and applying it to the bond of a prisoner are not traditional government
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actions but rather, those of a private citizen or corporation. See, e.g., Murillo v. Liz and Stan Bail
Bonds, Inc., 138 F. App'x 868, 869 (8th Cir. 2005); Dean v. 0/ibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (8th
Cir. 1997); Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1996); Lafayette v.
Prince, Civil No. 5:12cv122, 2013 WL 2637191, *2 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 11, 2013); Erwin v. Byrd's
Bail Bonding, Civil No. 2:10-1948, 2010 WL 3463881, *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2010); Jacobs v. A
Robert Depersia Agency, Civil No. 09-180 (JBS), 2009 WL 799944, *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2009).
See also Green v. Abony Bail Bond, 316 F. Supp.2d 1254, 1260-61 (M.D.Fla. 2004) (bail
bondsmen are not state actors; collecting cases). Moreover, the licensing and regulation of bail
bondsmen do not transform bail bondsmen into state actors. Murillo, supra (citing Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) and Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir. 1990)).
However, bail bondsmen have been held to be state actors in certain discrete factual contexts,
such as when making arrests with the assistance of law enforcement officers or acting in concert
with police action. See Lopez v. Zouvelos, Civil No. 13-CV-6474 (MKB), 2014 WL 843219, *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2014).
In this case, the A.A. Bails Bondsman Agency did not act jointly or in concert with
Government officials in any way that would constitute state action. Defendant simply provided
Plaintiff with an initial bail bond. Thus, Defendant cannot be qualified as a state actor because
Defendant's decision to give a bond neither resulted from the State's exercise of "coercive
power," nor accrued with the State's significant encouragement, willful participation, control,
delegation or any other forms of State activity. Since Defendant's action at issue cannot be fairly
attributed to the State, Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant fail to meet the threshold "color
of law" requirement, and the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state claim upon which
relief may be granted.
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Moreover, while this Court is mindful of the Third Circuit's teaching that a pro se civil
complaint, generally, should not be dismissed without allowing the litigant an opportunity to
amend, cf Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2000), a dismissal with prejudice appears
appropriate in the instant matter. Plaintiff named A.A. Bails Bondsman Agency as the sole
Defendant in this action, and the allegations against Defendant unambiguously indicate that, in
this action, Plaintiff intended to challenge solely the activity of Defendant as a private bail bond
agency in refusing to issue bail money for Plaintiff.
Indeed, Plaintiff alleges breach of contract
as part of his claim against Defendant. Therefore, because Defendant's status as a private bail
bond agency cannot be changed by Plaintiffs re-pleading, this Court finds leave to amend futile.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, in its entirety,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l), for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. An appropriate order follows.
United States District Judge
Dated:
CJ
/J5'f
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