JARVIS v. GLIOTTONE et al

Filing 99

OPINION filed. Signed by Chief Judge Freda L. Wolfson on 5/20/2019. (jem)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
WILLIE JARVIS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 14-7766 (FLW) (DEA)
:
v.
:
:
KEVIN CONWAY et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
WOLFSON, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Willie Jarvis (“Jarvis” or “Plaintiff”), is proceeding pro se with a complaint
alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 34.)
Presently before the Court is a motion by defendants, Kevin Conway (“Conway”) and Vincent
Monaghan (“Monaghan”) (collectively, “Defendants”), for summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Mot., ECF No. 85.) For the following reasons, the motion is
GRANTED.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts 1
As the underlying allegations are well known to the parties, I include here only the
undisputed facts as directly relevant to Jarvis’s active claims. On the evening of July 11, 2014,
at around 11:00 p.m., non-party Lamont Sterling (“Sterling”) reported to the New Brunswick

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The summary judgment motion includes, as required by Local Civil Rule 56.1, a statement of
undisputed facts. (Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 85-2 at 3–10.) Jarvis’s opposition to
the motion includes a series of admissions and denials, which the Court construes as his
responsive statement of material facts, under Rule 56.1. (See ECF No. 89 at ECF pp. 2–6.)

Police Department that four men, two of whom had guns, had tried to kidnap and rob him.
(Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 85-2 at 3–10, ¶ 2 [hereinafter, “Defs.’ Stmt.”]; see also
Pl.’s Disputed Facts, ECF No. 89, at ECF pp. 2–6, ¶ 2 [hereinafter, “Pl.’s Stmt.”].) Sterling
reported that his assailants had fled towards a liquor store near his residence, Hub Liquors.
(Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 3; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 3.) Officers Henry Gliottone (“Gliottone”) and Erika
DiMarcello (“DiMarcello”) responded to Sterling’s home, where he explained to the officers that
four men, two with guns, had encountered him near Hub Liquors and had ordered him to take
them to his apartment, threatening to shoot him if he attempted to escape. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 4; see
also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4.) Once in the building, Sterling had apparently entered a neighbor’s
apartment and closed the door on the other men, who had then left. 2 (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 4; see also
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4.) Sterling described the assailants as four black, Jamaican men who were wearing
jeans and t-shirts, one of whom had dreadlocks, and Gliottone distributed that description as well
as the possible location of Hub Liquors over police radio. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 5; see also Pl.’s Stmt.
¶ 5.)
Defendants, both also New Brunswick police officers, responded to the area of Hub
Liquors and saw Jarvis, who “matched the description of the suspect with dreadlocks that had
been broadcast over the radio.” (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 6–7; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 6–7.) Defendants

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Jarvis, in opposition, urges that it was, in fact, Sterling who committed a crime against Jarvis.
He alleges that Sterling had invited Jarvis to come to his residence so that Sterling could sell him
$20 worth of marijuana. Jarvis asserts that, once they had entered the building, Sterling
exclaimed “You got!,” which Jarvis states meant he was being robbed, and Sterling then ducked
into another resident’s apartment to escape Jarvis. Jarvis admits that he stuck his foot in the door
in an attempt to prevent Sterling from getting away but took his foot out of the door when the
resident of that apartment yelled at him. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4.) Jarvis further explains that he pleaded
guilty to attempted burglary because of sticking his foot in the other resident’s door, and he
“admits that he was wrong for sticking his foot in the lady’s door.” (ECF No. 89 at ECF p. 15.)
Importantly, however, Jarvis makes no argument concerning Sterling’s allegations to police that
Jarvis and others had assailed him. (See ECF No. 89.)
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detained Jarvis and frisked him. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 8; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8.) Gliottone and
DiMarcello then brought Sterling to Hub Liquors and conducted a “show-up” of Jarvis. (Defs.’
Stmt. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 10.) Sterling identified Jarvis to officers as one of the assailants who
had had a gun. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 11; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11.) Jarvis was then placed under arrest.
(Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 11; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11.)
Jarvis was subsequently charged with kidnapping, possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, possession of an unpermitted handgun, terroristic threats, possession of a weapon by a
felon, and refusing to allow fingerprints to be taken. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12.) He
was indicted on charges of kidnapping, conspiracy, attempted burglary, possession of a weapon
for unlawful purposes, possession of an unpermitted handgun, terroristic threats, obstruction, and
possession of a weapon by a felon. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 20; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 20.) Jarvis ultimately
pleaded guilty to burglary and attempt, and he was sentenced to three years in prison. (Defs.’
Stmt. ¶ 21; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 21.)
B. Procedural History
On October 8, 2014, Jarvis filed a Complaint against the New Brunswick Police
Department, Gliottone, and Middlesex Adult Corrections, in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Middlesex County, which Complaint was, apparently, never served. (See Notice of Removal,
ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1–2; Notice of Removal, Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1, at ECF pp. 1–6.) Plaintiff then
filed a First Amended Complaint in state court on November 6, 2014. (See id. ¶ 3; Notice of
Removal, Ex. B, ECF No. 1-1, at ECF pp. 7–19.) The First Amended Complaint added as
defendants DiMarcello, Judge Philip Barow (“Barow”), Middlesex Adult Correctional Center
Warden Mark Cranston (“Cranston”), County Councilor Ronald Rios (“Rios”), and Police

