PILLITTERI et al v. FIRST HORIZON HOME LOANS et al
Filing
15
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 2/24/2015. (mmh)
* NOT FOR PUBLICATION *
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
JOHN PILLITTERI, and
:
GAIL PILLITTERI
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
Civ. Action No.: 14-03076 (FLW)
:
FIRST HORIZON HOME LOANS,
:
OPINION
FIRST TENNESSEE BANK,
:
National Association, MORTGAGE
:
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
:
SYSTEMS, Incorporated, THE BANK
:
OF NEW YORK MELLON,
:
:
Defendants.
:
____________________________________:
WOLFSON, United States District Judge:
John and Gail Pillitteri (collectively, “the Pillitteris,” or “Plaintiffs”), appearing pro
se, filed an Amended Complaint against First Horizon Home Loans (“First Horizon”), First
Tennessee Bank National Association (“First Tennessee Bank”), Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Incorporated (“MERS”), and the Bank of New York Mellon
Corporation (“BNY Mellon”) (collectively, “Defendants”), seeking to quiet title on real
property located in New Jersey. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint based upon Plaintiffs’ lack of standing and, alternatively,
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
The Court will only recount the facts from the Amended Complaint and the exhibits
attached thereto, and take them as true.
On August 17, 2006, the Pillitteris purchased a residential property located at 318
Meadowbrook Road, Robbinsville, New Jersey 08691 (the “Property”). Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 1,
7. In order to purchase the Property, the Pillitteris obtained a mortgage loan from First
Horizon1 in the amount of $210,000 (the “First Loan”). Id. at ¶ 7. The First Loan was
evidenced by a promissory note, and it was secured by the Property. Id. Subsequently, the
Pillitteris obtained a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) from First Horizon in the
amount of $30,000, but it was eventually increased to $63,000 (the “Second Loan”). Id.
The Second Loan was also evidenced by a promissory note and secured by the Property.
Id. Prior to 2008, the Pillitteris’ main source of income was remodeling and selling homes.
Id. at ¶ 74.
The Pillitteris generally allege that “First Horizon was actively engaged in the
process of underwriting Mortgages with the intention of re-selling these mortgages to
eventually be bundled, converted, pooled, and transferred to investors of Asset-Back
Securities . . . under extremely sub-standard guidelines.” Id. at ¶ 8. According to the
Pillitteris, First Horizon was “fully aware” of the “reckless underwriting policy,” which
significantly contributed to “the subsequent decline in value [of the Pillitteris’ Property]
and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Meltdown of 2008.” Id. at ¶ 10. In that connection, the
1
On May 31, 2007, First Horizon merged into Defendant First Tennessee Bank. Defs.
Br. at 3.
2
Pillitteris broadly contend that First Horizon was underwriting other people’s mortgages
without documentation;2 however, the Pillitteris’ mortgages were documented. Id. at ¶ 11.
The Pillitteris specifically allege that First Horizon assigned the First Loan,
including both the promissory note and the mortgage, to First Horizon Asset Securities,
Incorporated (“FHAS”) in 2006. Id. at ¶ 33. Shortly thereafter, FHAS sold and deposited
the First Loan into the First Horizon Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series FHAMS
2006-FA6 (the “FHAMS Trust”). Id. at ¶¶ 32–33. BNY Mellon is currently the trustee of
the FHAMS Trust, which is established and governed by the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement (the “PSA”). Id. at ¶¶ 35, 5. Furthermore, the Pillitteris allege that First Horizon
sold and deposited the Second Loan into First Horizon ABS Trust 2006-HE2 (the “ABS
Trust”) in 2006. Id. at ¶ 19, 32. In 2013, however, the Second Loan was allegedly assigned
from the ABS Trust to First Tennessee Bank. Id. at ¶ 19.
In their Amended Complaint, the Pillitteris claim that they received several letters
from Defendants First Horizon and First Tennessee Bank requesting the Pillitteris to backdate some documents. See id. at ¶¶ 16-17. On October 27, 2008, the Pillitteris received a
letter from First Tennessee Bank stating that the Pillitteris’ Second Loan modification was
misplaced at the County Clerk’s Office. Id. at ¶ 17. Two days later, the Pillitteris received
a letter from Fiserv Lending Solutions (“Fiserv”), on behalf of First Horizon and First
Tennessee, which requested that the Pillitteris “resign a copy of your original documents.”
