BAADHIO v. HOFACKER et al

Filing 6

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 10/23/2015. (kas, )

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RANDY BAADHIO,
Civil Action No. 15-2752 (MAS)
Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

BRIAN HOFACKER, et al.,
Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Randy Baadhio ("Plaintiff') brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The Court previously granted Plaintiff in
forma pauperis status. (ECF No. 3.) At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to

determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (informa pauperis actions). For reasons
stated below, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims related to his eviction and false criminal
charges without prejudice, and allows Plaintiffs excessive force and denial of medical services
claims to proceed.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court recites only those facts relevant for the purposes of this Opinion. Plaintiffs
claims arise out of three separate incidents. The first incident occurred in February of2014, when
Plaintiff alleges that he was forced by state officials to vacate his rental apartment. Compl. 14,
ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brian Kofacker, Sean Sullivan, Robert Palmer,

Christine Madrid, Matthew Ambrosino, Joesph McGovern, and Valerie Meluskey conspired to
illegally remove him, under color oflaw, from his rental apartment while he had a valid lease. Id.
at 3-6. Plaintiff also asserts that his personal property in the apartment was never returned to him,
which amounted to illegal confiscation by the above-named Defendants. Id. at 4.
The second incident occurred on May 8, 2014, when Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted
by Defendant Monica Braun while under state custody. Id. at 8. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendants Timothy Bruey and Nurse Sinclair witnessed the assault but allowed it to happen, and
that Timothy Bruey helped Monica Braun cover up the assault by manufacturing false evidence
and making false criminal charges against Plaintiff. Id. at 9, 11. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts these
three Defendants, along with Defendants Saint Francis Hospital and Matthew Ambrosino,
conspired to deny Plaintiff proper medical services for injuries that resulted from the above assault.
Id. at 10.

The balance of the Complaint consists mostly of allegations of false charges, a "sham
parole term," and the resulting false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment.
Plaintiff alleges that they occurred as retaliation against Plaintiff for his various whistle-blower
activities. However, the Complaint does not allege that any of the false charges or parole terms
were overturned or invalidated.
Lastly, Plaintiff raises a claim against Community Education Centers ("CEC") for
deplorable prison conditions unrelated to any of the claims above. Id. at 12.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a)(2). "Specific facts are not

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necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."' Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do .... Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level ....
Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept
its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012),
and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); US. v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
III.

DISCUSSION

A plaintiff can pursue a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under§ 1983, a plaintiff must establish, first,
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that
the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-1 (1999); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 166-

7 (3d Cir. 2013).

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A. May 8, 2014 Incident
With regard to the assault and the subsequent denial of medical services that occurred on
May 8, 2014, the Court construes those as claims of excessive force and denial of medical services
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Claims against Defendants Monica Braun, Timothy Bruey,
Matthew Ambrosino, and Nurse Sinclair for this incident are allowed to proceed.
However, Plaintiffs claims against Saint Francis Hospital are dismissed. Under§ 1983, a
private corporation performing a state function 1 cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat

superior. See Weigher v. Prison Health Servs., 402 F. App'x 668, 669-70 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
that a private corporation providing medical services at a state correctional facility cannot be held
liable under a theory of respondeat superior in a § 1983 suit); Lassoff v. NJ., 414 F. Supp. 2d 483,
494 (D .N .J. 2006) (finding "almost every court to have considered the issue" has extrapolated the
holdings of Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to apply to private companies
performing state functions). 2

Private corporations contracted by the state to provide medical services to prisoners are
deemed to be performing a state function. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55 (1988); Miller v.
Beard, 699 F. Supp. 2d 697, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ("[A] private corporation acts under the color
of state law when it contracts to provide medical services to state inmates[.]") (citing Bivens v.
Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 05-3444, 2006 WL 2689821, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2006)).
2

Although the Court is constrained to follow the Third Circuit's non-precedential decision
in Weigher, some courts have decided differently. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Brookshire Bros., Ltd.,
284 F. Supp. 2d 459, 472-73 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
[T]he court finds no persuasive policy justification for shielding private employers
from vicarious liability. While the Supreme Court has found that Congress did not
want to create a "federal law of respondeat superior" imposing liability in
municipalities in the § 1983 context because of "all the constitutional problems
associated with the obligation to keep the peace," Monell, 436 U.S. at 693, this
court cannot find any similar concerns implicated in the private context. Imposing
liability on private corporations affects neither the state's police power nor its ability
to regulate its municipalities. Instead, allowing the imposition of vicarious liability
would seem to keep Congress within its broad power to regulate interstate
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Here, Plaintiff's claims against Saint Francis Hospital are premised upon a theory of

respondeat superior. (See ECF No. 1 at 10) ("St. Francis, via one of its nurse[ s], issued a
fraudulent medical clearance"). Plaintiff does not allege that any particular policy or custom
adopted by Saint Francis Hospital caused the denial of medical services to him. Consequently,
there is no indication that Saint Francis Hospital has directly violated Plaintiff's constitutional
rights as required in a § 1983 action and, therefore, the Court dismisses all claims against Saint
Francis Hospital.

commerce. Thus, no significant federalism issues are raised when private
employers are held liable for the constitutional torts of their employees.