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Director Anthony Caputo (“Caputo”). (See ECF No. 1-1 at ECF p. 12.) On December 12, 2014,
the defendants removed the action to this Court. (See ECF No. 1.)
On June 22, 2015, Jarvis, with leave of the Court, filed a Second Amended Complaint,
portions of which remain the operative pleading in this action. (See ECF Nos. 18, 27, 34.) The
Second Amended Complaint alleged claims arising from his arrest and prosecution against
Gliottone, DiMarcello, Barow, Caputo, Cranston, Conway, Monaghan, and Rios for unlawful
search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, failure to provide Miranda warnings, failure
to bring Jarvis before a neutral magistrate, failure to intervene, and supervisory liability or failure
to train. (See ECF No. 34.) The Court granted, on August 7, 2015, a motion by Barow to
dismiss the claims against him as barred by judicial immunity. (See ECF Nos. 5, 41, & 42.) On
September 21, 2015, Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert stayed the action pending the
conclusion of the state criminal proceedings against Jarvis. (Order, ECF No. 49.) The action
was reopened on March 10, 2017, after the Court was informed of Jarvis’s guilty plea and the
conclusion of the criminal proceedings. (See ECF No. 64.)
Thereafter, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint,
(ECF Nos. 65, 66, & 67), which I interpreted as motions for judgment on the pleadings under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), as the defendants had previously filed answers, (see Op.,
ECF No. 68, at 5.) I declined to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims as barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), finding that, because the claims “do not automatically impugn
the validity of a subsequent conviction arising from that arrest, the Court is unable to determine
whether Plaintiff’s success on his Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily impugn the
validity of his guilty plea for Burglary and Attempt without the full record.” (ECF No. 68 at 12
(citation omitted).) Nonetheless, I granted dismissal as to Cranston and Rios, as Jarvis had

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included no factual allegations suggesting that either of them was personally involved in any
constitutional violations. (Id. at 12–13.) Furthermore, pursuant to the Court’s screening power
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I dismissed the claims related to the alleged failure to bring Jarvis
before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause determination within 48 hours of his arrest and
the claims against Caputo. (Id. at 13–16.) The only claims remaining active following the
issuance of that Opinion and Order are the Fourth Amendment claims—for unlawful search and
seizure, false arrest, and false imprisonment—against Conway and Monaghan, and the other
defendants were dismissed. (See ECF No. 68 at 16 & n.12; ECF No. 69 at 2 & n.1.)
The remaining parties thereafter participated in discovery overseen by Judge Arpert. (See
ECF Nos. 75 & 94.) Upon the conclusion of fact discovery, Defendants moved for summary
judgment as to the remaining claims. (ECF No. 85.) Jarvis filed an opposition to the motion,
and Defendants filed a reply brief. (ECF Nos. 89 & 92.) Concurrently, Jarvis filed a motion to
strike Defendants’ Answer based on lengthy delays in their compliance with discovery
obligations. (See ECF Nos. 88 & 91.) Judge Arpert denied the application to strike the Answer,
but, given the discovery delays, granted Jarvis leave to file a supplemental opposition to the
summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 94.) Jarvis thereafter filed a supplemental opposition, and
Defendants filed a sur-reply. (ECF Nos. 97 & 98.)
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to award a party summary judgment if
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if
supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the non-movant's