Id. On November 12, 2008, Fiserv sent the Pillitteris another letter requesting that they “resign the enclosed documents before a notary public and return them to [Laurie A.
2
The Pillitterris also generally allege that “Defendants are using foreclosure as a
means of confiscating property at below value due to clouded title.” Id. ¶ 13.
3
Blackburn, Title Resolution Associate] using the UPS envelop provided for your
convenience.” Id., Ex. 16. The Pillitteris allegedly expressed concerns over the legality of
back dating those documents. See id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
In February of 2009, the Pillitteris allege that First Horizon “denied all access to
their online accounts.” Id. at ¶ 17(a). The Pillitteris admit that they “were not able to make
any payments” on the First and Second Loans, and thus, the Pillitteris “fell behind on [their]
payments.” Id. at ¶¶ 17(a), 74. On December 2, 2009, the Pillitteris allege that First
Tennessee Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure on the Second Loan. 3 Id. at ¶ 18.
Approximately one month later, First Tennessee Bank allegedly submitted a filing with the
Mercer County Recorder, which stated that the Second Loan “was duly assigned” to First
Tennessee Bank. Id. at ¶ 18. On March 12, 2010, the Pillitteris also allege that BNY Mellon,
the trustee of the FHAMS Trust, filed a complaint for foreclosure on the First Loan. Id. at
¶ 14. On May 19, 2010, BNY Mellon allegedly submitted a filing with the Mercer County
Recorder “to foreclose the [First Loan].” Id. at ¶ 16. On March 21, 2011, BNY Mellon filed
a certification in support of order permitting entry of default on the First Loan.4 Id. at ¶ 15.
Because of the aforementioned allegations, the Pillitteris maintain that “Defendants
have engaged in deceptive practices . . . [and they] have been prevented from selling their
3
In the Amended Complaint, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs’ Property has been
foreclosed, or whether Plaintiffs’ Property is still in the process of being foreclosed. While
BNY Melon has filed a certification in support of an order permitting entry of default on
the First Loan, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts regarding the current status of the two
Loans. In that connection, Plaintiffs stated that they have been prevented from selling their
home, which leads the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs are still in possession of the
Property.
4
Plaintiffs allege that they only learned of the foreclosure action “via a Certification
In Support of Order Permitting Entry of Default . . . which states that John Pillitteri was
personally served on that date.” Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 15.
4
home and recovering any of their money, and should be compensated for the mental
anguish, pain and suffering, and monetary loss caused by Defendants.” Id. at ¶ 74. The
Pillitteris state that they invested close to $60,000 in materials and eight months of labor
in the Property. Id. However, the Pillitteris claim that the value of the Property “dropped
more than $100,000,” and thus, the Pillitteris “lost their total investment.” Id. In that
connection, the Pillitteris assert damages in excess of $1,800,000, including treble and
punitive damages. Id.
The Pillitteris filed their original Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division. On May 14, 2014, Defendants removed the Pillitteris’ complaint to this
Court. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on June 4, 2014. Before
the motion was decided, the Pillitteris amended their Complaint on June 24, 2014, and
Defendants’ motion was dismissed as moot. In their Amended Complaint, the Pillitteris
seek declaratory judgment to quiet title pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1. 5 Thereafter,
Defendants filed another motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the court “accept[s] all factual
allegations as true, construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and determine[s] whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may
be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)
5
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs request, inter alia, that the Court “declare[s]
that each and every one of these defendants should be disqualified from enforcing
Plaintiff’s [sic] note and mortgage,” and Plaintiffs further request that the Court to
determined “each and every one of the clouds upon Plaintiff’s Property and order any such
legal and equitable relief as is necessary for removing these clouds.” Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶
74.
5
(citation and quotations omitted). As such, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted does not attack the merits of the action but merely tests
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“[a] pleading that states a claim for relief . . .
must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to
relief”). In other words, to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all the allegations contained in
the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff must show that there is “more than a sheer
possibility that the defendant has act unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009). In other words, for the plaintiff to prevail, the “complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief;” it must “‘show’ such an entitlement with its
facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35).
