JAYE v. NJ ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN HOFFMAN et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 5/24/2016. (km)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RECEIVED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MAY 25 2015
AT 8~30
. M
WILLIAM T. WALSH
CLERK

CHRIS ANN JAYE,
Plaintiff,

v.
NJ ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN
HOFFMAN, et al.,

Civil Action No. 14-7471 (MAS) (TJB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Chris Ann Jaye's ("Plaintiff' or "Ms.
Jaye") filing of a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 34.) By Order dated December 21,
2015, this Court denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of her First
Amended Complaint, but gave Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint that complied
with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 31.) On January 13, 2016,
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 34.) Like the first amended complaint,
however, the Second Amended Complaintis also pied in conclusory fashion and does not "show
the [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief' as required by Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,'
. . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)).

Thus, as Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is replete with conclusory

allegations, it does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See generally
Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 34.)

In addition, notwithstanding the Court "grant[ing] Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint

to properly state claims regarding the allegedly unconstitutional state statutes," Plaintiffs
Second Amended Complaint is entirely silent as to those claims. (Dec. 21, 2015 Op. 6-7, ECF No.
30) (emphasis added). Thus, the Second Amended Complaint does not comply with the Court's
December 21, 2015 Order. Plaintiff has now been provided three opportunities to comply with
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state cognizable claims, but has failed to do
so. In addition, the Court's December 21, 2015 Order warned Plaintiff that "[i]f [she] does not
file a second amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
January 15, 2016, the complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice and the case shall be closed."
(Dec. 21, 2015 Order ("Order"), ECF No. 31) (emphasis added). Accordingly, pursuant to the
Order, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. See also

Holmes v. Gates, 403 F. App'x 670, 673-74 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint
with prejudice after the plaintiff was given three opportunities to cure deficiencies in her
complaint).
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the Second Amended Complaint included more
than conclusory allegations, as the Honorable Joel A. Pisano, U.S.D.J. held, the Court is barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of abstention from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's challenges
to state court judgments. (Feb. 10, 2015 Op., ECF No. 10.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that various
state court judges, state court staff, the New Jersey Attorney General and his deputy violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act in connection with their involvement in a state
court action against Plaintiff for unpaid condominium common charges and in actions by Plaintiff
against her condominium association. (See generally Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 34.)

2

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over cases brought by 'state-court losers' challenging the 'state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced."' Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460
(2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine constitutes a bar to suits brought by the losing party in state court that

"seek[] what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's
federal rights.'' Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Rather, review of a decision
by a state court can only be had in the state's appellate courts or in the United States Supreme
Court. See D.C. Ct. ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
''The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is jurisdictional in nature, precluding further federal review."
Turetsky v. Turetsky, 402 F. App'x 671, 673 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Great W. Mining & Mineral
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010)). The Third Circuit has shed light

on the requirements necessary for the "doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court;
(2) the plaintiff 'complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments'; (3) those judgments
were rendered before the federal suit was filed 1; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to
review and reject the state judgments." Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 284).

1

With respect to Plaintiffs recent request for "injunctive relief for a stay of state action and
immediate stay of [a] pending arrest warrant as it applies to this pending civil rights case" (ECF
No. 63), the Court finds that the state court proceedings and orders are related to and entered to
effectuate the December 3, 2014 decision of the state trial court (see Pl.'s Application for
Injunctive Relief, Ex. C ("March 12, 2015 Order Denying Reconsideration of Judgment"), ECF
No. 63). Thus, Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief from the state action also effectively seeks
to challenge a state court judgment entered prior to the filing of the federal suit. Accordingly, the
Court is barred from exercising jurisdiction over these requests pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
abstention doctrine.
3

After careful review of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds
that all four prongs of Rooker-Feldman have been satisfied. Thus, the Court is barred from hearing
this action. The Court will issue an appropriate Order to accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: May ;tS-1016

4