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favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251–52 (1986); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455
F.3d 418, 422–23 (3d Cir. 2006). A fact is material if, under the governing substantive law, a
dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423. In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the
Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts “in the light most
favorable to the [non-movant].” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.
A movant for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district
court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). While a
defendant moving for summary judgment must support assertions by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), the movant is not required to “support its
motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim,” Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323. Instead, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—
that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. If the movant has shown an absence of material factual
dispute, the non-movant then bears the burden to “designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the nonmovant may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. Id. at 324;
Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994), aff’d 67 F.3d
291 (3d Cir. 1995). The non-movant must “do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. A
mere “scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

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Local Civil Rule 56.1 requires that a motion seeking summary judgment include a
statement of material facts not in dispute and that an opponent of summary judgment shall file “a
responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant’s statement,
indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and
citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion.” L. Civ. R.
56.1(a). The rule further provides that “any material fact not disputed shall be deemed
undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.” Id. Although a motion for summary
judgment may not be granted by default, merely because it goes unopposed, Anchorage Assocs.
v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990), the motion may be granted if the
undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law, Miller v. Ashcroft, 76 F. App’x 457, 462
(3d Cir. 2003); Houston v. Township of Randolph, 934 F. Supp. 2d 711, 723 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d
559 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2014).
B. Section 1983 Generally
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the statutory basis for asserting violations of a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. That section provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
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deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988).
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Unlawful Seizure, False Arrest, and False Imprisonment
I have construed the remaining portions of the Second Amended Complaint as asserting §
1983 claims against Defendants for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, and false
imprisonment, under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States guarantees a right to be free from unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
A seizure occurs when a government official restrains a person’s freedom of movement such that
the person is deprived of his or her free will to leave. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254
(2007). A seizure is generally permissible only if it is supported by probable cause to believe the
person has committed a crime. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013).
A claim for false arrest thus requires that the plaintiff show (1) an arrest and (2) that the
arrest was made without probable cause. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d
Cir. 2012). The probable-cause inquiry is an objective one: “an arresting officer’s state of mind
(except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant” and probable cause for an arrest will be found
“as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Fourth Amendment rights may also be implicated by investigatory—or “Terry”—stops,
which do not rise to the level of an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1968); see also
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). An interaction may constitute a Terry stop
when, “‘taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police

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conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business.’” Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003) (quoting
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). A Terry stop must be justified by a reasonable
suspicion based on an objective sign that a person is, was, or is about to be, committing a crime.
See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 & n.2. “The test is one of reasonableness given the totality of the
circumstances, which can include [the suspect’s] location, a history of crime in the area, [the
suspect’s] nervous behavior and evasiveness, and [the officer’s] ‘commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.’” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000)); see also United States v. Thompson,
772 F.3d 752, 758 (3d Cir. 2014). “To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer needs
only ‘a minimal level of objective justification.’” United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 104 (3d
Cir. 2018) (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123)). In examining this question, a court must
consider only the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop. See United States v. Lowe,
791 F.3d 424, 430 (3d Cir. 2015).
Reasonable suspicion may be based on what the officer observes firsthand or upon
reliable information provided by another person. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147
(1972). If an officer relies on information from a third party to justify a Terry stop, the reliability
of that information is assessed under factors identified by the Third Circuit in United States v.
Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2008). Under Torres, the reliability of third-party
information may be bolstered based upon certain indicators:
(1) The tip information was relayed from the informant to the
officer in a face-to-face interaction such that the officer had an
opportunity to appraise the witness’s credibility through
observation.