The Third Circuit has cautioned, however, that Twombly and Iqbal “do not provide
a panacea for defendants,” rather, “they merely require that plaintiff raise a ‘plausible claim
for relief.’” Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Thus, factual allegations must be more than
6
speculative, but the pleading standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
ANALYSIS
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs formally assert two claims. In their first
claim, Plaintiffs “challenge[] the interest held by Bank of New York. Plaintiff[s] maintain[]
that the interest of these parties lacks authenticity in essence” and that the “investors . . .
each holding a proportional and typically miniscule interest in Plaintiffs[‘] note and
security interest . . . are the real parties in interest.” Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 59. Plaintiffs’
second cause of action is a quiet title claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1. In that cause of
action, Plaintiffs generally challenge the validity of the assignments of the First and Second
Loans, and argue that the assignments were ineffective. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge:
(1) the ownership of the First and Second Loans by Defendants BNY Mellon and First
Tennessee, respectively, (2) the right of Defendants BNY Mellon and First Tennessee Bank
to initiate foreclosure proceedings, (3) that Defendants were not in compliance with the
PSA, (4) that Defendant MERS cannot properly execute an assignment on behalf of other
Defendants, and (5) Defendants did not comply with some assignment recording statutes.
See Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-19, 32-74.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to
challenge the validity of the assignments because Plaintiffs are not parties to those
documents. In the alternative, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim of
7
quiet title. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ claim to quiet title is dismissed because
they lack standing to challenge the validity of the assignments.6
i. Standing
“A motion to dismiss for want of standing is . . . properly brought pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), because standing is a jurisdictional matter.” Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d
806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (alternation in original). To satisfy the “case or controversy”
standing requirement under Article III, the plaintiff must satisfy the tripartite constitutional
standing requirements. See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d
Cir. 2009); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, a
plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact. Id. An “injury-in-fact . . . is an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical.” Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011).
Second, an injury-in-fact “must be ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court.’” Toll Bros., Inc., 555 F.3d at 137-38 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). And third,
“the plaintiff must establish that a favorable decision likely would redress the injury.” Id.
at 138.
In addition to establishing the constitutional standing requirements, “[t]he concept
of standing implicates prudential considerations that overlap, but extend beyond our
6
Plaintiffs also appear to assert that Defendants are in violation of several state and
federal laws. See Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 74. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs state that
“Defendants are in violation of Fair Debt Collection [sic] Act, the Laws of New Jersey,
The Helping Families Save Their Home [sic] Act, Title 46 Property, 46:10B-2 46:10b-50,
N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1, 25:1-11, Writing requirement, conveyances of interest in real estate and
other acts and laws determined by the Court, 25:2-2. Conveyances to deceive purchasers
void as to purchasers for money or other good consideration.” Id. (emphasis in the original).
8
inquiry under Article III.” Soc’y Hill Tower Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 177
(3d Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit has summarized those prudential principles as follows:
(1) the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties;
(2) even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet
the requirements of Article III, the federal courts will not adjudicate abstract
questions of wide public significance which amount to generalized
grievances pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
respective branches; and (3) the plaintiff's complaint must fall within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in questions.
Id. at 177-78 (citing Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc, 140 F.3d
478, 485 (3d Cir. 1998)).
At the outset, the Court notes that the Third Circuit has not yet addressed whether
a plaintiff has standing to challenge the assignment of their mortgage. In New Jersey, a few
district courts have addressed the issue, but those courts have reached mixed results. Some
courts have held that a mortgagor does not have standing to challenge the assignment of
his or her mortgage, because he or she is not a party to the assignment contract. See English
v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n., No. 13-2028, 2013 WL 6188572, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 26,
2013) (“Plaintiff has failed to allege that she is a party or intended third party beneficiary
to the contract and that she therefore she therefore has standing to challenge the contract”);
Oliver v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-4888, 2014 WL 1429605, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Apr. 14,
2014). Another district court held that a mortgagor does have standing to challenge the
assignment of his or her loan. See Boykin v. MERS/ MERSCORP, No. 11-04856, 2012
WL 1964495, at *2-3 (D.N.J. May 31, 2012) (holding that plaintiff had “alleged sufficient
facts to survive the Lujan test,” and thus, the plaintiff “ha[d] standing to sue”).
