JAYE v. NJ ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN HOFFMAN et al

Filing 10

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Joel A. Pisano on 2/10/2015. (kas, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
:
CHRIS ANN JAYE
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
NJ ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN
:
HOFFMAN, et al.
:
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Defendant.
:
____________________________________:

Civil Action No. 14-7471 (JAP)
OPINION

PISANO, District Judge.
Plaintiff Chris Ann Jaye (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action against
the New Jersey Attorney General, a deputy attorney general, several members of the New
Jersey judiciary, and state court personnel. While her complaint purports to challenge the
constitutionality of certain sections of the New Jersey Condominium Act, the facts pled
as well as the counts in the complaint appear to relate solely to occurrences in the course
of state court lawsuits in which Plaintiff was a litigant and in which she alleges the courts
wrongfully ruled against her. These lawsuits included an action by Plaintiff against her
condominium association in which she alleged improper conduct on the part of the
association and its counsel, as well as an action by the condominium association against
Plaintiff for unpaid common charges.
Presently before the Court are two motions by Plaintiff in which she seeks
temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as certain declaratory

relief relating to pending and concluded state court actions. Also pending is a motion by
Defendants to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
(6). The motion to dismiss has not been fully briefed. However, in light of the emergent
nature of Plaintiff’s motions and the urgency with which she seeks relief,1 the Court
decides Plaintiff’s motions.
I. BACKGROUND
As set forth in the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff is the owner of a
condominium unit in Oak Knoll Village (“OKV”) in Annandale, New Jersey. As best as
the Court can discern from the lengthy complaint, there have been a number of lawsuits
in New Jersey state court involving Plaintiff and the OKV Condominium Association.
One suit was brought by Plaintiff against OKV and appears to involve damage that
occurred to Plaintiff’s unit as well as alleged misconduct by the condominium association
and its counsel. Another suit was brought by OKV against Plaintiff and sought to recover
allegedly unpaid common fees.
A recent New Jersey Appellate Division decision provides some insight with
regard to the background of this case. In affirming certain judgments against Plaintiff,
the New Jersey Appellate Division stated that:
[Jaye] is, and at all relevant times was, a unit owner at Oak Knoll Village,
a condominium community. [Jaye] failed to pay her common element
expenses. As a result of the delinquency in those expenses, OKV
instituted legal action seeking a judgment against appellant for the
outstanding amount. Prior to the entry of judgment, a settlement was
reached between the parties whereby in exchange for a “zero-out” of the
claimed balance owed by appellant to OKV, [Jaye] would commence

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On February 9, 2015, Plaintiff advised Court personnel by phone that the relief she was
seeking was urgent and could not wait until the return date of the pending motion to
dismiss.
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payment of the common element charges. Notwithstanding the
agreement, [Jaye] ceased payments after a few months. Thereafter, OKV
instituted another action by way of counterclaim seeking judgment for
unpaid common element expenses and counsel fees. OKV filed a motion
for summary judgment which appellant opposed on grounds other than
OKV’s entitlement to the outstanding fees and costs. The judge, after
providing [Jaye] with the opportunity to contest the quantum of fees and
costs sought by OKV, granted the motion.
Jaye v. Oak Knoll Village Condominium Owners Ass'n, 2014 WL 7691938 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. January 28, 2015). The Appellate Division further noted that Plaintiff had
earlier “instituted a lawsuit seeking damages as a result of the alleged improper conduct
of OKV, two of its members and OKV's outside law firm” and those claims were
dismissed on July 28, 2013 in an order that was not appealed. Id. at *1, n.1.
Plaintiff brings the instant complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act, 10:6-1, et seq. In Counts One and Two, she alleges that all
defendants, including the New Jersey Attorney General, several members of the state
judiciary, and state court personnel deprived her of her numerous constitutional rights
during the course of the abovementioned litigations, including her rights under the Fifth,
Fourteenth (“including but not limited to Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause”) and First Amendments. In Count Three she similarly alleges violation of her
rights under the New Jersey Constitution. By way of relief, in addition to a general
request for damages, Plaintiff requests that this Court (1) reopen the New Jersey case
bearing the docket number MER-L-2733-13 and “restore” the statute of limitations; (2)
stay pending state court litigation; (3) enjoin any state actor from arresting Plaintiff for
non-compliance with state court orders.
By way of her first motion, Plaintiff asks the Court (1) to intervene in a matter
pending in state court and declare that the relief being sought against plaintiff in that

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action is not valid; (2) to order that the state court report to the appropriate agencies
certain parties to the state court action “as criminal;” and (3) to declare that the New
Jersey courts cannot be impartial to plaintiff. In the second motion, Plaintiff seeks
temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief (1) staying all of her state court
proceedings while this federal action is pending; (2) removing certain liens placed on her
property; and (3) enjoining defendants from destroying evidence in their personal
possession.
II. ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that federal courts have an independent obligation to
examine their own jurisdiction over a matter. See Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160,
162 (3d Cir. 2002). Undertaking such an examination, the Court finds that it lacks
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims in this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
This doctrine, derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), recognizes that
district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over cases that are, in substance, appeals
from state court judgments. Only the United States Supreme Court has such jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1257.
The doctrine has been described by the Third Circuit as follows:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states
in relevant part that “final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.” Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of
review of the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has
inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to review
state court decisions.
...
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts from adjudicating
actions in which the relief requested requires determining whether the

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state court’s decision is wrong or voiding the state court’s ruling.
Although § 1257 refers to orders and decrees of the highest state court, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been applied to final decisions of lower state
courts.
In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321,
329 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court has instructed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to
those “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The
Rooker-Feldman precludes a district court from overturning a state-court judgment. 544
U.S. at 293, 125 S.Ct. at 1527. The doctrine applies when (1) the federal plaintiff lost in
state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments, (3)
those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed, and (4) the plaintiff is
inviting the district court to review and reject the state-court judgments. Great W. Mining
& Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010).
Reviewing the above-listed factors, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies here. Plaintiff was a litigant in state court. She lost. She now has come
to federal court complaining of injuries as a result of the various decisions in state court.
In substance, she has asked this Court to review those decisions. This Court lacks
jurisdiction to do so.
Additionally, the Court finds that, in any event, it would be appropriate to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Federal district courts have
“discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where

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resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering
with an ongoing state proceeding.” Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton,
411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and its progeny -- known as “ Younger
abstention”-- requires the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The
Younger abstention doctrine reflects “a strong federal policy against federal-court
interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102
S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). As the Third Circuit has noted, “Younger
abstention arose primarily from ‘the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.' “ Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd
Township, 970 F.2d 1195 (1992) (quoting Younger 401 U.S. at 44).
The Younger abstention is triggered by only three categories of state court
proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) “civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3)
civil proceedings that “implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments
of its courts.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, -- U.S. -- , 134 S.Ct. 584, 591, 187
L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) (internal citations omitted). Here, the underlying civil proceedings
implicate New Jersey’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its Court.
Indeed, Plaintiff asks this Court, in effect, to prevent New Jersey courts from enforcing
their orders and judgment. As such, the Court must abstain.

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Consequently, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motions. Defendants’ pending motion
to dismiss is dismissed as moot. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive and declaratory relief are
denied, and the complaint is dismissed. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is dismissed as
moot. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

/s/ Joel A. Pisano
Joel A. Pisano, U.S.D.J.
February 10, 2015

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