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(2) The person providing the tip can be held responsible if her
allegations turn out to be fabricated.
(3) The content of the tip is not information that would be
available to any observer.
(4) The person providing the information has recently witnessed
the alleged criminal activity.
(5) The tip predicts what will follow, as this provides police the
means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.
Id. at 211 (internal ellipsis omitted).
Here, Jarvis’s encounter with police may be broken into two distinct seizures: his initial
detention when Defendants located him near Hub Liquors and his subsequent arrest after Sterling
had identified him as one of the assailants. The relevant undisputed facts relevant to the initial
detention are as follows:
1. Sterling reported to the New Brunswick Police Department that four men, two of
whom had guns, had tried to kidnap and rob him. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 2; see also Pl.’s
Stmt. ¶ 2 (not disputing that Sterling had made such a report to the police).)
2. Sterling reported that his assailants had fled towards Hub Liquors. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 3;
see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 3 (not disputing that Sterling had reported such to police).)
3. Sterling told Gliottone and DiMarcello that four men, two with guns, had encountered
him near Hub Liquors and had ordered him to take them to his apartment, threatening
to shoot him if he attempted to escape. 3 (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 4; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 4 (not
disputing that Sterling made such allegations).)

3

As noted above, Jarvis contends that what Sterling reported did not happen and that it was, in
fact, Sterling who stole money from Jarvis. (See Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 4.) Jarvis does not, however,
dispute Defendants’ representations as to what Sterling reported to police that night. (See id.)
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4. Sterling described the assailants as four black, Jamaican men who were wearing jeans
and t-shirts, one of whom had dreadlocks, and Gliottone distributed that description as
well as the possible location of Hub Liquors over police radio. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 5; see
also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 5 (not disputing that Sterling provided such a description or that
Gliottone broadcast it over police radio).)
5. Defendants saw Jarvis, who matched the broadcast description of the suspect with
dreadlocks, in the area of Hub Liquors. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 6–7; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 6–
7 (seemingly acknowledging that Sterling gave police “an exact description” of
Jarvis)).
6. Defendants detained Jarvis while Gliottone and DiMarcello brought Sterling to Hub
Liquors to conduct a show-up. (Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 8, 10; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 8, 10.)
While Jarvis argues that the alleged crime against Sterling never occurred and contests
Defendants’ assertions that he was struggling and belligerent while he was detained, he does not
raise any factual questions with regard to what Sterling told police officers. (See ECF No. 89.)
Based on these facts, I conclude that Defendants had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop of Jarvis. Defendants had received information from other police officers that
a person had reported being assailed by four men, two of whom were armed. Defendants had
heard a description of the alleged assailants and their potential location broadcast over the police
radio. Defendants had then reported to that location, and saw Jarvis, who matched the
description provided of one of the armed assailants. 4 Although this information stems from a tip

4

Indeed, regardless of whether Jarvis committed a crime against Sterling that night, or if,
instead, Jarvis was the victim of a crime committed by Sterling, it appears uncontested that
Sterling did, in fact, provide police a description of Jarvis. Thus, Jarvis does not make any
argument that his detention was unwarranted because he did not match the description provided
to police.
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from a third party, the information provided by Sterling to police satisfies at least the first four of
the Torres factors: Sterling reported the incident and described his assailants face-to-face with
Gliottone, who then relayed this information to other officers; the police knew who Sterling was
and where he lived, and could have held him accountable if he had made false allegations; the
incident allegedly involving Jarvis would not necessarily have been obvious to any observer; and
Sterling was alleging very recent criminal activity of which he claimed he was victim. See
Torres, 534 F.3d at 211. An investigatory stop is clearly warranted when a police officer
encounters a person who matches the seemingly reliable description of a reported armed criminal
in an area where the suspect is likely to be found. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 327 F.
App’x 378, 379–80 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354–57 (3d Cir.
2000).
Jarvis’s arguments that he did not commit any crime against Sterling, and was, in fact, the
victim of a theft committed by Sterling, is simply not relevant to the analysis of whether
Defendants had adequate reasonable suspicion to detain Jarvis at the time they did. Jarvis does
not contest any of the allegations Sterling made to police, and, indeed, seems to acknowledge
that Sterling made these reports. Although Jarvis argues that Sterling’s reports were lies, he
provides no reason why police officers should have found Sterling lacking in credibility at that
time. (See ECF No. 89.) The question before the Court is not whether Jarvis committed the
crimes of which he was accused, but, considering the totality of the circumstances, whether
Defendants, based on the information they had received, had “a minimal level of objective
justification” to detain Jarvis for the purposes of their investigation. See Foster, 891 F.3d at 104.
Similarly, Jarvis’s argument that he was not engaged in any suspicious activity at the time
Defendants encountered him is not determinative, as reasonable suspicion may properly arise

