CRANDALL v. NEW ROAD SCHOOLS OF NEW JERSEY, INC.

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 2/4/2016. (eaj)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JEFFREY CRANDALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW ROAD SCHOOLS OF NEW
JERSEY, INC.,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2800 (MLC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION

THE PLAINTIFF brought this action against the defendant employer, New Road
Schools of New Jersey, Inc. (“School”), to recover damages for alleged violations of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”). (See dkt. 1.) The School, which educates cognitively-disabled individuals,
moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
12(b)(6). (See dkt. 7; see also dkt. 9.) The plaintiff opposes the motion. (See dkt. 8.)
THE COURT presumes the familiarity of the parties with the factual context and
procedural history of the action. The Court will resolve the motion without oral
argument. See L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). The Court will deny the motion, but will direct the
plaintiff to file an amended complaint that fully comports with Rule 8(a), Rule 8(d), and
Rule 10(b).

THE PLAINTIFF alleged the following in the complaint (dkt. 1 at 2–4):
(1) “he is neurologically impaired” and “his movements are slower than usual” due
to his “neurological disability”, and thus he needs more time to do work assignments “as
an accommodation for his disability”;
(2) he “worked for [the School] for twelve years as a kitchen aid until he was
constructively terminated”, despite receiving no complaints about his work performance
before 2012;
(3) “[h]e was discriminated and retaliated against and ultimately constructively
terminated solely based on his neurological disability and defendant’s failure to properly
accommodate him”;
(4) starting in 2012, a new “direct supervisor . . . immediately put him under a
great scrutiny and unreasonably blamed him on every occasion when something went
wrong in the [S]chool’s kitchen”, and “kept repeating to [him] that he will never make it
in his job and humiliated him in front of the students and other kitchen staff”;
(5) the “constant harassment” and “constant yelling and scrutiny of his supervisor”
made him depressed and nervous, “thus making it very difficult for him to complete the
work on time”;
(6) when a third party named Janet Hirschfeld “tried to advocate on his behalf”, his
“work load was increased [in retaliation,] and from May 2014 his supervisor . . . began
constantly monitoring how long it took him to complete his work assignments”;

