LAMPKIN v. DONAHOE
MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 8/25/2017. (mps)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AUG 25 2017
WILLIAM T. WALSH
Civil Action No. 14-5686 (MAS) (DEA)
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster
General, United States Postal Service,
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Patrick R. Donahoe's ("Defendant")
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 24.) Plaintiff Felicia Lampkin ("Plaintiff') opposed
(ECF No. 26), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 27). The Court has carefully considered the
parties' submissions and decides the motion without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule
78.1. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Undisputed Material Facts
As the Court comprehensively set forth the undisputed facts relating to the background of
this case in its prior summary judgment decision, the Court incorporates those facts here and sets
forth only the allegations directly pertinent to the instant Motion. (Dec. 1, 2016 Mem. Op. 2-16,
ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff filed her Complaint on September 11, 2014. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) At the
outset, Plaintiffs Complaint stated that "[a]t the time of the events complained of herein, Plaintiff
was a Supervisor, Distribution Operations for the United States Postal Service and was assigned ·
to the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center [('P&DC')], Trenton, New Jersey." (Id.
(emphasis added).) Further, the Complaint contains no mention of any allegations regarding the
time period during which Plaintiff worked in Florida. (See generally id.) Accordingly, the
Complaint's allegations under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") arise from the time period
during which Plaintiff was assigned to work in Trenton, New Jersey. (Id.) Plaintiff "stopped
working at the Trenton P&DC on or about October 1, 2010.'' 1 ·(Dec. 1, 2016, Mem. Op. 15; see
also Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SUMF") on First Mot. for
Summ. J. if 77, ECF No. 16-28 ("Admitted").)
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). "Only disputes over facts
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A material fact raises a "genuine" dispute "if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non[-]moving party."
Williams v. Borough ofW Chester, 891F.2d458, 459 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S.
In evaluating the evidence, the Court must consider all facts and their logical inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cit.
2002). While the moving party bears the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving party to "set forth
Moreover, it appears that Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she was only seeking
compensation for "T-time" for the time period during which she was employed at the Trenton
P&DC. (See Def.'s Reply Br. 5 (citing Lampkin Dep. 311:13-312:6).)
specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute] for trial." Anderson, 447 U.S. at 250. If
the non-moving party fails to:
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial[,] .... there can be "no genuine [dispute] of
material fact," [because] a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non[ . . ]moving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.
Katzv. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The FLSA provides for a two-year statute of limitations commencing after the cause of
action accrued, except if the cause of action arises out of a "willful violation," where the FLSA
provides for a three-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Here, Plaintiffs claims are
time-barred under either statutory period. Plaintiffs allegations giving rise to her FLSA claim
took place prior to October. 1, 2010, and Plaintiff did not file her claim until September 11, 2014.
In her Opposition, Plaintiff attempts to amend her FLSA claim by attaching an Affidavit and citing
to deposition testimony that, in conclusory fashion, states that her FLSA violations continued when
she moved to her new post in Florida. (Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 4-5, ECF No. 26; see also id., Ex. A
("Plaintiffs Affidavit"), ECF No. 26.)
"It is well-established[,] [however,] that 'adding claims to a pleading is properly done by
amending the complaint; it is too late to introduce an additional claim at the summary judgment
stage."' Canadian Nat'! Ry. v. Vertis, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (D.N.J. 2011) (citation
omitted). Moreover, a plaintiff may not add new claims in an opposition to a defendant's summary
judgment motion. See OTA Ltd. P'ship v. Forcenergy, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 n.3 (E.D.
In addition to her attempt to amend her FLSA claim, Plaintiff makes no other
arguments, such as arguments that the statutory period should be tolled. (See PL' s Opp 'n Br. 45.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs FLSA claim is time-barred and, therefore, dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August cXS-
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