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from information obtained from other sources, not merely from activity witnessed firsthand by
officers. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.
I note that Jarvis repeatedly stresses that Defendants almost immediately handcuffed him
despite the fact that their frisk revealed no weapon and that they did not inform Jarvis that he was
being detained for the purposes of a show-up. (See ECF No. 89 at ECF pp. 4–5, 14–15; ECF No.
97 at ECF p. 2.) To the extent that Jarvis intends to argue that his detention should be considered
an arrest, requiring a showing of probable cause, rather than an investigatory stop justifiable
merely by reasonable suspicion, such an argument is unavailing. While Jarvis emphasizes that
Defendants made it clear that he was not free to leave, and even used force to restrain him, it is
well-established that “a Terry stop is a seizure, and one seized is by definition not free to leave.”
United States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1995). As Jarvis was properly seized,
Defendants had no obligation, as Jarvis suggests, to “giv[e] the Plaintiff the opportunity to walk
away or ignore the false accusations.” (See ECF No. 97 at ECF p. 2.)
Furthermore, “an officer may use intimidation and brief physical restraint without
necessarily transforming the encounter into an arrest.” United States v. King, ___ F. App’x ___,
2019 WL 1467994, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 2, 2019). Thus, neither Defendants making clear to Jarvis
that he was not free to leave nor their handcuffing of him converted the detention to an arrest.
See Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1995) (“There is no per se rule that
pointing guns at people, or handcuffing them, constitutes an arrest.” (emphasis added)). In
considering whether a seizure is an arrest or a mere investigatory stop, courts may consider “the
duration of the stop, the law enforcement purposes justifying the stop, whether the police
diligently sought to carry out those purposes given the circumstances, and alternative means by
which the police could have served their purposes.” United States v. Leal, 235 F. App’x 937,

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941 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, Jarvis’s brief detention 5 by Defendants while they waited for Sterling
to come for a show-up did not rise to the level of an arrest, despite the fact that Jarvis may have
been handcuffed during that period. Although Jarvis argues that Defendants did not inform him
that they were detaining him for the purposes of a show-up, there appears to be no dispute that
Defendants in fact detained Jarvis for that purpose (whether or not it may have gone unspoken)
and quickly brought Sterling to conduct a show-up, after which Jarvis was formally placed under
arrest. Thus, Jarvis’s initial seizure, prior to his formal arrest, was both short and directly related
to the investigatory purpose of conducting a show-up.
To the extent that Jarvis also challenges his formal arrest after he had been identified by
Sterling, that claim also fails. Similar to his argument regarding the initial seizure, Jarvis’s main
contention is simply that Sterling’s allegations against him were false and that it was, in fact,
Sterling who had committed a crime against him. (See ECF No. 89.) This argument is irrelevant
to the inquiry of whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Jarvis at that time. “Probable
cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or
is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482
(3d Cir. 1995); see also Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).
Jarvis contends that “there was no physical evidence or video surveillance in the possession of
the Defendants at the time of the arrest to corroborate that such a crime took place,” but probable
cause can arise from reliable information obtained from a third party, particularly if obtained
from the victim of a crime. See Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477–78 (3d Cir. 2016)

