BAADHIO v. ATTORNEY GENERAL et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Michael A. Shipp on 6/7/2016. (mmh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RANDY BAADHIO,
Civil Action No. 15-2444 (MAS)
Petitioner,

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,
Respondents.

This matter having come before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Petitioner Randy Baadhio, for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is not challenging the
validity of his original state conviction and sentence, but instead challenges the imposition of an
additional parole term by the State of New Jersey, or in Petitioner's own words, the "unlawful
imposition by NJDOC and NJSPB of 1,790 days to my lawful and completed sentence[.]" 1 (Pet.
2, ECF No. 1.) The Court had ordered Respondents to answer, (Order, May 29, 2015, ECF No.
4), and Respondents had filed an answer, (Resp., ECF No. 11).
However, before the Court had decided the matter, Respondents informed the Court, with
documented evidence, that Petitioner's parole term had expired.

(See Parole Termination

Certificate, ECF No. 22-1.) In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), the Supreme Court held that
once the sentence imposed by a revocation of parole had expired, "[t]he reincarceration that
[petitioner] incurred as a result of that action is now over, and cannot be undone[,]" and that the
collateral consequences courts normally presume for attacks on criminal convictions do not apply
to challenges against parole revocations. Id at 8-14. In finding that such a habeas petition would
The Court assumes that "NJDOC" refers to the New Jersey Department of Corrections,
and "NJSPB" refers to the New Jersey State Parole Board.

be moot, the Supreme Court expressly rejected, as speculative, such arguments of collateral
consequences as (1) revocation could be used against the petitioner in a future parole proceeding;
(2) revocation could be used to increase a future sentence; (3) revocation could be used to impeach
him as a witness or litigant in a future legal proceeding; and (4) dismissal of the habeas action
would foreclose a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). Id at 14-17. Nothing in the instant Petition indicates that Petitioner's claims are
distinguishable from those of Spencer.
As such, pursuant to the holdings of Spencer, the Court dismisses the Petition as moot.
Accord United States v. Robinson, 39 F. App'x 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that Spencer
rendered moot a challenge to the revocation of supervised release once the sentence had expired).
Furthermore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would not
find it debatable that dismissal of the Petition is correct. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). Likewise, Petitioner's motion for recusal, ECF No. 20, is also dismissed as moot.

M~.D.J.

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