Circuits outside of the Third that have addressed this issue have also reached mixed
results on the issue. See Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 86 (2nd
9
Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish constitutional and prudential
standing to pursue the “defects in the assignment of their mortgages”); Farkas v. GMAC
Mortg., L.L.C., 737 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2013) (“As a non-party mortgagor, and without
any evidence showing [the plaintiff] to be an intended third-party beneficiary, we conclude
that [the plaintiff] lacks the requisite standing to bring suit to enforce the terms of the PSA
that govern the assignment of the mortgagor’s note”); but see Culhane v. Aurora Loan
Servs. of Nebraska, 708 F.3d 282, 291 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding “that a mortgagor has
standing to challenge the assignment of a mortgage” despite the fact that the plaintiff was
not a party to, or a third-party beneficiary of, the assignments).
Since the First Circuit has held that a mortgagor has both constitutional and
prudential standing to challenge the assignment of a mortgage, this Court examines that
court’s reasoning.7 In Culhane, the plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her home; however,
the plaintiff fell behind on her mortgage payments, and the defendant initiated foreclosure
proceedings. Culhane, 708 at 286–88. In regard to the constitutional standing requirements,
the court reasoned that “[t]he foreclosure of the plaintiff’s home is unquestionably a
concrete and particularized injury to” the plaintiff. Id. at 289. The court then determined
that there was a direct causal connection between the defendant’s right to foreclose by
virtue of the assignment and the plaintiff’s foreclosure proceeding. Id. at 289–90. Finally,
the court found that “a determination that [the defendant] lacked the authority to foreclose
would set the stage for redressing the plaintiff’s claimed injury. Her complaint, at least in
The Court notes that the First Circuit’s holdings are persuasive but not binding.
E.g., Fair Hous. Rights Ctr. in Se. Pennsylvania v. Post Goldtex GP, LLC, No. CIV.A. 144441, 2015 WL 171840, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2015).
7
10
part, prays for monetary damages as a means of ameliorating the asserted wrong.” Id. at
290.
In regard to prudential concerns, the First Circuit acknowledged that “several courts
have ruled that mortgagors lack standing to challenged mortgage assignments because they
are neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the assignments.” Id. at 290. However,
the court reasoned that “a Massachusetts real property mortgagor finds herself in an
unusual position because” a “Massachusetts mortgagor has a legally cognizable right under
state law to ensure that any attempted foreclosure on her home is conducted lawfully,” but
“Massachusetts law permits foreclosure without prior judicial authorization.” Id. Because
Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state, the court opined that “unlike an ordinary
debtor… a Massachusetts mortgagor would be deprived of a means to assert her legal
protection without having standing to sue.” Id.
However, the First Circuit’s finding that the mortgagor in Culhane had prudential
standing to contest the validity of the assignment of her mortgage is distinguishable from
the facts here. See Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291. Unlike Massachusetts, New Jersey is a judicial
foreclosure state. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 469 (N.J. 2012)
(discussing that New Jersey’s Fair Foreclosure Act requires a judicial foreclosure). Indeed,
here, Defendants BNY Mellon and First Tennessee Bank filed foreclosure proceedings in
New Jersey state court. See Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18. Thus, under the First Circuit’s
reasoning, Plaintiffs are “ordinary debtors who could challenge the assignment as a defense
upon being haled into court by the assignee seeking to collect on her debt.” Culhane, 708
F.3d at 290.
11
Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to establish that they are “a party or intended third party
beneficiary to the [assignment] contract.” 8 English, 2013 WL 6188572, at *3 (“In the
context of a mortgage assignment, case law has held that a mortgagor, or borrower, does
not have standing to allege that an assignment between two third parties is invalid”). Here,
because New Jersey is a judicial foreclosure state and Plaintiffs could challenge the validity
of the attempted foreclosure in the judicial foreclosure proceeding, the prudential
considerations in Culhane do not apply; thus, there is no prudential reason for Plaintiffs to
have standing to collaterally attack their foreclosure in a separate judicial proceeding. This
Court is persuaded by the reasoning of our sister courts in English and in Oliver and holds
that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the validity of their mortgage assignments
in this judicial proceeding. See English, 2013 WL 6188572, at *3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
quiet title claim must be dismissed on this basis.9
ii. Failure to State a Claim
8
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert, without legal support, that privity
exists between the rightful note holders (whom they identify as investors in the mortgagebacked securities containing their mortgage) and themselves. Pls. Am. Compl. at ¶ 40.