5

In his Second Amended Complaint, Jarvis asserts that, after he was frisked, he was “placed in
the back seat of a patrol vehicle for about 60 seconds” before the show-up was conducted. (ECF
No. 34 at ECF p. 6.)
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(“[S]tatements of a victim witness are typically sufficient to establish probable cause in the
absence of independent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of a witness’s own
unreliability.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128
F.3d 810, 818–19 (3d Cir. 1997) (“When a police officer has received a reliable identification by
a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause to arrest.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007). When Jarvis was placed under arrest,
Defendants had received a report from Sterling that he had been assailed at gunpoint by four
men, two with guns, and Defendants had then been present for a show-up in which Sterling
affirmatively identified Jarvis as one of the assailants. (See Defs.’ Stmt.; Pl.’s Stmt.) Presented
with such information, the officers 6 clearly had probable cause to arrest Jarvis, regardless of
whether it could subsequently be shown that Jarvis, in fact, did not commit any crimes against
Sterling. Jarvis has presented no argument as to why Sterling’s allegations should have been
found, at that moment, inherently incredible, or why officers should have rejected them out of
hand.
The finding that officers had probable cause to arrest Jarvis also precludes any recovery
on a theory of false imprisonment. A false-imprisonment claim requires a showing that (1) the
plaintiff was detained, and (2) the detention was unlawful. James, 700 F.3d at 682–83. Thus,
when a person is arrested without probable cause, a claim for false imprisonment may be
asserted as to the detention following that arrest. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47
F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 (2017). Here,
however, while there is no question that Jarvis was detained, it has been established that this
6

There is some ambiguity as to which officer, whether one of the active Defendants or, instead,
Gliottone, actually effectuated the arrest of Jarvis. Nonetheless, any of the officers who were
present and privy to the information relayed by Sterling would have had grounds to arrest Jarvis,
and, thus, the Court need not resolve this question.
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detention was pursuant to an arrest with probable cause, and, therefore, was lawful. For all the
foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted as to the claims for unlawful seizure, false
arrest, and false imprisonment.
B. Unlawful Search
I have also construed the Second Amended Complaint as asserting a claim for unlawful
search, under the Fourth Amendment. (See ECF No. 34.) Jarvis primarily alleges that
Defendants immediately frisked him, without notice or consent, and did not locate any weapon.
(See ECF No. 34 at ECF p. 6; ECF No. 89 at ECF p. 14; ECF No. 97 at ECF p. 2.) Under Terry,
“a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find
weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has
accosted.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979). Like an investigatory detention, a Terry
frisk may be justified by “point[ing] to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 391 U.S. at 21.
Applying this standard, I conclude that the frisk of Jarvis was justified under Terry. Sterling had
reported that four men had attempted to kidnap or otherwise assail him, and that two of them
were armed with guns. When Defendants arrived at Hub Liquors, they saw Jarvis, who matched
the description of one of Sterling’s allegedly armed assailants. It is irrelevant to the justification
for the frisk that Defendants did not actually find Jarvis to be in possession of a gun; the frisk
was justified by the fact that they had received seemingly credible allegations that men with guns
and criminal intentions, including one who matched Jarvis’s description, were in that area. Thus,
summary judgment is granted to Defendants on the unlawful search claim.
Defendants additionally argue that a search of Jarvis after he was placed under arrest was
justified. (See ECF No. 85-2 at 17–18.) As Jarvis has made no mention of the post-arrest search

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in his Complaint or his filings related to this motion, I do not construe him as asserting a claim
arising from such a search. (See ECF Nos. 34, 89, 97.) Nonetheless, I note that Defendants
correctly assert that a search following his arrest would have been justified as a search pursuant
to lawful arrest, under Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979) (“The fact of a lawful
arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.”).
As I conclude that the search and seizures that are the subject of this action were fully
justified under controlling law, I need not reach Defendants’ arguments that the claims are barred
by Heck and collateral estoppel or that Defendants are shielded by qualified immunity. (See ECF
No. 85-2 at 18–30.)
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 85), is
GRANTED. As there are no other live claims in this action, the case will be CLOSED. An
appropriate order follows.

DATED: May 20, 2019

/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
FREDA L. WOLFSON
U.S. Chief District Judge

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