PADILLA v. CICCHIE

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 5/19/2014. (jjc)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LESNIN PIEDRA PADILLA,

Civil Action No. 14-3066 (FLW)

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

EDMOND C. CICCHIE,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
LESNIN PIEDRA PADILLA, #140500
Middlesex County Adult Correction Center
P.O. Box 266
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903
Plaintiff Pro Se
WOLFSON, District Judge:
Lesnin Piedra Padilla, who asserts that he is a civilly committed detainee, seeks to file a
Complaint without prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) This Court will grant
Plaintiff=s application to proceed in forma pauperis and, as required by 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B),
dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Complaint, Plaintiff sues Edmond Cicchie, the Warden of Middlesex County Adult
Correction Center, for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts
the following facts, which this Court is required to regard as true for the purposes of this review:
On date 6-25-2013 on or about time 2:45 PM[,] I was beat[en] up by another inmate
at upper D unit[.] I was bleeding from nose because of punching and the[n] I was
hit in the lower back on the lower left side with sneaker three time[s] and now my
lower back hurt[s] me so much[.] [W]hen I bend down it hurt[s], when I walk it

hurt[s and it] is very painful. A[n]d because of the punching to my nose it g[o]t
broken and today my nose is ben[t] as a curve. I g[o]t physically damage[d] for
life.
(Complaint, Statement of Claims, ECF No. 1 at 5-6.) For violation of his constitutional rights,
Plaintiff seeks damages. (ECF No. 1 at 6.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to
1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is subject to
sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because this Court is granting
Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis.
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim1,
the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc.,
708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)).
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pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Federal Jurisdiction
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a cause of action for violation of

constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law.2 To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff
must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Due Process Clause provides that a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. 14. “In the substantive due process
analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf
- through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty - which is the
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause.”

DeShaney v.

Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). “[W]hen the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care
for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing,
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The statute provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
the . . . Due Process Clause.” Id. The problem with the Complaint in this case is that Plaintiff does

not assert facts connecting Warden Cicchie to the wrongdoing plaintiff suffered at the hands of a
fellow inmate. Assuming that Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right to reasonable safety, this
Court finds that the Complaint, as written, does not state a claim for violation of that right because
Plaintiff provides no facts showing that the Warden was personally involved in causing Plaintiff’s
beating and injuries. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to

Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S.
507, 515-16 (1888) ("A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or positive
wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants
or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties"); Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must
have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”).

Aside from naming the Warden as

Defendant, Plaintiff’s allegations do not set forth any facts showing that the Warden was aware of
the danger to Plaintiff’s safety, failed to reasonably respond to this knowledge, or was involved in
causing Plaintiff’s attack by another inmate. Accordingly, the Complaint, as written, fails to
plead a due process claim against the Warden, who is the sole Defendant.
A District Court generally grants leave to correct the deficiencies in a complaint by
amendment. See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). In this case, it is conceivable that Plaintiff
may be able to allege additional facts indicating that the Warden or another official at the facility
was aware of the danger that Plaintiff would be attacked by this other inmate, and failed to
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reasonably respond to this knowledge. The dismissal of the Complaint is without prejudice to the
filing of an amended complaint that is complete on its face, and asserts facts showing how each
named defendant was personally involved in failing to protect Plaintiff from a known danger,
contrary to § 1983.3
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, this Court grants the application to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismisses the Complaint.

s/Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON, U.S.D.J.
DATED:

May 19, 2014

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This Court notes that the Supreme Court held in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), that jail
officials’ negligent failure to protect an inmate from assault by another inmate does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation. In that case, on Friday, December 19, 1980, inmate McMillian
threatened to injure plaintiff Davidson, while both were incarcerated at the same facility. The same
day, Davidson sent a note reporting the threat to Assistant Superintendent Cannon, who read the note
and sent it on to Corrections Sergeant James. Sergeant James did not inform other officers of the
threat, however, as he had forgotten about it by the time he left the prison and he was not scheduled to
work over the weekend. On Sunday December 21, 1980, McMillian attacked Davidson with a fork,
breaking his nose and inflicting other wounds. The Supreme Court held that the officials’
lack of due care in this case led to serious injury, but that lack of care simply does not
approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was
designed to prevent. Far from abusing governmental power, or employing it as an
instrument of oppression, respondent Cannon mistakenly believed that the situation
was not particularly serious, and respondent James simply forgot about the note. The
guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the State must
guarantee due care on the part of its officials.
Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347-48 (citation omitted); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 849 (1998) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of
constitutional due process.”); Burton v. Kindle, 401 F.App’x 635 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of
pretrial detainee’s failure to protect claim under § 1983 alleging that a correctional officer opened
Burton’s cell door for a fellow inmate to enter and attack him because negligence is not
unconstitutional).
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