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(7) the supervisor “kept screaming at [him] and continued to humiliate him in front
of the students which caused his emotional breakdown in September 2014”, and he “had
to consult with a doctor who placed him on leave and prescribed anti-depressants”;
(8) the School’s “failure to accommodate [him] shows a complete lack of good
faith on [its] part solely based on disability as plaintiff can and did perform the essential
functions of his job during the twelve years he was employed”; and
(9) he was constructively terminated, which “was pretextual as [the School was]
aware of his disability, [and] his need for accommodation”, yet the School “refused to
accommodate him and ignored his complaints of discrimination and retaliation”.
IT IS NOT NECESSARY for the Court to restate the standard for resolving a
motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Green v. Coleman, 575 Fed.Appx. 44, 46
(3d Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard; citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009));
Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., 714 F.3d 761, 764–65 (3d Cir. 2013) (setting forth
standard; citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); Am. Corp. Soc. v.
Valley Forge Ins. Co., 424 Fed.Appx. 86, 88–89 (3d Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard;
citing Iqbal and Twombly); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209–12 (3d Cir.
2009) (setting forth standard; citing Iqbal and Twombly).
THE SCHOOL argues that the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because he:
(1) “alleges that he suffers from a neurological disability, but does not state what that
disability is, only that his movements are slower than usual and that he may require
additional time to complete his job assignments”; (2) “does not plead that he has a
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disability as it is defined under the ADA, but instead states in conclusory fashion that he
has a neurological impairment, which alone is insufficient”; and (3) “has not set forth
facts to establish that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA or
[NJ]LAD”. (Dkt. 7-2 at 2 & 6.)
THE SCHOOL’S ARGUMENTS in the context of a motion made pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) are without merit. The plaintiff’s allegations — e.g., he is neurologically
impaired; his slow movements are due to his neurological disability; he needs additional
time to complete job assignments; and he suffered an adverse result — are sufficient at
this stage. (See dkt. 8-1 at 1 (plaintiff personally certifies that he “ha[s] a neurological
disability” and “the majority of [his] education was at the [School]”).) See 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (listing “physical or mental impairment” that affects “performing manual tasks”
and “working”, and affects “neurological [and] brain . . . functions”); N.J.S.A. 10:5-5
(listing “any mental, psychological or developmental disability . . . resulting from
anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the
normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions”); see also Riley v. St. Mary Med. Ctr.,
No. 13-7205, 2014 WL 2207347, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 2014) (stating ADA’s “plain
language suggests that a Plaintiff need only plead that she was discriminated against
because of an impairment (either actual or perceived)”); id. at *4 (stating “fact that
Plaintiff is allegedly limited in . . . concentrating, communicating and thinking suggests
that she might be substantially limited in those major life activities”, and thus plaintiff
therein adequately pleaded a disability under ADA).
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THE PLAINTIFF has sufficiently pleaded at this stage that the School was aware
of his disability because he had: (1) been a student at the School, which is a “private
provider of specialized education services for children and youth, facing learning,
language and social challenges” (dkt. 8 at 6 & 10); and (2) previously been provided with
a reasonable accommodation to perform his job. The plaintiff’s claims for disability
discrimination under the ADA and the NJLAD are sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss. See Brown v. City of Long Branch, 380 Fed.Appx. 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2010)
(stating plaintiff properly alleged under ADA that he is disabled, otherwise qualified to
perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation by the
employer, and suffered adverse employment decision, and that NJLAD claims are
governed by same standards).
THE SCHOOL also argues that the plaintiff fails to allege that he was qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job at issue, with or without accommodation. (See
dkt. 7-2 at 7.) The argument is without merit. As this is a motion made under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court must credit the plaintiff’s allegations that he properly performed his
tasks at the School for twelve years before he faced the allegedly discriminatory conduct.
See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210–12.
THE SCHOOL argues that the plaintiff failed to allege that the School hired
someone else to perform his job, and thus argues that he failed to satisfy the requirements
for a claim under the NJLAD. (See dkt. 7-2 at 9.) That argument is without merit. Such
a showing is not necessarily required at this early stage of the litigation. See Shipe v.
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Saker ShopRites, No. A-5227-11T4, 2013 WL 3184736, at *9–11 (N.J. App. Div. June
25, 2013); Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Schs., 323 N.J.Super. 490, 502–03 (N.J.
App. Div. 1999).
THE SCHOOL alleges that the plaintiff’s claims concerning retaliation are murky
at best. (See dkt. 7-2 at 10 (concerning advocacy on the plaintiff’s behalf performed by
“Ms. Hirschfeld”).) The Court agrees that the retaliation claims are not a model of
clarity, but finds that they are sufficient at this stage of the litigation. The Court will deny
the motion insofar as it concerns the retaliation claims, but will order the plaintiff to
clarify those claims in an amended pleading.
THE SCHOOL defends its heavy reliance upon a particular district court opinion
that disposed of certain ADA claims and NJLAD claims in addressing a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 — as opposed to a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) — arguing that “this distinction is of no consequence.” (See dkt. 9 at 3
(discussing repeated citation in briefs filed in support of the motion of Santiago v. City of
Vineland, 107 F.Supp.2d 512 (D.N.J. 2000)).) The School’s reliance on Santiago,
however, is misplaced. “It is axiomatic that the standards for dismissing claims under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and granting judgment under . . . Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 are vastly
different”. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213. Indeed, a motion for summary judgment is reviewed
under a more stringent standard than a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if the Court believes that actual proof of the
facts alleged is improbable and that a recovery is unlikely. See id.; see also Watson v.
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Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 436 Fed.Appx. 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (comparing
burden-shifting analysis for summary judgment under Rule 56 with failure-to-state-claim
analysis for dismissal of complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)).
THE COURT acknowledges that it will be cumbersome for the School to
properly answer the allegations in the complaint due to the manner in which they have
been presented. For instance, several allegations are presented in unnumbered
paragraphs. (See, e.g., dkt. 1 at 2.) Furthermore, many of the paragraphs contain multiple
sentences concerning separate allegations. (See, e.g., id. at 3–4.) In addition, more
specific allegations may be required, as will be explained below. The Court will order the
plaintiff to file an amended complaint that comports with Rule 8(a), Rule 8(d), and Rule
10(b). The plaintiff may file an amended complaint without moving for leave to do so
before the Magistrate Judge.
THE PLAINTIFF must file an amended complaint that:
(1) presents each allegation as a separate sentence;
(2) numbers each allegation;
(3) states each cause of action that is based upon the violation of a specific statute
— e.g., the ADA and the NJLAD — in separate counts;1

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The plaintiff has grouped all of the ADA claims and the NJLAD claims under only one
count. (See dkt. 1 at 4–5.) That is unacceptable.

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(4) contains any allegations raised in his opposition brief that are currently missing
from the complaint concerning his history as a student at the School, his neurological
disability, and the diagnosis; and
(5) identifies who Janet Hirschfeld is.2
FOR GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, this Court will issue an appropriate order.

s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
Dated: February 4, 2016

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The plaintiff states in the opposition brief that “if this Court should find plaintiff’s
complaint requires amendment we would request leave for same.” (Dkt. 8 at 7.) But the plaintiff
failed to cross-move for leave to file an amended complaint, and thus failed to anticipate that this
Court might find the complaint to be inadequate. The better practice would have been for the
plaintiff to have indeed so cross-moved in acknowledgment of these potential shortcomings, and
thus this Court would have simply denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice and referred
the cross motion to the Magistrate Judge to work out a solution among the parties.

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