CHRISTIAN v. CHRISTIAN

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 4/13/2015. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GLEN CHRISTIAN,
Civil Action No. 14-5899 (MAS) (LHG)
Plaintiff,

v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHERYLIN CHRISTIAN,
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court following Plaintiff pro se Glen Christian's filing of a
complaint or, in Plaintiffs alternative characterization, a motion to vacate the decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff
requests that the Court declare the New Jersey Supreme Court's final order denying certification
of his appeal from an adverse ruling void and vacate the order. For the following reasons, the
Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 1
I.

Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff pro se filed this action in September 2014. As noted, Plaintiffs initial pleading
professes to be a motion to vacate the order of the New Jersey Supreme Court. On February 2,
2015, Defendant Cherylin Christian filed a submission with the Court, which, while labelled as an
"Answer" on the Court's docket, is better characterized as correspondence explaining her position
with regard to Plaintiffs complaint. (ECF No. 5.) On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff submitted another

1

A court, having discovered that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter, must dismiss
an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

motion to vacate the New Jersey Supreme Court's order, which primarily points out that
Defendant's "Answer" to the Court was untimely.
The essence of Plaintiffs submissions to the Court is that the procedures employed in the
state trial court violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights because the court lacked jurisdiction over
the matter. It appears, based on the allegations of the complaint, that Plaintiff was a party to a
consent no-contact order (the "Order"), which barred Plaintiff from contacting Defendant, his exwife, in connection with allegations of domestic abuse. According to the complaint, Plaintiff filed
a separate action in state court seeking to vacate the Order, which was denied. Plaintiff appealed
that decision to New Jersey's Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court. Plaintiff again
appealed, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification. Plaintiff claims that, due to
a lack of jurisdiction in state court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey's denial of certification is
void and should be set aside.
II.

Discussion

The Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this case. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents
the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 'state-court losers'
challenging the 'state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced."' Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine constitutes a bar to

suits brought by the losing party in state court that "seek[] what is in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that
the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1005-06 (1994). Rather, review of a decision by a state's highest court can only be had in the
state's appellate courts or in the United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Ct. ofAppeals v. Feldman,

2

460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. "The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is
jurisdictional in nature, precluding further federal review." Turetsky v. Turetsky, 402 F. App'x
671, 673 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Great W Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d
159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010)). The Third Circuit has shed light on the requirements necessary for the
"doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 'complains ofinjuries
caused by the state-court judgments'; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit
was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments."
Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).

Here, Rooker-Feldman is applicable. The first and third requirements, set forth in Great
Western, are easily satisfied: Plaintiff failed in his attempts to set aside the Order in state court,

and the judgment was rendered prior to the institution of this suit. However, "[t]he second and
fourth requirements are key to determining whether a federal suit presents an independent nonbarred claim"-and are more intricately applied. See id.
The second requirement set forth in Great Western is also present. In determining whether
the second requirement is met, "[t]he critical task is to identify those federal suits that profess to
complain of injury by a third party, but actually complain of injury produced by a state-court
judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it." Id. at 167. Here, the
injury complained of is the denial of Plaintiffs attempts to the set aside the Order in state court.
This is exactly the sort of injury identified in Great Western: Plaintiffs professed injury is the state
court's decision.
In addition, the fourth requirement set forth in Great Western is present. "What this
requirement targets is whether the plaintiffs claims will require appellate review of state-court
decisions by the district court." Id. at 169. Indeed, here, Plaintiff invites just such a review.

3

Plaintiffs submissions to the Court complain of procedural irregularities and deprivations and
contend that the state court came to the wrong conclusion. These errors, according to Plaintiff,
caused him constitutional injury. For instance, the complaint states that: "The only question for
the court is whether the [Order] is void [based on lack of personal jurisdiction]; if it is, relief from
it should be granted." (Compl. 14.) Plaintiff plainly invites the Court to conduct a review of the
state-court decision below.
Based on the above, all four prongs of Rooker-Feldman are satisfied. Accordingly, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses this matter with prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: April

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