RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM and ORDER denying 20 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 11/26/2018. (km)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSE RODRIGUEZ,

Civil Action No.: 14-cv-7320 (PGS) (LHG)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

V.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s June 23, 2016
decision affirming the AU’s decision denying Plaintiffs application for Disability Insurance
Benefits.
In the initial brief in support of the complaint, Plaintiffs sole argument was that the AU
erred at step four by finding that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a real estate agent
(P1.’s Br. at 3-7). Past relevant work is work that a claimant has done within the past 15 years, that
was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn it. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1560(b)(1), 416.960(b)(1). If a claimant can still do his past work, given his severe
impairments and his Residual Functional Capacity (RFC), he is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520(e),(f), 404.1560(b)(3). In his original argument, Plaintiff did not argue that Plaintiffs
functional (reaching) limitation was a “non-exertional limitation” requiring the AU to employ a
vocational expert in determining Plaintiffs disability. However, in his motion for reconsideration,
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred because:
The essence of the Court’s Opinion in this case is that Plaintiffs
uncontested functional limitation precluding anything more than
occasional overhead reaching was not a non-exertional limitation
(Opinion at 9). The reasoning continues that because this is so, there
was no legal error in the AU failing to consult a vocational expert
(VE) here (Opinion at 9). With great respect, it must be stated directly

that the Court’s crucial finding that a reaching limitation is not a non
exertional functional limitation is unquestionably erroneous as a
matter of law.
Motion for Reconsideration- Standard of Review
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
“The “extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration is “to be granted sparingly.” A.K. Stamping Co.,
Inc., v. Instrument Specialties Co., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 627, 662 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting NL Indus.,
Inc., v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996)). The Rule “does not
contemplate a Court looking to matters which were not originally presented.” Damiano v. Sony
Music Entertainment, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Florham Park Chevron,
Inc., v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988)).
The Third Circuit has held that the “purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotincki,
779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171(1986). “Reconsideration motions,
however, may not be used to relitigate old matters, nor to raise arguments or present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry ofjudgment.” NL Indus., Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 516; See
Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed. Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d

§ 2810.1.

Such motions will only be

granted where (1) an intervening change in the law has occurred, (2) new evidence not previously
available has emerged, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent a manifest injustice
arises. See, North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
Because reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy, requests pursuant
to these rules are to be granted “sparingly,” Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp. 621, 630 (D.N.J.
1986); and only when “dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law” were brought to
the Court’s attention but not considered. Peiham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J.
1987). See G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990).

Whether or not the Court erred by stating that the reaching limitation was “non-exertional”
does not change the decision. That is because the AU’s inquiry stopped at Step 4 wherein he found
that Plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a real estate agent. See 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520, 416.920 (If a decision can be reached at any step in the sequential evaluation process,
further evaluation is unnecessary).
It is Plaintiff’s burden at step four to demonstrate that he lacked the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform his past relevant work. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir.
1999).

Here, the substantial evidence supports the AU’s finding that Plaintiff could perform his

past relevant work.
Plaintiff also argues that “in fact, because there was no vocational expert (VE) testimony
here at all, without the DOT (Dictionary of Occupational Titles) there would be no possible legal
basis whatsoever for the AU’s step 4 determination.” If the Plaintiff can perform his past relevant
work, the analysis stops. The AU need not proceed to Step 5. It is at Step 5 where the vocational
expert may be engaged to analyze any non-exertional limitations.
Here, the AU also found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and his alleged symptoms
were not entirely credible based upon medical findings and other available information. Jenkins v.
Commissioner, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 21295 (3d Cir. 2006). Generally, the credibility of witnesses
is quintessentially the province of the AU. Since “credibility determinations are the unique
province of a fact finder” in reviewing the record as a whole, I do not find any substantive reason to
reverse the determination. See generally, Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation omitted). Inasmuch as the Administrative Law Judge had the opportunity to
observe demeanor and determine credibility of witnesses, her findings are conclusive. See Wier v.
Heckler, 734 F. 2d 955, 962 (3d Cir. 1984). See also, Social Security Ruling 96-7, 20 C.F.R.
404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. 416.969.

In this case, the AU’s inquiry stopped at Step 4.

Even with the Court’s misstatement that

the reaching limitation was not “non-exertional”, the AU’s opinion, finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled at Step 4, is within the substantial evidence of the record.
ORDER
IT IS on this

26th

day of November, 2018;

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 20) is denied.

ea
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.