9
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also allege that First Horizon was “fully
aware” of the “reckless underwriting policy,” which significantly contributed to “the
subsequent decline in value [of Plaintiffs’ Property] and the Sub-Prime Mortgage
Meltdown of 2008.” Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Under the constitutional standing requirements,
the decline in value of Plaintiffs’ Property, and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings, are
not fairly traceable to First Horizon’s allegedly “reckless underwriting policy.” See Toll
Bros., Inc., 555 F.3d at 137–38; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Here, Plaintiffs’ “chain of
causation [is] simply too attenuated” against Defendant are because there are myriad other
independent actions of some third party, such as another bank, that may have contributed
to the decline in value of the Property. See Anderson v. Ayling, 396 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir.
2005). Accordingly, Plaintiffs also do not have standing to challenge the “reckless
underwriting policy” of Defendant First Horizon.
12
For the sake of completeness, the Court will, in the alternative, examine Plaintiffs’
claims under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.10 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants also
argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because they fail to allege the elements of their
claims and because Plaintiffs fail to establish that the mortgage assignments in question
were invalid. Even if Plaintiffs have standing, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim and accordingly in the alternative dismisses Plaintiffs’
claims on this basis.
a. First Claim: Validity of BNY-Mellon’s Interest
In what Plaintiffs call their “first claim,” Plaintiffs “challenge[] the interest held by
Bank of New York. Plaintiff[s] maintain[] that the interest of these parties lacks
authenticity in essence” and that the “investors . . . each holding a proportional and typically
miniscule interest in Plaintiffs[‘] note and security interest . . . are the real parties in
interest.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 59.
The Court notes that the complaints by pro se litigants are held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–
21 (1972). In the context of a motion to dismiss, “a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at
677–78 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). “However, even a pro se plaintiff . . . must still
plead the essential elements of his claim and is not ordinarily excused from conforming to
The Court notes that neither party has provided facts about the status of the
foreclosure action filed in state court. If such proceedings are ongoing or have proceeded
to judgment, it is possible that one of the federal abstention doctrines apply. See, e.g.,
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). However,
the Court lacks the necessary facts and arguments to make such a determination.
10
13
standard procedural rules.” Wright v. Borough of Buena, No. 05-4782, 2006 WL 1644869,
at *2 (D.N.J. June 12, 2006).
However, even under the less stringent formal pleading standards accorded to pro
se litigants, the Court is unable to discern what type of cause of action Plaintiffs are
attempting to plead in their “first claim.” Plaintiffs appear to challenge BNY-Mellon’s
standing to foreclose on their property. Such an argument is typically pled in New Jersey
as a defense in a foreclosure action. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v.
Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 316 (App. Div. 2012); Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v.
Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 222 (App. Div. 2011). However, the instant proceeding is
separate from a judicial foreclosure action, and thus such a defense has no place here.
Alternatively, plaintiffs have attempted to challenge the validity of a mortgage
assignment in this district through a quiet title action. See, e.g., English, 2013 WL 6188572;
Oliver, 2014 WL 1429605. However, Plaintiffs’ second claim is a quiet title action;
therefore, construing the “first claim” to be such an action would be redundant.
Because Plaintiffs do not identify or plead the elements of a recognized cause of
action in their “first claim,” the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ “first claim” on this basis.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Morrice, No. CIV. 12-7910 JBS/KMW, 2013 WL 5674349, at *5
(D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2013), appeal dismissed (Feb. 24, 2014) (A federal court only “has the
authority and duty to decide actual cases and controversies between a plaintiff and one or
14
more defendants who are alleged to be liable for harm suffered by the plaintiff under some
recognized cause of action arising under state or federal law.”).
b. Second Claim: Quiet Title
Plaintiffs’ second claim, however, does identify a recognized cause of action: quiet
title. New Jersey statute establishes the pleading requirements for a quiet title action. See
Club Comanche, Inc. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 278 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2002). New Jersey’s
quiet title statute provides:
Any person in the peaceable possession of lands in this state and claiming
ownership thereof, may, when his title thereto, or any part thereof, is denied
or disputed, or any other person claims or is claimed to own the same, or
any party thereof or interest therein, or to hold a lien or encumbrance
thereon, and when no action is pending to enforce or test the validity of such
title, claim or encumbrance, maintain an action in the superior court to settle
the title to such lands and to clear up all doubts and disputes concerning the
same.
N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1. The function of an action to quiet title is to empower “a person, who is
in peaceable possession of realty as an owner, a means to compel any other person, who
asserts a hostile right or claim, or who is reputed to hold such a right or claim, to come
forward and either disclaim or show his right or claim, and submit it to judicial
determination.” Schiano v. MBNA, No. 05-1771, 2013 WL 2452681, at * 26 (D.N.J. Feb.