Id.; see also Segler v. Clark Cnty., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268-69 (D. Nev. 2001) ("Although
EMSA is a state actor through its contract with LVMPD, the award of punitive damages against
EMSA would not punish taxpayers in the way such a decision would affect a municipality");
Moore v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., 825 F. Supp. 1531, 1548 (D. Wyo. 1993) ("If defendant Wyoming
Medical Center is not entitled to qualified immunity under Wyatt v. Cole, then the same reasoning
precludes Wyoming Medical Center from 'asserting municipal immunity pursuant to [Monell]");
Groom v. Safeway, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 987, 991 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 1997) ("The cases cited by the
parties provide no binding authority and little persuasive authority for the proposition that a private
entity cannot be vicariously liable for the actions of its employees if those actions violate§ 1983");
Barbara Kritchevsky, Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 35, 74 (2004)
(advocating imposition of vicarious liability in § 1983 suits for private corporations because the
concerns of Monell with regard to municipalities do not apply to private corporations). Indeed,
another court in this district has questioned the wisdom of applying Monell to private entities.
The policy considerations which prompted the Supreme Court to reject qualified
immunity for private prison guards are the same considerations which suggest that
private corporations providing public services, such as prison medical care, should
not be immune from respondeat superior liability under § 1983. In the context of
a claim that the deprivation of medical care amounted to a constitutional violation,
proof of such claim would almost certainly prove a case of ordinary state law
malpractice where respondeat superior would apply. It seems odd that the more
serious conduct necessary to prove a constitutional violation would not impose
corporate liability when a lesser misconduct under state law would impose
corporate liability.

Taylor v. Plousis, 101 F. Supp. 2d 255, 263 n.4 (D.N.J. 2000).
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B. False Charges
With regard to the claims of alleged false charges and sham parole terms, and related claims
of alleged false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, those claims are barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court stated,

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted).

"[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior

invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the
prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in
that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration."
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81-82 (2005)).
Here, in order for Plaintiffs claims related to the alleged false charges and sham parole
terms to succeed, success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement, or its
duration. This is so whether the claims stem from the alleged false arrest, malicious prosecution,
or false imprisonment that resulted from those alleged false charges and sham parole terms. The
Complaint does not allege, however, that any of these charges have been overturned, invalidated,
or otherwise exonerated. Indeed, Plaintiff has filed a concurrent habeas petition with this Court
challenging these charges against him, which the Court has yet to rule upon. See Baadhio v. Atty
Gen., No. 15-2444 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 7, 2015). As such, Plaintiffs claims are barred by Heck at

this time, and are dismissed without prejudice.
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C. False Eviction Incident

With regard to the claims arising out of the false eviction incident, the Court finds that they
are not related to the claims arising out of the May 8, 2014 incident, and therefore cannot be joined
in the same action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 18(a) states that "[a] party asserting a claim ... may join, as independent or alternative
claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party." However, Rule 20 limits the joinder
of defendants - Rule 20(a)(2) states that "persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(a) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction or occurrences; and (b) any question oflaw or fact common
to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); see also McDaniel v. Lanigan,
No. 12-3834, 2012 WL 5880371, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (claims by prisoners are not exempt
from Rules 18 and 20). Rule 20's requirements are to be liberally construed in the interest of
convenience and judicial economy. See Paladino v. Newsome, No. 12-2021, 2012 WL 3315571,
at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2012).
But this application, however liberal, "is not a license to join unrelated claims and
defendants in one lawsuit." Id. (citing Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App'x 436 (3d Cir. 2007)
(per curiam)); see also Miller v. Lanigan, No. 12-4470, 2013 WL 1750138, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 23,
2013) (stating that a plaintiff cannot "lump" all his challenges into a single pleading in violation
of Rule 18 and 20). In a case of misjoinder, "a court may not simply dismiss a suit altogether.
Instead, the court has two remedial options: (1) misjoined parties may be dropped 'on such terms
as are just'; or (2) any claims against misjoined parties 'may be severed and proceeded with
separately."' DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 21).

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As the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims arising out of the May 8, 2014 incident are
unrelated to the claims arising out of the false eviction incident, the Court will, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21, dismiss all claims arising out of the false eviction incident without
prejudice. Moreover, the Court finds that the prison conditions claim against CEC is also unrelated
to the May 8, 2014 incident, and therefore will similarly be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff
may assert the aforesaid claims by filing new, separate actions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, all claims other than those arising out of the May 8, 2014
incident for excessive force and denial of medical services are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

Additionally, all claims against Saint Francis Hospital are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The remaining claims arising out of the May 8, 2014 incident are
allowed to PROCEED.

Dated:

/D (~3 / J{

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