LAOYE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 3/1/2016. (mmh)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AKINTOYE LAOYE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 14-5195 (MAS) (DEA)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Akintoye Laoye's ("Plaintiff') Motion to
Reopen the Case. (ECF No. 4.) By Order dated June 30, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff's
application to proceed informa pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and thereafter, this
case was terminated. (ECF No. 2.) In the June 30, 2015 Order, the Court stated that Plaintiff's
IFP was denied for "[i]nsufficient showing of inability to pay filing fees, 28 U.S.C. 1915," and it
directed Plaintiff to "use [the IFP] form provided on the Court's website." (Id.) Thereafter, on
July 20, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a new IFP application using the form on the Court's website.
(ECF No. 3.) Having reviewed Plaintiff's newly filed IFP application, the Court will grant the
application on the strength of Plaintiff's allegation of indigence. The Court, however, considering
Plaintiffs Complaint, dismisses the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

I.

Legal Standard
"In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe

it liberally in favor of Plaintiff." Abdul-Mateen v. Fed. Bureau ofPrisons, No. 11-4715, 2012 WL

2087451, at *1 (D.N.J. June 8, 2012). "The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant
to a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Aruanno v. Green,
527 F. App'x 145, 147 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). According to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Rather, "[t]o prevent summary
dismissal, [the] complaint[] must allege 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially
plausible." Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation
omitted). Moreover, while prose pleadings are liberally construed, Higgs v. Att'y. Gen., 655 F.3d
333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal
citation omitted). Nonetheless, courts must be cognizant that the Iqbal standard "is not akin to a
probability requirement." Covington v. Int'! Ass 'n ofApproved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114,
118 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II.

Analysis
Plaintiff asserts claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the he was denied medical care as a result of the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Agency's ("ICE") failure to respond to his requests for the removal of his
ankle bracelet. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) The FTCA "operates as a limited waiver of the United
States's sovereign immunity." White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir.
2010). Under the FTCA, a plaintiff may sue the United States "for money damages ... for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission

2

of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment."
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l). An FTCA plaintiff may not recover for mental or emotional damages in
the absence of physical injury. See Abdul-Mateen, 2012 WL 2087451, at *2.
Here, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to support his FTCA claim. Although
Plaintiff alleges that "he was advised[] by ICE" as to the procedure for requesting removal of his
ankle bracelet and that he "personally" dropped off two requests for removal of the ankle bracelet,
Plaintiff does not provide the names of any of the ICE agents that allegedly advised him nor does
he provide the dates on which he made these requests. (Compl. 1.) In addition, while Plaintiff
contends that he satisfied the FTCA's jurisdictional notice requirements 1 by sending "a formal
complaint to the [Office oflnspector General]," it is not clear that this claim was presented to ICE
as required by the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). (Id. at 3) Furthermore, while Plaintiff seeks
$3,500,000 for his injuries, the only information that Plaintiff provides as to his "injuries" is that

1

As a prerequisite to filing certain types of civil suits against federal agents, the FTCA requires a
claimant to "present [] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency" before filing a lawsuit. 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a). The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the relevant agency has notice
of the claim, so that "it may investigate the claim and respond either by settlement or by defense."
Martin v. Unknown U.S. Marshals, 965 F. Supp. 2d 502, 538 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Tucker v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted). The Attorney
General has promulgated regulations that govern how a FTCA claim is to be "presented" to a
Federal agency; among them is 28 C.F.R. § 14.2, which provides:
For the purposes of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), 2672, and
2675, a claim shall be deemed to have been represented when a
Federal agency receives from a claimant ... an executed Standard
Form 95 or other written notification of an accident, accompanied
by a claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss
of property, personal injury, or death alleged to have occurred by
reason of the incident ....
28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). These FTCA requirements are "strictly construed." Martin, 965 F. Supp. 2d
at 538 (quoting Livera v. First Nat'! Bank ofN.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal
quotations omitted).
3

he has "immense physical and psychological pain and suffering" as a result of his inability to
undergo a scheduled surgery2. (Compl. 1.) Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Here, the Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)'s
requirements because the facts alleged are not sufficient to show that Plaintiff is entitled to relief
under the FTCA.
Moreover, the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint cannot be cured by amendment. The
crux of Plaintiffs Complaint is that ICE violated his constitutional rights by failing to remove the
ankle bracelet. (Compl. 2 ("The inaction by ICE and [i]gnoring of this request is worse than
denying plaintiff's medical request due to the fact it shows complete disregard for his health issues
also his right to medical care and this opens the United States to a civil action due to the fact that
the agents of ICE have ignored his fundamental rights under the constitution of the United
States.").). "Federal constitutional violations are not cognizable under the FTCA." Abdul-Mateen,
2012 WL 2087451, at *2 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994)). Thus, granting
Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Complaint with
prejudice. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that Section
1915(e)(2) permits dismissal with prejudice where amendment is futile).
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen the Case and
Plaintiff's application to proceed informa pauperis. The Court, however, dismisses the Complaint

2

In correspondence dated January 20, 2014, Dr. Michael Steinle, D.M.D., states that "Plaintiff
will be having corrective jaw surgery." (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he submitted this
correspondence to ICE. (Compl. 1.)

4

with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. The Court will
issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

s/Michael A. Shipp
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 1, 2016

5