11, 2013); see also Friedman v. Monaco and Brown Corp., 258 N.J. Super. 539, 543 (App.
Div. 1992). “Moreover, ‘it is a settled rule that in an action to quiet title the plaintiffs must
rely upon the strength of their own title and not upon the weakness of that of the
defendants.’” Oliver v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-CV-4888 RMB, 2014 WL 1429605, at
*2 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2014) (quoting Dudley v. Meyers, 422 F.2d 1389, 1394–95 (3d Cir.
1970)).
15
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs contend that there is a cloud on the title of the First
and Second Loans because their assignments were not valid. However, Plaintiffs fail “to
allege how any perceived irregularities in the assignment between third parties could cloud
title in the mortgage itself.” English, 2013 WL 6188572, at *3; see also Schiano, 2013 WL
2452681, at *26 (“One of the elements of a quiet title claim is that there must be some
doubt or dispute as to the status of the land. Here Plaintiffs do not allege that any other
party has attacked the validity of Plaintiffs' mortgage. Plaintiffs claim that they do not know
the owner of their mortgage and that the assignments of their mortgage are invalid.
However, these bald allegations fail to establish that a quiet title action is warranted here.”).
Here, as in Schiano, Plaintiffs do not flesh out their cursory recitation of the quiet title
statute. Rather, Plaintiffs merely ask Defendants to prove they hold the mortgages in
question as a result of the assignments. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 73.
Further, Plaintiffs do not adequately allege the strength of their own title; they
acknowledge that they fell behind on their mortgage payments, which would ordinarily
subject them to foreclosure by their mortgagee under the terms of their mortgage agreement,
and that “Plaintiff is indebted to the rightful owner of this lien.” See Dudley, 422 F.3d
1394–95; see also Jacobs v. Fannie Mae, No. A-5197-11T4, 2013 WL 3196933, at *2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. June 26, 2013) (“[Plaintiff] acknowledges that he obtained a loan
secured by the mortgage and note in question and does not allege that he paid off the note
and extinguished the mortgage lien.”).
Based on those facts, Plaintiffs have “failed to plead that Defendants’ competing
interests in the mortgage[s] are wrongful.” See English, 2013 WL 6188572, at *3.
Accordingly, the Court finds that even if Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the validity
16
of their mortgage assignments, which they do not, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim to
quiet title pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1.
c. Miscellaneous Claims
Further, Plaintiffs also appear to assert in their Amended Complaint that
Defendants are in violation of several state and federal laws. See Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 74. In
a single paragraph of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state, without more, that
“Defendants are in violation of Fair Debt Collection [sic] Act, the Laws of New Jersey,
The Helping Families Save Their Home [sic] Act, Title 46 Property, 46:10B-2 46:10b-50,
N.J.S.A. 2A:62-1, 25:1-11, Writing requirement, conveyances of interest in real estate and
other acts and laws determined by the Court, 25:2-2. Conveyances to deceive purchasers
void as to purchasers for money or other good consideration.” Id. (emphasis in the original).
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs have failed to plead the essential elements of their
aforementioned claims, and thus, those claims must be dismissed. See Pushkin v.
Nussbaum, No. 12-00324, 2013 WL 1792501, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2013) (“[T]he Court
‘cannot expect Defendants to defend against claims that are not clearly and specifically
alleged.’”); see also Roy v. U-Haul, No. 14-2846, 2014 WL 6611338, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov.
21, 2014) (“[T]he Court will not be tasked with trying to ascertain what possible claims or
theories of relief that could arise from the facts set forth in the amended complaint, nor will
the Court impose upon Defendant the burden of gleaning a cause of action from the
pleadings.”); Fontanez v. Pennsylvania, 570 Fed. App'x 115, 116 (3d Cir. 2014).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not have standing
to challenge the validity of the assignments of the First and Second Loan. In addition, the
17
Court also finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim to quiet title and their additional
federal and state law claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
amended complaint is GRANTED.11
Dated:
February 24, 2015
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
The Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
United States District Judge
11
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the validity of the
mortgage assignments and that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim, the Court need not address
Defendants’ narrower arguments that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for damages and that
MERS should be dismissed as a defendant. See Defs.’ Br. at 18–21.
18
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